Law and courts

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Event

• Kurz ibn Jabir's detachment against the men of Bajila who killed Yasar

  c. 627 CE · c. 6 AHIbn Hisham tells it from a scholar, from Muhammad ibn Talha, from Uthman ibn Abd al-Rahman: in the raid on Muharib and Banu Tha'laba the Prophet acquired a slave named Yasar and put him in charge of his milch-camels grazing near al-Jamma'; a party of Qays Kubba of Bajila came to Medina, fell sick and their spleens swelled, so the Prophet told them to go out to the camels and drink their milk and urine; when they recovered they attacked Yasar, slaughtered him, drove thorns into his eyes and drove off the camels. The Prophet sent Kurz ibn Jabir after them; he caught them and brought them to the Prophet on his return from the Dhu Qarad raid, and he cut off their hands and feet and put out their eyes.

• Ibn Abi Hadrad's raid on Batn Idam and the killing of Amir ibn al-Adbat

  c. 629 CE · c. 8 AHA detachment the Prophet sent before the conquest of Mecca to Idam, with Abu Qatada and Muhallim ibn Jaththama among its men; Amir ibn al-Adbat al-Ashja'i passed them and gave the greeting of Islam, but Muhallim attacked and killed him over an old grudge and took his camel and goods; Ibn Abi Hadrad says Qur'an 4:94 was revealed about them. At Hunayn Uyayna ibn Hisn and al-Aqra' ibn Habis disputed the blood before the Prophet until blood-money was accepted, and the Prophet prayed three times: 'O God, do not forgive Muhallim'.

• Ali's judgment on the men who fell into a lion pit in Yemen

  631 CE · 10 AHWhile Ali was in Yemen, four men fell one upon another into a pit dug for a lion; the lion killed them, and their kin took up arms. Ali ruled that the first gets a quarter of the blood-money, the second a third, the third a half and the fourth the full diyya, and sent the parties to the Prophet when they refused.

• Ali's judgment on three men who lay with one woman in one purity

  631 CE · 10 AHThree men lay with one woman in the same purity period in Yemen. Ali asked two at a time whether they claimed the child, and when neither would, he drew lots and gave the child to the one the lot named, with two-thirds of the diyya. The Prophet laughed and approved; the book notes that the men's act may have been before their Islam.

• Umar's Friday sermon on the stoning verse and on Abu Bakr's pledge

  c. 12 June 632 CE · c. Rabi' I 11 AHOn the first Friday after the death Umar recalled a verse of stoning, which he said had been in God's book and had been recited, memorised and applied, and feared that someone might say there is no stoning in God's book; he then called the pledge to Abu Bakr a sudden act that God had averted the harm of, and said whoever pledges to a man without consultation has no pledge, nor has the one he pledged to.

• Ali's counsel in Umar's judgments

  between 634 and 644 CE · 13 AHDuring Umar's caliphate Ali repeatedly corrected or advised the judgments: he stopped the stoning of a woman with a mental affliction, asked Umar what authority he had over the unborn child of a confessing pregnant woman, showed by a test that a woman's claim of assault was false, and said that the innovated marriage should be returned to the Sunna. Umar is reported to have said that he sought refuge from a problem Abu al-Hasan could not solve.

• Ali appoints the sons of al-Abbas and Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr as governors

  between 656 and 661 CEAli gave the provinces to several sons of his cousin al-Abbas: Abdallah in Basra, Ubaydallah in Yemen and Bahrain, Qutham in Mecca and al-Ta'if, Tammam in Medina, and with them Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr, his step-son, in Egypt. The book sets this among a list of forty-one governors and holds that Ali and Uthman both appointed kin when their competence was clear, not for kinship alone.

• Ali flogs the poet al-Najashi al-Harithi for drinking wine in Ramadan

  between 656 and 661 CEAl-Najashi al-Harithi, a poet, drank wine in Ramadan; Ali flogged him eighty lashes and jailed him, then flogged him twenty more the next day, saying the lashes were for his defiance of God and breaking the fast. The book cites the case as an example of prison as ta'zir.

• Ali frees two men who each confessed to one killing and pays the diya from the treasury

  between 656 and 661 CETwo men each confessed to the same killing before Ali. Hasan's ruling was that the one who had killed had saved a life by confessing; Ali released both and paid the diya from the treasury. The book suggests the victim's heirs may have waived retaliation.

• Ali's rulings on the apostate and the zindiq, and the ways he killed them

  between 656 and 661 CEAli is reported to have said the apostate is asked to repent three times and then killed; the book gives two reports on the zindiq and two on women apostates. It lists the methods Ali used: the sword, beating to death, burning after killing (Mustawrid al-Ijli), and burning the Saba'iyya.

• Ali's judgment on a slap over a debased dirham in Kufa

  between 656 and 661 CEA man sold a sheep on the condition of no debased coin and gave one; the buyer returned it and was slapped by the seller. Ali, passing through the market, ruled that the slapper sit, let the slapped man choose between retaliation and pardon, then had the slapper carried on a man's back and beaten fifteen strokes, saying this was the punishment for violating the other man's sanctity.

• Ali's judgment: Shurahah flogged and stoned after confessing zina

  between 656 and 661 CEShurahah confessed to zina while pregnant; Ali flogged her a hundred lashes on Thursday and stoned her on Friday, saying stoning is the Prophet's sunna. The book notes that combining flogging with stoning is disputed among jurists.

• Ali's oversight of his governors: inspectors, complaints and discipline

  between 656 and 661 CEAli followed his governors through inspectors who questioned people about them, secret reports, an open door for every complaint, and written advice. When a charge against a governor was proven he jailed and whipped him with a rod, and on hearing a complaint he would say, 'O God, I did not order them to wrong Your creation or to leave Your right unpaid'.

• Al-Qadir's rescript imposing distinguishing dress on the dhimmis

  c. April 1038 CE · Rajab 429 AHAt the end of Rajab 429 the ashraf, qadis, witnesses, jurists and notables were assembled at Bayt al-Nawba, the Nestorian katholikos and the Jewish Ra's al-Jalut were summoned, and the caliph's rescript was read: recalling the bounds the Rashidun caliphs had laid on the dhimmis — distinction, humility and separateness from the Muslims — it ordered all dhimmis to alter their outward dress into what would mark them on sight, their neglect having let them assimilate to Muslim dress.

• The Shahanshah laqab controversy

  c. August 1038 CE · Ramadan 429 AHIn Ramadan 429 the laqabs 'Greatest Shahanshah, King of Kings' were proposed for Jalal al-Dawla and the caliph ordered the khutba with them; the crowd pelted the khatib with bricks and a fitna broke out. The jurists wrote opinions — al-Saymari and Abu'l-Tayyib al-Tabari permitting, al-Mawardi refusing — whereupon Jalal cut him off, then received him warmly on the feast day, telling him that only religion had moved him and that it had raised his standing in the king's heart.

Work

• The Prophet's written charge to Amr ibn Hazm on sending him to Yemen

  A written charge the Prophet gave Amr ibn Hazm when sending him to Banu al-Harith ibn Ka'b: fear God, take what is right, give good tidings, teach the Qur'an which none may touch but the pure, be gentle in right and severe against wrong, teach the rites of the greater hajj and the lesser (the umra), forbid praying in one small garment, sitting wrapped with the private parts exposed, braiding the hair at the nape, and tribal rallying-cries in strife; order full ablution, the five prayers at their times, Friday and its bath, the fifth of booty and the sadaqa rates on crops, camels, cattle and sheep, with the rule for Jews and Christians who convert and for those who keep their faith and owe a full dinar per adult or its value in cloth.

• The hadith of the five afflictions

  Words of the Prophet to the Muhajirun transmitted by Abdullah ibn Umar in the account of Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf's dispatch: five things he sought refuge from befalling them: open indecency bringing plague, short measure bringing famine and tyranny, withheld zakat bringing drought, broken covenants bringing an outside enemy, and rulers not judging by God's book bringing internal strife.

Person

• Abd al-Rahman ibn Ziyad ibn An'am

  694 CE · 75 AHThe scholar, traditionist and judge Abu Khalid Abd al-Rahman ibn Ziyad ibn An'am al-Mu'afiri al-Sha'bani, known in the African East; he transmitted hadith and held judicial office.

• Abu'l-Sa'ib 'Utba al-Hamadhani

  c. 877 CE · 264 AHAbu'l-Sa'ib 'Utba b. 'Ubayd Allah al-Hamadhani (264–350), chief qadi of Baghdad: drawn first to Sufism and the people of zuhd, he left home, met the scholars, occupied himself with understanding the Qur'an, wrote hadith and took Shafi'i fiqh; Ibn Abi'l-Saj made him judge of Maragha and all Azerbaijan, then Hamadan, then he held the great offices of Kufa, Diyar Mudar, Ahwaz and a share of the Sawad, until the chief qadiship in Rajab 338; he died Rabi' II 350 and was buried in his house at Suq Yahya.

• Abu Muhammad Abd Allah al-Asili

  936 CE · 324 AHThe Maliki traditionist, jurist and judge Abu Muhammad Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim al-Asili of al-Andalus, one of the leading transmitters and jurists of his time; he grew up at Asila near Tangier before returning to al-Andalus.

• Abu 'Ali al-Tabari, author of al-Muharrar

  Al-Husayn b. al-Qasim Abu 'Ali al-Tabari the Shafi'i jurist (d. 350); he studied under Abu 'Ali b. Abi Hurayra, excelled and settled at Baghdad, and composed al-Muharrar — the first book ever written on legal divergence — plus al-Ifsah on the madhhab, a book on jadal and one on usul al-fiqh; he died at Baghdad in 350.

• Ibn al-Tabari al-Marwazi

  Ahmad b. al-Husayn Abu Hamid al-Marwazi, known as Ibn al-Tabari (d. 377): son of a Hamadani father, he trained in Baghdad under Abu'l-Hasan al-Karkhi in Abu Hanifa's school, returned to Khurasan as its chief qadi, composed books and a chronicle, then re-entered Baghdad in old age to transmit — taken up by al-Daraqutni and certified by al-Barqani; he died at Marw in Safar 377, some say 373.

• Al-Khalil ibn Ahmad the qadi

  Al-Khalil b. Ahmad the qadi (d. 378), shaykh of the Hanafis in his time — foremost in fiqh and preaching; he heard hadith from Muhammad b. Ishaq b. Khuzayma and his peers and in Iraq from al-Baghawi and Ibn al-Sa'id and theirs; he died Jumada II 378.

• أبو عبد الله الحسن بن حامد الوراق الحنبلي

• Abu al-Asbagh Isa ibn Sahl

  1022 CE · 413 AHThe Maliki jurist and judge Abu al-Asbagh Isa ibn Sahl al-Asadi of Cordoba, known for his responsa on new cases; early biographers praised the breadth of his learning.

• Taj al-Din 'Abd al-Wahhab ibn 'Arabshah

  between 1410 and 1411 CE · 813 AHSon of the historian Ibn 'Arabshah, b. 813 — rose from a professional witness ('utter cunning in the craft of testimony') and poverty to wealth and rank, composed a large verse work on Hanafi doctrine, was chief qadi of Damascus Rajab 884–Shawwal 895, then held the Sarghitmishiyya shaykhate in Cairo until his death 15 Rajab 901.

• Shihab al-Din Ibn 'Ubba al-Maqdisi

  c. January 1429 CE · 12 Rabi' I 831 AHJerusalem's qadi, b. 831 — tried over the Qumama, the famous church whose demolition Qaytbay punished him, the scholar Burhan al-Ansari and others for, some beaten in the sultan's presence; exiled to Damascus he preached and reminded the people; his verse to a water-wheel survives: 'Na'ura, I told her — cut short your groaning; / this is provision for a grieving heart'; d. Damascus, night of Saturday 3 Jumada I 905, buried north of Bab al-Saghir.

• Burhan al-Din Ibn Abi Sharif al-Maqdisi

  between 1429 and 1430 CE · 833 AHShaykh mashayikh al-Islam, 'the recourse of elite and commoner' — b. Jerusalem 833; Egypt's chief qadi 906–910, then shaykh of the Ghuriyya qubba until 919, when he ruled that a coerced adultery confession could be retracted: al-Ghuri had the pair beaten to death and hanged at his door, dismissing him and all four chief judges. He withdrew home, living off a Jerusalem soap-factory, and 'people said all that befell al-Ghuri was by the shaykh's secret'. Author of the four-volume Sharh al-Minhaj; died dawn Friday 2 Muharram 923, buried beside Imam al-Shafi'i.

• Shams al-Din Ibn Jama'a al-Kinani

  c. November 1429 CE · Safar 833 AHThird-generation Jerusalem chief qadi, b. Safar 833 — licensed to give fatwa by Taqi al-Din Ibn Qadi Shuhba, held in Safar 872 the combined offices of chief qadi, Salahiyya teacher and Aqsa preacher without ever taking an unlawful dirham; dismissed under al-'Aziz al-Kinani he withdrew into his house in the Aqsa compound; works include al-Najm al-Lami' on Jami' al-Jawami', volume-length ta'liqs on the Rawda and Minhaj, and al-Durr al-Nazim on the tale of Musa; d. ~901 at Jerusalem.

• al-Burhan Ibn 'Awn the Hanafi

  between 1432 and 1433 CE · 836 AHDamascus's Hanafi mufti (b. 836) — pupil of al-Sa'di and al-Bakri, audited al-Sakhawi, and 'drew from the manners of our shaykh Ibn Qiddis his dignity and some of his virtues' through long companionship; buried before Bab al-Faradis, d. 916.

• Taqi al-Din Ibn Qadi 'Ajlun

  c. January 1438 CE · Sha'ban 841 AHShaykh al-Islam of Damascus — b. Sha'ban 841, 'the most juridical of his age', riyasa of the Shafi'is 'not in Syria alone but in other lands of Islam'; he boycotted al-Biqa'i over the anti-Ghazali/anti-Ibn-'Arabi tract; under al-Ghuri he was hauled to Cairo and fined until he sold most of his books — then his fatwa prevailed and the razed turba was rebuilt. Died Monday 11 Ramadan [928], Bab al-Saghir.

• Shihab al-Din Ibn al-Furfur

  c. December 1448 CE · Shawwal 852 AH'Seal of the world's dignitaries and sultan of jurists and chiefs' per al-Hamawi — b. mid-Shawwal 852, Damascus's Shafi'i chief qadi who was then granted the Cairo chief-judgeship together with it; d. 911.

• al-Dalji al-'Uthmani

  c. 1456 CE · 860 AHThe Shafi'i of Dalja — b. 860; after Cairo he lived thirty years in Damascus studying under al-Biqa'i, Burhan al-Din al-Naji and al-Sakhawi, met Sultan Bayezid in Rum, then returned to Cairo; works: sharhs of the Khazrajiyya, the Arba'in, the Shifa' and the Munfarija, plus Maqasid al-Maqasid with his own sharh; al-Ghayti heard much from him.

• Qutb al-Din ibn Sultan

  c. 24 November 1465 CE · 12 Rabi' I 870 AHShaykh al-Islam, mufti of Syria — b. eve of 12 Rabi' I 870; Egypt's qadi under al-Ghuri as Ibn al-Shihna's deputy, then blind with eyes still seeming to see; 'nafidh al-kalima' with the state, seal-engraver of his own fatwas against forgery, author of the coffee-prohibition tract, an anti-opium risala, and al-Barq al-Lami' against mosque dancing; died Tuesday eve 17 Dhu'l-Qa'da [950], buried in the Qalandariyya turba.

• al-Tanbadhawi al-Bakri al-Siddiqi

  c. 1466 CE · c. 870 AHZabid's riyasa of fatwa and teaching — 'the sun among his generation's stars', fierce for truth; Ibn Ziyad's own teacher (who told him 'you have one of the Muzjaj's profit, we have his glance and his tongue'); he skimmed both huge volumes of the Idah in a single night writing three notebooks of notes — 'a breach of the norm'; works: the relied-upon Zabid fatawa, Sharh al-Tanbih in four volumes, a gloss on al-'Ubab.

• al-Tayyib al-Makhrama al-'Adani

  c. 8 January 1466 CE · 12 Rabi' II 870 AHAden's mufti — b. Sunday eve 12 Rabi' II 870, 'the soundest mind, the brightest spark' of the city: 'I teach fourteen sciences', author of a sharh of Sahih Muslim, Asma' Rijal Muslim, and a long history ordered by tabaqat from the first hijra year; died 6 Muharram [947], buried in Shaykh Jawhar's qubba.

• 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Ziyad, mufti of Zabid

  c. July 1494 CE · Rajab 900 AHZabid's blind mufti — 'a Shafi'i in branches, a Yafi'i in Sufism, an Ash'ari in creed'; Tanbadhawi's own pupil who taught and gave fatwas from 948; in 964 a film fell over his eyes — 'welcome, gift of God' — and he refused the surgeon: 'what God clothed me in, I shall not remove'; his works include the famous quarrel-books with Ibn Hajar al-Haytami on debtor-gifts, the raised-hands proof, the aloud-basmala tract and the singing rulings; died Zabid Sunday eve 11 Rajab [975].

• Molla Hasan al-Samuni

  In the service of Molla Khosrow he acquired 'all the sciences, root and branch, rational and legal'; teacher in the madrasas then one of the Eight, tutor to Mehmed II, judge of the victorious army then qadi of Constantinople — of upright conduct and sound nature, scrupulous, a prolific copyist; d. 901.

• Muslih al-Din al-Qastallani al-Rumi

  One of Mehmed II's Eight Madrasas teachers — he claimed he could deliver three lessons a day in each of all eight; thrice qadi of Bursa, of Edirne and of Constantinople, then qadi al-'askar, so plain-spoken that vizier Muhammad Pasha al-Qaramani had the office split in two to curb him; Bayezid II pensioned him off at a hundred dirhams a day; al-Ghazzi notes he took hashish daily yet was so quick he read Ibn Sina's Shifa' in a few nights; wrote glosses on Sharh al-'Aqa'id, a treatise on seven difficulties, and glosses on Sadr al-Shari'a's Four Muqaddimat answering Molla 'Ali al-'Arabi; d. 901, buried beside Abu Ayyub.

• Ghars al-Din Khalil al-Faradisi

  The Hanbali of Bab al-Faradis — after Qur'an he read the Muharrar to Majd al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and attached himself to qadi Nasir al-Din Ibn Zurayq, then turned to witness-work and administering the Abu 'Umar madrasa's endowments; Ibn Tulun held his ijaza. He died in the prison of Qurtubay the Red, commander-in-chief at Damascus, in 904.

• Ibn Hajar al-Haytami

  c. December 1503 CE · Rajab 909 AHIbn Hajar al-Haytami — b. Rajab 909 at Abu al-Haytham in Gharbiyya, orphaned young and fostered by Ibn Abi al-Jamayil and al-Shinnawi, licensed to teach before twenty; from 940 a Meccan mujawir teaching, issuing fatwas and writing: Sharh al-Mishkat, Sharh al-Minhaj, al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqa, Kaff al-Ri'a', al-Zawajir; 'shaykh al-Islam, seal of the scholars, imam of the two Harams'; died at Mecca in Rajab 973, buried at Ma'la.

• Burhan al-Husayni, naqib of Damascus

  Damascus's naqib al-ashraf — when an official sought to jail him, Sultan Qaytbay freed him, and his word was undone with a ring 'for shackles are not for the necks of the Prophet's house'; he judged and deputized repeatedly and rode the mahmal on the 919 hajj.

• Shihab al-Din Ibn al-'Askari

  Damascus's Hanbali mufti — 'no peer in his age for learning, humility and Salafi-style austerity', a recluse who annotated fatwas; his fiqh book combining al-Muqni' and al-Tanqih was unfinished when he died in Dhu'l-Hijja 912.

• Ibrahim al-Damiri, the Maliki chief qadi

  Cairo's Maliki chief qadi — he had preached forcibly before Sultan al-Ghuri one Monday night in Ramadan, then died Wednesday 13 Ramadan 913; al-Ghuri led his funeral prayer.

• Burhan al-Din Ibn Muflih, the mufti

  Damascus's Hanbali mufti — Ibn al-Shihna: 'a master of learning in Iraq, prolific in it'; d. Sunday 16 Sha'ban 917 at Mayda'a.

• 'Ali al-Qitali-zade, the poet-qadi

  c. 1512 CE · 918 AHMolla 'Ali al-Qitali-zade — b. 918, 'one of the excellent poet-courtier qadis'; author of a tract on the mashbab punishment, poet of 'al-Tarid ila'llah'; killed by a poisoned draught said to be given by his wife at Antioch, died 7 Ramadan 979.

• 'Abd al-Barr Ibn al-Shihna

  Aleppo's qadi, transferred to Cairo's Hanafi bench — one of Sultan al-Ghuri's boon-companions until a poet satirized him for it; 'a lover of learning and learned men'; d. 921.

• Ahmad al-Manufi al-Maliki

  The model qadi of Minuf — per al-Manawi's Nafa'is, an imam of piety; jurist of Minuf for thirty-three years in which no injustice struck it and 'no widow rose bereaved'; appointed Cairo's qadi but death took him before he could sit; died Friday eve, end of Dhu'l-Hijja 921.

• Ibn al-Samdisi

  Cairo deputy qadi whose house sheltered students; d. Monday 16 Jumada I 922.

• Ahmad Pasha ibn Khidr Beg

  Khidr Beg's son — 'my grandfather recounted he was a man people and the poor sought out for his forbearance, generosity and warm response'; climbed Bursa's madrasas to become its mufti, known in his day simply as 'Molla Ahmad Pasha', and endowed several awqaf; d. 933.

• Isma'il al-Nabulsi, mufti of Damascus

  c. 1530 CE · 937 AHBadr al-Din Isma'il al-Nabulsi — Damascus's mufti and teacher at the Zahiriyya; orphaned, teaching at sixteen, a teacher's man of 'ulus and furu' who kept students housed on his roof and took no illicit fee; author of a sharh on al-'Aqida al-Nasafiyya and al-Mustaqsa fi'l-khilaf; dismissed by Murad Beg in 993 and died Saturday 13 Muharram 993.

• Ibn Kamal Pasha

  Ibn Kamal Pasha — 'the unique, verifying polymath'; his grandfather an Ottoman amir, he began in the army until the sight of the shabby Molla Lutfi outranking a great amir ('the learned are honoured for their learning') turned him to scholarship; mufti of Constantinople after 'Ali al-Jamali until his death. Near a hundred rasail on knotty questions, a nearly finished tafsir, glosses on the Kashshaf, Hidaya, Miftah, Talwih and Khwaja-zada's Tahafut; d. 940.

• Qara Ughli, qadi of Damascus

  The freedman of Ibrahim al-Amasi who became qadi of Damascus in 940 — a lover of Sufis and scholars who proclaimed that no woman or girl go out to the markets; 'of handsome grey hair, sound doctrine, literate and wise' — though 'hands above his hand' curbed his word's reach; died Tuesday 11 Dhu'l-Hijja [941] in office, Bab al-Saghir beside Sidi Bilal.

• Badi' ibn al-Diya, qadi of Mecca

  Mecca's qadi and shaykh of the Haram — at Damascus in 941 he attended Shaykh 'Ali al-Kizwani's mawlid opposite the 'Afif mosque and drank with him 'the coffee made of bunn — and I do not know that it was drunk in our country, Damascus, before that' (Ibn Tulun's notice); reappointed qadi of Jeddah in Rum, died at Bitlis.

• Sa'di Chalabi

  Sa'di Chalabi — Kastamonu-born, trained in Constantinople to al-Samuni's service; Mahmud Pasha madrasa, then the Sultaniyya of Bursa, qadi of Constantinople, then long-serving mufti; 'superior to his peers, short on words, prompt to the right answer' — glosses on Baydawi's tafsir circulating among scholars, a short Hidaya sharh, a house for Qur'an readers beside his own; died at Friday prayer on the second day of 'Id al-Fitr [945] of gout, Jawizade succeeding him as mufti.

• Shams al-Din al-Tunisi 'Maghwash'

  Maghwash — qadi 'askar of Tunis, honoured by Sulayman at Constantinople where even the qadi 'askars studied under him and he dictated sessions on al-Ja'bari's Shatibiyya sharh; departing for Egypt he taught at Aleppo (Ibn al-Hanbali among his pupils) and Damascus (al-Taybi licensed by him in qira'at) — 'from the marvels of the world': he read everything from memory and owned no book nor paper; died late Sha'ban [947] in Cairo, buried beside Imam al-Shafi'i.

• Molla Muhammad Bik

  Bayezid's mamluk who left the amirate for scholarship — served Ibn Kamal Pasha as his repetitor; after a bout of madness he sailed for Egypt, was captured by Christians at sea and ransomed by friends; Sulayman gave him Bursa's Sultaniyya, Edirne's Bayezid Khan madrasa, then Damascus's qadiship (946–949); appointed qadi of Egypt while ill, death caught him on the winter road at Kutahya.

• Sa'd ibn al-Dayl

  The trilingual poet-jurist of the Mardaniyya — Aleppo deputy qadi who settled at Damascus's Sumaysatiyya khanqah composing in Arabic, Turkish and Persian; found cast dead on the khanqah doorstep beneath his cell window, thumbs bound, strangled, no killer known — end of Safar 953, in his seventies.

• Musa al-Hajjawi

  Musa al-Hajjawi — Hanbali mufti and shaykh al-Islam of Damascus, author of al-Iqna', the distilled sound of Ahmad's madhhab — 'no one composed its like for verified transmissions and multitude of issues'; also Sharh al-Mufarradat, Zad al-Mustaqni' and a gloss on al-Furu'; died Thursday 22 Rabi' I [960], buried below the Rawda.

• Shams al-Din al-Ja'fari al-Tabrizi, qadi of Damascus

  Qadi al-qudat Shams al-Din al-Ja'fari — sadr of Tabriz who rose through the Ottoman madrasas to the Eight; qadi of Aleppo in 949 then of Damascus in 952, where with Qutb b. Sultan and Yunus al-'Uthawi he proclaimed coffee abolished and obtained Sulayman's sultanic order of Shawwal 953 — the first coffee ban at Damascus; he dyed his two locks and beard black; died at Constantinople.

• Dada Khalifa, mufti of Aleppo

  Dada Khalifa — the tanner who became Aleppo's first Ottoman mufti and first teacher of the Khidr Pasha madrasa; 'were I given this house's worth of rubies I would not deviate from the law a span'; tracts on bayt al-mal revenues and on the prohibition of hashish and banj.

• Ibn Nujaym

  Ibn Nujaym — 'the sea, the savant, unique of his age, seal of the verifiers and muftis'; pupil of Qasim b. Qutlubugha and al-Karaki; al-Bahr al-Ra'iq sharh of Kanz al-Daqa'iq, al-Ashbah wa'l-Naza'ir, Sharh al-Manar, Lubb al-Usul, the thousand-rule Fawa'id al-Zayniyya; died Wednesday of Rajab 970.

• Taj al-Din al-Hamadani

  Taj al-Din al-Hamadani — the Hanafi who compiled his sixteen-point refutation of Ibn Kamal Pasha's Sadr al-Shari'a sharh into a risala and delivered copies to vizier Muhammad Pasha and the grand vizier Rustam Pasha, who 'changed utterly' when he read the denunciation; later teacher then mufti of Amasya, 'sea of knowledge, fathom of the sciences'; also a Miftah gloss refuting Ibn Kamal's claimed unique points and a sharh of the Mir'ah.

• Molla Bistan, qadi 'askar of Rumeli and Anatolia

  Molla Bistan — one of the few to hold the qadi-'askar office of both Rumeli and Anatolia (~11 months, the two posts then four qadis); teacher of Sa'd al-Din; died in Ramadan's last ten days 977, buried at Edirne.

• 'Ata' Allah, Sultan Selim II's teacher

  Molla 'Ata' Allah al-Konari — madrasa teacher at Iznik then Edirne, up the dar ladder to the eighty, then qadi 'askar, and teacher of Sultan Selim b. Sulayman while he reigned; died at the start of Safar 979.

• Hamid Afandi, mufti of the Sultanic seat

  Molla Hamid Afandi — Abu al-Su'ud's successor as mufti of the Sultanic seat; 'among the excellent men of letters, lavish in alms, fierce for the right,' chronically ill until he died at the start of Sha'ban 985.

• Jiwi-zade, mufti of the Sultanic seat

  Jiwi-zade — 'best of the Ottoman qadis, most upright and chaste of conduct'; Damascus's qadi 977, then Egypt, qadi 'askar, finally mufti of the Sultanic seat; he cut Damascus's deed-fees, took no gift, and on leaving had a herald proclaim at the Umayyad mosque that anyone wronged should claim redress — the people wept and prayed for him; died Thursday eve 6 Jumada II 995 still mufti.

• Molla Asad al-Shirazi, Shafi'i mufti of Damascus

  Molla Asad al-Shirazi — the Persian Shafi'i mufti of Damascus after al-Nabulsi; arrived 964 with munshi Shah Quli, lived in Shaykh Ruslan's mosque in zuhd and seclusion, never eating waqf food or taking gifts; handsome and awe-inspiring; died Jumada II 998.

• Abd al-Khaliq al-Wabari

  Abd al-Khaliq ibn Abd al-Hamid ibn Abd Allah, Abu al-Fadl, al-Wabari al-Khwarazmi, a blind Hanafi jurist, legal theorist and man of letters. Ibn al-Shi'ar, quoted in the book, describes him as one of the leaders and imams of the companions of Abu Hanifa, responsible for fatwas and teaching in Khwarazm. Dates are not given.

• Abd al-Rahman al-Haik al-Tatwani, Maliki jurist

  Abd al-Rahman al-Haik, Abu Zayd, of Tetouan, a careful jurist. He studied with Shaykh al-Tawdi, Shaykh al-Banani and Shaykh Jasus, and taught Shaykh al-Rahuni and Shaykh al-Mamun Ijlal al-Hasani, judge of Tetouan. The entry says he was alive in 1220 AH and attributes to him Fatawa Ghayat fi al-Tahrir.

• Abd al-Rahman ibn Muadh (Companion)

  Abd al-Rahman ibn Muadh ibn Uthman ibn Amr ibn Kab, of the Quraysh (Taym); al-Bukhari and others say he was a Companion. A report from him describes the Prophet's address at Mina, and Ibn Sa'd counts him among those who witnessed the conquest of Mecca.

• Abu Bakr al-Baydawi al-Shafii (Muhammad ibn Ahmad), judge and jurist

  Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn al-Abbas, Abu Bakr al-Baydawi al-Farisi, a Shafii judge, jurist and man of letters; the entry gives his death as 468 AH. His works include al-Tabsira on the branches of fiqh, al-Adilla on the causes of the Tabsira's rulings, al-Tadhkira on its problems, and al-Irshad on the Kifaya of al-Sayməri.

• Abu Zakariya al-Sarraj (Yahya ibn Ahmad), Andalusian-Fasi jurist

  Abu Zakariya Yahya ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Sarraj, an Andalusian of Fez, a jurist, traditionist, memoriser, philologist and poet; the entry gives his death as 805 AH. He studied with Abu al-Barakat ibn al-Hajj al-Balfiqi, 'Abd al-Nur and Ibn Abbad, among others, headed the study of hadith in his time, and wrote a catalogue of his teachers and books.

• Ahmad ibn Umar ibn Hilal

  Ahmad ibn Umar ibn Hilal, Abu al-Abbas, chief judge, a jurist and judge learned in many fields. He studied law with Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Mukhallada and with others, and his works include a commentary on Ibn al-Hajib's lesser work and a commentary on the Qur'an verse of the Throne. The book gives his death as 795 AH.

• Al-Mutayti, Ali ibn Abd Allah, Maliki notary-jurist and judge

  Ali ibn Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim ibn Muhammad, Abu al-Hasan, al-Ansari al-Maliki al-Mutayti, from the village of Mutayta near al-Jazira al-Khadra; a jurist and judge who held the judgeship of Shari'sh; the entry gives his death as 570 AH. His work is al-Nihaya wa-l-Tamam on documents and judgements.

• Al-Qasim ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Masudi, judge of Kufa

  Al-Qasim ibn Abd al-Rahman ibn Abd Allah ibn Mas'ud, Abu Abd al-Rahman, al-Mas'udi of Kufa and its judge; the entry gives his death as 120 AH. He narrated from his father, Ibn Umar, Jabir ibn Samura and Masruq, and held the judgeship of Kufa taking no pay for it.

• Al-Tasuli, Ali ibn Abd al-Salam (Maliki jurist)

  Ali ibn Abd al-Salam, Abu al-Hasan al-Tasuli, a Maliki jurist; the entry gives his death as 1258 AH. His works include al-Bahja, a commentary on the Tuhfa in Maliki furu', a gloss on al-Zaqaqiya, and a commentary on al-Shamil.

• Ali al-Tarabulusi

  Ali ibn Khalil, Ala al-Din Abu al-Hasan al-Tarabulusi al-Hanafi: a jurist who held the judgeship in Jerusalem. His Mu'in al-Hukkam on judicial rulings in disputes between two parties, written on the Hanafi school's view of judging, is his known work. The book gives his death as 844 AH.

• Ali ibn Muhammad al-Simnani

  Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad, Abu al-Qasim, al-Halabi al-Hanafi al-Simnani, named after Saman, a town in Qumis between Damghan and Khuwar al-Rayy. A Hanafi jurist and historian, he studied law with the chief judge Abu Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Ali al-Damghani and studied theology and legal theory with Abu Ali Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn al-Walid. His works include Rawdat al-qudat wa-tariq al-najat on the duties of judges, and al-Urwa al-wuthqa on contracts and conditions. The book gives his death as 499 AH.

• Ali ibn Musa ibn Harun

  Ali ibn Musa ibn Harun, Abu al-Hasan, known as Ibn Harun, a Maliki jurist, mufti and expert in inheritance. He studied with Ibn Ghazi for about twenty-nine years, and with al-Wansharisi and al-Miknasi. Abd al-Wahid al-Wansharisi and Abd al-Wahhab al-Zaqqaq studied with him. The book gives his death as 951 AH.

• Ali ibn Rabi'ah ibn Nadla al-Kufi (transmitter)

  Ali ibn Rabi'ah ibn Nadla, Abu al-Mughira, of Kufa, of the clan of Bajila. He narrated from Ali ibn Abi Talib, al-Mughira ibn Shu'ba and Samura ibn Jundub, and from him al-Hakam ibn Utba and Abu Ishaq al-Sabi'i, among others; Ibn Ma'in, al-Nasa'i and al-Ijli rated him reliable.

• Amir Badshah (Muhammad Amin ibn Mahmud al-Bukhari), exegete and usuli

  Muhammad Amin ibn Mahmud al-Bukhari, known as Amir Badshah, an exegete and a scholar of usul al-fiqh; the entry gives his death as 987 AH. His works include Taysir al-Tahrir, a commentary on the sura of Victory, a treatise that a pilgrimage accepted removes sins, and a treatise on the particle qad.

• Ibrahim al-Tarabulusi (Burhan al-Din, Hanafi jurist)

  Ibrahim ibn Musa ibn Abi Bakr, Burhan al-Din al-Tarabulusi, a Hanafi jurist. Born in Tripoli of the Levant, he studied at Damascus with several masters, then moved to Cairo and died there. His works include al-Isʿaf on the rules of endowments, Mawahib al-Rahman in the school of al-Nu'man, and its commentary called al-Burhan.

• Ibrahim ibn Qasim al-Uqbani

  Ibrahim ibn Qasim ibn Sa'id ibn Muhammad, Abu Salim al-Uqbani al-Tilimsani, a Maliki jurist, judge, mufti and memoriser, who held the judgeship of Tlemcen. Ahmad al-Wansharisi studied with him, and al-Mazari quoted his responsa. The book gives his death as 880 AH.

• Muhammad ibn al-Uqbani

  Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Qasim ibn Sa'id, Abu Abd Allah al-Uqbani al-Tilimsani: a jurist of Tlemcen who held the judgeship of the congregation there. His book Tuhfat al-Nazir wa Ghunyat al-Dhakir on guarding the rites and changing what is wrong treats enjoining good and forbidding evil. The book gives his death as 871 AH.

• Muhammad Ibrahim al-Maydani al-Darir, Hanafi jurist of Nishapur

  Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, Abu Bakr, the blind al-Maydani (from Maydan in Nishapur). al-Dhahabi calls him one of the imams of the Hanafis, and al-Lucknawi says he was a great shaykh who knew the school as few did. He narrated from Abu Muhammad al-Muzani, and Maymun ibn Ali al-Maymuni narrated from him; he held disputations with Ahmad ibn Nasr al-Ayyashi, brother of Abu Bakr al-Ayyashi.

• Musa ibn Ishaq al-Ansari

  An Ansari judge. Al-Mas'udi reports that he died in al-Muqtadir's reign in 297 AH, was buried on the east bank, and was among the scholars of hadith and senior transmitters.

• Najm al-A'imma al-Bari'i

  Najm al-A'imma al-Bari'i: a learned jurist and preacher, whose title Bari' (excelling) is given to one who excels in a field of learning. He died at Jurjaniyya in Khwarazm in 645 AH, according to the book.

• Qawam al-Din al-Kaki

  Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Sinjari al-Khujandi, known as Qawam al-Din al-Kaki: a Hanafi jurist and legal theorist. He studied with Ala al-Din Abd al-Aziz al-Bukhari, reading al-Hidaya with him, and with Husam al-Din Hasan al-Sighnaqi. He reached Cairo and then taught and issued fatwas at the Mosque of Mardin until his death in 749 AH. Works attributed to him include Mi'raj al-Dirayat (a commentary on al-Hidaya) and Jami al-Asrar (a commentary on al-Manar).

• Sa'id ibn Muzahim al-Umawi (transmitter, client of Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz)

  Sa'id ibn Muzahim ibn Abi Muzahim al-Umawi, a client of Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz. He narrated from his father, and Qutayba ibn Sa'id narrated from him; the entry notes one hadith for him.

• Ibn Ma'ruf the chief qadi

  Ibn Ma'ruf, chief qadi of Baghdad in al-Ta'i''s later years: appointed to the chief qadiship in Sha'ban 360 after Abu Bakr b. Sayyar was dismissed; on Monday 26 Safar 369 'Adud al-Dawla had him seized and sent to the castle at Fars, giving the office to Abu Sa'd Bishr b. al-Husayn; he was charged with neglecting 'Adud's due and with laxity unbecoming the qadis, and his answer went unheeded.

• Yahya ibn Umar Munqari-zadah

  Yahya ibn Umar al-Ala'i al-Rumi, known as Munqari-zadah, a Turkish judge and exegete with some other learning, who wrote in Arabic and was styled Shaykh al-Islam. He studied the sciences in Anatolia with its senior scholars, among them Abd al-Rahim al-Mufti. He was appointed judge of Egypt in 1064 AH, then judge of Mecca, where he taught the commentary of al-Baydawi at the Sulaymaniyya madrasa. Later he held the judgeship of Constantinople and of the army, and in 1073 AH he was moved to the post of mufti. His works include a gloss on al-Baydawi's Anwar al-tanzil and treatises on listening and on the clear epistle. The book gives his death as 1088 AH.

Concept

• Ahliyya (legal capacity: to have rights and duties, and to act; its stages from the womb to full maturity, and what impairs it)

  Ahliyya is lexically suitability, and it is of two kinds: capacity to have rights and duties, the capacity of liability; and capacity to act, that is to perform acts recognised by the law. Its bearer passes through the stages of the foetus, childhood, discernment, puberty and maturity. Liability is complete from birth and incomplete for the foetus; the capacity to act is partial at discernment and full with puberty and reason. It is affected by heavenly impediments such as madness, imbecility, sleep, fainting, illness, slavery, menstruation, childbirth and death, and by acquired ones such as ignorance, drunkenness, jest, folly, travel, error and coercion.

• Democracy and the Sharia — compatibility and conflict

  The 'Al-Wasatiyya' episode on democracy and Islam. The audience voted: 16% saw it conflicting with the sharia, 42% saw no conflict, 42% partial conflict. On the Islamists' record in it: 40% successful, 60% failed. Azzam al-Tamimi distilled the issue by splitting democracy into a procedural arm (elections, oversight, rights — unproblematic for the panel) and a philosophical legislative arm (the real dispute), insisting no recognised Western philosopher makes secularism a prerequisite of democracy.

• Fatwa on the satellite channels — its benefit and harm

  The 'Al-Wasatiyya' episode on satellite fatwa programmes, no longer private to the questioner but heard by millions. The youth voted on why people turn to them: ease of access first, 35% to reach the most-learned, 20% for less-strict answers; on whom to ask: 43% the country's scholars, only 15% satellite scholars, 42% fiqh bodies and academies; and on the solution: 39% for one option, 31% for restricting to collective fatwa over individual ijtihad.

• Secularism and Islam — conflict or concord

  The 'Al-Wasatiyya' episode on secularism and Islam. The studio youth voted: 43% could define secularism, 57% could not; on its spread in the Arab world: 24% weak, 42% medium, the rest strong; on whether the two can meet: 65% judged the equation impossible, a third possible. Panelists distinguished a minimum level (separating religion from politics) from a maximum (separating it from all of life), and Omar al-Shobaki showed secularism is not one model: the French (laïcité) bars every religious symbol in public institutions, the Anglo-Saxon permits personal observance but not state adoption, and the Turkish was the harshest in practice.

• Stoning (rajm) as a penalty for zina

  Al-Sha'rawi affirms stoning for a married offender on the basis of the Prophet's practice: he stoned Ma'iz, al-Ghamidiyya, and a Jewish man and woman. He holds that a practice is a text stronger than an argument from the apparent wording of 'muhsanat', and that a slave woman's penalty, being half, cannot apply to stoning. He reports the Kharijite view that the Qur'an contains no stoning and that 'muhsanat' means married women, and answers it.

• Allusion to a proposal during the waiting period

  In his commentary on verse 235, Sha'rawi holds that allusion to a proposal to a woman in her waiting period is allowed, while open declaration and a secret promise are forbidden, and that the firm resolve to marry may not be made until the waiting period ends. He reads the contract as passing through three stages: allusion, resolve, and the contract.

• Aman (safe-conduct granted to enemies in war)

  Aman in the lexical sense is the absence of expected harm; in the technical sense it is lifting the lawful killing, enslavement and seizure of property of an enemy in war, while he remains under Islamic rule. It differs from truce and from the poll-tax, which only the imam may grant, and the poll-tax is permanent while aman is not binding. It is made by any clear or implied word, by writing or by a clear sign, and it may be given by the imam or by an individual Muslim; most jurists require Islam, sanity and adulthood in the giver.

• Amana (trust, deposit and what is entrusted)

  Amana is the opposite of betrayal. It names the religious duties and whatever is entrusted to a person, such as a deposit, property or family. The jurists use it in two senses: as a thing held by the trustee, such as a deposit, a loan, a silent partnership, a pledge or a found object, and as a quality, such as trustworthiness in a cost-plus sale, in a guardian, a judge or a witness. The trust must be kept and returned on demand; liability arises from denial, transgression or neglect, and falls away if the thing is lost without transgression or neglect.

• Amara (indication: the probable evidence in usul)

  Amara is a sign in the lexical sense, and for the usulis a probable evidence: that by which correct reasoning reaches a probable factual conclusion. It differs from proof, from a mark, from a suggestive attribute and from a presumptive circumstance. Jurists rely on indicators for the qibla and for puberty; in judging by indicators they differ, some citing the story of Joseph's shirt and others the hadith on the woman accused without proof.

• Amn (security of person, property and faith, and the ruler's duty to keep it)

  Amn is the opposite of fear: the absence of expected harm. It is among the most necessary things for life, and the ruler's duties include guarding the faith, deciding disputes, protecting the realm, enforcing penalties and fortifying the frontiers. The jurists agree that a person's safety in life, property and honour is a condition of the obligation to worship; fear for one's life excuses facing the qibla, congregation, pilgrimage, and retaliation that could cause death.

• Amr (command: forms, force and meaning in usul)

  Amr in the lexical sense means a matter or a state of affairs, and a request to act, the opposite of a prohibition. Explicit forms of the command are three: the imperative verb, the imperative noun-form, and the present verb with the command-prefix; there are also implicit forms. The form do is, for the majority, a command to obligation, and for others to recommendation. Carrying out a command validates it, and a prohibition takes precedence over a command in conflict.

• Aqal al-jam' (the least number that counts as plural)

  The least number of plural in the grammarians' sense is contested, and in the jurists' view most hold it to be three. In inheritance most scholars take two as the least, against Ibn Abbas, and the Hanafis take two for bequests; elsewhere the jurists build their rulings on three. The point affects oaths, endowments and acknowledgements.

• Aqal ma qila (the least of what was said)

  Aqal ma qila is a usuli principle: when the companions differ on an amount with several sayings, the least is taken unless evidence points to more; the example is the blood-money of a Jew. The opposite is to take the most. al-Shafi'i and al-Baqillani hold it valid; Ibn Hazm denies it.

• Kin liability for blood money (aqila)

• Ard (land: purity, places and rulings)

  Land is pure by default. An impurity that is liquid is cleansed by flooding the ground with water; a solid impurity is cleansed by removing it. The entry also covers prayer on land, the land of torment with its prohibition of entering it without awe and its water, and the sacred precinct.

• Arsh (compensation for injury)

  Arsh is the property due for a wrong short of killing, and is sometimes used for the full diya. The lawgiver fixed some amounts for particular injuries, as in the letter to the people of Yemen; where no text fixes a sum, hukumat al-'adl applies. The schools differ on the amounts for a woman and for a dhimmi.

• Awl (proportional reduction of shares in inheritance)

• Supervision of banks

• Sale of the prohibited

  The prohibition of selling the prohibited in the forty-fifth hadith of Ibn Rajab's additions: 'God and His Messenger forbade the sale of wine, carrion, swine and idols' — so what is forbidden to eat or benefit from is forbidden to sell, the extension of the prohibition to its price being drawn from the question over carrion fat sought for caulking, oiling and lighting — answered 'no, it is forbidden' — and from the saying 'God fight the Jews: God had forbidden them the fat, so they melted it, sold it and ate its price' — the rule being that whatever's substance is forbidden, its price is forbidden too, and altering its form does not make it lawful (Jami' al-Ulum wal-Hikam p. 871).

• Burden of proof and oath

  The rule of litigation founded by Ibn Abbas's hadith — the thirty-third of the Forty — 'proof lies on the claimant and the oath on the one who denies': were people given by mere claims, some would claim others' blood and wealth, so the claimant must produce evidence for what he alleges and the denier swear to the negation of what is imputed to him; the two Sahihs word it 'but the oath is on the one against whom claim is made', the Prophet so ruling in Nafi' ibn Umar al-Jumahi's route, and al-Isma'ili's wording has 'proof on the seeker and the oath on the one sought from' — the root of the Islamic evidentiary order in judgment (Jami' al-Ulum wal-Hikam p. 684).

• Breastfeeding and weaning

  In his commentary on the nursing verse (al-Baqara 2:233), Sha'rawi treats the period of suckling, the child's claim on both parents, and the duty of maintenance, which he places on the father; he reads weaning as a matter for mutual consent and consultation, and holds that the verse protects the child from the effects of divorce.

• Daf' (the fiqh term: repelling, giving, returning and rebutting)

  In the lexicon daf' means pushing away, delaying, pleading on behalf of another and returning; as a term it means turning a thing away before it arrives. Jurists use it to mean giving or paying (as in zakat), returning (a deposit), warding off harm (repelling an aggressor), and rebutting a claim and voiding it. The maxim that repelling is stronger than removing (al-daf' aqwa min al-raf') is cited from al-Zarkashi; among its applications, water already used that reaches two qullas does not become pure in one view.

• Dahri (the naturalist who holds that time is eternal)

  As a term the Dahriyya are a group of disbelievers who held that time is eternal and attributed events to it, denying the existence of a Creator who chooses, and denying the Hereafter, resurrection and recompense. The jurists distinguish the Dahri from the zindiq, the mulhid, the hypocrite and the apostate, though all of them share disbelief with him; an original disbeliever of this kind is treated as a harbi, a musta'min or a dhimmi according to his residence.

• Al-Dakhil in fiqh (possessor in dispute)

  Al-dakhil in the terminology of the jurists is the possessor who actually holds the disputed object or whose exercise of owners' disposal is established, contrasted with al-kharij (the outsider) who holds nothing and disputes the possessor. The default principle in litigation is that the outsider is the plaintiff and the possessor is the defendant, since the possessor has no need to sue while holding the object. When both parties produce evidence for an absolute claim of ownership, the outsider's evidence is preferred by the Hanafis, the prevalent Hanbali view, and Ibn al-Majishun of the Malikis because the plaintiff's evidence proves a new cause, whereas the Shafi'is, the prevalent Maliki view, and a Hanbali narration give precedence to the possessor's evidence because it is strengthened by possession. In ownership attributed to a specific cause, the possessor's evidence is preferred if the cause is non-repeatable such as birth or breeding; if repeatable such as purchase, Hanafis prefer the outsider unless both claim purchase from the same person where the possessor prevails, while Malikis and Shafi'is prefer the possessor on the soundest view unless the outsider claims purchase from the possessor himself. In dated ownership evidence, the earlier date takes precedence according to Hanafis, Malikis, and a Hanbali narration, whereas Shafi'is prefer the possessor even if his date is later on the relied-upon position to uphold present possession, and a Hanbali narration gives precedence to the outsider without regard to date.

• Dalil (evidence in the principles of jurisprudence)

  In lexicon a dalil is a guide or a revealer; as a term it is what, through sound reasoning, leads to knowledge of a factual aim, even if only probable, though some restrict it to the certain. The four sources agreed for establishing rulings are the Qur'an, the Sunna, consensus and analogy; the disputed sources are many. Scriptural evidence divides into four classes by certainty of transmission and of meaning, and the Hanafi jurists tie the strength of a ruling to the strength of its evidence.

• Blood (in fiqh)

  In fiqh blood is the red fluid that runs in the veins of living creatures; jurists also use the word for retaliation, for the sacrificial offering, and for the blood of menstruation, irregular bleeding and postnatal bleeding. The jurists agree that blood is forbidden, impure and not to be eaten or used; they differ on how little of it is excused. Its rules are spread across ablution, impurity, prayer, menstruation, fasting, pilgrimage, food, slaughter, the aqiqa sacrifice and retaliation.

• Dinars (gold coins and their legal measure)

  A dinar is a piece of gold coin struck to a set weight, and in the jurists' usage it is the same as the mithqal. The legal dinar is the one struck by Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan on the weights of the Jahiliyya, weighing twenty-two qirats less a grain; rulings measured in dinars, such as zakat, diya and theft, rest on it. The gold nisab for zakat is twenty dinars, on which a quarter of a tenth is due once it is reached; the gold diya for a free Muslim man is a thousand dinars; the theft threshold is a quarter of a dinar for the majority and a dinar or ten dirhams for the Hanafis.

• Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam)

  Dar al-Islam in the terminology of jurists is every territory in which the rulings and institutions of Islam are manifest. If non-Muslims seize any part of it, defense becomes an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) upon all inhabitants of that region, men and women alike, extending outward to neighbors until encompassing all Muslims, and its communities are obligated to maintain manifest public rites such as Friday prayers, congregational prayers, Eids, and the adhan; a harbi may not enter without safe-conduct or official permission. Jurists disputed whether Dar al-Islam can transform into an abode of disbelief (Dar al-Kufr): the Shafi'is hold that it never becomes Dar al-Kufr under any circumstance even if occupied and non-Muslim laws are enforced, based on the hadith "Islam prevails and is not prevailed over"; the Malikis, Hanbalis, and Abu Yusuf and Muhammad hold that it becomes Dar al-Kufr solely by the manifestation of the laws of disbelief; whereas Abu Hanifa requires three concurrent conditions: the manifestation of disbelief, contiguity with enemy territory, and that no Muslim or dhimmi remains secure under the original security, making security and fear the core criteria. Non-Muslims are barred from permanent settlement in the Arabian Peninsula by consensus based on prophetic reports; Shafi'is and Hanbalis restrict this prohibition to the Hijaz because early Caliphs did not expel communities from Yemen and Tayma, whereas other jurists extend it across the peninsula from Aden to the rural borders of Iraq. A foundling discovered in Dar al-Islam is legally deemed Muslim by virtue of the territory, and non-Muslims may not acquire uncultivated land through reclamation or extract its subterranean minerals.

• Al-Dar in fiqh (the house / residential estate)

  Al-dar linguistically is a collective noun comprising courtyard, structure, and quarter, metaphorically applied to a town, province, or tribe; its legal meaning conforms to its lexical sense. Related architectural terms include bayt (night lodging, having an overlapping relation with dar), hujrah (room), ghurfah (upper chamber), khidr (screened domestic area), manzil (dwelling smaller than a dar and larger than a bayt), and mikhda' (storage closet). Jurists unanimously agree that an unqualified contract on a house—whether sale, hire, bequest, or waqf—includes the land, the structure, and all fixtures attached to it, such as projecting wings, balconies, built staircases, roofs, hung doors, fixed locks, storage vats, living planted trees, wells, and the fixed lower millstone; loose movables such as furniture, bedding, draperies, unfastened shelves, detached locks, ropes, buckets, detached pulleys, and the separate upper millstone in one view do not enter unless explicitly stipulated or endowed with all its contents. The majority validate the endowment (waqf) of the upper story of a house without the lower, or vice versa, or designating the courtyard as a mosque without stipulating an access pathway, reasoning that what may be sold may be endowed, whereas Hanafis disallow such partial endowments.

• Da'wa (the fiqh article: call, invitation and summons)

  In fiqh the word da'wa covers three senses the encyclopedia treats: conveying the religion and entering it, calling someone and asking them to attend, and the food to which one invites people. A call takes the ruling of what it summons to: calling to Islam is a binding duty, a collective obligation on the Muslims according to the stronger view; answering a summons to a required act is binding, while answering most meal invitations is recommended or permitted; there are recognised excuses that end the duty to answer.

• Claim before the judge (legal sense of da'wa)

  In technical usage a claim (da'wa) is a statement by which a person seeks to establish a right against another before a judge or an arbiter. The jurists count its pillars as the claimant, the defendant, the thing claimed and the statement itself. Claims are sorted by soundness and by the kind of thing claimed; a valid claim must meet conditions on the statement, on the parties and on the subject. A claim brings the judge's hearing, the presence of the opponent and an answer, and it usually ends with a judgment or with the claimant's withdrawal

• The state (in fiqh and siyasa shar'iyya)

  In fiqh the state rests on three pillars: the territory, the subjects (Muslims and protected non-Muslims), and sovereignty. It is made of several offices, and the supreme imam holds them as the nation's agent: the heir apparent, the people of loosening and binding, the muhtasib, the judiciary, the public treasury, the viziers and the military command. The majority hold that two imams may not hold office at one time.

• Dayatha (cuckoldry: failing to guard one's family, in fiqh)

  In the lexicon dayatha is a lack of jealousy over one's household and kin; the dayyuth is the man without such jealousy, and jurists add the qurtuban and the qarnan. Dayatha is a grave sin: a report counts the dayyuth among those who will not enter Paradise, and when it is widespread it is counted as corruption in the land. It bears on the rules of divorce; one who insults another by calling him dayyuth is discretionarily punished and not hadd-punished; and the Shafi'is and Hanbalis count it among the things that remove a witness's probity.

• God's debt (dayn Allah): obligations owed to God that remain in the liability

  God's debt is a right of God that stays in the liability of the obligated person, with no human claimant: vows, expiations, the zakat of fast-breaking, pilgrimage, fasting, and a prayer whose time has passed, all of which must be made up. A right of God becomes a debt in the liability when its time passes before performance, when the due property is destroyed, or when the person was unable to perform it when it fell due. Financial debts to God may be paid by a proxy by agreement; bodily worship may not be done for the living, and the schools differ on proxies for the dead. The schools also differ on whether it binds the estate of the dead, whether it blocks zakat, and whether it lapses through hardship, apostasy or death.

• Debt (dayn) in fiqh

  In fiqh a debt is a binding right in the obligor's liability; it covers money and other things, such as a missed prayer or zakat, and arises from a contract, a wrong, damage, a legal trigger, paying for another, or a benefit done without permission. A debt attaches to the debtor's liability and not to his property, except where it is secured by a pledge, where the debtor is bankrupt or dying ill, or where it falls on the estate.

• Slaughter (dhaba'ih): the lawful killing of animals for food in fiqh

  In the terms of the jurists, slaughter is the cutting of the throat or the lower neck; dhaka is the wider term, the means that makes the flesh of a land animal lawful to eat, by choice or by necessity. Slaughter is either chosen (cutting the throat or, for the camel, the lower neck) or forced (wounding an animal that cannot be caught); fish and locusts need no slaughter, and a fetus follows its mother's slaughter. For a valid slaughter the animal must be alive, the death must come from the cut, it must not be a game animal of the sanctuary, the slaughterer must be sane and a Muslim or a People of the Book, and the blade must cut. The majority require the invocation of God's name when it is remembered and possible, and the schools differ on the forgetful and the ignorant.

• Gold (dhahab) in the rulings

  Gold is a known metal. Men are forbidden to wear gold ornaments or a gold ring, except from necessity, such as a gold nose or tooth; women may wear gold; eating and drinking from gold vessels is forbidden; zakat is due on it; and gold may be exchanged for gold only hand to hand and weight for weight. The majority set the threshold for the amputation of a thief at a quarter of a dinar of gold.

• Blame and reproach (dhamm) in the rulings

  Dhamm is the opposite of praise; in the rulings it is harm done to another, such as slander, abuse and insult, and it carries the hadd or discretionary penalties. Blaming God or His Messenger is disbelief, and cruel speech against believers is forbidden; the law forbids mockery, sneering, and calling people by insulting nicknames, while the jurists allow a nickname that describes an unavoidable trait without disparagement. Blaming innovators is sought, and blaming sins, disbelievers and hypocrites is found in the law.

• Dhari'a (the means that lead to an end; see blocking the means)

  Dhari'a in the lexicon is the means that leads to a thing; as a term it is whatever leads to a further end. It may lead to forbidden harms or to goods; the ruling on it has two sides, blocking and opening, treated under the entry on blocking the means.

• Taste (dhawq) in the rulings: fasting, injury to it, and oaths

  Dhawq is perceiving the taste of a thing through the moisture spread on the nerve over the tongue; it is one of the five senses. Tasting food does not break the fast unless it reaches the body inside, though it is better avoided. For injury that takes away taste a full diya is due by agreement; the schools differ on retaliation for it. In oaths, one who swears not to taste and then eats or drinks breaks the oath, while one who swears not to eat or drink and then tastes does not, because all eating is tasting but not every tasting is eating.

• Dhimma (the liability that bears rights and duties, in the rulings)

  In the rulings the dhimma is a quality in a person, or a self with an obligation, by which he is fit to bear rights for and against him. It lasts from conception until death; each person has one; it has no limit of capacity; and it attaches to the person, not to his property. At death the majority hold that it stays until the estate's rights are settled, some Hanafis that it weakens, and a Hanbali narration that it ends.

• Dibaj (brocade woven of silk)

  Dibaj is a kind of cloth whose warp and weft are of silk, that is natural silk. Its general rules are those of silk, and the jurists give no separate rules for it except in some particular cases; the Hanafis disliked wiping oneself with a piece of dibaj as wasting property without need, while the Shafi'is allowed it even for men because such use is not treated as ordinary use of it.

• al-Dinariyya al-Kubra (the greater Dinar case in inheritance)

  The Greater Dinar is another named problem in inheritance: the heirs are a wife, a mother or grandmother, two daughters, twelve brothers and one sister, the estate six hundred dinars; the case is a just one from twenty-four. Other names are al-Rakabiyya, al-Shakiyya, al-Dawudiyya and al-Amiriyya, each tied to an anecdote about a judge or a jurist who divided the estate.

• al-Dinariyya al-Sughra (the lesser Dinar case in inheritance)

  The Lesser Dinar is a named problem in inheritance: the estate passes to seventeen women, three wives, two grandmothers, four maternal sisters and eight full or paternal sisters. Its base is twelve, raised by the rule of increase (awl) to seventeen; it is called the Dinar case because a deceased left seventeen dinars and each woman received one. It has other names.

• Divorce before consummation

  Sha'rawi sets out what a woman divorced before consummation is owed. If no dower was fixed, she receives a provision (mut'a) according to the husband's means; if a dower was fixed, she receives half of it unless she waives it or the one in whose hand the marriage knot lies waives it. He reads grace (fadl) as completing justice ('adl) here.

• Diwan (the state register: the office books of troops, taxes, judges and governors)

  A diwan is a register in which names or documents are entered, and which keeps what concerns the state's business, funds and officials. The jurists differ over keeping one: the Malikis allow it, the Shafi'is recommend it, the Hanbalis say it is fitting; Umar ibn al-Khattab is the first to have set one up. The state's diwan has three parts: the army (enrolment and pay), the business of revenue (tithe, land-tax, the non-Muslims' poll tax and the frontier duties), and the officials (appointment, dismissal and their stipends); a judge's diwan holds his records and minutes.

• Diyana (the rule that a person's own intention is judged before God, not by the court)

  As a term, diyana means accepting a swearer's or divorcer's stated intention, when the words are clear and the claimed meaning is a remote possibility, though a judge does not accept it against the apparent meaning of the words; the matter is left between the person and God. The schools differ on which claims are accepted in diyana and which are accepted in court too; the same applies to oaths, the vow of abstinence, the zihar formula and similar cases.

• Blood-money (diya) in fiqh

  In fiqh diya is the compensation for a killing or for an injury to a body part. It falls on the killer in an accidental killing or a quasi-intentional one, and the kin group ('aqila) bears it; in a deliberate killing where retaliation is dropped, it is owed by the killer himself. The full diya of a free Muslim man is a hundred camels, or a thousand dinars of gold, or twelve thousand silver dirhams (ten thousand in the Hanafi view); a woman's diya is half a man's. A protected non-Muslim's diya is half a Muslim's according to the majority and equal to it according to the Hanafis; a belligerent is owed nothing. Injuries to body parts and faculties carry fixed sums, and the diyas for lesser injuries are absorbed into the diya for a killing when the victim dies before healing.

• Oil and fat (the fiqh rules on oil)

  Duhn is any oil or fat used for anointing; samn is fat from living animals and shahm is what melts from animal fat by fire. If a solid fat is made impure, the piece and what is around it are removed and the rest is used; the majority, and the sounder view of the school, hold that liquid oil made impure cannot be purified, while another view allows purifying it by washing. The sale of dead animal fat is agreed to be forbidden; the majority allow lighting with impure oil outside the mosque.

• Fasiq

  Fasiq in fiqh is one who departs from obedience through a grave sin or persistence in sin; the Kuwaiti Fiqh Encyclopedia treats fisq in the chapters on testimony, leading prayer and interdiction.

• Financial expiations (kaffarat)

• Habs (imprisonment and detention)

  In the technical sense habs is holding a person back, preventing him from acting for himself and going about his affairs. Jurists agree that it is lawful. Most treat it as a branch of discretionary punishment (ta'zir), used either as a penalty or to secure a suspect, and most set no upper limit on its length, leaving that to the judge. It may be open-ended or for life, and it ends with death, repentance or the pardon of the person wronged. Jurists also set rules for women, ambiguous and juvenile detainees, the prisoner's transactions, maintenance and oaths, the prohibited forms of discipline, and the jailer's qualities and the state's duty to oversee prisons.

• Hadhayan (delirium: its effect on acts and testimony)

  Hadhayan in the lexical sense is speech without sense, in illness or otherwise; technically it is speaking without reflection. It differs from lagh, speech with no legal weight, and from laghat, noisy talk whose meaning is intended. All scholars agree that the divorce of one who has lost his reason, without intoxication, does not take effect; the Hanafis hold that the words of one whose speech is mostly delirious carry no weight. The Malikis hold that one who divorces in delirium and later says he did not notice is not bound, unless evidence shows his reason was sound; if he says something happened that he did not understand, Ibn Naji holds the divorce binds him, and al-Dardir objects that a sick man may imagine things and speak accordingly. Among the conditions of uprightness, the Hanafis require little idle talk and delirium; a man given to lying or delirium is not accepted as a witness.

• Hadiyya (gift)

  Hadiyya in the lexical sense is a thing of value sent to another as an honour; technically it is the transfer of a thing to another without return, a kind of gift (hiba) that differs in that it is carried to the recipient as a courtesy. It is complete when the giver sends it and the recipient takes it; no formula is required. The giver may retract before receipt, in the view of the majority. Where a gift comes in a container, the container is returned or held in trust depending on custom. At a circumcision or wedding, gifts suited to children go to the child, and others follow the kinship of the giver to the father or the mother. Gifts that officials and judges receive by virtue of office are forbidden; the Prophet's saying 'the gifts of officials are plunder' is cited. The imam may not accept gifts, according to the jurists. The mufti, preacher and teacher may accept, though it is better to refrain.

• Hadm (demolition, real and legal)

  Hadm in the lexical sense is tearing down a building, destruction or collapse; the technical sense does not depart from this. It is of two kinds: real demolition of a structure, and figurative demolition of something else, such as a contract, meaning annulment. Real demolition is required in several cases: a church built by People of the Book in a city the Muslims founded, a building within a river's buffer, a projecting structure over a public road that harms passers-by (the judge orders it removed), and a leaning wall, whose demolisher bears no liability. Real demolition has legal effects: demolishing a mosque wall obliges its restoration, a buyer who demolishes part of the house confirms the sale, and one who demolishes a house decorated with figural images owes its value. The figurative case is triple divorce: a woman divorced three times returns to her husband, after another marriage, under a new marriage, the earlier divorce being demolished.

• Hadr (blood and value wasted: no retaliation, no compensation)

  Hadr means waste or nullity; as a technical term, a hadr soul is one for which there is neither retaliation, diya nor expiation. The principle is that a human life is protected, but an apostate is an exception agreed by the jurists: the imam or his deputy executes him, and if someone other than the imam kills him without authorisation there is no retaliation or diya, though he is disciplined (ta'zir). The blood of a heretic whose innovation is takfiri is also wasted, and so is that of a belligerent non-Muslim; non-combatants such as women, children, the old, and monks may not be killed. The blood of a married adulterer is wasted in the view of most jurists; the Hanafis require that the killing follow a judgment. Where a wounded person's status changed between protected and wasted before death, the majority hold the earlier wound unliable, while Ibn al-Qasim (Maliki) holds a diya due. If a Muslim shot a hadr person who then converted before the arrow struck, the majority hold no retaliation is due, while the Shafi'is hold, in the sounder view, a lighter diya paid by the kin. For the Shafi'is the retaliation is claimed by the Muslim next of kin; for the Hanbalis it is the imam who executes. A person whose blood is wasted need not be given water he needs, and the Shafi'is and Hanbalis permit a compelled person to kill such a person to save his own life if no other food is found. One whose blood was wasted by a crime who kills himself gets no expiation from that act, since he has no right to spill his own blood.

• Interdiction (hajr)

  Interdiction (hajr) means prevention. Jurists define it differently: the Shafi'is and Hanbalis as a bar on financial dealings, whether for the sake of another, such as a bankrupt debtor's creditors, or of the restricted person himself, such as a madman or a wastrel; the Hanafis as a bar on the validity of a spoken transaction; the Malikis as a legal quality that prevents its bearer from carrying out dealings beyond his means or giving away more than a third of his property. It is established by the Qur'an (”Do not give the foolish your property”, and ”when you perceive maturity in them, hand over their property”) and by a report that the Prophet restricted Mu'adh's property for a debt, which some scholars hold to be a mursal report. The causes are childhood, madness and slavery, agreed upon, and, for the majority, wastefulness and terminal illness. A minor under restraint is released on reaching puberty and proving sound judgement; the majority take sound judgement to mean sound management of property, the Shafi'is in the sounder view take it to cover religion and property, and Abu Hanifa fixes it at twenty-five years of age. The Hanafis hold that the transactions of an overwhelmed madman are void; the Malikis hold that he is liable for what he destroys. For the wastrel, the majority require a judge's order both to impose and to lift the restraint, and re-impose it if he returns to waste; Muhammad ibn al-Hasan and Ibn al-Qasim do not require a judge's order. The heedless person who is cheated in sales is restrained by Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, not by Abu Hanifa. The dissolute man is not restrained by the majority unless he wastes his property; the Shafi'is in the opposite view restrain him. For a free adult wife, Malik and a report from Ahmad restrain her in giving more than a third of her property without her husband's consent. One dying of illness is restrained from giving beyond a third of his estate where there is no debt. A pledgor is restrained from dealing in the pledged thing, and Hanafi jurists restrain for public good the reckless mufti, the ignorant physician and the bankrupt muleteer, the restraint being physical rather than legal.

• Hakim (the judge, in fiqh usage)

  In fiqh usage hakim is a general term covering the caliph, the governor, the judge and the arbitrator, but when used alone it refers to the judge. Appointing a judge is a communal duty (fard kifaya), and the appointment of the ruler is an obligation on the imam. A judge's authority is valid only when appointed by the imam or his deputy with permission.

• Halak (destruction of property and its legal effect)

  Halak in the legal sense is the loss of a thing's intended benefit, whether or not it survives, and it is also used of death. If a sold article perishes before delivery it is at the seller's risk; if it perishes with the buyer and a defect is later found, the buyer recovers the arsh (compensation for the defect), except that the Malikis hold that if the destruction was caused by a defect the seller concealed, the buyer recovers the whole price. If the property perishes before a year is complete, or before the owner can pay, the zakat falls away; if it perishes after the owner could pay, the zakat stands as a debt. If a sheep or camel is designated as a sacrifice and dies before the day of sacrifice, the owner owes nothing; if it perishes through his negligence he is liable. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis treat the pledgee's possession as a trust, so he is not liable for loss without fault; the Hanafis treat it as a liability.

• Halal (the lawful)

  Halal is lexically the opposite of haram, and technically what the law permits; for the majority it covers recommended, permitted and disliked acts, and for the Hanafis also obligatory acts. The Hanafis count as disliked-but-lawful what is nearer the lawful, and as forbidden-leaning dislike what is nearer the forbidden or proved forbidden by a probable proof. On silent matters the majority of Hanafis and Shafiis hold the default is permission, some Hanafis suspend judgement, and some traditionists hold the default is prohibition. The majority argue from the Quranic creation of all that is on earth for mankind and from the saying that what the law leaves silent is pardoned. Where the lawful and unlawful mix, the unlawful prevails, a rule the Shafiis limit to permitted acts and the Hanafis extend to obligatory acts; the rationale is to minimise changes to the rulings. Exceptions include the bird that dies after being shot and falls. Lawfulness arises from an intrinsic cause, such as using grain, or an extrinsic cause, such as a valid sale, lease or gift; lawful property has degrees according to how free it is of doubt.

• Halif (judicial oath)

  Halif is lexically an oath, from a root meaning firm resolve; technically it is the affirmation of a ruling by naming something revered in a fixed form. Swearing in court makes one litigant take the oath to settle the dispute; the practice rests on the Prophet's instruction to the defendant to swear by God, and his word to al-Ash'ath ibn Qays: your proof, or else his oath. A binding oath is sworn by God or His attributes, and swearing by other than God is forbidden. Oaths lie over financial rights without dispute; a claim for a legal penalty of God is not sworn to, while non-financial private rights such as slander, retaliation, marriage, divorce, revocation and manumission are disputed between the schools. The majority hold that the oath ends the dispute at once but does not discharge the right; the Malikis treat it as barring later proof except for a valid excuse. The oath is sworn to the act itself, or to another's act by denial of knowledge; the Hanafis divide oaths on the cause from those on the outcome. The judge administers the oath only when the claimant asks, and the Hanafis list five cases where it applies without that request. For intention, the oath follows the swearer's intention when he is the wronged party and the examiner's intention when he is the wrongdoer. The entry refers the reader to the headword on oaths (ayman) for detail, and closes at the next heading حِلْف on p.7251.

• Hamal (pregnancy and carrying)

  Hamal in jurisprudence is what a female carries in her womb, and it also means lifting and carrying a load, which is narrower than habal; the jurists use both senses. The minimum term of pregnancy is six months by agreement; the maximum is four years for the Shafiis, the Hanbalis on the apparent view and the Malikis in one view, two years for the Hanafis, and five years for the prevailing Maliki view. The unborn has a deficient capacity to be a holder of rights, so it takes rights that need no acceptance such as inheritance, bequest and descent, and is not liable for any financial obligation. Descent is attached to the marital bed within the possible term; an unborn child inherits if it cries out at birth, may take a bequest by the majority, may be the object of an endowment by implication and of an acknowledgement, but not of a gift. The schools differ on negating an unborn child by oath of cursing and on acknowledging it; a later acknowledgement, if valid, prevents later denial. The waiting period of a pregnant woman ends with delivery, and a twin birth has its own rule. If a pregnant woman dies with a living child in her womb the child is to be taken out if possible, and the jurists differ on cutting open the body. The majority allow eating an unborn animal's flesh slaughtered through its mother's slaughter; Abu Hanifa requires its own slaughter if it is born alive. Selling an unborn young alone, or excluding it from the sale of its mother, is forbidden by agreement for uncertainty. The sense of lifting includes the transport of goods sold or rented, the carrier's fee and liability, and the carrying of the Quran with or without a cover, disputed. The entry closes at the next headword, hammam (حمام), on p.7321.

• Hamala (bearing a debt to end a feud)

  Hamala is the blood-money or fine a person bears for another; technically it is the debt a man undertakes to pay in order to end a feud between two groups in which lives or property have been lost. Guarantee (daman) is wider than hamala, which is guarantee of blood-money or other sums for the sake of peace; kafala is for the Hanafis the joining of the surety's liability to the principal's, and for most jurists an undertaking to produce the person. Hamala is lawful beyond dispute and counted among the noble acts; the Arabs knew it, and its basis is the Quranic command to fear God and mend relations among believers. Zakat may go to a hamil who borrowed to end a feud: the Hanafis require him to be poor; the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis give him from the share of debtors even if rich, where the burden is crushing. Most jurists allow the bearer of a hamala to ask others for help until he has paid.

• Hammam (bath-house)

  Hammam is lexically a bath-house with hot water, and later any bathing. The Hanafis (sound view), Malikis and Shafiis allow building, selling and renting bath-houses without uncovering the awrah; the Hanbalis dislike renting or buying them, and the earnings of a bath-keeper are disliked, the women's bath more so. Pre-emption does not apply to an indivisible bath according to the majority, and the Hanafis allow it. Men and women may enter a bath if they are sure of avoiding what is forbidden, covering the awrah; some jurists require full cover, a woman may enter for an excuse, and a dhimmi woman is barred from entering with Muslim women. There are rules of entry and exit, the purity of its water is accepted by the Hanafis and Hanbalis, Quranic recitation aloud there is disliked, and greeting in it is not recommended. Prayer in a bath-house is valid for the majority; in the preferred Hanbali view it is not. The schools differ on whether a thief from a bath-house is hand-cut, the Hanafis distinguishing night and day. The entry closes at the next headword, hamw (حمو), on p.7329.

• Hamw (husband's relatives; in-law rules)

  Hamw lexically is the father of a husband or his brother, or any relative of the husband's side; hama is the husband's mother, and the term runs both ways like in-law. A mahram in-law, such as the husband's father or son, may look at the woman and be alone with her, on the Quranic permission and the ban on a man spending the night with a married woman unless he is a husband or a mahram. A non-mahram in-law, such as the husband's brother, has the status of a stranger in looking, being alone, residing and hearing the voice; if looking is forbidden, touching is forbidden too. The saying 'the in-law is death' is read as applying to non-mahram in-laws and as a strong warning. The entry refers to the headwords stranger, mahram, hamala and kafala.

• Himyan (money belt: pilgrim's wearing, spoils and theft)

  Himyan in the lexical sense is a purse in which provision is kept and tied at the waist; it is a loan word, used in the same sense in the law. The Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is permit a pilgrim in the state of ihram to tie the himyan at his waist, relying on a report of Ibn Abbas; the Malikis allow it only for the pilgrim's own and his family's provision, not for trade, and only when tied on the skin, not on the waist-wrapper. Abu Yusuf disliked a silk girdle for the pilgrim, and Ibn Umar disliked tying the himyan in the sounder of his two reports. The Hanbalis permit it only when it holds provision. Most jurists count the himyan within the spoils a fighter may take; the Malikis and in one Shafi'i view do not. Most jurists hold that a thief who cuts a himyan and takes its money is liable to amputation; the Hanafis distinguish a purse hanging outside the sleeve, which is not cut for, from one reached through the sleeve.

• Hanth (breaking an oath)

  Hanth lexically is a great sin and wrong-doing; technically it is breaking an oath, so that a swearer who does not do what he swore to do owes expiation. Barr is keeping an oath, and naqd, nakth and khulf are related words. The ruling on breaking follows the thing sworn to: an oath to do what is obligatory or to abstain from what is forbidden must be kept and breaking it is sin; an oath to abandon an obligation or do a forbidden act must be broken with expiation by the majority; the recommended and the permitted each follow their own rule. Breaking an oath and atoning is recommended when one sees a better course than what was sworn. Breaking applies only to a binding oath about the future; the majority hold the oath about the past, the perjurious oath, carries no expiation, and the idle oath cannot be broken. Expiation is owed by one who breaks a binding oath; the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis take the oath as the cause and the breach as a condition, while the Shafiis take both. Expiation before breaking is allowed by the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis but not by the Hanafis. A positive oath is broken only when the chance of keeping it is gone, a negative one by the act itself, and a timed oath at the end of its time. The majority do not hold a forgetful swearer to breach, the coerced breaches only if the coercion is not overpowering, and the Hanafis hold the forgetful to breach.

• Haqiqa (literal sense)

  In technical use haqiqa is a word employed for what it was coined to mean in the convention through which speech is conveyed; its counterpart is metaphor, a word used for something other than its coinage because of a link between the two. Kinaya is speech whose intended meaning is hidden by usage though its literal sense is clear, so it needs intention or context to settle what is meant. Literal meaning is linguistic when set by the lexicographers, legal when set by the lawgiver, and customary when set by custom; the same word may be literal in one sense and figurative in another, as prayer is literal in the legal sense and figurative in supplication. Speech is taken literally by default and moved to metaphor only when the literal sense is impossible, hard or abandoned by custom, with branches in bequests, oaths and acknowledgements. Most usulis forbid taking the literal and figurative sense together in one use, the Shafiis allow it unless reason forbids; a general metaphor is admissible.

• Right (haqq)

  Haqq means, in Arabic usage, what is established, owed or certain, the opposite of falsehood. In the jurists' terms it has two senses: a judgement that matches reality, and a duty established by the law. It falls into the right of God and the right of the servant. Ibn al-Qayyim: God's right admits no compromise, as in the hudud, zakat and expiations, while the servant's right admits settlement, waiver and exchange. Usulis disagreed whether the right is the divine address itself or the act it binds. Al-Qarafi divides obligations into God's alone, the servant's alone, and the mixed case of slander. Ibn Rajab lists five kinds of the servant's right. Jurists also use the word for financial and non-financial entitlements, for contractual obligations, for state stipends and for easements. The source of every right is God, and the holder, the obliged party and the object of the right are its pillars; the object must be lawful. The jurists divide rights into God's pure right, the servant's pure right, and mixed rights. The servant's pure right is one whose benefit belongs to a specific person, such as debt and blood-money. In a mixed right one side prevails: slander (qadhf) is mainly God's right, so penalties merge, the penalty is not inherited, pardon does not cancel it, and the imam executes it. Retaliation for killing (qisas) is mainly the servant's right, so the victim's heirs may sue or not, pardon, or settle. The Malikis divide the servant's right into three: owed by God to him, owed in general, and owed by one servant to another. Al-Zarkashi sets the order when rights collide: God's rights such as prayer, zakat, fasting and pilgrimage come first, human rights come first in compulsion and concessions, and in zakat against a debt the sounder view gives God's right priority. God's rights cannot be waived by people, no one may contrive to drop acts of worship, and no settlement may be made over pure hudud. The servant's right may be waived by one who is competent to dispose and whose object is waivable; waiver covers objects, debts, usufructs and unrestricted rights, and the schools disagree on taking an exchange for a right. Al-Shatibi divides rights by whether their purpose is intelligible: worship is God's pure right and admits no partner. Acts of custom touch God's right through the universal ordering and the servant's right in the afterlife and worldly benefit. Rights divide by definition into fixed, unfixed and disputed; fixed rights (the five prayers, the zakat amounts, prices) bind the liability once their cause exists and do not lapse by silence or time, while unfixed rights (charity, spending on relatives) bind only after being fixed by agreement, settlement or a judge. The maintenance of a wife is disputed: the majority hold it binding on the liability, the Hanafis only once the ruler fixes it. Fixing varies with the holder, the obliged person, the object, the amount, the place, the time, the direction and the number. Rights are either complete or lightened by a lawful excuse. By inheritance, rights are inherited, passed by succession without inheritance, or not transferred at all, as with offices, agency and the choice among wives. Jurists disagree on inheriting the option of stipulation, choice, defect and acceptance, and on usufructs; the Hanafis and the Hanbalis deny inheritance of the stipulated option, the Malikis and Shafiis allow it, and retaliation accrues to the victim's heirs by succession, not inheritance. By financial value, rights fall into four kinds; by religious and judicial standing they are binding in conscience, binding before a court, or binding in both. The right of ownership and the permitted right are bare rights with no fixed object. Rights of acquisition are graded: the bare permitted right or right of acquisition, which has no specific object; the fixed or binding right, a right to acquire a specific thing by the holder's will once a cause of ownership exists; and the established right, which settles on a particular thing even before ownership. The fixed right differs from the bare one in that it attaches to a specific thing and its holder can raise it to ownership by acceptance alone. In spoils of war the established right becomes firm when the spoils are secured inside Muslim territory; it is then compensable on destruction, inheritable on the holder's death before division, and may not be sold before division. The established right resembles ownership in that it is compensable on destruction and inheritable by consensus, but it differs in that it cannot be sold or disposed of. Rights divide by how they are enforced: those that must go to a court (penalties and marriage-related rights), those that need no court (taking a specific object, a wife's or children's maintenance), and those disputed (collecting debts). The headword closes at the next entry, hiqqa (حُقّة). The headword closes at the next entry, hiqqa, p.7214.

• The Sanctuary of Medina

  The Prophet's declaration of Medina as a sanctuary, as Abraham sanctified Mecca, with defined bounds — 'between 'Ayr and Thawr' or, in the reading preferred by al-Hazimi and Abu 'Ubayd, 'to Uhud', and 'between its two lava fields' east and west; within it hunting and tree-cutting are forbidden save specified exceptions, the bloodwit for unintended killing is made heavier, and innovation or harbouring an innovator is proscribed. Samhudi credits the sanctity of the boundary with diverting the fire of 654 as it reached the haram.

• Hashima (a head wound that breaks the bone: its compensation)

  Hashima in the lexical sense is a wound that breaks the bone of the head; for the majority it is a wound that breaks the bone, the Shafi'is adding that it does so even without separating the flesh or exposing the bone, and the Hanbalis and some Shafi'is defining it as a wound that exposes and breaks the bone. No retaliation is due for it, by agreement, and compensation is due. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis fix it at ten camels, on the ruling of Zayd ibn Thabit; the Hanafis at a tenth of the full diya; the Malikis differ according to their definitions. When a hashima accompanies a muwadiha, the compensations combine, and the victim may take retaliation for the muwadiha, with the schools differing on the extra arsh. The Malikis give discretionary compensation for a broken bone in the body where retaliation is excluded, and most jurists do not call a break in the body other than the head or face a hashima.

• Hawala (transfer of debt)

  Hawala lexically is transfer; technically it is the transfer of a debt from one liability to another by offer and acceptance between two of three parties: the creditor, the debtor and the one who undertakes payment. The transferor is the debtor, the transferee the creditor, the transferee-debtor the one who undertakes payment, and the debt is the object. Hawala differs from surety in that it releases the transferor's liability, and from release in that it moves a right rather than dropping it. It is lawful by the saying 'delay by a rich man is wrong, and when one of you is referred to a solvent man let him follow the reference', by consensus and by analogy with surety. On the command to accept, Ibn al-Humam takes it as permission, and a creditor known for good payment may be followed as recommended. On the nature of the contract, the Hanafis, Hanbalis and the sounder Shafii view treat hawala as an exception to the sale of debt for debt; others call it a sale; Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim deny that it runs against analogy, and the Hanbalis treat it as an act of accommodation. The article closes at p.7413. Hawala is divided into restricted and unrestricted: restricted when tied to a debt the transferor is owed by the transferee, or to a deposit or a secured object in the transferee's hands; unrestricted when tied to nothing. The unrestricted form is either immediate or deferred, and a deferred one may be fixed by stipulation or by the terms of the original debt, with some rules borrowed from surety. Most jurists hold that hawala cannot be made on a specific object; they require the transferred sum to be a debt. Pillars are five on the majority view (formula, transferor, transferee, transferee-debtor, the debt), while the Hanafis make the formula alone the pillar. Any words conveying the sense are valid; the Malikis require the word hawala in Khalil's view, the Shafiis hesitate over the word sale. The transferor's consent is required by the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis, and the Hanafis require it in one report; the transferee's consent is not required by the majority but is by the Hanafis. If the parties dispute whether the act was a hawala or an agency to collect, the Hanafis and Shafiis have set rules about who is believed, depending on the words used. When the transferor claims the act was agency for collection and the transferee denies it, the jurists give rules on who is believed and on the money received, whether it is still held, consumed or lost. The Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis have the hawala concluded by the transferor's offer and the transferee's acceptance in the session of knowledge; the Hanafis require offer and acceptance in one session. A timed hawala, or one deferred to an unknown term, is invalid, while a deferred debt with a known term is valid. The transferor must be sane and competent; some jurists allow a man under insolvency decree to make one under two conditions; the majority require the transferor to be a debtor to the transferee. The transferee must be sane; the Hanafis also require the transferee-debtor to be adult and able to pay. On the transferee, the Hanbalis require solvency in wealth, speech and presence; the solvent man is one who can pay, does not deny and does not delay. The Hanafis allow an unrestricted hawala that is not tied to a debt the transferor is owed; most others require the transferee to owe the transferor. Hawala on a specific object is not allowed by most jurists; both the transferred sum and the transferee's sum must be a firm debt known in kind, amount and quality. The Malikis require the transferred debt to exist before the hawala; the Hanbalis require the transferee's debt to exist before it. Most jurists require the sum to be fungible, while the majority and the sounder Shafii view allow a non-fungible debt fixed by attributes. The Hanafis require equality of kind, quantity and quality, and no difference in deferral; their reason is that hawala is an accommodation for paying and receiving, not for profit. The Hanafis require the transferee's capital of a salam or a ribawi debt to be delivered if it matches the transferred one in the cause of usury; the Shafiis do not require delivery. The two debts may come from different contracts, the transferred debt may be borrowed through another hawala or surety, and the Shafiis allow several transferees with one transferee-debtor. Where any condition of formation is missing, the hawala is void, a rule agreed by all. Conditions of enforcement include the majority of the transferor, transferee and transferee-debtor by the Hanafi rule, the transferee's authority over the sum, and acceptance; the Hanafis treat a hawala on an agent or guardian as suspended on approval or tied to the ward's interest. The hawala is binding on the majority; the Shafiis and Hanbalis reject the option of stipulation, the Hanafis allow it to be cancelled only by consent, and they treat later stipulations, valid or void, accordingly. Once a hawala is valid the transferor is freed from the creditor's debt; the schools differ on whether the claim and the surety pass; the Hanafis hold that the debt passes with its defences but not with the creditor's securities. The creditor may claim against the transferee and detain him; the transferee may detain the transferor under Hanafi conditions. Under the Hanafis the transferee may recover from the transferor after paying the debt only if the transferor consented, the payment reached the creditor, and the transferee did not owe the transferor a like sum. Hawala ends by consent through performance or its equivalent, cancellation or release, and without consent by the death of the transferor or the transferee or the loss of the object; the Hanafis hold a restricted hawala is dissolved by the transferor's death while an unrestricted one is not. It is void when the transferor is found not to owe the creditor, or the sum named perished before the debt attached; it is not void by the discovery that the transferee's property was another's in an unrestricted hawala. Failure to recover (tawa) is the creditor's inability to reach his right through the transferee; the Hanafis let the creditor return on the transferor for it, the Shafiis reject return altogether, the Malikis allow it when the transferor deceived, and Ahmad in one report allows it when the transferee was insolvent and the creditor did not know. On the Hanafi view the causes of failure are four: the death of the transferee insolvent before payment, his denial of the hawala without proof, the judge's declaration of his insolvency, and the loss of the trust held as surety for the hawala. When failure is established the creditor returns on the transferor, and the schools differ on how the debt returns: by rescission, by automatic dissolution, or by the cause of failure. The article closes at the cross-reference heading hawz (ر: أرض الحوز) on p.7413; the next headword is hawd (حوض).

• Hay'a (the recommended forms of prayer, and the dignified offenders)

  Hay'a in the lexical sense is the outward state a thing is in, sensed or understood. In prayer the Shafi'is divide its acts into pillars (arkan), sunan that sahw prostration repairs, and hay'at that it does not repair and to which the worshipper does not return; they liken the prayer to a person, the pillar to the head, the condition to life, the sunan to the limbs and the hay'at to the hair. By the Shafi'i count there are more than fifteen hay'at, including raising the hands at the opening takbir, at bowing and at rising from it, placing the right palm on the left, seeking refuge before recitation, saying amin, the glorification in bowing and prostration, and the postures of sitting. The Hanbalis list hay'at as matters of manner: the fingers, the placing of the right hand over the left below the navel, the gaze at the place of prostration, and measured recitation. In discipline, most jurists lighten the punishment for the dignified, the people of religion and piety, relying on the saying 'pardon the lapses of the dignified except in the hadd punishments'. The jurists differ: some admonish but do not discipline a first lapse; Ibn Abd al-Salam holds the dignified are not punished at all, and al-Adhra'i disputes him.

• Hazl (jest in speech, and its effect on contracts, acts and belief)

  Hazl is jest, the opposite of seriousness; technically it is when a word is used without intending its meaning, literal or figurative. It is distinct from play (la'ib), banter (mizah), error (khata') and forced compliance (talja'). Jest does not affect capacity or choice of the act, but it does affect choice of the legal effect, so the act is taken as valid cause while the ruling is not desired. For contracts that can be cancelled, the Hanafis disagree: Abu Hanifa gives priority to the party who claims the jest was dropped, while the two companions hold the contract void when both agreed to proceed in jest. The Shafi'is hold a jester's sale valid in the sounder view, and the Hanbalis in the prevailing view void. For contracts that cannot be cancelled, such as divorce, manumission, return to a wife and vows, most jurists hold that jest and seriousness are equal, relying on the saying 'three things, in jest or earnest, are binding: marriage, divorce and return'. The Malikis differ in some cases. Most jurists hold a jester's marriage valid, while the Malikis hold it binding, and some hold it not binding where proof of jest exists. On khul' (divorce for compensation), Abu Hanifa and the two companions differ on whether the divorce takes effect and the compensation is due. The Hanbalis hold a gift or endowment made in jest void, and the Hanafis hold a bequest void for jest. Jest in admission: the Hanafis void it; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold the admission binding even if made in jest. In belief, a Muslim who speaks words of unbelief in jest is held to have apostatised by the majority, and a non-Muslim who professes Islam in jest is held a Muslim in the view of the Hanafis and Shafi'is; Ibn al-Qayyim holds the speaker bound by the words outwardly. Slander made in jest is punished by hadd according to the Shafi'is, and by discretionary punishment according to the Hanafis if the speaker habitually jests in that way.

• Hiba (gift: its pillars, the parties, the thing given, possession, return and conditions)

  Hiba in the lexical sense is giving a thing to another without return; technically it is transferring property without return at once. It differs from the wider atiya, from hadiya in that most jurists require acceptance in a gift, and from sadaqa, which seeks reward in the hereafter. Gifts are lawful by the Qur'an, the sunna and consensus, recommended, forbidden when meant for sin, aid to wrongdoing or bribery, and disliked when meant for show. The pillars are, for most jurists, the two parties, the thing given and the formula; for the Hanafis only the formula. The donor must be competent; the schools differ on the debt-bound, the feeble-minded, a dying man's gift beyond a third, and a father's gift of his son's property for a return. The gift of an unauthorized donor is void for most, suspended on approval for the Hanafis; a drunkard's gift depends on whether the drink was lawful. The thing given must exist, be owned by the donor and have value; most jurists disallow gifts of the non-existent or unknown, while the Malikis allow what can be moved. The schools differ on giving a debt to a third party and on an undivided share. On possession: the Hanafis, Shafi'is and one Hanbali view require it, with donor's leave and no encumbrance; the Malikis hold the gift binding by the contract, and a Hanbali view accepts an unpossessed gift of what is not measured. On the formula: the Hanafis count the offer alone as the pillar, the majority the offer and acceptance; acceptance may be by act; delayed acceptance is allowed by the Malikis and Hanbalis; a conditional gift is refused by the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis. Conditions attached to a gift: the majority void an invalid condition and keep the gift; the Malikis, Shafi'is and one Hanbali view void both. A gift for a return: most jurists allow it, the Shafi'is in the weaker view and one Hanbali view forbid it; its nature is a sale by the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, and a gift begun and sale completed by the Hanafis. Whether a return is due without stipulation: the Hanafis, Shafi'is and the Hanbali school do not require it except by statement; the Malikis and one Hanbali view require it by custom. Retraction: the majority forbid it except for the father in his son's gift; the Malikis extend it to the mother and ascendants; the Hanafis allow it with disapproval. Impediments to retraction: for the Hanafis, the thing's destruction, its passing out of the donee's hands, a joined increase, a return, kinship, marriage, alms, the death of either party, or change in the thing; for the Malikis, an increase or decline, a debt contracted on account of the gift, or the donee's illness; for the Shafi'is, leaving the donee's control; for the Hanbalis, leaving his ownership, others' interest in it, or an increase. A retraction is a dissolution for the Hanafis when made by judgment or by mutual consent (Zufar holds consent a new gift); the retracted thing returns to the donor, and the donee who holds it after retraction is not liable unless he exceeded.

• Hikma (purpose of a ruling in usul)

  In lexical use hikma is the knowledge of things as they are and acting on it; in the Quran it is applied to prophethood. For the usulis hikma is the benefit that follows from tying a ruling to its cause or occasion (securing a good or removing or reducing a harm), and it also names the fitting quality that suits the ruling. A cause (sabab) is an apparent, regular attribute that defines a ruling; an impediment (mani') is what, when present, excludes the cause or ruling. The illa is the attribute the lawgiver made the criterion of a ruling; the hikma is the benefit itself, which may be hard to measure or hidden, so the usulis dispute whether a ruling may be tied to the hikma.

• Hikr (long lease of waqf land)

  Hikr lexically means injustice, narrowness and hardship; its technical uses are three: the rent fixed on a property held under a long lease, the leased property itself, and the long lease. Ibn Abidin defines it as a lease whose purpose is to keep others out and to keep the land for building or planting, distinct from khulu and from the wider long lease. Hikr occurs mostly on waqf property, sometimes on private property; most jurists' discussion concerns waqf. A long lease of private property is lawful; for waqf the Hanafis and Malikis forbid exceeding a set term (generally three years for land among the Hanafis; four years for land and one year for a house for mosques and the poor among the Malikis). The Shafiis and Hanbalis allow long leases of waqf as need and benefit require; Ibn Qudama argues from the lease in the story of Moses and Shu'ayb. Where the founder forbids a long lease his condition binds; some Hanafi and Shafii jurists allow a device of consecutive yearly contracts unless the founder forbids it. Most jurists limit the long lease of waqf to conditions such as ruin of the waqf, lack of income to repair it, and no lender who can advance the sum. (On the ruling about leasing waqf land long-term the majority allow it with conditions: the waqf is ruined and its beneficiaries cannot use it, it has no income to repair it, and no lender will advance the needed sum below the rent for that term; the Hanafis add that the waqf cannot be exchanged for income-bearing property. The Hanbalis and most Shafiis allow it outright unless the founder forbids it, and some Shafiis forbid it altogether. When the administrator takes a sum from a person to repair the waqf and grants that person part of the usufruct as khulu, the payer owns that part and owes a permanent hikr on the rest. Only the administrator, who holds the power to lease, may grant hikr; the Maliki Adawi treats the custom in Egypt as a condition, so hikr leases run for ever; the Hanafis give the holder a right of settlement while his building stands and he pays the fair rent. A lease below the fair rent is void for gross undervaluation in the Hanafi view, and the jurists differ on liability; the fair rent may rise or fall during the term according to each school's rules. What the holder builds or plants with the permission of the judge or administrator is his absolute property, saleable, giftable and inheritable, while the soil remains waqf. Views differ on pre-emption over buildings, on endowing a building to another beneficiary, on the holder's death before building, and on the end of hikr when the building perishes. The entry closes at the next heading, hukm (حُكم), on p.7232. )

• Hila (legal device)

  Hila (legal device) is lexically skill in arranging affairs and turning the mind to reach the aim; technically it is a hidden path to an end, often with some baseness but sometimes wisdom. It is distinguished from deceit, delusion, planning, plotting, guile, allusion and the means to evil (dhari'a). Devices are lawful or unlawful by their standing: lawful devices free one from sin or reach what is lawful or due, and do not undo a lawful principle; some are unlawful means to a lawful end. Devices are of three kinds: one is unlawful in itself but aimed at a lawful end, like a false witness brought to prove a right; one is lawful in itself but aimed at a forbidden end, like travelling to rob; one is not meant for the forbidden but used for it. Lawful devices are backed by proofs: escape from the unbelievers, the use of lawful causes, the utterance of unbelief under compulsion to save life, and escape from the unlawful to the lawful as in the case of the sick man's bundle of twigs and the Khaybar dates. Unlawful devices rest on deceit and fraud; examples include the marriage of the one who restores a divorced wife, the 'sale of return' (inah), the Jews' trick with fat, and their trick on the Sabbath.

• Hilf (alliance and inheritance by alliance)

  Hilf is lexically a covenant or alliance for mutual support; in pre-Islamic Arabia alliances bound an individual to a clan, two individuals, or two clans, as in the alliance of the perfumed and the alliance of the virtuous. The ally protected his partner and bore his offences, and Islam forbade alliances for wrong or for inheritance beyond blood kin. The hadith 'no alliance in Islam, and whatever alliance existed in the age of ignorance Islam only strengthened' is read by some as forbidding alliances for inheritance and support in wrong, and by others as allowing alliances for good and for right. Inheritance by alliance was first practised and then abrogated, and the jurists differ on the abrogating verse. The majority hold inheritance by alliance abrogated; the Hanafis, al-Hakam, Hammad and a report from Ahmad hold it survives after the other heirs. For the Hanafis an alliance holder pays the blood-money for his patron and cannot shift his loyalty without consent; the majority deny that any blood-money arises from alliance. An alliance between two groups is allowed by some scholars for mutual support in right and the removal of wrong, and forbidden by most on the apparent reading of the hadith. The entry closes at the next headword, halq (حلق), on p.7261.

• Hilya (jewellery and its ruling)

  Hilya lexically is ornament made of worked metals or precious stones. A man may not wear gold ornaments in any form, except for need, as an artificial nose or tooth, which the majority allow; the Malikis and Hanbalis allow gold on a sword's hilt, while the Hanafis and Shafiis forbid gold on weapons. A man may wear a silver ring; the Malikis limit its weight to two lawful dirhams, and the Hanbalis have three opinions on other silver ornaments. The jurists agree that women may wear gold and silver ornaments so long as they are not extravagant or imitate men; all three schools forbid a woman to decorate weapons with gold or silver as an imitation of men. Gilding with gold or silver is allowed to men by the Hanafis, Malikis and the sounder Shafii view if no metal is recovered by fire; the Hanbalis forbid it on vessels. The three imams allow men gems; the Shafiis and some Hanbalis dislike it for men as women's dress or extravagance. The jurists agree that iron, brass and tin rings are disliked for men and women; al-Nawawi holds that they are not. Zakat is due on ornaments kept for forbidden use and hoarded ones; for ornaments worn lawfully the Malikis, Hanbalis and the old Shafii view exempt them, while the Hanafis and the new Shafii view require zakat, citing reports from Aisha, Ibn Umar, Asma and others. Breakage changes the zakat position, hiring ornaments is allowed by the Shafiis and Hanbalis, and they also accept an endowment of ornaments, which the Hanafis refuse. The entry closes at the next headword, hima (حمى), on p.7283.

• Hima (protected reserve)

  A reserved pasture closed to all but those for whom it is set aside; in Ibn Hisham the Prophet set a hima around the village of Jurash with marked boundaries for the horse, the riding camel and the plough-ox, declaring the property of any outsider who grazed it forfeit, and wrote to Hamdan that the heights and lowlands of their land were theirs to graze while they prayed and paid zakat. Al-Hamdani's gazetteer still maps the tribal himas by name two centuries on — the hima of Dariyya, of the Qutayf and of the Nuta among them.

• Hima (protected pasture)

  Hima lexically is a place protected from people grazing in it; technically it is a stretch of waste land that the ruler protects for particular herds. The rule is prohibition, since it narrows the common ground, on the saying 'no protection except for God and His messenger'. The majority allow the ruler to protect pasture for the horses of fighters, the herds of the poll tax, the camels of zakat and weak herds under conditions; the Prophet is reported to have protected al-Naqi' for Muslim horses and al-Rabadha for zakat camels, and Umar and Uthman did the same. Conditions include that it be set by the ruler or his deputy, serve the Muslims, not be private property, and be small; the ruler may not reserve it for himself. Officials may not take payment from herders for waste or protected pasture; the ruler should appoint an agent to admit the herds of the weak and bar those of the strong. A violator who continues after being warned may be disciplined. The protection set by the Prophet stands and reviving such land is void; for protections set by later rulers the Shafiis have two views on whether reviving confers ownership, and the Hanbalis have two views, the preferred one holding that revival confers ownership by the hadith on reviving dead land. A protection set by a ruler other than the Prophet may be annulled when the public interest requires it; the Prophet's protection is not annulled.

• Hiqqa (a camel of four years)

  A hiqqa is a camel that has entered its fourth year, and the female is called hiqqa; the name is taken from its fitness to be ridden and loaded and to be covered by the stallion. Related terms: ibn makhad and bint makhad (second year), ibn labun and bint labun (third year), and jadha'a and jadhaa (fifth year), the last age of camels counted for zakat. The jurists agree that a hiqqa is due for 46 to 60 camels, and two hiqqas for 91 to 120; the mawsu'a grounds this on Anas's narration of the Prophet's charity rulings in Sahih al-Bukhari. Its rules are treated in the zakat book under camels and in the blood-money articles, where they stiffen or lighten the diya.

• Hiyaza (possession and its effect on title)

  Hiyaza lexically is gathering and taking something into one's hand; technically it is laying hands on a thing and controlling it, and it equals taking possession. Al-Hattab gives three grades: the weakest is dwelling or farming, next building, planting and exploitation, and strongest a disposition by sale, gift, charity, manumission or any act an owner does with his property. For most jurists possession and taking delivery are one; laying the hand may mean ownership or management, and it counts in the weighing of proofs. Possession is lawful when it comes by reviving dead land, hunting, gathering grass, mines, treasure trove and found property, or by contract, and unlawful when by usurpation, theft or brigandage. Ibn Rushd holds that possession is evidence of ownership and does not transfer it; its weight depends on its duration, the claimant's relation to the possessor and the nature of the thing. On conflicting proofs, the Hanafis and a Hanbali view prefer the claimant's proof, while the Shafiis and Malikis prefer the possessor's; the Malikis have detailed rules on the grades of possession, the claimant's presence and knowledge, the length of silence, and bars such as fear, incapacity or youth. On the Maliki view the period is ten years, the sound view by the hadith 'whoever possesses a thing for ten years owns it', with a view of seven years and a view leaving it to the judge; between relatives and partners it exceeds forty years, and between father and son the view differs. For movables the rule differs: clothes and beasts are judged by discretion, and possession of property between relatives, in-laws and clients has its own grades. The effect of a sale or a gift depends on whether the owner was present, objected or was silent, and a right is not lost by a late claim. Where the right is fixed by a judgement or a sound deed, possession avails nothing, and possession only avails where the origin of ownership is unknown.

• Hukm (legal ruling)

  Hukm means judgement, lexically a prevention. For the majority of usulis the legal ruling is the address of the lawgiver concerning the acts of the obliged, by demand, choice or stipulation; for the jurists it is the effect of that address, such as obligation. The majority count five kinds of legal ruling (obligatory, recommended, permitted, forbidden, disliked); the Hanafis add two (wajib, and disliked-as-forbidden). The majority equate fard and wajib, the Hanafis separate them. The ruling by stipulation includes cause, condition, impediment, dispensation or strictness, and validity or nullity. The entry refers the reader to the separate headwords and to the usuli appendix for the details.

• Hukumat al-adl (assessed compensation)

  Hukuma is lexically a noun from hakama and means restraining the wrongdoer. In jurisprudence the hukuma of fairness is the sum fixed by a just assessor for a wound with no prescribed amount, the assessment resting on the judge's or arbiter's reasoning. In principle every injury short of death with no retaliation or fixed compensation carries a hukuma. Its conditions: the injury has no fixed compensation in the law, the hukuma does not exceed the fixed compensation of the organ, the assessment comes after healing, and a judge or arbiter gives it. On the method, the majority value the victim as if a slave and take the loss of value; others liken the wound to the nearest injury with a fixed sum, and cite a narration attributed to Ali for a tongue injury. The Maliki position holds that a wound healed without a scar carries no payment beyond the fixed sum, and the scarred head and face wounds are disputed.

• Human rights — the violations file in the Arab world

  The 'Al-Wasatiyya' episode on the human-rights file in the Arab world. The youth voted: 69% judged international covenants practically worthless and 19% of limited use; 72% judged the Arab person's situation worse than others' and 10% saw no difference; and only 9% endorsed international intervention while 65% saw the solution as internal. Panelists discussed causes — the culture of despotism and media that does not teach rights (14 of the top-20 watched programmes are serial dramas) — and advised starting with non-political rights to avoid collision.

• The sanctity of a Muslim's blood

  The inviolability of the blood of one who testifies that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His messenger, lifted in only three cases as in Ibn Masud's hadith in the two Sahihs — 'the previously-married adulterer, a life for a life, and the one who abandons his religion, leaving the community' — Uthman's version in al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasa'i and Ibn Majah running 'disbelieves after his Islam, commits adultery after being chaste, or kills a soul without due cause', with one of al-Nasa'i's routes spelling out the ruling in each; Ibn Rajab calls these three the claim of Islam by which blood may lawfully be shed, transmits that killing for each is agreed among Muslims, that Muslims agree the previously-married adulterer's hadd is stoning until death — the Prophet having stoned Ma'iz and the Ghamidiyya woman — that stoning stood among what was abrogated from the Quran's wording, and that Ibn Abbas derived it from al-Ma'ida's 'you used to hide of the scripture'; Umar's version adds his fear that a time would come when people, not finding stoning in God's book, would stray by abandoning an obligation God sent down.

• Iddah (waiting period)

  Iddah in fiqh is the waiting period a woman observes after divorce or widowhood before she may remarry; the Kuwaiti Fiqh Encyclopedia treats it across its chapters, from the term of the iddah to the supervening iddah and residence in the iddah home.

• Idhn (permission: the Lawgiver's, the owner's, the right holder's and the judge's)

  In law, idhn is permission to act, making an act lawful, and it is general or specific according to the person permitted and the act, time or place. It comes from the Lawgiver for ease, lifting hardship and making forbidden things lawful in necessity; from the owner over his property; from the holder of a right over his right; and from the judge where the validity of an act depends on his leave. ${S} p.2025} ${S} p.2026} ${S} p.2028} ${S} p.2030} ${S} p.2031}

• Idrak (attaining: catching up with a prayer, reaching a term, and the right to one's own property)

  In law, idrak (attaining) means catching up and reaching a stage, and it may be figurative, as when a price binds a buyer. Its main rulings concern attaining the obligatory prayer and the merit of congregational prayer; in dealings, whoever finds his own property with another has the better claim to it, and the guarantee of eviction rests on this.

• Ihmal (neglect or carelessness as a ground for liability, and the rule that speech is to be given effect rather than left void)

  Ihmal is lexically leaving a thing neglected; the technical sense keeps this meaning. Neglect in a trust that leads to its loss makes the trustee liable, since a trustee is liable only for excess or neglect. The neglect of a private hired worker creates liability, and a shared worker is liable by the majority. The neglect of a skilled practitioner, such as a doctor, circumciser or teacher, makes him liable for what follows, as does a cutter who exceeds his mandate in retaliation or in the hand cut for theft. The rule is that speech is to be given effect rather than left void; when neither the literal nor the figurative sense is possible, the speech is left void, as in a claim that a living man has been killed by his heir, or that a child of known lineage is one's son.

• Ikrah (duress or compulsion)

  Duress is an act done to another that removes his consent or spoils his choice. Coercion without right is a major sin, and the Hanafis alone divide it into compelling and non-compelling. For the Hanafis, duress removes consent and corrupts choice: a confession made under it is void, a sale made under it is defective, while marriages, divorces, vows and oaths made under it stand. The conditions are the coercer's power to carry out the threat, the victim's fear, and a threat of killing or of losing a limb. Duress removes the hadd penalty from the one compelled, because it is a doubt.

• Ilgha' (annulment or cancellation, and the principle of removing a difference)

  Ilgha' means annulment in the lexical sense. For the jurists it is the removal of a ruling after the thing or its act has occurred, and it is close to faskh (rescission) and isqat (waiver). Transactions the Law does not allow are void, and conditions that contradict a text are void while the contract stands; conditions that secure a contract are valid. The usulis use ilgha' also for removing the difference between root and branch in analogy.

• Ilgha' al-fariq (removing the difference between root and branch)

  Ilgha' al-fariq is the usuli demonstration that the difference between root and branch has no effect on the ruling in analogy, so the ruling holds for what they share. An example is extending the manumission of part of a slave to a slave-girl, or extending the false-accusation penalty to men on the ground that womanhood is no difference. It differs from tanqih al-manat and from sabr wa taqsim, and the analogy that rests on it is called the analogy in the same sense as the root.

• Ilhaq (attaching one thing to another: analogy, lineage, and accessories)

  Ilhaq is following in the lexical sense. Jurists use it in two senses: attaching a branch to a root by a shared cause, which is analogy, and ascribing a child of unknown lineage to the one who claims him, on conditions. Its applications include the fetus of a slaughtered animal joining its dam for the majority, young livestock joining the adult in zakat, and the accessories of a sold thing, such as a fetus in the sale of its dam.

• The science of inheritance shares

  The science of inheritance shares, anchored in the forty-third hadith — the first of Ibn Rajab's additions — as the text that gathers the rulings of succession: 'give the fixed shares to their people; whatever the shares leave over goes to the nearest male' — so those named for fixed portions in the Book take them first, then the nearest male agnate claims the residue, on the view of a group of imams including Ahmad and Ishaq; upon it turns the dispute of the sister alongside the daughter — Ibn Abbas's and the Zahiris' position that she inherits the residue by agnation versus the majority of Umar, Ali, A'isha, Zayd, Ibn Masud and Mu'adh that she is residuayer with her — and to the hadith attach further the controversy over the distant kindred's share and the sense of 'a male man' (Jami' al-Ulum wal-Hikam pp. 846–847).

• Iltisaq (adhesion of things, and its rulings)

  Iltisaq is the joining of one thing to another with no gap between them. It may happen by itself or by intent, and it carries rulings: for the Hanafis, a neighbour whose house adjoins a house on a through street has priority of pre-emption, and a splint fixed to a wound allows wiping over it in ablution. Some joining is obligatory, such as the forehead touching the ground in prostration; some is forbidden, such as two men or two women under one cloth without a barrier.

• Iltizam (binding obligation in fiqh)

  Iltizam means binding oneself, and an agreement is a binding of offer and acceptance. Its causes are voluntary acts; some modern writers add harmful acts, unjust enrichment and the Law, which the classical jurists call imposition rather than obligation. Non-Hanafi jurists count four pillars: the formula, the one who binds, the party bound to, and the object. Binding contracts, covenants, vows and duties to people must be fulfilled, while promises and gratuitous contracts that may be revoked need not be. Obligations end by performance, release, rescission, set-off and other causes.

• Ilzam (imposing an obligation on another)

  Ilzam is establishing and maintaining; it is making a thing binding on another, and it differs from iyjab (obligation by order) and ikrah (compulsion) and iltizam (binding oneself). In principle one person may not impose on another, and compulsion comes from God or from the authority of the ruler, who must enforce the Law; whoever refuses a right owed to people is compelled to pay, and imposing injustice is forbidden.

• Imhal (granting time or respite)

  Imhal in the lexical sense is granting delay and postponing a demand; it is the opposite of hastening. One whose poverty is proven must be given time until he is able to pay, citing the Quranic verse in al-Baqara (2:280). A man impotent with his wife is given a year by most jurists, the one who swore off intercourse four months, and a claimant is given time to bring his proof, while respite is refused where immediacy is required, such as the option to return a defective sale or pre-emption.

• Indibat (the controllability of a feature, as a condition for legal causes)

  Indibat is not found in the older lexicons; the modern dictionary gives its verb from dabata, to hold firm, and it means in usage falling under a rule, a general judgement, so that a thing becomes known. Among the conditions of a cause for the usulis is that it be a controllable feature (wasf mundabit) of the wisdom, and not a bare wisdom that cannot be controlled, as hardship is controlled by its likely cause, travel. A suitable feature is controlled in three ways: by itself, by custom, or by the law through its likely cause. Examples in fiqh include the controlled description of the goods in a forward sale (salam) and the controlled injury in retaliation for wounds short of death.

• Indiras (the effacing of a thing's marks: mosques, endowments, graves and dead land)

  Indiras is the effacing of a thing's marks while its trace remains. Its ruling depends on its subject. A mosque left unused remains a mosque for Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf; Muhammad held it returns to the founder, and the Hanbalis allow selling part of it to repair the rest. An endowment that cannot yield anything may be exchanged by most Hanafis with the judge's leave, the Malikis allow exchanging movable endowments, and the Shafi'is are strict. A Muslim grave that has become earth may be opened and reused according to most scholars. The revival of effaced dead land is disputed: the Shafi'is and Hanbalis keep it for its first owner.

• Infirad (acting alone, and when a power may be exercised by one of several holders)

  Infirad is lexically the reflexive of tafarrud, to stand alone, and the jurists use it in that sense. It arises in several places. Where equal guardians of a woman dispute who shall marry her, the Shafi'is and Hanbalis draw lots, the Malikis leave it to the judge, and the Hanafis allow each to marry her. Two agents may act alone when the principal gives that power to each, and the Hanafis allow one to act alone in matters that need no joint judgement, such as litigation. In a partnership of trade on general terms, each partner may act alone by agreement of the jurists. Where a testator names two executors together, the majority hold that neither may act alone unless he allows it.

• Infisakh (the dissolution of a contract by itself, by the parties, or by a supervening cause)

  Infisakh is lexically the reflexive of fasakh, meaning undoing and passing away. For the jurists it is the dissolution of a contract either of itself or by the will of the parties or one of them. Fasakh is undoing the tie by the will of one or both parties or by a judge; infisakh may be its result or the result of a cause beyond the parties' will. A continuing contract such as a hire dissolves when its object perishes, but an immediate contract does not dissolve after receipt. The Hanafis hold a hire dissolved by the death of a party who made it for himself; the majority hold it not dissolved. Non-binding contracts such as loan, agency and partnership are generally dissolved by the death or madness of a party. A sale is dissolved by the claim of a third party or by usurpation in some schools. A contract before dissolution exists and has effect, whereas for the Hanafis a void contract has no existence at all. A continuing contract is dissolved from that moment, an immediate one is undone from its origin.

• Inha (informing another judge of a ruling or of a claim, so that he may carry it out; and the sense of completion)

  Inha is lexically informing and reporting, as one says ‘I informed the ruler of the matter’, and also completing and finishing. The Malikis and Shafi'is use it to mean informing another judge of one's ruling so that he may carry it out, or of what has come before one short of a ruling, such as a claim heard so that the other may complete it; this may be done in person, by letter, or before two witnesses.

• Islamic inheritance system

  Al-Bahi reads the Islamic inheritance system as breaking up inherited wealth rather than keeping it whole: fixed shares stated in fractions prevent accumulation and push heirs to work (pp. 135-136). He contrasts it with a European system that kept a title and estate in one heir's hand (p. 137). On bequests he reads the hadith 'no bequest to an heir' as a rule against shifting wealth back toward heirs, and holds that the bequest stops at one third, citing the report of Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas (pp. 140, 142). These are the author's readings.

• Inhilal (dissolution, invalidation and the ending of an obligation)

  Inhilal in the lexical sense is coming apart; for the jurists it means invalidity, dissolution, rescission and cancellation. It is applied properly to ending what was formed. It occurs mostly in oaths, divorce and contracts: an oath is dissolved when its condition occurs, when the object of the pledge ceases, by breaking it, by an exception, or, for some jurists, by the ending of the marital bond. Contracts are dissolved by rescission by either side, by mutual consent, by judgement or by iqala (mutual cancellation).

• Inkar (denial in a claim, its forms and its effects, and denial of religious matters)

  Inkar in lexical use means ignorance of a thing, negation, and changing a wrong; for the jurists it means denial (jahd) and changing what is wrong. Denial is made in clear speech, and the jurists differ on words such as ‘you have no right over me’, which some count as denial. The proof lies on the claimant and the oath on the one who denies: if the claimant brings proof he wins; if the denier refuses the oath, the Hanafis and Hanbalis judge against him, while the Malikis and Shafi'is do not, unless the oath is returned to the claimant. The defendant's silence is treated in several ways: as denial for Abu Yusuf and the Shafi'is, as refusal (nukul) for the Malikis and Hanbalis. The majority hold that one who denies a deposit or a loan is not cut by the hand for theft. Where a person retracts an acknowledgement of a right of God, the jurists differ; a right of people cannot be retracted. A person who denies a matter of religion is not declared an unbeliever unless it is universally known as part of religion.

• Inqad (the forming and binding of an act, contract or office)

  Inqad is lexically the opposite of dissolution, and carries the senses of obligation, binding and confirmation. For the jurists it varies with the subject: the forming of a worship is its valid beginning, and the forming of a contract is the binding of offer to acceptance in the manner the law requires. It differs from validity, which is reached only when all pillars and conditions are complete, whereas forming may occur before the conditions are complete. A contract may be formed by words or by act, as the mu'atah is by most jurists. What is void is by agreement not formed; the forming of invalid transactions is disputed. The imamate is formed by the choice of those who loose and bind, or by the appointment of the previous holder with their allegiance.

• Inqida (the ending of a thing by reaching its purpose, its term or a cause, and its rulings)

  Inqida is the reflexive of qada, meaning passing away and ceasing, and in another use completion and exit. A contract ends when its aim or purpose is achieved, as with a hire for a fixed term, an agency to buy, a pledge when the debt is paid, or a surety when he pays or is released; it also ends by rescission, by dissolution for invalidity, or by impossibility such as the loss of a fungible object before delivery. A waiting period ends by childbirth, by the lapse of months or by the cycles, and custody ends at the child's puberty, with the schools differing in the detail. A vow of abstinence (ila') ends by return, expiation or the passing of four months, and the wiping over socks ends with the obligatory washing, removal or the lapse of the period. Where the parties dispute whether the ending has occurred, the word lies with the one who denies it.

• Intifa' (the right of use and benefit, and its rulings)

  Intifa' in the lexical sense is reaching a benefit. It names a personal right of use that cannot pass to another, and ownership of the benefit, which can be transferred. The difference is that the cause of the right of use is wider than the cause of owned benefit, and that bare use is a weaker right than owned benefit. Use is obligatory when needed to save life, forbidden when the thing is forbidden, and permitted when the thing is lawful. Its causes are permission, necessity and contract; it is bound by conditions, by custom and by the owner's leave.

• Intihab (taking by force what is grabbed or distributed)

  Intihab is taking a thing by force and contest. It differs from stealth, from usurpation and from pilfering the booty before division. It has three kinds: taking what the owner has not permitted, which is forbidden by agreement; taking what has been thrown open, such as the sweets thrown at a wedding, where the jurists differ between disliked and forbidden; and taking what the owner allowed to be shared equally, such as a banquet, which is forbidden because it goes beyond the permitted share.

• Intihar (self-killing: its kinds and the jurists' rulings)

  Intihar is a person killing himself by any means. The jurists divide it into killing by an act, which is a forbidden deed, and killing by refusing what is obligatory. It is forbidden by agreement and counted among the greatest sins; most jurists hold that the one who kills himself does not leave Islam, so he is washed and prayed over, although the hadith warn severely. There is neither retaliation nor diya for one who kills himself; the rulings on compulsion and on ordering a killing differ.

• Intiqal (transfer or passage: of a thing, a duty, a right and a ruling)

  Intiqal in the lexical sense is moving from one place to another, and used figuratively for a change of state. A duty passes to its substitute when the original cannot be done: ablution to tayammum, standing to sitting, fasting to a ransom, a debt to its value. Some rights pass to heirs and others do not, depending on whether they concern property or the person of the deceased; a rule also passes, as a waiting period passes from divorce to widowhood.

• Intishar (spreading; erection, and spreading of a report)

  Intishar in the lexical sense is spreading or extending. The jurists use it in two senses: the stiffening of the male member and the spreading of a thing. The first matters for whether a triply divorced woman becomes lawful to her former husband after another marriage, and for compulsion to fornication; the second matters for proof of the new moon by a widely spread report.

• Iqrar (confession or acknowledgement of a right)

  Iqrar means acknowledgement in the lexical sense, and in the majority's technical sense it is the report that a right belongs to another person against the one who reports it. It differs from a claim and from testimony in that iqrar reports a right that existed before the speaker and its ruling is limited to him. It is obligatory in rights of people, and its authority rests on the Qur'an, the Sunna, consensus and reason; the Sunna gives the stoning of Ma'iz and of the Ghamidiyya on their own confession. Its effect is to show what was acknowledged, that is, to establish the right in the past and not to create it from the start, and its force is limited to the one who confesses. The confessor must be sane, free in choosing, and not under suspicion; the recipient must be known, and the thing acknowledged must have value; an acknowledgement of an unspecified thing is valid, and the confessor is required to specify it. Qualifications such as an exception, a conditional clause tied to a will, or a later retraction can affect it; the majority accept retraction in rights of God that fall away under doubt, and do not accept it in rights of people.

• Iqta' in fiqh (the ruler's grant of land)

  In fiqh, iqta' is the ruler's grant of a land or a right to use it, from dead land or from the public treasury. There are two kinds, the grant of use and the grant of ownership. It is permitted under conditions, and the Prophet's grant to al-Zubayr of the ground his horse ran over in the dead land of al-Naqi' is its basis. The ruler may recall a grant if the holder does not cultivate it within the period the jurists set, and they differ on that period. The majority do not allow granting public utilities or what the Muslims cannot do without.

• Iradah (will and intention: its place in contracts, acts and consent)

  In law, iradah is the purpose of a thing and the turning towards it, distinct from intention (niyya), contentment (rida) and choice (ikhtiyar). It counts only when it comes from a competent person; an agent's or guardian's will may stand in for the principal's; contracts are made by the will of both parties, unilateral acts by one will alone, and error or duress allow the affected party an option to annul.

• Irdaf (riding behind another)

  Irdaf is the verbal noun of ardafa, to make someone ride behind oneself, and the jurists use it in the same sense. A man may carry a man, and a woman a woman, if it does not lead to harm or the stirring of desire; a man may carry his wife, and a wife her husband; a man may carry an unlawful female kinswoman when desire is safe. A man carrying a non-mahram woman, or a woman carrying a non-mahram man, is forbidden to block the means to what is unlawful. If a hirer of an animal makes another ride behind him without the owner's permission, and the animal perishes because of the pillion, he is liable for half its value according to the Hanafis, the whole value according to the Malikis and Shafi'is, and the whole value is the preferred view of the Hanbalis.

• Irjaf (spreading alarm)

  Irjaf in the lexicon is violent agitation; it is also used for dwelling on bad news and mentioning strife, because it causes agitation among people. In the usage of the jurists it is seeking strife and spreading lies and falsehood to cause distress.

• Irsad (assigning the revenue of bayt al-mal)

  Irsad is the imam's assignment of the yield of some bayt al-mal lands to some of its expenditures, and for the Hanafis also the assignment of a waqf's revenue to pay its debts. Its nature is disputed: it is either not a waqf, since the assignor owns nothing of what he assigns, or a waqf, since the sultan acts as agent for the Muslims. It is lawful by agreement, and obligatory where public interests cannot be secured without it; it differs from iqta' and hima.

• Irsal (sending; the mursal report)

  Irsal in the lexicon is release, neglect, direction and empowerment; in the jurists' usage it covers letting the hands hang in prayer, letting the turban's end hang, and sending a messenger with money or a letter. In hadith it is a Successor's report that omits the companion and goes straight to the Prophet, and its authority is disputed. In the rulings, a contract or divorce by messenger or letter is valid under its conditions, the sent thing remains the sender's property until the addressee takes it, and liability follows the circumstances.

• Irshad (guidance)

  Irshad means guidance and pointing the way. The usulis treat it as a figurative meaning of the command, the teaching of a worldly matter, distinct from nadb by its worldly benefit. For the jurists it is pointing people to good and counselling them, which is obligatory when done gently, a benefit is likely and no harm is feared to oneself or one's property.

• Irtifaq (the rights of use attached to property: the public places, the house's amenities and the watercourses)

  In law, irtifaq is a right of use attached to property, either for another property or for the public, such as amenities, watercourses and water shares. It arises from the Lawgiver's leave, the owner's leave or the requirement of a transaction; its basic ruling is permissibility so long as no harm is done; its duration is fixed by the term or the customary measure; and whoever reaches a public place first has the better claim to it while his goods remain there.

• Irtithath (the wounded man carried from the battle still alive, and his rulings for washing, prayer and the rank of martyr)

  In law, irtithath is a wounded man carried from the battle while still faintly alive; such a man is the mutarrath. The jurists require that his life have settled: he spoke, ate, drank, slept, bought or sold, or survived for a customary time, and then died. The mutarrath is washed and prayed over, does not have the rulings of a martyr in this world, but is a martyr in reward by agreement when he dies after the battle with unbelievers; the case of a rebel carried away is disputed.

• Khabar (report and its kinds; its evidential force)

  Khabar (report) lexically is what is conveyed and spoken of; among the traditionists it usually means the same as hadith, athar is wider, and naba' is a report of great benefit. A report about a particular matter is confession, testimony or claim; a report about a general matter is narration, judgement or legal opinion. A trusted man's report that water, cloth or food is impure is accepted when he states the cause; an unbeliever, a sinner or a madman is not believed in impurity, and the discerning child is disputed. The report of a trusted man about the qibla is accepted by the majority; the unbeliever, the mad and the non-discerning child are rejected, and the discerning child and the sinner are disputed. On the sighting of the Ramadan crescent, the Shafiis, Hanbalis and a Hanafi report accept one just witness; the Hanafis require several witnesses when the sky is clear. On the Ramadan crescent, the Malikis require the completion of thirty days of Sha'ban or the sighting by two or more just men, a view also held by a Shafii opinion and a report of Ahmad, from the hadith 'fast on its sighting and break fast on its sighting; if it is hidden from you, complete thirty days'.

• Khadhf (throwing small pebbles; stoning the jamarat)

  Khadhf is lexically throwing a pebble or stone held between two fingers, or with a wooden catapult or sling; it means throwing small pebbles with the fingertips, and can also mean the sling itself. Related words (hadhf, qadhf, ilqa') share the sense of throwing, but khadhf is a particular manner of throwing. The root ruling is the report that the Prophet forbade khadhf, because it neither kills game nor wounds an enemy, and it blinds the eye and breaks the tooth. Jurists differ: some forbid it absolutely (Qadi Iyad); others weigh benefit and permit it in war or hunting when it does not usually kill, Ibn Hajar distinguishing by the likely outcome; Taqi al-Din disliked pellet-throwing in all cases. Stone-throwing is allowed in war, training or unpaid contests. Jurists also differ on what the reports on stoning the jamarat settle: the size of the pebble, the manner of throwing, or both. The Hanafis give three manners and prefer holding the pebble between thumb and forefinger; they read the report about khadhf-sized pebbles as fixing size, not manner. The Malikis agree on manner; the Shafiis call the khadhf grip disliked and prefer another; the Hanbalis name no particular manner. On size there is agreement that the pebble should be small like khadhf pebbles, with differing measures: a bean for the Hanafis, a broad bean or a date stone for the Malikis, a broad bean for the Shafiis, and between a chickpea and a hazelnut for the Hanbalis. Among its rulings is stoning the jamarat with khadhf-size pebbles, a rite of the Hajj, on the basis of the instruction to take pebbles of that size and the warning against excess in religion. Game killed by khadhf pebbles is not lawful, as the pebble counts as a blow that kills without a cut.

• Khafa' (hidden meaning in usul)

  Khafa\' is lexically concealment or disclosure of a thing, one of the words with two opposite senses, and the jurists use it for being hidden; for the usulis it is a word whose meaning is hidden by something in the form of the word or outside it. It is near to ishtibah, confusion, and to jahl, belief in a thing contrary to what it is; hiddenness may cause ignorance of existence or of place. The usulis divide words by the degree of hidden meaning into four ranks; the first, the hidden (khafi), is one whose meaning is obscured by something outside the form, as with the word thief which is hidden for the pickpocket and the grave-robber; the hiddenness may add or lessen what the ruling depends on, and the grave-robber is disputed: cut by the majority, not cut by Abu Hanifa and Muhammad. The second rank, the ambiguous (mushkil), is one whose meaning is obscured by entering a form that is not known except by a sign that marks it off. The hidden is the lowest rank and needs a little reflection; the ambiguous needs effort and inquiry; the general needs a clarifying statement from the lawgiver, and the unclear is the highest rank, calling for suspension and submission; the non-Hanafi schools treat all these as the general. Example of the ambiguous: the verse on coming to your tilth as you wish has a word shared by where and how; context shows "how". The general includes prayer, zakat and usury. The unclear includes the disjoined letters at the head of some chapters and some divine attributes. Hidden meaning and claims: a claim that contradicts itself is not heard, but contradictions born of hidden matters are forgiven, as with heirs who did not know a sale of the rest of a house by their father; claims of descent, freedom or divorce are heard on the same ground. The Hanbalis do not hear evidence after denial, unless the claimant then finds it. Hidden impurity: if the place of an impurity on cloth or body is unknown, the whole is washed by the majority; the Hanafis accept washing one part in one view; on a wide place the Shafiis and Hanbalis allow sprinkling or praying anywhere, and the Malikis have two views. If one doubts impurity while sure of prior purity, prayer is valid by the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis; the Malikis distinguish the body and cloth. Hidden defects in sale: defects inside melons, nuts and eggs give the right to return the goods; the Hanafis award the shortfall if the goods can still be used; the Malikis do not return for an inner defect unless the thing is changed; the Shafiis and Hanbalis separate by value. A hidden debt appearing after the estate has been divided: if the heirs settle it, the division stands; if they refuse, the division is annulled.

• Khafara (guarding, safe-conduct, escort fee)

  Khafara is lexically guard, protection and safe-conduct, the guard is a khafir, and khafara also means the guard\'s fee; the jurists also call it the escort, a group that goes before a caravan to guard it. Ruling: guarding may be a duty, as a body guarding another during the prayer of fear, a recommended watch on the frontiers, or lawful when hired for a lawful work; safe-conduct is lawful where it serves the Muslims and must be granted to one asking to hear God\'s word. In the Hajj: security of the road is a condition of ability; if pilgrims must hire a guard, the Hanafis, Malikis and one Hanbali view hold that a small fee that does not ruin them, given with assurance against betrayal, does not excuse the Hajj; the Shafiis and most Hanbalis treat it as a bribe that need not be paid; for the Shafiis a guard hired at the going rate is a duty of the pilgrimage. On guards\' liability: most jurists do not hold guards liable, as they are trustees unless they transgress or neglect; any stipulation making guards liable in markets is disregarded. Khafara as a covenant between God and His servants: a Muslim is under God\'s protection while obedient, and one who disobeys has broken faith; Ibn Hajar draws from the report on praying in our prayer that the one who abandons prayer may be killed in the view of some. The dawn prayer is under God\'s protection; al-Qadi Iyad says one must not molest the one who prays dawn with a claim. Khafara as the safe-conduct among people: the protection of Muslims is one, and the least of them may grant it; whoever betrays a Muslim\'s protection is cursed; when protection is given to enemies, killing or taking their goods is forbidden, and one who asks it to hear God\'s word is granted it and returned to his place of safety.

• Khal (maternal uncle; inheritance and guardianship)

  Khal (maternal uncle) lexically is the mother's brother however far up; the mother's sister is the khala. By consensus the maternal uncle is among the kin who are not sharers or agnates, and inherits as such. The Hanafis and Hanbalis let the maternal uncle inherit when agnates and sharers are absent, on the Quranic verse on the closer of kin and the saying 'the maternal uncle inherits from one who has no heir'; the Malikis and Shafiis deny him inheritance, and the estate goes to the treasury. On the maternal uncle's guardianship of a minor girl in marriage, the majority deny it since he is not an agnate, while the Hanafis let him marry her when no nearer guardian exists. The maternal uncle has no guardianship over a minor's property, on which the jurists agree.

• Khala' (privy; relieving oneself)

  Khala' is lexically an empty place, then by custom the building for relief, called the privy, the place of ease or the toilet; the verb takhalla means to relieve oneself. Among the manners the jurists give: enter with the left foot saying the formula of seeking refuge from evil spirits, following the report of Anas; details of relief are under the entry on relieving oneself.

• Khala (maternal aunt)

  The khala (maternal aunt) is the mother's sister, the mother being whoever bore one, in fact or by extension. A maternal or milk-aunt is forbidden in marriage by consensus, by the Quranic list of the forbidden and the saying that what is forbidden by kinship is forbidden by suckling. As a kinswoman by blood she is among the kin who are not sharers or agnates, and her inheritance is disputed: the Shafiis and Malikis deny it, the Hanafis and Hanbalis grant it when agnates and sharers are absent. She has the right of custody; the majority deny maintenance to her, the Hanafis oblige maintenance to a blood aunt; a milk-aunt has neither custody nor maintenance.

• Khall (vinegar: ruling, purity and sale)

  Vinegar is valuable clean property, lawful to eat and to trade, and it may come from wine; the report says "vinegar is a good condiment". Turning wine into vinegar: if it turns naturally, it is lawful by agreement; by treatment (onion, salt, fire), the Shafiis, Hanbalis and one Maliki report forbid it, citing the report of Abu Talha on whether to pour it out, while the Hanafis and the preferred Maliki view allow it. Eating and drinking vinegar is lawful by agreement; the worms in it may be eaten with it, though eating them alone is forbidden. Purity by vinegar: it may not replace water for lesser or greater impurity, since it is not pure water; most jurists do not clean impurity with it, while Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf and one Hanbali view allow it, on the report of Aisha rubbing blood with the nail. Sale of vinegar: the same kind may not be exchanged unequally or deferred, being a usury good; the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis in the sounder view allow exchange of different kinds unequally; the Hanbalis except grape vinegar against raisin vinegar; the Malikis count all vinegars as one kind. Seizure and destruction: whoever seizes or destroys vinegar must pay; if a usurper turns seized wine into vinegar, it returns to the owner by the Hanafis, Malikis, Hanbalis and the sounder Shafii view; if the usurper treats it with valuable salt, Abu Hanifa gives the vinegar to him, while Abu Yusuf and Muhammad give it to the owner. Seizing juice that turned to wine: most jurists require the like; if it turned to vinegar after fermentation, the Hanbalis and the sounder Shafii view return it with the loss, and the Malikis let the owner take juice of the like or the vinegar.

• Khalt (mixing of property and things)

  Khalt is lexically mixing a thing with another, and is wider than liquids; the Kulliyat defines it as joining the parts of two or more things; its rules vary with its subject. Mixing of zakatable property: if two owners mix their property, by joint ownership or by neighbourhood, some jurists have them pay zakat as one owner. Mixing capital in partnership: the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis hold that partnership is concluded by the contract alone without mixing; the Shafiis require the mixing before the contract to a degree that the goods cannot be told apart, and if it is after, the contract must be repeated. Mixing by wrongdoing: a usurper or trustee who mixes the property with other goods must pay it if it can be separated; if not, it counts as lost and the duty passes to his liability, whether he mixes it with a like, better or worse thing. A guardian mixing an orphan\'s property with his own: allowed where it benefits the orphan, and the mixing of food for orphans for the good of all, as the verse on reform of orphans is cited. Mixing water with a pure thing: it does not lose its purifying power if the mixing cannot be avoided, like weed; it loses it when mixed deliberately.

• Khalwa (seclusion with a woman)

  Seclusion is lexically being alone with a thing in an empty place; it is linked to solitude, withdrawal and concealment. Being alone with oneself is lawful and may be recommended for remembrance and worship; with others it is lawful between two men, two women, a man and his mahram or his wife, and between a man and a woman in public where their talk is not heard; it is forbidden with a non-mahram woman. Seclusion with a non-mahram woman is forbidden by agreement, on the report "no man is alone with a woman but the devil is the third"; the Hanafis excuse a creditor who sheltered a fleeing debtor; seclusion for treatment is forbidden unless a mahram, a husband or a trustworthy woman is present, on the sounder view. Seclusion with others present: the Shafiis forbid a man to be alone with several women as with one, but the usual Shafii view allows a man with two trusted women, or men with a woman if collusion is unlikely; the Hanafis lift the prohibition with a trustworthy woman or a mahram present; the Malikis dislike a man praying among women\'s rows; the Hanbalis forbid a man alone with several women. The betrothed is a non-mahram to her suitor, so seclusion with her is forbidden by agreement; seclusion with a beardless youth is forbidden if he is handsome and temptation is feared; seclusion with mahrams is lawful, including with a woman divorced by a revocable divorce. Seclusion that has effects (the valid seclusion of the Hanafis, the sufficient seclusion of the Malikis): no bar to intercourse, whether physical, legal or natural; physical bars are illness, childhood, closure or horns; legal bars are fasting, pilgrim\'s state and menstruation; natural bar is a third person present; it is not valid in a mosque, the road, the open desert or an uncovered roof. The Malikis require an adult who is not castrated and a woman able to bear intercourse, with a curtain drawn or door closed; the Shafiis in the new view give no effect to seclusion, citing the verse on touching; the Hanbalis give it effect when the man is adult and can have intercourse, even if asleep, blind or under a legal bar. Effect on the dower: most jurists require the full dower by a valid seclusion, citing the report of uncovering a wife\'s veil and the agreement of the Companions reported by al-Tahawi; the Shafiis in the new view give it no effect. Effect on the waiting period: the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis require the waiting period after valid seclusion in a valid marriage; the Shafiis in the new view do not, without intercourse. Effect on return to the wife: the Hanafis say seclusion is not a return; the Malikis require knowledge of consummation and no denial of intercourse for a return; Ibn Qudama holds seclusion equal to intercourse for a return on the apparent words of al-Kharaqi. Effect on descent: the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis establish paternity by seclusion, and the Shafiis make the wife a bed by mere possibility. Effect on marriage bars: valid seclusion bars the sister and four others during the waiting period; on the daughter of the wife there is dispute: the Hindiyya says seclusion does not equal intercourse; Abu Yusuf does not bar her if he was alone with her while fasting or in ihram, Muhammad does; the Hanbalis\' best-known view bars the stepdaughter, al-Qadi and Ibn Aqil do not.

• Khanq (strangling in fiqh)

  Khanq is lexically squeezing the throat until death; the jurists use it for any means: a cord, the hands, or stopping the mouth and nose. Hunting and slaughter: by agreement an animal that is to be slaughtered is not lawful when strangled; the verse on the strangled animal in al-Ma'ida is cited; game dead from strangling is not lawful. Homicide: the majority (Malikis, Shafiis, Hanbalis and the two companions) impose retaliation for an intentional strangling, since it usually kills; Abu Hanifa imposes no retaliation for strangling as it is semi-intentional, and holds that one who strangles repeatedly may be killed by discretion. Oaths: the Hanafis and Hanbalis count striking a wife as including strangling, so an oath not to strike her is broken by strangling; the Shafiis do not count it as striking by custom.

• Kharaj (land levy, fiqh entry)

  Kharaj is lexically the yield of a thing, and it can mean a rent or a levy or tax. Abu Ubayd and al-Layth treat kharj and kharaj as one word, while Abu Amr ibn al-Ala' distinguishes them: kharj is what one gives freely, kharaj what one must pay. As a technical term it has a general sense, the funds the state collects and spends, and a particular sense, the duty the Imam imposes on productive land; al-Mawardi and Abu Ya'la define it as the rights laid on the necks of land and paid for it. Other names for it are land jizya, land rent, and tasq, a Persian word that appears in Umar's letter to Uthman ibn Hunayf. It is distinct from ghanima, fay', jizya (a levy on persons, not land), khums and 'ushr (the tithe on land owned by a Muslim). When conquests grew under Umar ibn al-Khattab, he decided not to divide land taken by force among the conquerors but to hold it as an endowment for all Muslims, with a fixed kharaj on its cultivators. Companions first differed; Abu Yusuf reports that Bilal ibn Rabah was among the strongest objectors; Umar argued from the verses on fay' in Surat al-Hashr and consulted the Emigrants and the Helpers until the matter was settled. Jurists base its legitimacy on the Qur'an, the Sunna and public interest. The Sunna cited includes the report 'Iraq withheld its dirham and qafiz' (a prophetic foretelling of the kharaj imposed on land), and the Prophet's division of half of Khaybar for the needs of the community. The interests cited are a stable revenue for future generations, keeping wealth from concentrating in one group, and keeping land cultivated by those who know it best; Mu'adh ibn Jabal's advice to Umar is quoted for this. Kharaj is due on every holder of productive kharaj land, Muslim or not, adult or minor, sane or insane, man or woman, since it is the cost of the land's yield. By form of levy there is kharaj al-wazifa, a fixed sum owed on the land's area and crop type whatever it yields, which Umar imposed on al-Sawad, Egypt and Syria; and kharaj al-muqasama, a share of the produce such as a quarter or a fifth, which al-Mahdi introduced in place of the fixed sum, a change that the text connects to falling prices. By status of the land there is sulhi kharaj, levied on land whose people made terms to keep it, and 'anwi kharaj, levied on land taken by force and held for all Muslims, including land its people left in fear without fighting. Kharaj lands are of two kinds: those settled by treaty, and those abandoned out of fear without battle, which by most jurists become an endowment for Muslims upon seizure. Conditions for kharaj land: it must be kharaj land, so the wazifa is not owed on 'ushri land; and it must be productive in fact (by yield) or in estimate (by fitness for cultivation), so no kharaj falls on houses or on barren land unfit for farming. When 'ushri land passes to a dhimmi, most jurists allow the sale; Malik and one report of Ahmad forbid it. They then differ on what falls due: the Shafiis and the preferred Hanbali view keep it non-kharaj; Abu Hanifa and Zufar make it kharaj; Malik and Abu Yusuf double the 'ushr on the dhimmi; Muhammad al-Shaybani keeps it 'ushri. Whether a dhimmi may revive barren land with the Imam's leave is disputed. The amounts: the Hanafis levy a qafiz and a dirham on each arable jarib, five dirhams on clover and ten on vines, with the ceiling at half the yield; Malik sets no fixed sum and leaves it to the Imam's judgement with experts; the Shafiis follow the figures of Uthman ibn Hunayf (two dirhams on barley, four on wheat); the Hanbalis set a dirham and a qafiz, and eight dirhams on palms. On raising or lowering Umar's figures, the Shafiis, one report of Ahmad, Muhammad al-Shaybani and one report of Abu Yusuf allow both; Abu Hanifa allows only lowering; a second report of Ahmad allows only raising; a third report forbids both. The assessor considers soil quality, the cost of irrigation (rain and river water cost less than well water), the crop or fruit, nearness to towns and markets, and leaves a margin for calamities, as the Prophet did in the estimation of fruit for zakat. When it is due depends on the type: a share levy (muqasama) is due at harvest and recurs with each yield; a fixed levy (wazifa) is taken once a year, by the lunar year for land area and the solar year for crop area; Abu Hanifa has it due at the start of the year on condition the land stays productive. Advance payment was allowed by the Hanafis and Hanbalis for a year or two; the Hanbalis refund it in all cases, the Hanafis only if the sum still exists. On default, a solvent holder is jailed until he pays unless goods are sold for it; an insolvent holder is given time and the debt stays. The Shafiis, the Hanbalis and the two companions of Abu Hanifa do not drop it; Abu Hanifa drops it on insolvency, as he does the jizya. The duty falls on whoever holds the land; if it is let or lent, most jurists place it on the owner, while a usurper owes it. The Imam, just in his rule, assesses, demands and disburses it; no one may distribute it himself; whoever pays an unjust ruler is generally released. Where rebels seize a town and collect it, most jurists release the payers; the Malikis require repayment. Brigands do not release the payer, since the sum is seized by force. The collector (amil) acts as the Imam's agent and may not distribute the sum without leave; the conditions are Islam, freedom, trustworthiness, sufficiency, knowledge and understanding (a dhimmi is not appointed to assess it, most jurists say, citing the verse on not taking an inner circle from outside the believers and Umar's refusal of a Christian scribe). The collector should be gentle, dividing the levy according to each harvest; just, without favour; and chaste, taking no bribe or gift, since Khattabi calls officials' gifts unlawful. The Imam must supervise the collectors through men of trust, and pay them salaries that suffice, as Abu Ubayda told Umar. Farming out the levy (qabala or tadmin): a person undertakes to collect it for himself at a fixed price; it appeared under the Umayyads and spread under the Abbasids. Ahmad, Abu Yusuf, Abu Ubayd and al-Mawardi rejected it for the injustice it brings, while Abu Yusuf allowed it where the Imam is secure from injustice and the payers consent. Causes of remission: first, the land's loss of fitness for cultivation through an event beyond human action, which by most jurists remits the levy; where it can be repaired the Imam repairs it from the public-interest share. Second, idleness: if it comes from outside the owner, the levy lapses; if by the owner's neglect, the share-levy lapses and he is ordered to farm; the fixed levy is not remitted by the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis, but is by the Malikis. Third, a crop lost to a heavenly blow before harvest remits the share-levy; for the fixed levy the Hanafis require two things: fewer than three months remain for another sowing, and the surviving crop is less than twice the levy. Fourth, the Imam's remission for a public interest: allowed by the Hanbalis and Abu Yusuf, forbidden by Muhammad al-Shaybani. Fifth, building on kharaj land: most Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis keep the levy; the Hanafis drop it; al-Mawardi drops it only for a necessary dwelling. Sixth, conversion of the owner or sale to a Muslim: the conquered-land levy never lapses; the treaty levy lapses by most jurists, citing a report of al-Ala' ibn al-Hadrami, but not by the Hanafis. Joint 'ushr and kharaj on a Muslim: most Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis require both; the Hanafis require only kharaj, citing the report that no Muslim pays both and Umar's order on a Nahr al-Malik convert. Uses of kharaj follow those of fay': the soldiers' pay, judges, scholars, mosques, roads, bridges and frontier defence; most Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis do not take a fifth of it, while the Shafiis do.

• Kharṣ (estimating the fruit for zakat)

  Kharṣ is lexically speaking by guesswork, and can mean a lie, and the estimate of the fruit on palms and vines, as dried dates or raisins; the technical sense agrees. Guessing, conjecture and inquiry are close to it. The Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis hold that the Imam should send his agent to estimate the fruit on the palm and vine once it is ripe, so that the zakat threshold and due amount are known; they cite the report of Attab ibn Asid that grapes are estimated as palms are. The time is when the fruit ripens, on the report of Aisha that Abdullah ibn Rawaha was sent to the Jews of Khaybar. Most jurists limit estimating to palms and vines, not grain on the stalk or olives; one Maliki view allows olives when the owners need it, and al-Zuhri, al-Awza'i and al-Layth estimate olives. The Shafiis forbid disposal of the fruit before estimating or guarantee, since the poor have a claim on it; the Hanbalis allow disposal before and after, the zakat falling on the seller. One estimator suffices by agreement among those who allow it; one Shafii view requires several; he must be trustworthy, just and knowledgeable, and for the Shafiis (the sounder view) male and free. The estimator views the trees and judges how much will become dried dates or raisins; if there are several kinds, each is estimated apart. The Hanbalis require leaving a third or a quarter to the owner for his household and guests; the Shafiis leave the fruit of a palm or two; the Malikis and the preferred Shafii view leave nothing, reading the report as about zakat. Most jurists hold that after estimation the poor's claim moves from the fruit to the owner's liability, so he may dispose of it; the Shafiis require the agent's guarantee and the owner's acceptance, and one view holds the claim ends by the estimate alone. If the estimated fruit perishes without the owner's neglect before zakat is paid, nothing is owed if he could not pay; if he delayed without excuse he owes the poor's share. If the owner claims loss without fault, his word is accepted without oath (Malik, Ahmad); the Shafiis have him swear for a hidden cause. The Malikis and the preferred Shafii view allow dividing the fruit on the palms by estimate once it ripens and may be sold, when the partners' needs differ, for the need and the ease of estimating. Sale by guesswork, without measure or weight, on sight and estimate, is lawful by agreement.

• Khars (muteness in fiqh)

  Khars is lexically the lack of speech from birth, or the loss of speech through impediment; a mute (akhras) is one who cannot speak, and i'tiqal is the tongue's impediment. A mute's Islam is valid by gesture where signs show that he assents in his heart, the Maliki view and the sound Shafii view, which Ibn Nujaym also draws from the Hanafis; the Shafii variant requires him to pray after the gesture. Speech is dropped from the prayer for the mute by agreement. The Malikis, Hanbalis (except al-Qadi) and the sound Hanafi view do not require moving the tongue; the Shafiis require moving tongue and lips as far as possible; Ibn Nujaym requires it for the opening takbir and the talbiya. A speaker may not lead a mute in prayer; a mute may lead another mute, as the Hanafis and Malikis allow, but the Shafiis and Hanbalis forbid. A mute's gesture does not invalidate prayer for the Hanafis, the sound Shafii view and one Maliki view; the Hanbalis count it as an act, invalid only if frequent and repeated; one Maliki view and the opposite Shafii view hold that it invalidates. A mute may slaughter and hunt lawfully even without saying the basmala; the Hanbalis treat a gesture to heaven as the basmala, and in hunting the mute's intention is not required. An intelligible gesture or clear writing stands for speech in contracts and dispositions such as sale, marriage, divorce, manumission and acquittal; divorce by intelligible gesture takes effect, and for the Shafiis and Hanbalis it is explicit if all understand it, and allusive if only some do. Li'an by gesture or writing is valid according to most jurists, the Malikis, the Shafiis and the preferred Hanbali view, with the same effects as for a speaker; the Hanafis and some Hanbalis reject it. A mute's acknowledgement by gesture or writing is accepted for private rights, including retaliation by agreement except one Hanafi view; for hadd offences the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis accept it, while the Hanafis reject it to avert the hadd by doubt. A mute's testimony is rejected by the Hanafis, the Hanbalis and the sounder Shafii view; the Malikis accept it by intelligible gesture or writing when the judge is sure of its meaning, and the Hanbalis accept writing in his hand. Speech is a condition of judgeship for the Hanafis, the Hanbalis and the sounder Shafii view; the Malikis treat it as a duty, so he is removed, though a judgement given stands. Fatwa by a mute is valid when his gesture is understood. Oaths by gesture are valid for the Hanafis and Malikis when he is understood; the Shafiis have two views and the Hanbalis two reports. Injury to a mute's tongue carries a fair assessment (hukuma 'adl) for the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafiis; one Hanbali view gives a third of the blood-money. Retaliation between two mutes for an intentional injury stands for the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis if the wound will not spread, but the Hanafis allow none for the tongue.

• Khasa' (castration in fiqh)

  Khasa' is the removal of the two testicles; the jurists use it for taking the testicles without or with the penis; the castrated man is one whose penis is cut off, the impotent (unan) cannot have intercourse, and wijā' is crushing the testicles' vessels without removal. Castrating a human is forbidden for child or adult by agreement, on reports of Ibn Mas'ud and Sa'd; the Prophet refused Uthman ibn Maz'un celibacy; a report from Umar says "no castration in Islam"; Ibn Hajar gives as reasons that it defeats the growth of offspring, tortures the self and alters God's creation. For animals: the Hanafis see no harm for their benefit; the Malikis allow it for edible animals without dislike; the Shafiis allow it for edible animals when young, if it does not kill; the Hanbalis allow castrating sheep (one view dislikes it), citing the Prophet's strong prohibition on castrating animals. On annulment of marriage: the Hanafis treat a castrated husband like an impotent one, with a one-year delay; the Malikis give the wife a choice if he does not ejaculate; the Shafiis have two views; the Hanbalis give no choice if he can have intercourse. On retaliation for the testicles: most jurists order retaliation when its conditions hold; the Shafiis treat crushing or paralysing them as cutting; the Malikis allow no retaliation for crushing; the Hanafis find no text for retaliation and so require blood-money; the Prophet's letter to Amr ibn Hazm says "blood-money for the testicles". On the price of cutting the testicles: a report from al-Zuhri on Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab says the sunna sets full blood-money for the penis and full for the two testicles; for one testicle, half, by most scholars; he is also reported to have set two-thirds for the left and one-third for the right. If both are crushed or paralysed, the full sum is due; if both are cut and procreation is lost, only one sum; if one is cut and procreation lost, half. Where both testicles and the penis are cut together, the majority give two sums; the Hanafis and Hanbalis give two if the penis is cut first, but if the testicles are cut first, one sum for them and a fair assessment for the penis; the Shafiis give a full sum for the testicles and for the penis in every case. On sacrifice of a castrated animal: reports say the Prophet sacrificed two horned, spotted, castrated rams; al-Shawkani took the desirability from this; the Hanafis allow castrated and whole males alike; the Malikis prefer the whole male unless the castrated one is fatter; the Shafiis and Hanbalis allow the castrated animal (the Hanbalis not the fully emasculated one).

• Khass (specific; opposite of general)

  Khass (specific) is lexically the opposite of general; technically a term coined for one thing or a limited number, whether a single person such as Zayd or a kind such as man or horse. A general term embraces all that it can apply to under one coinage without limit. A specific word fixes its ruling unless a proof calls for another meaning; when specific and general conflict, the Shafiis let the specific narrow the general, while the Hanafis hold the later one abrogates to the extent of its indication and suspend judgement when the order is unknown. A hired worker for a term serves all the agreed time, except for the times of purification and the five prayers, the Friday and festival prayers, and need not be allowed to attend the congregation except on conditions. A private road is a closed passage between a limited number of houses, and no one may alter it without the leave of its owners. Private property is held by a particular person; public property, such as the treasury and waqf for all Muslims, is contrasted with it, and the thief of private property is cut by the usual conditions.

• Khata' (error, unintended act)

  Khata' is lexically the opposite of right; one who misses the way strays from it, and an archer who misses the target has not hit it; khati'a is a sin, the verb with intent being khatiya and without intent akhta'a. Technically it is an act done without intent toward the object of the act: Kamal ibn al-Humam gives the example of rinsing the mouth that reaches a fasting man's throat, and shooting at game that hits a human. Most jurists treat ghalat as equal to khata'; some Malikis distinguish that khata' is in the heart and ghalat in the tongue, yet ghalat takes khata's ruling; Abu Hilal al-'Askari distinguishes that ghalat is placing a thing out of its place and may be right in itself, while khata' is never right in any way. Most jurists use khata' for what slips from the tongue without intent, while the Malikis use ghalat for what concerns belief. Near terms are forgetfulness, inattention, distraction and heedlessness; compulsion (forcing another against his will, short of compulsion that removes choice); jest (speaking without meaning); and ignorance, simple or compound; the one in error is not responsible for what he erred in. Ignorance and error excuse in what is forbidden, not in what is commanded; they excuse nothing in the rights of persons, so the ignorant and mistaken pay for what they destroy. The usulis differ on whether the act of one in error can be called lawful or unlawful: al-Asnawi holds that lawful and unlawful apply to accountable persons, so the error is not described; al-Shatibi holds that error and forgetfulness are in a zone of pardon. Most jurists hold that error excuses some of God's rights but not all, citing the report "God has lifted from my community error and forgetfulness"; the rights of people are not lifted by error, so destroyed property and blood-money are owed, since that is a rule of ruling not of commanding. Al-Qurtubi distinguishes: the kind that is never lifted, such as fines, blood-money and the obligatory prayers; the kind always lifted, such as retaliation and uttering unbelief under duress; and the disputed kind, such as one who eats in Ramadan by forgetting. The maxim "no weight is given to a clearly mistaken assumption" is held by the Hanafis and Shafiis; a case: one who thought the dawn was near and prayed it before the missed isha, then saw the time was long, must repeat the dawn prayer. Shafii cases: one who thought himself pure, prayed, and then his impurity appeared, or who prayed behind an imam he thought Muslim who proved an unbeliever, and so on, mostly void. The Malikis use the maxim of clear manifestation; Ibn Rajab sets out rules on one who disposes of what he thinks he does not own. Error in purity: one who judges a vessel or cloth by guesswork and then finds it impure must repeat, by the Hanafis, Shafiis and one Maliki view; the Hanbalis do not apply the same rule. Error in the intention for wudu: by agreement of Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis the lesser intention can be overtaken; the Hanafis do not require intention for wudu or washing. Error in the intention for the major washing and dry ablution: intending the washing for sexual impurity when it came from a wet dream is not harmful for the Shafiis and Hanafis; a menstruating woman intending only the major impurity raises a Maliki dispute. The entry continues in the following pages. On dry ablution: the Malikis and Ibn Maslama permit it, the Shafiis accept a mistaken intention for the minor state when one is in the major, and the Hanbalis require the purpose to be specified. One who had water in his baggage, forgot it, searched, found none, dry-ablutes and prays: valid for the Malikis, one Shafii view and the Hanbalis; the other Shafii view requires repetition for his neglect of the baggage. One who knew of the water but thought it was used up must repeat, by the Hanafis, Malikis, the sounder Shafii view and the Hanbalis. In prayer intention: where the thing need not be specified, error does no harm, as with the place, the time and the number of units; where it must be specified, error harms, as with a noon prayer intended as an afternoon one. On following an imam: error about his identity usually does no harm; intending to pray over one person and finding another invalidates the funeral prayer by most schools, and the Hanbalis differ on the sex of the dead. On ada' and qada' and the wrong day: the Malikis generally validate; the Hanafis and Shafiis invalidate except in certain cases; the Hanbalis validate qada' with a mistaken ada' intention when the error shows against belief. On prayer before the time: invalid by agreement, whether by design or error. The Shafiis require certain knowledge or a valid estimate; the Hanbalis accept a strong estimate, and repeat if the prayer proves early. On error in the qibla: the Hanafis accept ijtihad without repetition; the Malikis repeat within the time if clear signs were present and one faced the wrong way; the Shafiis have two views once error is certain; the Hanbalis require no repetition for the ijtihad, but the sighted at home and the blind without a guide repeat. On error in recitation: the Hanafis distinguish errors of inflection, which do not invalidate unless they change the meaning badly, from errors of letters and words, and treat near-synonyms as harmless. On error in recitation as it affects the follower: the Malikis examine prayer behind a faulty reciter, some voiding it outright or by detail, and validating it where the reciter cannot learn; the Shafiis validate following one whose fault does not change the meaning, and void it where the opening chapter's sense is changed and he cannot correct it; the Hanbalis treat one who cannot recite the opening chapter, or whose faults change its meaning, as unfit to lead. Speech in prayer: the Hanafis void the prayer by speech done in forgetfulness, intent or error; others separate slight speech, which does not void, from much speech, which does. The imam\'s doubt: if two whom he trusts tell him of an error, he must go by them, by the three Imams; al-Shafii holds that if he judges their error likely he need not follow them; if he is certain of his own correctness, the Hanafis, Malikis, the sounder Shafii view and most Hanbalis do not follow the followers. Error in the fear prayer: if the troops saw a dark shape and took it for an enemy, prayed the prayer of extreme fear, and it proved otherwise, the Hanafis, Hanbalis and one Shafii view require repetition; the Malikis do not. Zakat: if the fruit proves more than the estimate, the Malikis take zakat on the excess; if the owner claims the estimate was too high, the Hanbalis accept his word if the claim is plausible; the Shafiis distinguish by the size of the error. Error in the recipient of zakat: if it is given to one thought eligible who proves not, the Hanafis and one Shafii view hold it valid; Abu Yusuf, the Hanbalis and the sounder Shafii view, when the giver is the ruler, let the sum be recovered; the Hanbalis hold it invalid if given to an unbeliever or to one not eligible. Fasting: whoever gives a general intention for Ramadan, or errs in its description, has a valid fast by the Hanafis and one view of others, since the time is fixed. One who breaks the fast by forgetfulness owes no expiation. Water entering by mistake while rinsing voids the fast and requires only a make-up by the Hanafis, Malikis and one Shafii view; the Hanbalis and another Shafii view hold it does not void. Error about the time: one who ate on the belief that dawn had not broken, or broke the fast on the belief that the sun had set, owes a make-up but no expiation by most jurists; the Hanbalis require both make-up and expiation for intercourse, even by mistake. Hajj: if the pilgrims all erred and stood on the tenth, the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis hold it valid; the Malikis distinguish by how many erred; standing on the eighth in the belief it was the ninth is invalid for the Hanafis, Malikis and the sounder Shafii view, valid for the Hanbalis. Erring in the place of standing and standing outside Arafat requires a make-up. Killing game in the sacred precinct, or game by one in the state of ihram, is forbidden and carries a compensation whether done by intent or error, by agreement; the Hanafis and Malikis treat errors and intent alike for the prohibitions of ihram, while the Shafiis and Hanbalis distinguish destruction from enjoyment. On error in a sacrifice: if two men each slaughter the other's victim by mistake, the Hanafis and Hanbalis count it valid and owe nothing, by istihsan (the analogical rule would require a debt); the Malikis hold it invalid, each owing the other the value; the Shafiis require paying the difference in value, and each victim counts if it was owed by a vow. Sale by error: the Hanafis hold a sale spoken by slip to be concluded but void for lack of consent; the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis hold it not concluded, since the sale needs knowledge and intent. Error in the subject of sale: on a mistake of kind or a gross difference, the Hanafis except al-Karkhi hold the contract not concluded, al-Karkhi holds it void; the Malikis disregard an error the other party did not know; if one names the thing wrongly, the buyer is not bound and neither is the seller by agreement; the Shafiis and Hanbalis void a sale of an unknown thing. Hire: the appraiser who errs owes nothing by the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis (the Hanbalis require skill and trust); the Shafiis make a scale-man liable for weighing errors; the paid worker who loses goods through transgression or gross neglect is liable. Scribe: the Hanafis divide the error by the leaves affected, and the Shafiis give a fee for correct work, make the scribe pay for paper if the error is gross, and require him to correct. Physician, circumciser and cupper: no liability for what they do with leave, provided they are skilled and do not exceed the proper place; exceeding it makes them liable whether by intent or error. Error in describing lost property: the Hanafis require every sign to match; the Malikis distinguish errors in the bag, string and coins; Ibn Rushd takes error to mean conceiving a thing differently from what it is. Error in shuf'a: if the buyer said he paid a hundred, the pre-emptor waived his right, and the price proved fifty, the Shafiis and Hanbalis keep his right; the Hanafis keep it if the price proved lower than stated, since his consent rested on the higher figure; the Malikis keep it where the price proved lower, the claimant swearing that he waived because of the lie about the price. On error in shuf'a: if the pre-emptor was told that a certain man had bought his partner's share and waived his right out of good opinion of the buyer, and it proved he had bought with another, the majority keep his right, since his consent was to that partner alone. Marriage: the Hanafis hold that a text garbled by mispronunciation does not conclude the contract, while a common usage meaning the marriage is valid by the Hanafis, Shafiis and a Hanbali view; error in the bride\'s name prevents the contract unless she is present and indicated, where the Shafiis and Hanbalis distinguish naming from pointing. Error in the bride: whoever has intercourse with a woman brought to him by mistake owes the proper dower and no hadd; the lineage stands. The Shafiis and Hanbalis treat a father and son who marry two women and consummate by mistake: both contracts are dissolved and each owes the dower of the one he consummated; the Hanbalis remit the dower to the husband, since she shared in the dissolution. Divorce by slip: the Shafiis and Hanbalis hold that a divorce said by slip without intent does not take effect; the Hanafis hold it does, since the lapse of mind is hard to test; the Malikis require intent to speak the formula, not its meaning, and a slip is accepted in the judge\'s ruling if proven. Injuries by error: the price of unintended homicide is owed by the killer\'s kin with expiation by the killer, and loss of inheritance by most jurists; for lesser injuries a full sum or a share of the full sum by the wound. Self-injury by error: the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafiis owe nothing; the Hanbalis (preferred view) owe the sum to the heirs from the kin if it exceeds a third; expiation is owed by the Shafiis and Hanbalis but not the Hanafis and Malikis. Collision by error: the jurists differ on whether each must make good the other\'s loss or pay half the value. Holing a boat by error: the Shafiis treat a deliberate fatal hole as retaliation or blood-money and a hole for repair as quasi-intentional; a hole elsewhere is pure error; the Hanafis distinguish the boatman\'s liability by whether the damage was by his act. Error in oaths: the Hanafis require expiation on breach of an oath spoken by slip; Ibn al-Humam disputes that the oath of one in error is binding; the Malikis distinguish a slip of the tongue (oath is binding) from a switch of word while meaning another (the speaker is believed in conscience); the Shafiis hold an oath spoken without intent is not binding, except the oath of divorce, freeing or vow; the Hanbalis hold no sin and no expiation for an oath spoken without intent, except divorce and manumission on a past fact believed true. On oath and breach by error: the Hanafis require expiation on breach even under compulsion or forgetfulness; the Malikis hold breach by error counts, as when one swears not to enter a house and enters it thinking it is another; the Shafiis have two views, the preferred one that there is no breach, citing the report that error and forgetfulness are lifted; the Hanbalis require no expiation under compulsion or forgetfulness, but divorce and manumission take effect if the sworn act is done in forgetfulness. Error in division: the Shafiis and Hanbalis accept a claim of error with proof; for a compulsory division the claim needs proof, and for a consensual one the division is annulled only on proof; the Hanafis have the partners swear if there is no proof; the Malikis distinguish wrong made by intent from error, and annul only where the error is gross and known to the experts. Error in an admission: the sounder Shafii view accepts an admission retracted as an error, and the property stays with the admitter. Error in testimony: the Hanafis accept a just witness who says after the judgment that he erred in part; the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis distinguish before and after the ruling and blood from property; if witnesses to retaliation or a hadd retract after the ruling and say they erred, the penalty is suspended and the blood-money falls on their property; most jurists do not discipline witnesses who retract by error. Error in judgment: the ruling is set aside when the error in reasoning or in the cause shows; a ruler who cuts the left hand instead of the right is not liable by Abu Hanifa, but liable by Zufar; the Malikis allow a wrong cut between equals; the Shafiis put the sum on the kin or the public treasury; the Hanbalis make good the excess over the hadd. Error in retaliation: the Hanafis hold that one who exceeds an intended cut and kills owes the blood-money by Abu Hanifa; the Malikis retaliate for the excess intended; the Shafiis require retaliation for an intended excess and a fine for an error; the Hanbalis fine for the error. Error in a fatwa: the Hanafis differ on whether the mufti is liable; the Malikis hold a follower liable if he acts on the fatwa, a mufti who is only a teacher not; the Shafiis (and Abu Ishaq) make the mufti liable if he is qualified; the Hanbalis make both judge and mufti liable where the error is against a clear text.

• Error and forgetfulness

  Error and forgetfulness in Ibn Abbas's hadith — the thirty-ninth of the Forty — are among what God lifted from this community: 'God has pardoned for my sake on behalf of my community error, forgetfulness, and what they were coerced into' — error being the doing of the prohibited without intent, and forgetfulness the omitting of a command or doing of a prohibition through the heart's heedlessness, both lifting accountability on the commentators' prevailing reading since culpable intent is absent, while worldly consequences may still attach to error, such as the blood-money and expiation rulings for accidental killing (Jami' al-Ulum wal-Hikam pp. 796–797).

• Khatar (mortal danger and risk)

  Khatar is lexically the brink of ruin and fear of loss, a matter hanging between happening and not happening; wagering is mukhatara. Exposing oneself to mortal danger is forbidden by agreement, since preserving life is among the highest aims of the law; the verse on not casting oneself into ruin is cited. Dispensations for danger: carrion may be eaten by one forced by hunger, wine may be used to swallow a choking morsel when life is at risk, and a diseased organ must be cut if leaving it risks life. Hardship that reaches the danger to life or limb brings relief: dry ablution is required when water threatens life or a limb, the Hajj lapses when the journey is risky, sea travel is forbidden if death is likely, and fasting lapses for the sick, the nursing and the pregnant if their life or the infant is endangered. Jihad is an exception, and it is allowed to risk life in it, since hardship is its nature; flight from a larger enemy is forbidden; and repelling an aggressor is also excepted. Removing a gland or a diseased organ: forbidden when cutting endangers life more than leaving it, and allowed when there is no danger or leaving it is worse; a stranger who cuts it without leave owes retaliation if the patient dies. Contracts of risk are those that hang between being and not being and between gain and loss, like wagers and gambling; the race is lawful on conditions.

• Khayl (horses)

  Khayl is the collective of horses; it is feminine with no singular of its own form — a stated singular being kha'il, plurals khuyul and akhyal — and was named for their prancing self-admiration; it covers Arab and non-Arab horses, male and female, as in Surah al-Nahl ayah 8, and is applied to cavalrymen as in Surah al-Isra ayah 64; the jurists' usage stays within the first linguistic sense. The Law urges acquiring horses for jihad and tethering them for the cause of God, by Surah al-Anfal ayah 60 and the hadith "goodness is tied to the forelocks of horses until the Day of Resurrection". On their zakat, the majority, including Abu Yusuf and Muhammad on whom the Hanafi fatwa rests, hold none is due unless they are for trade, by "a Muslim owes no sadaqa on his horse and his servant" and "I have exempted you from sadaqa on horses and slaves", and because they are not grazing livestock; Abu Hanifa obliges it on pastured horses when they are male and female, with two reports when all female, and on the apparent report none when all male though the Nawadir questions oblige it. On eating them, the majority — the Shafiis, Hanbalis and a Maliki view — permit it; the Hanafis on the preponderant view and a second Maliki view hold it lawful with light disapproval, also the view of al-Awza'i and Abu Ubayd, while a transmission from Abu Hanifa and a Maliki view give grave disapproval. On their booty share, the majority allot the horseman three shares, one for him and two for his horse, the view of Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, al-Hasan, Ibn Sirin, al-Thawri, al-Layth ibn Sa'd, Ishaq and Abu Thawr, for Ibn Umar's report that at Khaybar he allotted the horseman three shares, two for the horse and one for him; Abu Hanifa gives the horse one share for Mujamma' ibn Haritha's report on the Khaybar division, weakened by Ibn Hajar, and because it is an animal with a share not exceeding one like the human; no more than one horse shares at the Hanafis except Abu Yusuf, the Malikis and the Shafiis since no one fights on more than one; the Hanbalis, and Abu Yusuf among the Hanafis, let two horses share and no more, per al-Awza'i's report that no man received for more than two horses even with ten, since a second is needed — constant riding of one weakens it and bars fighting on it — while a third is dispensable. The jurists do not dispute the permissibility of horse racing, with a prize or without. Other questions attach to horses in their places: a donkey stallion covering mares in zakat, the purity of their urine for a fighter on enemy soil under impurities, women riding under prohibition and permission, and barring the dhimmi from riding under jizya.

• Khazz (silk-blend cloth and men's dress)

  Khazz is cloth woven from wool and silk, or from silk alone; the word is from the fur of the hare, for its softness, and the jurists use it for cloth whose warp is silk and weft is other, or the reverse. Qazz is raw silk, the source of silk; khazz is silk mixed with other fibre such as wool or cotton; dibaj is cloth with silk warp and weft, which men may not wear without necessity by agreement. Pure silk khazz is forbidden to men outside war without necessity by agreement, and allowed to women, by the report of Hudhayfa "do not wear silk or dibaj" and the report that gold and silk are lawful to the women of my community and forbidden to its men. For cloth woven of silk and another fibre, most Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis allow men to wear it, as does one Maliki view; Ahmad reports the Companions wore khazz; the Malikis dislike it, as a precaution. The Shafiis, in the sounder view, distinguish by quantity: if silk outweighs, it is forbidden; if the other fibre is more or they are equal, it is allowed; the Hanafis, in the sound view, allow it when the weft is not silk, since cloth is made by weaving; Ibn Aqil of the Hanbalis forbids it when equal. The rules on khazz are in the books on prohibitions and dress, and in the sections on the waiting period, mourning and the shroud; see the entry on silk for more.

• Khibra (expertise, and its use in vetting witnesses)

  Khibra (expertise) lexically is the knowledge of a thing's true nature; its people are the experts, and Khabir is a name of God. Expertise differs from knowledge and recognition in that it is the knowledge of a thing's inner reality, from trial (tajriba) in needing no repetition, from skill (hidhq) in being broader than craft, and from physiognomy (firasa) in being mostly by study rather than insight. The jurists rely on the word of experts in many rulings, including the vetting of witnesses; most require the judge to seek those who vouch for the witnesses, and the vetter must know the grounds of reproach and praise and the inner conduct of the one he vouches for, through knowledge, neighbourhood or dealing. The jurists rely on experts in estimating dates and grapes for zakat (kharṣ), the estimate given when the fruit is ready, which the majority require the imam to send someone to make; the Hanafis call it a guess that binds no one. The qa'if traces and recognises kinship from likeness, and the majority, against the Hanafis, act on his word on descent if he is experienced; one qa'if suffices. In valuation the jurists rely on experts among merchants and craftsmen for the value of what was destroyed, the compensation for injuries and the defects that give a right to annul; more than one assessor is needed where a legal penalty depends on the value, as for the value of stolen goods. Expert testimony is testimony when it is given as such and then two are needed by the majority, but one suffices when given as information, as with physicians, veterinarians, the estimator of dates, the tracker of kinship, the divider of inheritance and the measurer of wounds; a single witness does not suffice where a legal penalty depends on it. When experts disagree, each question has its ruling: the Hanafis hold that a defect not agreed on by merchants gives no right to return, the Malikis prefer the more just of two testimonies, and the Shafiis believe the buyer where in doubt.

• Khidma (service and servants; the rules of hiring them)

  Khidma (service) lexically is a trade; a servant may be male or female. The entry separates service from craft (mihna) and from work ('amal). The majority forbid a non-mahram woman to serve a single man in his house when the service needs seclusion, without distinction between free and slave, or handsome and plain; some jurists allow it with dislike, and Ahmad distinguishes free from slave and bars seclusion. A grown man who may not look at a woman may not serve her in private, except a mahram, a boy, a slave or a eunuch; outside service, like buying what she needs in the market, may be done by a stranger. A Muslim may not serve an unbeliever by hire or loan, but he may contract for a particular task such as sewing, and a Muslim slave may be lent for a specific task. A father must serve his poor, young, sick or incapable child; the Hanafis and Malikis forbid a child to make his parent serve him, while the Hanbalis and Shafiis dislike it; a husband must provide a servant for a wife whose rank forbids her to serve herself. A husband must provide a servant for a wife who cannot serve herself by rank or illness; if she refuses to grind and bake and cannot serve, he must bring ready food; the majority require one servant, while the Malikis and Abu Yusuf allow more when her standing needs it. He may not change her servant unless there is suspicion or betrayal, and providing a servant for a poor husband is disputed. The servant must be a Muslim woman, a discerning boy, a mahram or a eunuch; a dhimmi woman serving a Muslim woman is disputed, and the servant's keep covers food, housing and clothing for the majority. If the wife asks for wages or the servant's keep, the Shafiis and Hanbalis do not oblige the husband to accept, since her serving him saves his rights and comfort; the Hanafis hold that she may not take wages for serving her husband or herself, as this resembles a bribe for a duty, unless she is ill or of a noble family. If the husband offers to serve her himself to drop the servant's cost, the Hanafis, the sounder Shafii view and the preferred Hanbali view say he may not and she need not accept; the Malikis say he may and she must agree. Poverty of the husband in paying for a servant does not justify divorce; the debt stays on him according to the Shafiis and Hanbalis, and falls away for the Hanafis and Malikis, since no one is charged beyond what he has been given. On the servant's zakat al-fitr: if the servant is hired with the wife's own money the husband owes nothing; if she is her own slave or one the husband must maintain, the duty follows the maintenance; if he serves her with his own slave or maid, he pays for that slave by ownership. A wife serving her husband is permitted by all; the majority say it is not obliged, the Hanafis say it is owed religiously, not judicially, and the Malikis and others require inner household work by custom, citing the case of Ali and Fatima and a hadith on the wife's obedience. A free husband serving his wife is permitted by the majority, and she may accept it; the Hanafis forbid making his service her mahr, though it is valid as a mahr if it is herding her flock or working her land. The jurists agree that a Muslim may be served by an unbeliever, and that a Muslim may hire himself out to an unbeliever for a defined task, but not for forbidden work such as pressing wine or herding pigs. On hire or loan of a Muslim to an unbeliever for service: the Hanafis permit it with dislike; the Malikis divide it into permitted, disliked, forbidden and unlawful; the Shafiis forbid both direct and indirect service and order the hire ended; the sound Hanbali view forbids it, while another view permits it with dislike.

• Khifya (secrecy; concealment in worship and theft)

  Khifya is lexically concealing or disclosing, one of the words with two opposite senses; the jurists use it for concealment. Most jurists prefer silent supplication, as the verse on calling on God humbly and in secret shows, and to avoid show; supererogatory acts are better in secret while obligatory acts are not open to show; the jurists exempt the talbiya on the day of Arafat, which is better said aloud. In theft: taking in secrecy is a condition of the theft that carries the hadd; there is no cutting for the one who snatches or seizes openly, on the report of Jabir that the betrayer, the plunderer and the snatcher are not cut.

• Khimar (women's head covering in fiqh)

  Khimar derives from khamara, to cover; anything that covers a thing is its khimar, but the word is used for what a woman covers her head with; some jurists define it as what covers the head, the temples and the neck. Related words: hijab (covering, wider than khimar), qina' (a cloth a woman wraps about her head, and for some the cloth a man throws over his shoulder), niqab (for the face) and burqu' (for the face). A free woman is bound to wear a khimar, since her hair is awrah by agreement; the Quranic verse on drawing the khimar over the breast is cited, and Aisha said the thick khimar that covers is the one meant. Wiping the khimar in ablution: the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafiis do not accept wiping the khimar alone unless it is thin enough for water to reach the hair; the Hanbalis differ, the preferred view allowing it on the report of Umm Salama, and Ahmad in one report forbidding it. The khimar in prayer: covering a free adult woman\'s hair is a condition of prayer, and prayer without it is void, on the report that God accepts no prayer of a woman in menses without a khimar; the Hanafis repeat if a quarter of the head is left bare, the Malikis advise covering a girl, the Shafiis do not accept the prayer of a discerning girl without it, the Hanbalis do not require it of the non-adult. The khimar in pilgrim state: the free woman in ihram covers her head with what covers it fully and may not uncover what requires uncovering her face; all agree she may wear shirts, trousers and socks. The khimar in the shroud: the least shroud covers the body except the head of a man in ihram and the face of a woman in ihram; the preferred number for a woman is five pieces including a khimar; the Hanbalis shroud an unmarried girl in two wraps and a shirt without a khimar.

• Khinzir (the pig in fiqh)

  The pig is forbidden: the community agrees on the prohibition of eating its flesh except in necessity, on the Quranic verse of al-An'am; the Hanbalis give the dog precedence over the pig in necessity, the Malikis give other carrion precedence over pig. Its impurity: the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis hold the pig and all its parts, its semen, saliva and sweat impure; the Malikis hold its substance pure while alive. Tanning its hide: it is not purified by tanning by agreement; a report from Abu Yusuf says it is; Ibn al-Faras reports a Maliki view that its hide may be used once tanned. Leftover: impure by the Shafiis, Hanafis and Hanbalis, washed seven times for a dog in the Shafii and Hanbali view and three in the Hanafi; the Malikis hold it pure because its saliva is pure. Its hair: most jurists hold it impure and forbid its use; for the Malikis it is pure if cut, not plucked; the Hanafis allow its use by cobblers in necessity. Medicine from its parts: forbidden, since medicine from the impure and the forbidden is not allowed. Change of substance: the Hanafis, Malikis and a Hanbali report hold that an impure thing purified by transformation, so a pig turned into salt is clean; the Shafiis and Hanbalis say no, except wine and the hide of carrion. Value: by agreement the pig is not property of value for a Muslim, so its sale and purchase are invalid. A pig may not be sold or bought, on the report of Jabir that God and His Messenger forbade the sale of wine, carrion, pigs and idols; its sale for dirhams or dinars is void for the Hanafis, since it is to be despised, and its sale for goods like cloth is defective, since the cloth is what the contract concerns. Non-Muslims may keep pigs by agreement, but may not display them or feed them to a Muslim; if shown, they are destroyed without liability; the Shafiis compel a Christian wife to give up eating it, the Malikis do not. Theft or destruction of a pig: no hadd and no liability for a pig of a Muslim; the Hanafis and Malikis make one liable for destroying a dhimmi\'s pig; the Shafiis and Hanbalis return what was seized and do not compensate its destruction. The sea pig: the Malikis take it as the dolphin; al-Shafii allowed it; Abu Hanifa forbade it; Ibn Abi Layla allowed it; al-Layth forbade it if people call it a pig.

• Khitba (marriage proposal)

  Khitba, with a short vowel on the kha, is the verb khataba, to propose marriage to a woman; the marriage contract gives ownership of enjoyment by intent between a man and a woman free of legal bar; the proposal comes before it and does not carry its effects. The proposal is usually a means to marriage and not a condition of it; the majority permit it, and the Shafiis prefer it, following the Prophet\'s proposals to Aisha and Hafsa. Proposing to an unmarried woman with no waiting period is lawful, directly or by hint, by agreement; proposing to a married woman is forbidden; proposing to one barred by an impediment, such as a Magian woman until she accepts Islam, is not lawful. A proposal to a woman in waiting varies by her state: a direct proposal to another man\'s waiting woman is forbidden by agreement, on the Quranic verse that distinguishes hint from express offer; a hint is what admits of the desire to marry or of something else. A hint to a woman in a revocable waiting period is forbidden by agreement; a hint to a widow is permitted; a hint to a woman divorced irrevocably is permitted by the Malikis, the Shafiis in the preferred view and the Hanbalis, while the Hanafis and a Shafii view forbid it if it causes enmity with the former husband; a hint to a woman in the waiting period of an invalid marriage or a dissolution is permitted by most. On the answer to a proposal: the woman or her guardian\'s answer has the same lawfulness as the proposal; a widow may answer by hint, but not openly, and the same goes for other women in waiting. A proposal by a pilgrim in ihram is disliked by most, on the report of Uthman that the pilgrim neither marries, is married, nor proposes; the Hanafis allow it in ihram. Who is approached: a compelled woman through her guardian; a woman of sound mind may be approached on her own behalf, as the Prophet approached Umm Salama for Hatib. A guardian is advised to offer his ward to the righteous and learned, as the father of the two daughters offered one to Moses and Umar offered Hafsa to Uthman and then to Abu Bakr. Concealing the proposal is recommended by the Malikis and most jurists, but announcing the contract is recommended. Proposing over another\'s proposal: most jurists forbid it once the woman has inclined to the first suitor, on the report of Ibn Umar; al-Nawawi reports agreement that the prohibition is absolute. When the prohibition applies: the Shafiis and Hanbalis require that the first suitor was accepted, not withdrawn, not refused, and that the second knows; the Shafiis add explicit acceptance; the Hanbalis accept a hint of acceptance; the Malikis require inclination and that the first suitor is not a sinner. A contract made after a forbidden proposal stands according to most jurists, though some Malikis require it dissolved if the inclination continues. Looking at the woman proposed to is lawful by agreement, recommended for the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafiis and some Hanbalis, on the report of Mughira ibn Shu\'ba that looking helps love between them; the Hanbalis require the wish to marry and a likely acceptance, the Hanafis only the wish to marry. Consent or knowledge of the woman or her guardian is not required by most; the Hanbalis require safety from temptation, the others do not. What may be seen: the face and the two hands are allowed by the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafiis; the Hanbalis allow what usually shows, such as the face, neck, hand and foot, though one report allows only the face, and the school\'s preferred view is the wider. A woman of sound mind may adorn herself and show herself to suitors; the Hanafis count the dressing of daughters as a sunna. A suitor may look again as needed until he knows her state, no further than need; touching is not allowed, nor privacy. A suitor may send a woman to see the proposed bride and describe her, even what he may not see, since the need is great; the Malikis allow him to send a man too. If the suitor sees a woman and does not like her, he should keep silent and not say he does not want her, since that hurts. Whoever is asked about a suitor or a woman must name the defects, religious or customary, as advice and not as harm; this is not forbidden backbiting when the purpose is warning, as in the case of Fatima bint Qays and Muawiya and Abu Jahm; whoever is asked about himself must state his case; some Shafiis separate the defects that give a right to annul from those that only lessen desire. A preliminary sermon before the proposal is recommended: praise of God, prayer on the Prophet, counsel to piety, then the declaration of coming as a suitor, with the sermon of need reported from Ibn Mas\'ud as the model. Withdrawal: the Shafiis and Hanbalis hold the proposal a promise, not a binding contract, and the guardian may withdraw for the woman\'s interest; the woman may withdraw if she dislikes the suitor; withdrawal without cause is disliked; the Malikis dislike leaving a woman who inclined to the suitor. Recovering gifts and maintenance: the Hanafis recover a gift given for the dowry if it still exists, not what is lost or used; the Malikis allow gifts but not maintenance to a waiting woman; the Shafiis recover what was spent with the marriage in view, the thing or its value; the Hanbalis hold that gifts before the contract return if the promise fails, and after the contract return on a voluntary separation before consummation.

• Khiyana (breach of trust)

  Khiyana (breach of trust) linguistically is that a person is entrusted and does not give faithful counsel; its opposite is amana, and the jurists' usage does not depart from the linguistic sense. Related terms: ghishsh, the opposite of sincere counsel, technically a deception in the very sold item like curling hair or pounding cloth, khiyana being broader as deception in the item's essence, its description with false qualities, or an outside matter like quoting a false price; nifaq, entering Islam one way and leaving it another, khiyana applying to pacts and trusts and nifaq to religion; and the betrayer, thief and usurper are distinguished: the betrayer betrays what was entrusted to him, the thief takes secretly from a place he was barred from reaching — every thief is a betrayer but not vice versa on a stated view — and the usurper takes openly relying on force. Betraying a trust is forbidden by Surah al-Anfal ayah 27 and the hadith "the signs of the hypocrite are three: when he speaks he lies, when he promises he breaks, when he is entrusted he betrays"; al-Dhahabi and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami count it among the grave sins, ugly in everything but worse in some. Trust-based sales rest on confidence between the parties, so the seller must be truthful in reporting what he paid and what it cost him, and such sales must be guarded from betrayal and suspicion as far as possible by Surah al-Anfal ayah 27 and "whoever deceives us is not of us"; guarding is achieved by disclosing what must be disclosed, and the ruling when betrayal appears is disputed, detailed under bay' al-amana. The musaqah worker is trusted and his word accepted on claimed loss and on betrayal claims against him; if betrayal is proved by confession, evidence or returned oath, an overseer is attached to him until the work is done with the overseer's wage on the worker, and if he is only suspected an overseer is attached at the owner's cost, at the Shafiis and Hanbalis; the Hanafis count his being a thief feared for the fronds and fruit an excuse annulling the musaqah for imposing an unassumed harm on the landowner; the Malikis hold it a binding contract not annulled by his thieving, nor is he replaced but guarded. One who takes a found thing intending betrayal and seizure is liable as a usurper, not cleared until he delivers it to its owner; whether he is cleared by handing it to the ruler or returning it to its place is disputed, detailed under luqata. The market overseer watches craftsmen for honesty: he confirms the trustworthy, removes and publicizes the betrayer, and may appoint a guild head from each craft's righteous, expert members, knowing their frauds, to supervise their affairs and prices, per "seek help for every craft from its righteous people". The betrayer's hand is not cut, per Jabir's hadith "no cutting for a betrayer, a snatcher or an embezzler", Ibn al-Humam reporting consensus, since the duty is cutting the thief and the betrayer is no thief for the deficiency of custody, the property being in his authorized hands; they dispute the denier of a borrowed item: the majority impose no cutting as he is a betrayer like the deposit-denier, while Ahmad in a transmission and Ishaq ibn Rahawayh impose it for Aisha's report that a woman used to borrow goods and deny them so he ordered her hand cut, the majority reading the cutting as for a theft she committed after becoming known for denying loans so she was described by her famous trait; Ibn Qudama knows none obliging cutting for a deposit-denier or like trusts. On treaty partners' betrayal: the Shafiis and Hanbalis hold that if the imam senses betrayal by clear signs, not mere fancy, their pact is not void but he may renounce it to them under Surah al-Anfal ayah 58 and must before attacking, and if the truce ends while some are in Muslim land they must be returned to safety; the Malikis hold that once he suspects betrayal before the term by appearing signs he must renounce the pact, warning them obligatorily unless their betrayal is confirmed; the Hanafis let the imam annul the truce whenever he sees benefit, even without sensing betrayal, since when benefit changes renouncing is jihad, Ibn al-Humam reporting consensus that renouncing is not conditioned on fear arising, and if they begin with betrayal the imam fights without renouncing when the breach is unanimous. The Shafiis and Hanbalis state that the pact with the people of the dhimma is not renounced on feared betrayal, since the dhimma contract is due to them and they are in the imam's power so their betrayal can be countered, unlike treaty partners beyond his reach. A Muslim entering enemy land under aman must not betray them in property, since the aman was given conditioned on his not betraying, known in meaning though unexpressed, and betrayal is perfidy which has no place, per "Muslims are bound by their conditions". The betrayer who spies for the unbelievers, informing them of the Muslims' weak points by letter, is barred from going out with the army. Betrayal recurs across many chapters: sale, partnership, mudaraba, deposit, loan, the found thing, agency, wills, custody, testimony and the conduct of war.

• Khiyar al-ayb (option of defect)

  Khiyar al-ayb (option of defect) is a compound of 'option' and 'defect'. The majority use this name; the Malikis usually call it the option of deficiency (khiyar al-naqisa). Ibn Nujaym and Ibn al-Humam define a defect as what the sound natural state lacks, so as to count as deficient; Ibn Rushd as what falls short of the natural creation or the lawful form, with a real effect on the price; al-Ghazali as any disliked attribute whose absence customarily is assumed for the thing. Lawfulness of return for defect: the jurists agree in general that a defective thing may be returned. They cite the Qur'an, that trade must be by mutual consent (Surah al-Nisa, 4:29), since knowledge of a defect means the consent is not full; and the Sunnah: the report of Aisha about a man who bought a slave, used him, found a defect and returned him, and the Prophet's ruling that the yield goes with the liability. Al-Kasani also cites the hadith of the sheep with its udder held full, and argues by analogy that the buyer pays a price for a sound thing and does not get it. Duty of the seller to disclose: the seller must tell the buyer of a defect that gives the option. Not mentioning a defect that gives no option is not forbidden deceit, in the view of Imam al-Haramayn. The majority hold that disclosure is obligatory, and whoever hides a defect is sinful, a matter on which there is no dispute according to Ibn Qudama and al-Subki. Ibn Rushd counts it as eating wealth falsely. The sources cited include the hadith of Uqba ibn Amir that a Muslim sells to his brother only with the defect shown, the hadith of Wathila ibn al-Asqa' against selling without explaining what is in it, and the saying «whoever cheats us is not of us», from the heap of grain that the Prophet found wet. Concealment and the validity of the sale: a sale that conceals a defect giving the option is valid though sinful, according to most jurists, since the prohibition is on concealment, not on the contract. If the buyer learns of the defect after buying and accepts it, the seller is still at fault and the sale holds, as al-Shawkani holds. The Companions' practice included Ibn Umar buying camels with mange, and accepting them when told of it. Duty on others than the contracting party: the duty to disclose is not limited to the seller but extends to anyone who knows of the defect, on the report of Wathila and the many texts on giving counsel. Timing of the disclosure: a seller or a third party who knows of a defect should disclose it before the sale, so that the buyer may refrain; if the third party is not present, or cannot, then after the sale, so that the buyer may return the thing. The duty is strongest when only a third party knows. The purpose of the option is to remove harm from the buyer: a sale implies a sound object, and when soundness fails through a defect the buyer has the choice, because consent is part of the sale's nature. Three conditions for the option of defect: a real defect must appear; the buyer must not have known of it at the contract; and the seller must not have stipulated release from defects. A defect counts when it lowers value or defeats a valid purpose, and when soundness in that respect is the normal state of that kind of thing. Definitions: the Hanafis take any thing that lowers value in the eyes of experts, whether or not the substance is reduced; a grave defect in a dowry moves it from good to middling to poor quality. The Shafiis take a defect that lowers value or substance so that a valid purpose is lost, when the usual state of such things is free of it; the Hanbalis count loss of substance even where value rises, and loss of value even where substance is unchanged. The Malikis count a house where someone was killed as defective, since people shun it and its price falls. Normal state: the freedom from the defect must be the normal state of the kind of thing. What is common in such things is not a defect; for instance a usual sediment in oil. Experts decide: merchants for goods, craftsmen for crafted things. The Hanafis require the agreement of experts (if they disagree, there is no right of return); the majority of the Shafiis accept one expert, and the author of al-Tatimma requires two. If the two disagree and no other authority is available, the seller's word stands with his oath. Conditions of effect: the defect must be in the object itself, not in the other party, a pledge, or a guarantor. It must be old, that is present at the contract or arising before receipt; a defect that arises after receipt gives no option, though the Malikis apply the rule of warranty (three days for slaves; a year for madness, leprosy and vitiligo). The Hanafis make an exception for leasing, which is annulled by a new defect, since leasing is a contract of benefits that accrue gradually. The buyer's own act: a defect caused by the buyer before receipt gives no option, in the Shafii view. The defect must remain after delivery and until return: if it disappears before the buyer returns the thing, the right to return lapses. The Hanafis and Shafiis require that the buyer prove the defect is present with him, since a defect present with the seller may be removed. Removable defects: no option where the defect can be removed without hardship, such as a maker's stamp on cloth that washing does not harm, or stain on a garment that washing removes. If the seller minimised the defect and the buyer accepted it, the Malikis grant the buyer the right to return unless a new defect has arisen; then he may choose between return and compensation (arsh), as in a legal opinion by al-Wansharisi about a beast wounded by a spear. Proof of defects by how visible they are: a visible defect needs no proof beyond the buyer's sight, and he may sue the seller. A hidden defect known only to experts (such as pain in the liver or spleen) is proven by two Muslim men or one just man of expertise. A defect only women see is proven by the word of one just woman, two being safer; in the Hanafi view it proves the claim but not return. A defect known only by trial, such as a slave who absconds, needs two men or a man and two women. The seller's oath: if the buyer cannot prove the defect was with the seller, the two companions of Abu Hanifa have the seller sworn; Abu Hanifa does not. If the defect may occur in the buyer's hand, the oath is absolute (a definite oath); if the seller only knows of another's act, he swears on knowledge. If the seller refuses to swear, the defect is established against him. Knowledge of the defect: the buyer must be unaware of the defect. If he knew it at the contract or at receipt he has no option, since by buying or taking the thing with knowledge he consents in effect. A defect that is obvious and that anyone would see counts as known, and so does a defect the seller pointed out. Where the seller said that a thing is faulty as a condition of sale, as with a bull sold on condition that it sleeps in the plough, the seller is free of blame. A buyer who knows of a thing that is a defect without knowing it is one: if he takes it and only later learns that it is a defect, the question is whether the defect is plain. A plain defect that anyone sees gives no right to return; a defect that only experts know gives the right. Likewise a buyer who knows a coin is false, but not how many are false, has not consented to the defect. The release from defects: the option is lost if the seller stipulates release. A release is valid in the Hanafi view whether the defect was known or unknown to the seller and whatever the thing; Malik and al-Shafii allow it only for animals. Such a sale with release is a special type called the sale of release. Origin and the views: the report of Ibn Umar, who sold a slave with release and was challenged over a hidden illness; Uthman ordered him to swear he did not know of it, and he refused, took the slave back, and later sold him for more. The jurists differ on the release: release from all defects whether known or not (Abu Hanifa, Abu Thawr, from Ibn Umar and Zayd); no release unless the defect is named (Ibn Abi Layla, al-Thawri); no release unless the buyer has seen it (some Shafiis, Shurayh, Ata, a report of Ahmad and Ishaq); release only from hidden defects in animals (Malik, and the apparent view of al-Shafii); a release only in a sale of spoils, of a bankrupt, or in debt payment; or a voiding of the sale altogether, a Shafii view. Kinds of release: particular (of a named defect) or general (of all defects). If it refers to a defect existing at the contract, it covers only that. If it refers to a future defect arising before receipt, the condition is void and the sale invalid. If unqualified, Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf take it to cover defects at the contract and until receipt; Malik, Muhammad, Zufar and al-Hasan ibn Ziyad limit it to defects at the contract. Contracts that take the option of defect (Hanafi list): sale and purchase (the valid sale, not the void one, and including exchange of money); leasing, which takes it whether the defect is old or new, and where the lessee may return before and after receipt; division; settlement on property; the dowry; the compensation of khul'; and the settlement for willful blood. For these, return is only for a grave defect, not a slight one. Ibn Rushd: contracts divide into three: those meant for exchange, which take the option without dispute; those not meant for exchange, such as a gift without return, which do not; and mixed contracts, such as a gift with intent of return, which he thinks do not. Timing of the return: three views. (1) Immediately, meaning as soon as custom allows; whoever knows and does not return loses the right and bears the loss without arsh, the Shafii view and one of Ahmad. The Hanafi al-Hawi also holds this; Ibn Nujaym calls it strange, and the Hanafi view taken is that the option lasts. (2) Delayed, as long as no sign of consent appears, the view of the Hanafis (as relied on) and a sound Hanbali report. (3) A day or two, the Maliki view, where continued possession after that counts as consent. Effect on the contract's rule: the defect does not stop the transfer of ownership: the buyer owns the thing at once and the seller owns the price, since the sale is absolute in its pillars. The implied condition of soundness only stops the contract from being binding, not its basic effect. What the buyer may choose: three views. (1) Hanafis and Shafiis: return against full price, or keep the thing for the full price with no arsh; arsh only if return is impossible. (2) Ahmad and Ishaq: return, or keep with arsh, even when return is possible; but if keeping with arsh leads to ribā, keeping is free. (3) Malikis: a grave defect allows return or keeping free; a slight defect in land means arsh only, and in goods return, by the apparent view of the Mudawwana. The source of the dispute: whether the defect reduces the substance or the attribute. Conditions of return: the option must still exist; the thing returned must be as received, without a further defect such as a defect of partnership arising from split of the deal; and the deal must not be split before the whole thing is received, unless the seller accepts, since then it is damage the seller accepts. Splitting the deal: when a thing is one deal, the buyer may not return part of it for a defect by compulsion, unless the rest is the seller's, in which case the part may be returned by compulsion; this is the view the judge relies on, since the valid reason is the harm of splitting the deal on the seller. Before the whole thing is received, the deal may not be split, whether the thing is one (cloth, a house), a measure in containers, two things in fact or one in account (like the two leaves of a door). The Malikis: if the sound part is lost, the buyer may return the defective part with its share of the price; if the sound part remains, he may return part by its share only if the defective part is not more than half, and the defect is not the purpose of the deal; otherwise he returns all or keeps all. The Hanbalis forbid return by splitting in one thing, and in two things that lose value when split; the Shafiis do not allow returning part, though al-Qadi Husayn allowed it where there is no split on the seller. Splitting by plurality of parties: when two buyers buy one thing and find a defect, one may return it alone according to Abu Yusuf and Muhammad; Abu Hanifa says no, since the return would not be of the thing as received (a new defect of partnership). The Shafiis and Hanbalis distinguish a plural deal (several sellers or buyers, or price stated per part) from a single one: the first allows return of one share; if one seller is absent, the buyer returns the present seller's share by its price share. Knowledge and consent: the Hanafis require the other party to know of the return, whether before or after receipt; a return without his knowledge is suspended, and the deal binds if the term lapses. The Shafiis and Hanbalis require neither knowledge, consent, nor a judge's ruling. Before receipt the Hanafis need neither consent nor judgement; after receipt they need one of them, because the deal is complete on receipt. Nature of the return and its effect on resale: in Hanafi terms, a return by consent after receipt is a rescission between the parties but a new sale as against others; a return by judgement annuls for all. The effect appears in a chain of sales: if the second buyer's return was accepted by judgement, he may return to his seller; if by consent, he may not, because it is a new sale for the third party. Before receipt, the first buyer may return to the first seller in all cases. Ibn Qudama holds that a buyer who knew of the defect, or showed consent, may not return it. Keeping with arsh: when a return is impossible through increase, change or disposal, the buyer's right passes from return to compensation of the price, called the substitute right. This is the Hanafi and Shafii view; the Malikis have three kinds of defect (slight, with nothing due; grave, with return or free keeping; and medium, with compensation of the price); the Hanbalis let the buyer choose between keeping with the price reduction and return even when return is possible. Arsh is found by valuing the thing sound, then with the defect, and taking the proportion of the difference to the value and applying it to the price. The author of al-Ashbah holds that the value is taken on the day of the contract; al-Hasan al-Basri and Ahmad take the value at purchase. Obstacles to return: natural, legal and contractual. Destruction in the seller's hand prevents return, and the seller claims no price from the buyer. Destruction after receipt by a heavenly cause prevents return, leaving the price reduction. Consumption by the buyer through lawful use (eating food, wearing cloth until torn) also prevents return; Abu Hanifa differs from his two companions here, who hold it an obstacle to return but not to arsh. The Hanbalis distinguish whether the seller concealed the defect: if he did, the buyer may claim the whole price; the Malikis give the whole price only when the concealed defect itself caused the loss. Legal obstacles to return: a connected increase that is not generated from the thing (dyeing, sewing, building, planting) bars return whether before or after receipt, because it is a thing in itself and not a subordinate part; the seller's consent does not allow it, since it would be riba. A separated increase generated after receipt (offspring, fruit, milk, compensation for an injury) bars return in the Hanafi view, since returning it with the thing is profit on what was not guaranteed; al-Shafii counts it as earnings and does not let it bar return. Increases that do not bar return: a connected generated increase (growth, fattening; for the Hanbalis the unborn young before birth and the fruit before pollination) does not bar return in the apparent Hanafi report, unless the buyer refuses to return it with the thing, in which case he takes the arsh; Muhammad differs. A separated generated increase before receipt (offspring, milk, fruit on trees) does not bar return, but the thing may not be returned alone: the buyer returns all or keeps all at the full price; the Hanbalis return the thing alone and the increase stays with the buyer. A separated non-generated increase (rent, earnings) does not bar return, and the buyer keeps it by the rule that the yield goes with liability; in the Hanafi view he keeps it without price but not in good conscience, and the two companions give it to the seller; if he chooses to keep the thing, the increase is not good for him (not lawful in the sense of clean gain). If the increase perishes: by a heavenly cause the rule does not change; by the buyer's act the seller may accept the thing with the whole price, or refuse and take the lower price; by a third party's act return is impossible. The Malikis: Ibn Rushd gives five forms of increase. Growth from market change gives no option; an increase in the state of the thing gives none; growth within the thing or from its kind, such as offspring, is disputed; an added increase of another kind, like fruit that appears on a palm, gives no option, and the buyer returns the palm and its fruit before they ripen, with the cost of treatment, or keeps them with no return; an increase the buyer made by craft, such as dyeing or sewing, gives the option either to keep and claim the arsh or to return and become a partner in the value. Ibn Ghazi and al-Hattab describe valuations of two or four stages in these cases. Contractual obstacle (a new defect): if the thing is defective with a new defect in the buyer's hand, by his act, by a heavenly cause, or by a living thing it harmed, the return of the defective thing is barred, and the substitute right to a price reduction takes its place, because the condition of return is that the thing be returned as received, and returning it would harm the seller who does not guarantee the new defect. The Hanafis and a Hanbali report give the buyer no right of return, since he caused the inability. The Malikis and another Hanbali report let him choose between keeping with the arsh of the old defect and return with the arsh of the new. The Shafiis hold that the right to return falls away automatically; if the seller does not accept the defective thing, the buyer adds the arsh of the new defect to it and returns it, or pays the arsh of the old defect and keeps it, and must notify the seller promptly. Ending the option: by the return (or by keeping with arsh) and by acts that show consent; also by removal of the defect before return, if done quickly and without harm to the buyer. Ibn Hajar's examples: land with seed that the seller undertakes to remove quickly; a house with a roof fault that the seller repairs; land with buried stone whose leaving does no harm but whose removal does; and a shod animal, whose shoe, if removed, would worsen the defect. Duty to refrain from return for the public interest: where keeping the defective thing is the better course and the contracting party's power is restricted: a bankrupt buyer, because return would take the creditors' gain; a guardian buying for his ward in a case where buying is lawful, since return harms the ward; and a mudarib who did not get the owner's order to return. Waiver: the Hanafis allow the buyer to waive the option of defect by express words, since it is his own right, unlike the option of sight, which is an option by law. A waiver for consideration is not allowed in the Shafii view: Ibn Hajar held that paying for the option to be surrendered is not valid, as it is an option of rescission, like the option of deliberation, which has no value. The arsh is not a payment for waiving the option but an assessment of the price loss. Express consent: words such as «I consent to the defect», «I waived the option of defect», «I approve the contract» end both the return and the arsh, since the right to return exists because the condition of soundness implied in the contract has failed, and consent to the defect means the buyer waived that condition. Acts of consent: three kinds. First, use without loss, such as wearing a garment, riding an animal (other than to return it, water it or buy fodder), irrigating, planting or harvesting land, or offering the thing for sale or lease, even once; these show a wish to keep the thing. Second, destroying the thing, such as tearing cloth or killing an animal, which ends the option. Third, taking the thing out of ownership by a transfer, such as sale, gift with delivery, or settlement; the return to the seller is then barred for the buyer, who is held responsible for the barrier, so he has no right to the arsh either. If he later gets the thing back by an option of condition or of sight, he may return it to the seller, by judgement or by consent before receipt, but not by consent after receipt. Other views on acts of ownership: the Hanafis and Hanbalis hold that any transfer, even by a buyer ignorant of the defect, bars return and moves the right to the arsh. The Malikis say that a transfer with consideration ends both return and arsh, and without consideration leaves the arsh. The Shafiis distinguish a transfer that gives no hope of return, such as a waqf, which bars return, from one that leaves hope of return, such as a sale, which ends the option. Proof and dispute over the defect: claims arise between the parties over whether the defect is old or new and over the cause of return; the Malikis and Shafiis have details falling under the general methods of proof, and the Hanbalis record that where a defect can admit the word of only one side, such as a fresh wound the buyer claims to be old, the word is that of the claimant without an oath. The option of defect passes to the heir on the death of the one entitled, by agreement.

• Khiyar al-ghabn (option of fraud in price)

  Khiyar al-ghabn is the option the defrauded party holds in some schools for a price below or above the experts' valuation; ghabn in language is shortfall, and to cheat someone in a sale, and Ibn Najim defines it as a shortfall in the price in sale and purchase, with the like in the counter-value of other exchange contracts. Ghabn has effect in many places, among them riba exchanges between goods of one genus, hoarding, and forbidden sales such as najsh, meeting the caravans, the townsman's sale for the desert-dweller, the musarrah, selling over another's sale, the sale to the trusting buyer (mustarsil), sales of trust, and verbal deceit joined with ghabn; Ibn Qudama made ghabn the pivot of three options: meeting the caravans, najsh and the mustarsil, the last being a true ghabn option as a betrayal by the seller after the buyer relied on him and left bargaining. The schools in brief: the Hanafis give the defrauded no option unless he was deceived, on the preponderant view, or the ghabn fell on a minor; the Malikis in one view give the option to the defrauded absolutely or if he is a mustarsil; the Hanbalis restrict it to the mustarsil. The ghabn that counts for return is the gross one, defined by the Hanafis, the preponderant Maliki view and one Hanbali view as what traders' custom estimates, the measure being the valuers' assessment; the second Maliki and Hanbali view fixes it at one third, and a third Maliki view at more than a third. The option requires the defrauded to have been ignorant of the ghabn at the contract; some holders of the option argue from the hadith of Habban ibn Munqidh which includes the stipulation of no cheating, while one who proceeds with knowledge has no option. Its effect, when trust and unusual ghabn are proved, is the choice between annulment and confirmation without charge, with no claim for the arsh. On the Hanafi view as contained in the Majalla the option of ghabn with deceit lapses by the goods perishing, being consumed, changed or newly defective, by silence and dealing after knowledge of the ghabn, and by the death of the defrauded, whose claim does not pass to the heir, while the deceiver's death does not prevent it. The option of ghabn in the bargaining sale is denied by the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis and by the Malikis on the preponderant view, the Malikis and Hanbalis restricting it to the mustarsil. The Hanafis transmit three views on bare gross ghabn in the bargaining sale: no return at all, return absolutely, and return only when joined with deceit, which is preponderant. The mustarsil is for the Malikis the one who surrenders to his seller, for the Hanbalis the one ignorant of the goods' value who is not skilled in trading, and in another wording from Ahmad the one who does not bargain; the operative trait is inexperience in trading, and Ibn Qudama held that the knowledgeable man who would have known had he paused has no option if he hastened and was defrauded. Khalil of the Malikis states there is no return for ghabn even against custom, which is the well-known view though a view of return exists, and slight ghabn binds the contract by agreement; Ibn Rushd recorded no standing against ghabn in the bargaining sale and that standing against it is obligatory by consensus in the istirsal and istinama sale for the hadith of the Prophet's governor 'the ghabn of the mustarsil is wrongdoing', transmitted by al-Tabarani and recorded by al-Haythami who weakened it for Musa ibn Umayr al-A'ma in its chain. The Hanbalis affirm the ghabn option for the mustarsil alone on the preponderant view, among the issues Ibn Taymiyya chose in Ahmad's school, while a transmission noted by Ibn Abi Musa with the wording 'it was said' makes the ghabn binding on the mustarsil too. The Malikis affirm the option for the ghabn of a guardian over a minor or an agent over his principal to avert harm, and article 356 of the Majalla states that ghabn alone in an orphan's property invalidates the sale, the property of the waqf and the public treasury being alike; the option stands in the contract of purchase by their agreement, some restricting it to that and allowing sale with ghabn by the boy or the one acting for another since sale removes ownership. On the preponderant Maliki view its effect is rescission while the goods stand, none if they are lost, recourse then being to completing the price; it lapses by dealing in the goods and by their perishing or loss, in which case the principal and the ward recover the ghabn from the buyer, then from the seller who is the agent or guardian; the recovery is not limited to a third but covers every clear shortfall of the value, which Ibn Arafa deemed correct and which the transmissions of the Mudawwana require.

• Khiyar al-kammiyya (option for the unknown quantity of the price)

  Khiyar al-kammiyya in the jurists' usage, as the author of al-Fatawa al-Sirajiyya defines it, is the seller's option in the price: the seller's right to annul for the hidden amount of the price at the contracting; it is so named for the ignorance of the price's quantity since it is not seen in a way that informs, being seen inside a container whose contents cannot be known; it is very close in purpose to the option of sight but does not fall under it because the option of sight does not stand in currency, and kammiyya is a technical verbal noun of kam, the particle of asking about amount. It has applications though few: it occurs in friendly bargainings and in settlements of rights, where the exchanger tenders a purse of money or a bundle of banknotes, and sometimes in ordinary sales a person buys a thing for the money in his pocket or bag without stating the amount, and affirming this option for the seller when the amount is learned completes full consent. The Hanafis affirm it, list it among their options and regard it as complementary to the option of sight, arguing for it by analogy with the option of defect so that it is an option of deficiency, its establishment perhaps being a treatment of the ignorance for which the option of sight was established, averting it and reducing gharar; the Hanafi comparison brings it near the option of sight as though it were it, save that the option of sight is confined to specific things and the option of quantity to currency. Among the conditions of a valid sale is knowing the amount and description of the price when it is of the absolute prices which are established without pointing, so that the gross ignorance preventing delivery and receipt is removed, unlike what is pointed at; knowledge of the amount is like saying ten dirhams, and knowledge of the description is specifying the dirhams by the mark that distinguishes them from others when kinds differ, since the buyer wants to pay the baser and the seller demands the finer; a contract for an unknown price is invalid, like selling for its value, for what falls due, for what the buyer wants or likes, for the capital or what he bought it for or for the like of what so-and-so bought for, unless that is known in the session in which case it is allowed; and of it is selling for what people sell for unless the thing does not vary, and selling at the price one previously sold for when it varied or at what will be sold for in the future, which is corrupt. If the price is not named by number and kind but pointed at, the pointing is either to the thing itself or to its container; in direct pointing, as when the dirhams are in his hand visible to him, the contract is valid and binding with no option, because what remains is ignorance of description which does not harm since it does not bar delivery and receipt; but if it is in a container preventing knowledge of its amount even approximately, like a box, a jar or a purse, and he then sees it outside the container, he has the option because he had not known its amount from outside. Ibn Abidin of the Hanafis refined the purse case making the criterion knowledge of its contents from outside: if knowable there is no option, else it takes the rule of the jar; and the standard is that a container holding the price which indicates its contents, even approximately, bars the option of quantity, otherwise the option stands. The Shafiis treat the case where the price is unnamed and undefined, a purse of dirhams exchanged by estimate with neither party knowing its amount but both seeing it, the sale being valid without dispute; whether sale for a purse of dirhams by estimate is disliked is transmitted in two views by the Khurasani scholars, the sounder being dislike, which al-Shirazi and others held decisively for the gharar in it, and the second that it is not disliked because it is seen.

• Khiyar al-majlis (option of the session)

  Khiyar al-majlis is the contractor's right to confirm or annul the contract from the contracting until parting or mutual choosing; al-majlis here names a place of sitting and means the session of the contract, a unit of time that begins with the offer, continues while the parties remain engaged in contracting, and ends by parting or mutual choosing; the option begins not at the offer but at the acceptance matching it, what precedes acceptance being a distinct option of acceptance; actual sitting does not count, only the parties' engagement in contracting; some name it the option of the two parties from the hadith "the two parties have the option". The majority of early and later jurists affirm it, including the Shafiis and Hanbalis, the contract binding for them only on parting from the session or on mutual choosing of confirmation; the Hanafis, Malikis and some early jurists deny it, among them al-Thawri, al-Layth and al-Anbari; the affirmers argue from Ibn Umar's report "the two parties each have the option over the other as long as they have not parted, except a sale of option", from Ibn Umar's statement "the sunna was that the two parties had the option until they parted" which has the force of a raised report, from his giving a man the choice after a sale saying "choose" then "this is how sale is", and from reason in people's need to take back a regretted sale. The deniers argued from Surah al-Nisa ayah 29 and Surah al-Ma'ida ayah 1, the hadith "whoever buys food must not sell it until he has received it in full", the transmission "it is not lawful for him to leave his companion for fear he may ask to cancel", the hadith "Muslims are bound by their conditions", analogy with marriage, khul', manumission for payment and kitaba, analogy of before-parting with after-parting, that it is an option over an unknown since the session's length is unknown, and that an unconditional contract requires ownership to pass in both countervalues at once. Its duration is unfixed, left to the parties' will, ending by parting or mutual choosing, both of unknown timing; a Shafii view al-Nawawi calls weak caps it at three days, and a third view lapses it by the parties turning to another matter with a long lapse, the preponderant being that it stands until parting or choosing. Its endings are parting, agreed among the affirmers and governed by the parties' custom, and mutual choosing, which is both parties choosing the contract's bindingness and ends the option at the Shafiis and Ahmad on the sounder transmission against another transmission confining the ending to parting on the strength of the more numerous reports; choosing is express or implied, as re-trading the two countervalues in the session, and one party's dealing with his own countervalue suffices. The silent party after being given the choice keeps his option at the Shafiis and the sounder Hanbali view since nothing from him voids it, a second Hanbali view lapsing it by analogy with its indivisible establishment; the one who offered the choice and got no answer loses his option on the sounder view since the hadith makes his option contingent on his issuing the choice and he gave the other what he owned, a second view keeping it since he acted seeking agreement. Annulment by either party dissolves the contract even if the other insists on confirming, since the option was established to enable annulment not confirmation and annulment is its purpose as al-Nawawi says, and the option lapses consequently with the contract because when a thing is void what is within it is void. Dealing in the goods or the price does not lapse the option at the Shafiis; at the Hanbalis the buyer's dealing with the seller's leave lapses both their options and the dealing is valid, the seller's dealing with the buyer's leave is the like on the preponderant view, while a transferring dealing such as sale, gift or waqf, or an encumbering one such as hire or pledge, does not lapse the option for the seller who dealt in what is not his since ownership during the option is the buyer's on their view, and for the buyer it drops the seller's right of option and bars the dealing's validity since the seller's right attached to it. Waiving the option at the outset, the sale on condition of negating the option, has three views: its validity, the Hanbali school and an unauthenticated Shafii view; its impossibility with the sale void, the sounder Shafii view stated in al-Buwayti and the old-school books; and its impossibility with the sale valid, an unauthenticated view; waiving both options binds the contract while waiving one leaves the other's; the validators argue from the hadith of choosing and from the option being a kindness and a gharar that may be dropped, the deniers that it is waiving a right before its cause is established, like the right of pre-emption, and that it contradicts the sale's import which is established accompanied by the option. The effect of death: the option passes to the heir on the sounder Shafii view by analogy with the passing of rights and with the options of defect and stipulation; it lapses at the Hanbalis as a will attached to the contractor's person; and a Hanbali view transfers it only if the deceased claimed it in his will. Madness and fainting: on the sounder view the option passes to the guardian, judge or other, without waiting on the preponderant view; if one becomes mute and neither his gesture nor writing is understood the judge appoints a deputy for him, else he keeps his option; a view lapses it since departing reason is no weaker than departing the place; and the Hanbalis hold madness does not void it, the party holding his option on waking, while in enveloping madness his father, executor or the judge stands in his place. Its agreed principal effect is preventing the contract's bindingness until parting or choosing; on its effect on the transfer of ownership there are two views: the Hanbalis in the apparent school that ownership passes to the buyer despite the option with no effect on the contract's enforceability or validity so it yields all its rulings while annullable, arguing from the hadiths of selling a slave with property and selling pollinated palms where the property and fruit go to the buyer by mere stipulation; and the Shafiis on the clearest of three views that the contract is suspended and awaited as to transfer of ownership, so if completed it is judged to have been the buyer's by the contract, else the seller proved never to have lost ownership, and likewise the price, because the option standing for both parties entails two contradictory implications requiring suspension until it ends. The option of the session has no effect on the option of stipulation: the stipulated term counts from the contract in which the condition was made, or from the stipulation if made in the session.

• Khiyar al-naqd (option of payment)

  Khiyar al-naqd is a right a contractor stipulates to be able to annul for non-payment; naqd linguistically means giving and taking possession, as in "I paid the man the dirhams and he took them". It has two forms: first, contracting with the stipulation that if the buyer does not pay the price by a known period there is no contract between them, its exerciser being the buyer though its greater benefit is the seller's, in the position of a stipulated option for the buyer; second, contracting then the buyer paying, on the agreement that if the seller returns the countervalue within a set period there is no contract, its exerciser the seller who alone benefits, a case closely resembling bay' al-wafa' so that some include that sale under it, in the position of a stipulated option for the seller. It is affirmed by the Malikis, Hanbalis and Hanafis except Zufar ibn al-Hudhayl, held by al-Thawri, Ishaq and Abu Thawr, attributed to Umar and Ibn Umar, and held among the Shafiis by Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi arguing from Umar's report; the Shafiis on the sound view and Zufar oppose it. The affirmers argue by analogy with the option of stipulation, the shared cause being deliberation, by Companion reports including Shurayh's ruling by it when the buyer brought the price the next day and he said "you broke your word", and by the need for it like the need for the stipulated option; the deniers call it a corrupt condition corrupting the contract since it hangs annulment on a gharar, Zufar adding that it stipulates a corrupt rescission while even stipulating a valid rescission corrupts; al-Kasani records that it is established by istihsan against analogy since it shares with the stipulated option the feature of conditionality. Its holder is the buyer or the seller as the form stipulated, the seller's benefit being greater since he gains by the annulment if the buyer delays. Its term is disputed like the stipulated option: left to the parties even beyond three days, the Hanbali school and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan alone among the Hanafis, also al-Thawri and Ishaq; fixed at three days, the view of Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf, differing from his own rule on the stipulated option, and of Abu Thawr, attributed to Ibn Umar; and about three days not exceeding twenty at Malik; if more than three is stipulated on Abu Hanifa's and Abu Yusuf's view, payment within the three validates, else the sale is corrupt not annulled, as Zahir al-Din determined and Ibn al-Humam and Ibn Abidin approved. It matches the stipulated option in causes of lapse, rules and transfer, not being inherited at the Hanafis like its origin. Ibn Nujaym made bay' al-wafa' one of its instances and its fittest place of enquiry; Ibn Abidin did not accept this, since it is an instance only on the view voiding bay' al-wafa' beyond three days, the payment option being capped at three days while bay' al-wafa' is not.

• Khiyar al-ru'ya (option of sight)

  The option of sight (khiyar al-ru'ya) is a right to annul or confirm when one sees the specific thing contracted that one had not seen; it is set by the law for the Hanafis, required as a stipulation by the Malikis for the sale of an absent thing, and denied by the new Shafii view and the better Hanbali report. It concerns the sale of the absent: absence means not seen at the contract, whether it is away from the session or hidden from the eye. Ruling: the Hanafis rely on "God has made sale lawful" and the report "he who buys what he has not seen has the option when he sees it", and the judgement of Talha and Uthman; the Shafiis and others reject it. Sight means knowing the principal object of the contract, by any sense. Sight in fungibles and in values: a specific measure is like a specific thing, while a described debt has no option of sight; values such as animals, lands and varied cloths need the sight of each item, since sight of one does not show the rest. Cases: through glass (Abu Hanifa requires seeing the thing without barrier; Muhammad allows), in water (fish: no), by mirror (no), through a thin cover (yes), in a light that hides colours (no), the blind by other senses. Custom fixes what partial sight suffices, and changes with custom. Conditions: the subject must be a specific thing, not a debt (so not currency or debts); the contract must be one which can be annulled by return; the buyer must know at the contract that what he contracts is the one seen before; the seeing before must have been with intent to buy in one view; sight after the contract is the condition for the option to arise. On the party: the Hanafis hold the option for the buyer alone; some hold it also for the seller, which was Abu Hanifa\'s earlier view and an old Shafii view. Contracts: it arises in sale, in salam if the capital is specific (for the supplier), not in the deferred goods nor in exchange of money, in istisna\' for the buyer, in leasing a specified thing, not in weighed things. Time: it arises at the sight, not before; if one allows the contract before sight and then sees it, one may still annul; a waiver before sight is void for the Hanafis. Annulment before sight: possible for the Hanafis because of the unknown at contract, not by the option itself; the Malikis hold that property does not pass under the option of sight. Term: the sounder Hanafi view is that it runs without a set limit; another view makes it immediate after sight. Effect: the contract before sight is as one without option; after sight it becomes non-binding without affecting transfer; the Malikis differ on resale before sight. Ways it ends: a transfer that touches another\'s right, change of the thing not by the buyer, defect in his hand, one partner\'s confirmation, death; a plain waiver before sight does not end it, since it is God\'s right according to al-Kasani. Termination: by confirmation, explicit or by act (receipt, cutting, building after sight); by annulment, voluntary or compelled (such as perishing before receipt). Conditions of annulment: the option must exist, no split of the deal to the seller, and for Abu Hanifa and Muhammad the seller must know; Abu Yusuf disagrees. Transmission: the Hanafis hold it does not pass at death, as it is for general deliberation.

• Khiyar al-shart (option of stipulation)

  The option of stipulation (khiyar al-shart) is a compound name for the right, set by stipulation, of one party to choose between confirming and annulling; Ibn Arafa defines it as a sale whose conclusion is held back for a confirmation expected. Other names: the stipulated option (distinguished from the legal option, such as defect), the option of deliberation, and the sale of option. Its lawfulness: most jurists hold it lawful and not contrary to the contract, on the report of Ibn Umar and of Habban ibn Munqidh ("when you sell, say: no deceit" and "you have the option three nights"); al-Nawawi and Ibn al-Humam report agreement. Wording: no fixed words; any word that conveys the option (consent, will) is enough, and custom counts for the Malikis, as when people have long bargained with an option in a certain sale. Conditions: it must be stipulated in the contract or its session in the Shafii and Hanbali view; the Hanafis allow it to be added later as if at the contract; it must be limited by a known term, since an unlimited option causes gross ignorance. Term: the least is not fixed and may be a moment; for the greatest, Ahmad, Muhammad al-Shaybani, Abu Yusuf and others allow any term by agreement, while Ibn Abi Layla, Ibn Shubruma and others too; Ahmad says he dislikes a long term, and the author of Ghayat al-Muntaha finds a term far beyond custom (such as a thousand years) invalid; Malik limits it by need and what is usual for the sale. Purpose: to let the party consider and test the thing; the term under the Malikis is measured by what the thing needs to be tested and consulted about. Term for land: the outer limit is one month plus six days, so the option may run up to thirty-six days; two further days are added so that the buyer, still holding the thing at the end of the term, can return it. Animals: if the option is to learn their food, strength and price, the limit is three days; if to test them within the town, one day or so; outside it, a barid (half a day's march) according to Ibn al-Qasim and two barids according to Ashhab. Clothes, goods and fungibles: three days plus one day. Fruit and vegetables: the term is set by what testing needs before they change. The third view fixes three days with their nights for any subject, and forbids more. It is the view of Abu Hanifa, Zufar and (in the better-known report) al-Shafii. The sources are the report of Habban ibn Munqidh and the hadith of the sheep with its udder held full (musarrah): whoever buys a sheep so held has the option for three days, as al-Shafii argued. Beyond three days: for Abu Hanifa and Zufar the contract is void as fasid; for al-Shafii it is void as batil. Abu Hanifa alone holds that dropping the excess makes the contract valid, as long as the three days have not passed; Zufar disagrees, since continuation follows the original validity. The Malikis add that the term is faulty if it is to consult someone whose view is known only after it ends, or if it greatly exceeds the life of the goods; one extra day does no harm. An option with no term has four views. (1) The contract is void or invalid: al-Shafii and, in one report, Ahmad; the Hanafis hold the sale invalid without distinguishing gross from small uncertainty. Abu Hanifa and his companions hold that if the defect is removed within the three days the contract becomes valid; the two companions hold it valid even after three days. (2) The condition is void but the contract stands: one report of Ahmad, and Ibn Abi Layla. (3) The contract stands and the term is set: Malik lets the judge fix the usual term for testing such goods; Ibn Taymiyya suggests three days if they gave none. (4) The contract stands and the option stays open as it arose, the view of Ibn Shubruma and one report of Ahmad. Permanent option: a condition that makes the option last forever (or for unstated days) invalidates it. Unknown term: invalid, whether the uncertainty is gross (wind, rain, a person's arrival or death, the birth of a pregnant animal) or slight (harvest, threshing, the return of pilgrims). Connection: the term must start at the contract. If the term is set to begin later (from the end of the month or tomorrow) the sale is void for the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis; the Hanafis rescue it by counting the gap within the term, as in an option of two days after Ramadan in a contract made at the end of Ramadan. Continuity: the parts of the term must follow one another; for a day held and a day not, the Hanbalis have two views. Holder: the option holder must be named. If the parties give it to one of them without naming which, or to whomever one of them chooses, it is void according to Ibn Qudama; al-Nawawi holds the sale valid if the option is for one party only. Contracts: the option belongs only to binding contracts that can be rescinded. Sale is its main field, including sale of trust such as murabaha. The exceptions are salam, exchange of money (sarf) and exchange of ribawi goods of the same kind, for which some Hanbalis require the price to be received in the session; Ibn Abidin notes that excluding salam and sarf strains the rule, and the Malikis allow it in short salam. Other contracts: leasing takes the option in general for Hanafis and Malikis; Shafiis and Hanbalis allow it only in leases on the debt, or in fixed leases whose term does not begin at once. Transfer of debt (hawala): accepted by the Hanafis, refused by the Shafiis and Hanbalis as it is not built on exchange. Division: divided; division of different kinds is by consent, division of the same kind of values takes the option. Guarantee (kafala): the Hanafis allow it, and Abu Hanifa allows more than three days because it is built on latitude. Waqf: allowed by Abu Yusuf, void for Muhammad, and in the Shafii and Hanbali view. Who may stipulate: the option may be given to either party or to both, the view of most jurists; al-Thawri and Ibn Shubruma limited it to the buyer. It may be given to a third party: the jurists agree this is sound if the third party can speak for himself. The Hanafis base this on juristic preference (istihsan), because a party with little experience may need someone wiser; Zufar objected because the option is part of the contract. A third party as option holder: the Malikis say that if the term reads 'on the advice of so-and-so', both the contracting party and the adviser may decide alone, since advice does not bind to agreement; if it reads 'on so-and-so's option' or 'consent', the better view is that it is delegation, not agency, and the contracting party cannot decide alone. Words close to these, such as 'if he wills he confirms, if he wills he annuls', count the same. The Shafiis hold the option for a third party is delegation or arbitration, not agency, and that is their sounder view; Abu Yaala held that it is then invalid. Consultation clause: the Shafiis have two views on whether the party must state he consulted and was told to annul; the Hanbalis do not require it, and al-Nawawi affirmed the first view. The person consulted must be named; 'on my consultation' without naming him is not enough, though al-Adhra'i thought it sufficient. The Hanafis have no text on the point that the compiler found. Agency in the option: the option belongs to the contracting party who stipulates it for himself, whatever his position: owner, guardian, executor, agent, or the partner or mudarib of a company. A guardian or executor may stipulate it for the good of the minor or the ward; an agent acts on the principal's general instruction to contract, which includes an option. The agent in the Shafii view: an agent may stipulate the option for himself or for his principal. A selling agent may not give the option to the buyer, nor a buying agent to the seller; if he does, the contract is void unless the principal permits it. The better view is that the option does not pass beyond the party named. The Hanbalis agree that an agent may stipulate it for himself. An agent must act for his principal's benefit, since he is trusted. Several parties: as the option holds for a single party, it also holds for several, as when two partners sell a thing or one owner sells to two buyers who stipulate the option for both. Effect of the option on the contract: it prevents the contract from taking effect in its legal rule for the party holding the option. Abu Hanifa holds this also against the other party; his two companions hold that the rule takes effect for the party without the option. Al-Kasani describes the contract as suspended, not known in its rule until the option ends. The Shafiis treat it as suspended; the Malikis hold the seller keeps ownership of the thing. Effect on transfer of ownership: with the option for both parties the Hanafis hold that neither price nor thing changes hands, and the Shafiis suspend the transfer until the option ends; the Hanbalis hold that ownership passes to the buyer at the contract. With the option for one party, the Malikis hold that ownership stays with the seller, the sale being a dissolved not a formed contract, and confirmation then transfers it; another Maliki view and one of Ahmad hold the buyer owns it, or that it is suspended. When the seller holds the option, ownership stays with him, the buyer may not dispose of the thing, and the seller's disposal is an annulment. When the buyer holds it, ownership leaves the seller. Liability for loss (Hanafis): when the seller holds the option and the thing perishes before receipt, the seller bears it. When it perishes in the buyer's hand after receipt and the option has ended, the buyer bears it at the price. When the seller holds it and the buyer had received the thing and it perished during the option, the buyer bears it at value, as with a thing taken for inspection. When the buyer holds the option and it perishes in his hand, he bears it at the price, since loss is a defect that leads to perishing. Liability for loss in other schools: the Malikis put liability on the seller, except that a movable thing that can be hidden, once lost with no proof, falls on the buyer. The Shafiis hold that if the thing perishes by heavenly cause after receipt and the option is the seller's, the sale is dissolved; if the option is the buyer's, the sale is not dissolved. The Hanbalis hold that ownership is the buyer's and so is liability, except measured and weighed goods, where liability stays with the seller until they are measured or weighed by the buyer. Increase in the object: the Hanafis divide increase into four kinds: connected and generated from the thing (fat, healing, ripening); connected and not generated (dyeing, sewing, building and planting on the land); separated and generated (offspring, fruit, milk, eggs, wool); and separated and not generated (rent of a hired thing, compensation for injury, and the mahr for intercourse by mistake). Other schools divide increase only into connected and separated. Ruling on increase in the Hanafi view: the general rule is that increase prevents return, so the contract is binding and the increase goes to the buyer, except that separated non-generated increase never prevents return, while connected generated increase is disputed. If the option is annulled, Abu Hanifa returns the thing with its increase, since ownership was suspended; the two companions hold the increase is the buyer's. Connected generated increase: Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf hold that it ends the option and the holder owns both the thing and the increase; Muhammad holds that the option does not end, and the holder may confirm or annul. Increase in the Maliki view: offspring and wool go to the buyer, as a part of the thing that remains; the rest, such as milk, fat, eggs and compensation for injury, go to the seller, because ownership stays with the seller during the option until the holder uses it. Increase in the Shafii view: separated increase during the option belongs to the one who owns the thing; if the option is for both, it is suspended like the thing itself. Connected increase follows the thing, and a pregnancy present at sale is part of the thing. The Hanbalis give all increase to the buyer, connected or separated, even if the thing is still in the seller's hand before receipt, citing the hadith «the yield goes with the liability». Delivering the two prices during the option: it is agreed that neither side must deliver during the option unless stipulated; the seller need not hand over the thing at once, nor the buyer the price, until the term ends or the holder waives it. Voluntary delivery does not void the option, if it is meant for testing and not for ownership; if the seller delivers the thing as ownership while holding the option, his option ends. If one party delivers voluntarily and the other refuses, Abu Hanifa does not compel the other, and the Shafiis allow the deliverer to take it back. Ending the option before use: by the coming of age of a minor for whom a guardian contracted; by madness or the like; or by the death of the holder, which is disputed. Abu Yusuf holds that the minor's coming of age ends the option for the guardian and binds the contract; Muhammad holds that it does not, and his reports differ. Madness does not end the option in itself, but the lapse of the whole term without a decision does; if the holder recovers in the term, he keeps his option for the rest, in the sounder Hanafi view. The Malikis say that if the holder goes mad and does not recover, the sultan considers what is best for him. Ending the option by confirmation or by lapse of term: the option ends by confirmation, which may be express (words such as «I confirm the sale», «I have waived the option») or by implied act, such as disposing of the thing as an owner would, by sale, bargaining, lease, gift or pledge. Confirmation need not be known to the other party, and the thing need not still exist if it was fit at the contract. A settlement for money or goods to waive the option is valid, and becomes an increase in the price. Death: the Hanafis and Hanbalis hold that the option ends at the death of its holder, whether buyer or seller, and whether he acts himself or through an agent. The Malikis and Shafiis hold that it passes to the heirs. If the obligor dies, the option stays, and its holder may annul against the heirs, as al-Sarakhsi reports. Lapse of term: agreed in general, since the option is limited to a term and the contract is binding by default; the lapse is taken as confirmation, and the holder's silence over the term is consent, though Abu Yaala differed. The Malikis treat the lapse as an ending, not a confirmation: if the thing is in the buyer's hand, it is confirmation; if in the seller's hand, it is annulment. Ending by annulment: may be express by words, such as «I annul the sale» or «I return the price», or by act, which shows return. An express annulment includes the seller saying he will not sell unless the price is raised, and the buyer saying he will not buy unless it is lowered. Annulment by act: the option holder annuls when he deals with the thing as its owner would, or with the price if the option is the buyer's and the price is a specific thing. A debt cannot be annulled by act, since prices are not fixed by being named. The reason is that such dealing shows the holder keeps the ownership, and that can only be kept by annulment. Ibn al-Humam and al-Kasani hold that what the seller does with the thing would, if done with the price, confirm the sale, so it annuls the sale by implication. Implied annulment in the Hanafi rulings: eating, drinking and wearing end the option (Qadikhan says wearing once does not); copying from a book does not, but erasing it does; riding an animal to water it, return it or feed it is confirmation for some, and Qadikhan says it does not void the option, by juristic preference (istihsan); sale, gift or pledge of the thing with delivery ends it, without delivery not; leasing is an annulment even without delivery, for some; Abu Bakr ibn al-Fadl separates delivery for testing (no annulment) from delivery for ownership (annulment). Conditions of valid annulment: the option must still exist. Abu Hanifa and Muhammad require that the other party know of the annulment; if the holder annuls without his knowledge the annulment is suspended, valid if he learns of it within the term, and the contract binds if the term ends unknown to him. Abu Yusuf has three reports, the best known requiring no knowledge; al-Shafii, the Malikis and the Hanbalis agree that knowledge is not required. Annulment must cover the whole deal and not split it; the Malikis compel return of all, and the Shafiis hold that splitting is not allowed in the sounder view. Transfer of the option at death: Malik and al-Shafii hold the option passes to the heir, since it is a right set to protect the property, like a pledge; the Hanafis say it does not pass, being a personal wish and will that is not transferred. The Hanbalis say it passes only if the holder claimed it before death; Ibn Qudama holds that the option of the dead party lapses, while the other party's option stays. Madness and fainting: for the Shafiis the option does not end on madness or fainting; the guardian or the judge acts for the holder by what is in his interest; a mute with no understood sign has a judge's agent appointed. For the Malikis, the judge acts when madness is not expected to end, or when it lasts long enough to harm the other party; the sane holder may annul or confirm and overturn the guardian's acts if he has proof. A person in a faint waits until he recovers; if he recovers after the term, a new term is granted.

• Khiyar al-ta'yin (option of specification)

  Khiyar al-ta'yin (option of specification): lexically singling out from a group; for the Hanafis it is buying one of two or three things with the buyer to choose which he wants; technically the right of a party to specify one of the things on which the contract fell in common, within a set term. Also called option of distinction (khiyar al-tamyiz); the Malikis call the contract a sale of choice. It differs from the option of stipulation, which attaches to one thing, while specification concerns an indefinite group, and from the choice a convert keeps among four wives; in price, selling at two times or two prices for the buyer to choose is forbidden unless the parties separate in the session with the choice made. Ruling: lawful for the Hanafis, Malikis and some Hanbalis; the Malikis call the contract binding, the option being only in the choice; the Shafiis and most Hanbalis reject it as hazard and forbidden in the report on thunya. Conditions: the stipulation in the contract, a known term, no more than three things, one to be chosen, its attachment to the option of stipulation in the common Hanafi view; it may belong to the buyer or to the seller, not both. Effect: it prevents the transfer of ownership until a choice is made; if one perishes the other is entrusted; if the term passes without choice, the Malikis hold him liable for half each, and loss is treated in detail. Term: required by the preferred Hanafi view unless accompanied by the option of stipulation; ends by the same causes as the option of stipulation; passes at death to the heir who chooses, the price paid from the estate.

• Khiyar fawat al-shart (option for loss of the condition)

  Khiyar fawat al-shart is an option established upon the loss of an act stipulated from the contractor beyond the contract's own import, the loss of the condition being the failure of its purpose; it shares with the other options the removal of the contract's binding force while having its own annexed ground. For the Hanafis the principle is that when the other party refuses to fulfil a valid condition he undertook, the stipulator resorts to the judge to compel fulfilment if it is a condition that can be compelled; where it cannot be compelled, such as an undertaking to give a pledge for the price, he has the right to annul the contract though they do not name it the option for loss of the condition, and al-Kasani states that the seller gives the buyer the choice between paying the pledge or its value or paying the price at once, else he annuls the sale for the loss of the condition and its purpose, counting among it the sale conditioned on giving a guarantor but not the stipulation of transfer or guarantee of debt. The Shafiis took the principle of the prohibition of a sale with a condition, such as sale conditioned on lending, on the seller sewing the garment or harvesting the crop, but excepted forms they judged valid such as sale conditioned on a term, a pledge or a named guarantor with knowledge, or on attestation; if the obliged party does not fulfil the condition the stipulator holds the option for its loss, immediate because it is an option of deficiency, and the obliged party is not compelled to perform since the harm is removed by annulment, nor does another stand in place of the named pledge if it perishes. The Hanbalis state that in a sale conditioned on a pledge and a guarantor, fulfilment binds the contract and refusal gives the stipulator the choice between annulment and confirmation without compensation for dropping the pledge and guarantor; their school is the widest in regard for conditions, holding that the basis of contracts is the parties' consent and their outcome what the two imposed on themselves, so they allowed more than the pledge and guarantor provided it does not clash with a revealed text or a principle of the law, and a condition may be non-binding in itself yet validly stipulated, its fruit being to enable the stipulator to annul on non-fulfilment. The Hanbalis did not list the option for loss of the condition among their options, though the author of Ghayat al-Muntaha deemed it right to add a ninth kind to the eight current among them, the option established for the buyer upon the loss of a valid or invalid condition whether or not it voids the contract, and the commentator approved the addition though its benefit is formal. The Shafiis state that the seller's option when the buyer is unable to hand over the pledge stipulated in the sale passes to the heir without dispute, and its lapse and remaining rules follow the rules of the option of defect as detailed under the option for loss of the description.

• Khiyar fawat al-wasf (option for loss of a stipulated quality)

  Khiyar fawat al-wasf is the right of rescission for the failure of a desired quality the contractor stipulated in the object of the contract, as when one buys a horse stipulated as a purebred Arab and it proves a hybrid, a steed stipulated as smooth-gaited (hamlaj) and it proves jerky-paced, a cow stipulated as giving much milk, a dog stipulated as a hunter, or a price stipulated as guaranteed. It is also called the option of the failed stipulated quality, the option of failure, and the failure of the attribute; the name "option of the quality" is misleading because that is mostly used for the conformity of an unseen sold thing to its description, and some treat it independently while others annex it to the option of defect or the option of stipulation. Its lawfulness rests on the validity of stipulating the quality, which falls in the undisputed zone of conditions counted among the contract's benefits; the Hanafis liken it to a condition the contract itself requires when free of gharar, and the majority hold the effect of breach is the option, not corruption of the contract, since the failure changes the kind not the genus, making it like the loss of the quality of soundness in the option of defect. It is affirmed by the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis and by the Shafiis on the sound view, resting on the option of defect, since the loss of a desired quality after the seller undertook it equals the loss of the quality of soundness, except that the condition in the option of defect is implied while here it is express, as al-Kasani says. Conditions of the quality that counts: it must be a quality, not the ownership of another thing or a benefit — hence the Hanafi ruling that stipulating a sheep as pregnant corrupts the sale; it must be lawful, so stipulating a butting ram or a fighting cock is idle; it must be determinate and free of gharar; and it must be desirable by custom, so if the thing proves better than stipulated, as a camel stipulated male turning out female for a desert buyer who wants milk and offspring, he has no option — the Malikis define the desirable as whatever serves the contractor's purpose whether financial or not, the Shafiis as what carries value; and the buyer must stipulate it with the seller's assent, his circumstances not being a sufficient presumption though they aid interpretation, while the seller's own cry over the goods that they are such and such ranks as a stipulation, save the broker's customary puffery in al-Dusuqi's view. Conditions of the failure: it must fall within the same genus — stipulating cotton and finding linen corrupts the sale for change of genus — and Ibn al-Humam's criterion is that what shows gross disparity of purposes counts as genera, like linen and cotton and male and female, while what does not is one genus differing in kind like goat meat and lamb meat; the loss must reach the point where the quality's name no longer applies, so the dog that hunts deficiently gives no return, while one that does not hunt at all does; and the lost quality must not itself be a defect, else the matter belongs to the option of defect. Its effect is the option between returning the goods and keeping them for the full price without arsh for the lost quality; if return is barred the buyer recovers the lost quality's share of the price by valuing the goods with and without it, though a transmission from Abu Hanifa grants no recovery and the sounder is the first since the seller failed to deliver the quality of soundness; the option is confined to return or keeping at full price because qualities meet nothing of the price, being annexed and entering the contract without mention. Its field is that of the option of defect: the contract must be over a determinate object, so it does not stand in the unindividualised debt-based sold thing nor in the unseen one which has the option of sight. Its timing is deferred at the Hanafis and Hanbalis until something lapses it, a day or two at the Malikis and immediate at the Shafiis. It is inherited on the death of the entitled party and passes to the heirs as the Hanafis state and others establish for it and its like, and it lapses by whatever lapses the option of defect.

• Khiyar (the right to annul or confirm a contract)

  Khiyar is lexically choosing and selecting; to give someone the choice between two things is to leave the choice to him; technically it is a party\'s right to annul or confirm a contract for a legal cause or by a stipulated term. It differs from non-binding nature (the power to withdraw by one\'s own will, a natural feature of some contracts, while option is an added qualifier to a contract that is binding by origin), and from annulment for invalidity, whose effect does not reach back in some kinds according to al-Kasani. Annulment by option has retroactive effect as if the contract were never concluded, unlike annulment in non-binding contracts which does not touch what came before. Option is distinct from invalidity, which is annulled after delivery and is not dropped by a plain waiver as option (except the option of sight) is; and from suspension, which arises from defect of capacity or the rights of another, while option arises after conclusion and fitness for effect. Option is distinct from rescission (iqala), which needs both wills; options are legal (arising by the law, as for defect) or voluntary (from the parties\' will, as the option of stipulation, of price payment or of choice); by aim they are for deliberation (benefit) or for deficiency (avoidance of harm), as al-Ghazali and al-Dardir teach. Maliki classes: options of deliberation (session, return, acceptance, stipulation); of deficiency (defect, eviction, division of the deal, partial loss); of ignorance (sight, quantity, disclosure of the matter, specification); of deception (fraud, bidding up, meeting caravans); of unfair price (the uninformed seller, the minor); of trust (sale at cost-plus, transfer, partnership, stock); of breach (delay); and of impossibility of delivery (payment, failure to deliver, quick corruption, bankruptcy). The wisdom of option: in legal options, to make good the shortfall when a condition of binding fails, to avert harm and to purify consent; in voluntary ones, deliberation by counsel or testing; the aim may be both; the Malikis force the seller to hand over the goods where the purpose is testing and receipt is stipulated; the term is set by need, while al-Shafii and Abu Hanifa allow no option beyond three days. Option removes binding: the option contract differs from non-binding ones such as loan; the option of stipulation prevents the effect from starting, that of sight prevents completion, that of defect prevents binding; the Hanafis hold rescission by sight and stipulation effective for all, while for defect they separate before and after receipt. Options on quantity, on the eviction of a thing, on delay, on quick corruption and on bankruptcy are referred to sale, eviction, stipulation or payment.

• Khiyar kashf al-hal (option upon disclosure of the quantity)

  Khiyar kashf al-hal is the right of rescission for one to whom the amount of the sold thing proves other than he supposed; kashf in language is disclosure, the lifting of a thing from what covers it, and the Hanafis name it kashf al-hal, inkishaf al-hal and takashshuf. Its field is the personal measures the parties resort to instead of the customary measures of volume or weight, as when one sells what is sold by measure or weight by a particular vessel of unknown capacity, such as a box or a bag, or by the weight of a particular stone; the sale is valid under special conditions and carries the buyer's right of option, the sale being non-binding, and its validity is disputed in the Hanafi books. The Hanafis take it in a transmission and list it among their named options; the Shafiis affirm it too though under another name and at times unnamed, and Ibn Hajar states that selling the fill of a jug or a houseful from a heap, or a pebble's weight of gold, is valid because taking from the determinate is possible before it perishes and knowledge of the determinate amount is not required, unlike saying "in my liability is such-and-such of it"; the Malikis forbid it counting it among the forbidden gharar sales, and the prohibition is the transmission of al-Hasan ibn Ziyad from Abu Hanifa. The ground for permission is that the ignorance present in this contract does not lead to dispute because its delivery is prompt in the session, only dispute-breeding ignorance barring validity; Ibn al-Humam held that the principle requires the option whenever he measured or weighed for the buyer, and the fatwa books state it when the amount is learned by weighing, and its closest parallel for him is Abu Hanifa's view on selling a heap at a dirham the qafiz: if it is measured in the session until the amount is known the sale is valid and the buyer holds the option, as though he had seen it without having seen it at the time of the sale. The ground for prohibition is that a sale of measurables and weighables is either by estimate, the object being what is pointed at, or by naming the amount, the object being the named amount, and neither is found here since the measure was not known. Conditions of the contract's validity with it: the unknown vessel or scale must remain as it was, for if it perishes before delivery the sale corrupts since the amount sold cannot be known; delivery of the goods must be prompt in the contract's session, as the jurists' wordings all state including al-Sarakhsi's; and in measuring only, the personal measure must not admit shrinkage, neither collapsing nor contracting, such as wood or iron, so the wicker basket and the sack do not serve. Of this kind is selling the fill of a particular waterskin or a large one: from Abu Hanifa that it is not allowed because the water is not with him nor is the skin's capacity known, though he unqualifiedly allowed it for a specified skin with the town's customary skins among most water-carriers being the measure; from Abu Yusuf that if it is filled and they then agree it is allowed; and Ibn al-Humam said the analogical rule is Abu Hanifa's transmission while the juristic preference established by practice implies permission after the skin's kind is named when it is not specified, the disparity then being slight and wasted in water.

• Khul' (divorce by payment from the wife)

  Khul\' tends to mean the wife giving a consideration for her divorce; its wording for the Shafiis and Hanbalis is explicit or allusive: the explicit words are khul\' and its derivatives, and the word for ransom, from its use in the Quran; the Hanbalis add faskh, which is literal for it; allusive words include "I have cleared you" and "I have divorced you". Disputes: if the husband says khul\' and the wife denies, the separation stands by his admission, the consideration remains disputed and her word is accepted with an oath by the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis; if she claims khul\' and he denies, it does not take effect. If they agree on khul\' and dispute the sum, the kind, the due date or the form, her word is preferred by the Hanafis and Malikis, while one Hanbali report prefers the husband, since the marriage goes out of his right. Shafii: when two proofs conflict, the parties swear as in sale, and the wife owes the dower of the like if the consideration fails.

• Khullu (tenant's right over waqf and state land)

  Khullu is lexically emptiness; in later books it names the usufruct a tenant owns over a waqf property in return for paying the administrator funds to repair it, with a fixed share of its use and the rent paid for the rest for the beneficiaries. It also names the right of a tenant of state land to keep it if he has built, planted or filled it, and the cash paid for giving up that right. Related terms: hukr (the rent on waqf land for one who built or planted), farigh and ifrigh (giving up a right for a price), jadak (movable goods of a tenant attached to a shop or not), kirdar (what a farmer builds or plants with leave), murassad (a debt fixed on the waqf by the tenant\'s repair), and mashd al-maska (the right to farm another\'s land in later Hanafi usage). The nature of khullu: it is ownership of the usufruct, not of use, so its holder may let, give or lend as he likes; the Malikis distinguish that the owner of use uses the thing by its quality, whereas the owner of usufruct may transfer; khullu passes by inheritance. Ways khullu arises on waqf property: by agreement of founder or administrator with the tenant; the Maliki cases include a crumbling waqf let to someone who repairs it, the mosque with shops whose rent cannot repair it, a barren waqf land on which the tenant builds, and shops whose use is sold before the endowment; Shaykh Ulaysh held that the third case is practised. Sale of usufruct apart from the property: the Hanbalis allow selling part of a waqf to repair the rest when it cannot be let, the founder and the beneficiary being one; Buhuti holds that khullu cannot be created for money in every case; a person who takes a property from a previous tenant for money does not become owner of the khullu, as Ibn Abidin argues. Hanafis: khullu falls under the sale of bare rights; the Hanafi texts split on the validity of such sale on custom, with the Shahid and most texts against it; many muftis allowed it by custom; al-Hamawi leaned against it; al-Amadi made it binding by necessity, analogous to the sale of trust. Malikis: the fatwa of al-Laqani on ownership, inheritance and sale of khullu was followed; al-Hamawi says it has no text from Malik; al-Gharqawi says it is derived from the texts; on continuation by custom acts as a condition, and al-Dusuqi and al-Bannani base continuation on the public interest. Rent: the rent for waqf property is the going rate; the Hanafis hold that a large sum paid to get a lower rent does not count, as it harms the waqf. Conditions for khullu by Maliki law: the sum paid must go to the waqf\'s needs, no income must already cover the repair, and the spending must be proved. The holder may sell, let, pledge, give, lend or bequeath; Buhuti holds bought khullu is held in common, so it may be sold, given or used for debt but not let. Pre-emption: where several tenants built on a lease-land and one sells his part of the building, the others have pre-emption; Abu al-Saud allows it in plantings, and Ibn Abidin calls it an error against the text. Gift or endowment of khullu: most later Malikis allow it, since part of the usufruct is waqf; the Shirwani, Hanbalis and al-Ajhuri forbid it, since a waqf cannot be made of a waqf; Ulaysh turned to permit it, and it was practised in Egypt. Hanafis: a building apart from its land may not be endowed by many, though it may be by custom; Ibn Nujaym allowed the sale and endowment of buildings and plantings on leased land; a filling of earth may not be endowed. Khullu in waqf property passes by inheritance where it is owned and may be sold or pledged; these views are reported from the Malikis, Hanafis and Hanbalis, and inheritance follows God\'s shares; repairs fall on the holder in proportion to his interest, and the administrator may share them. Second case: the tenant has a right of occupation by what he built or planted in the waqf land with the administrator\'s leave, to be his own and khullu (the kirdar by Hanafi usage, or the jadak attached to a building); he may keep it on payment of the going rent unless its keeping causes harm. Renewal at the end of the lease: the administrator has a choice at the root, but keeping the tenant is better in the view of those who support it, to avoid harm to him; the renewal may not be below the going rent, and if the rent rises much the contract is renewed at the higher rate, the tenant\'s acceptance suffices. The Hanafi condition for a right of occupation: the building must be made with the administrator\'s leave to be the tenant\'s; without a kirdar or jadak he has no right after the lease; if he dies before building, the lease ends and the heirs lose the right. Sale of a valid khullu: the tenant may sell what he built on the land, and the right of occupation passes to the buyer, who pays the rent for the bare land; the bare right before building cannot be sold by the Hanafis, and some forbid its surrender for money; the Hanbalis hold that surrender of private waqf is void. Malikis: when the lessor beneficiary dies the lease ends, and the building belongs to the builder, who may remove it or take its value if the waqf income can pay; Khurashi reports this. The Shafiis and Hanbalis do not state the text, and the rule of lease ends the right at the end of its term; Ibn Rajab says the lessor may take the building for its value if the lessee does not remove it; the Malikis say khullu is sold, pledged and inherited. Khullu in state land: for the Hanafis state land is not inherited, as its ground belongs to the treasury, and it passes only by the ruler\'s leave; what is planted or built on it is inherited; the holder\'s right of possession is not inherited, but later Hanafi fatwas let it pass to the sons as priority. Among the Malikis the state land is disputed: some say not inherited, some say its usufruct is inherited while the land tax is paid. Shafiis and Hanbalis allow sale of what the holder built and planted, not of the land; Ahmad disliked selling a shop above its value lest it become a means of selling the land; Ibn Taymiyya allowed selling it so that the tax goes with it. Inheritance of state land: the Hanafis: what is planted or built on it is inherited, and the right of possession is not; the Malikis who deny inheritance hold the ruler may assign it, and a custom in some villages of Upper Egypt gives sons only, which Ulaysh rejects in favour of the legal shares. Inheritance of khullu: the Malikis, Hanafis and Hanbalis who hold it owned, saleable and pledgeable hold that it is inherited by God\'s shares; the Malikis add that the heirs of one who held state land have prior right if the land tax was paid. Private property: a tenant has no right of occupation in private rented property for the Hanafis, since the owner is entitled to his property; the Hanbalis allow selling the usufruct but not renting it; if the tenant built with the owner\'s leave and leaves, the building may be sold to a buyer who takes on the rent. Taking a khullu price from a later tenant: if the first tenant owns the usufruct by a valid lease at the going rent, he may take a payment from a tenant who takes his place; Ulaysh holds that a tenant without a valid lease has no khullu, and the payer may recover from the one who took his money. Continuation after the term: the owner regains his property, unless the contract established khullu for a sum, in which case it may be sold to a later tenant by those who admit it.

• Khulta (joint and neighbourly mixing of property)

  Khulta is lexically mixing, and the partner is the mixer; in fiqh there are two kinds: mixing of things, called joint or common mixing, where property belongs to two or more in common and remains undivided, and mixing of attributes, called neighbourly mixing, where each owner\'s property is known and they use the same facilities without separation. The ruling: mixing is lawful in itself and may ease the owners, as when the herds of a village go to one shepherd, or joint farming shares water and labour. The Prophet forbade showing a mixture to reduce zakat, or showing separation for that end, in the report that one does not join what is separate nor separate what is joined for fear of zakat. On the effect of mixing on zakat: the majority hold it has an effect, citing the report of Anas that two mixing partners settle between them equally; the schools differ on some conditions and on which property is affected. On the effect of mixing on zakat: al-Azhari and al-Shafii read the report "do not join the separate nor separate the joined for fear of zakat" as a ban on mixing to escape duty; the Hanafis hold that mixing has no effect, since joining or separating concerns ownership, not places. Ways mixing affects zakat: the completion of the minimum (Shafiis and Hanbalis), the number (more or less), the age, and the kind; the Shafiis and Hanbalis allow one partner to pay for the other with or without consent, on dispute. Property affected outside the Hanafi school: livestock by agreement; for crops, fruit, trade goods and money the preferred Shafii view says mixing counts, while Malik, one report of Ahmad and most scholars say it counts only for livestock; al-Awza\'i and Ishaq allow neighbourly mixing for crops. Conditions: each partner must hold a full minimum (Malikis), or the joint property must reach it (Shafiis), while the Hanbalis do not require each to hold it; both must be Muslim free owners liable to zakat; intention is a condition for the Malikis and not for the Shafiis and Hanbalis; sharing of facilities: in livestock the watering place, the pen, the night shelter, the milking, the pasture, the herd and the stallion, with each school counting the required number; for crops the guard, the threshing floor, the water and the labour. Duration: the Shafiis in the new view and the Hanbalis require the mixing through the whole year; the Malikis require it at the end of the year; for crops, until the fruit ripens or the grain hardens. Collection: partners are treated as one owner, so the collector may take the due from either property, and from the young or the old as the case requires. Refunds between partners: in joint ownership there is no problem; in neighbourly mixing partners settle by number and by value of what was taken; Ibn al-Qasim takes the value on the day of taking, Ashhab on the day of settlement; if the collector wrongly took by a plausible interpretation, it is treated as rightful; if not, there is no refund. If the collector took without right and without a plausible interpretation, the one charged cannot recover from his partner, since the taking is a wrong the victim cannot pass on; if he took an older animal than due, the one charged recovers from his partner the value of his share of the difference, since the excess is wrong.

• Khums (the fifth of spoil)

  Khums is lexically a fifth; khammasa is to take a fifth; technically it is the fifth of spoil or booty, and takhmis is setting aside the fifth. Related terms: mirba' (the quarter taken by the chief in pre-Islamic raids), safi (what the chief chose for himself before division, including what the Prophet chose, such as a sword, a horse or a slave-girl), nashita (what a chief took before division) and fudul (remnants too small to divide among an army). Ruling: setting aside a fifth of spoil is obligatory by agreement, on the Quranic verse of the spoil; setting aside a fifth of fay' is disputed. Property subject to the fifth: spoil taken from unbelievers by force; spoil was lawful to the Prophet\'s community, and four fifths went to the warriors and the fifth to its beneficiaries. If the spoil is land conquered by force the division is disputed; movable spoil is divided after the salab and expenses are deducted. The Shafiis and Hanbalis give five shares: one for God and His Messenger (for horses, arms, the public good and the stipends of judges and scholars); one for the kin of Hashim and al-Muttalib (by descent, male and female, rich and poor by the majority); one for orphans (by the preferred view poor Muslims); one for the needy; one for the traveller; the beneficiaries must be generally given when enough is available. The Hanafis divide the fifth into three shares for orphans, the needy and the traveller, holding that God\'s and the Messenger\'s share lapsed at the Prophet\'s death; the Malikis leave it to the Imam; some divide it into six; Abu al-Aliya gives God\'s share to the Kaaba. Fay\' is not divided into a fifth by the Hanafis and Malikis; the Shafiis and Khiraqi divide it, the four fifths going to the frontier soldiers. Spoil: if the slayer takes it, the majority do not divide it; al-Awza'i, Makhul and Ibn Abbas held that it is divided; the Hanafis divide it unless the Imam granted it. Buried treasure: the fifth is due, on the report of Abu Hurayra; its details are under zakat, buried treasure, mine and hoard.

• Khuntha (the one of unclear sex)

  Khuntha is lexically one who is neither purely male nor female, or who has the features of both, from khanth, softness; technically one with both sets of organs, or with neither and only an opening for urine. It differs from the mukhannath, one who imitates women in softness, speech and movement; one made so by birth is not blamed, while one who imitates by choice is cursed in the sound reports. A clear khuntha shows male or female signs and is judged by them; an unclear one has no clear signs or contrary ones, and is of two kinds: both organs with equal signs, or no organ but an opening. Before puberty the sex is set by urination: from the penis, a boy; from the vagina, a girl; from both, the earlier; the majority rely on the report of Ibn Abbas and hold that the function at birth is urination. When the signs are equal: the Malikis, Hanbalis, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad hold that the greater quantity counts, reported from al-Awza'i; the majority say quantity is no proof. Some Malikis hold that urinating twice from the vagina and once from the penis shows he is female. After puberty the sex shows by beard or emission by the penis (male), by impregnating or being penetrated (male), by menses, milk or fitness for intercourse (female); birth shows female; inclination shows the opposite; equal inclination leaves him unclear, and in fiqh an unqualified khuntha means the unclear. The unclear khuntha is judged by the safer and firmer course, and no ruling whose ground is doubtful is applied. Awrah: as a woman\'s by the Hanafis and Shafiis, except the face and hands; the Malikis cover as a woman in prayer and pilgrimage; the Hanbalis as a man. Ablution and touch of the genitals: the Hanafis and a Maliki report say no; the Maliki school and the Shafiis say yes; the Hanbalis divide. Ghusl and penetration without emission: not required by the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis, unlike the Malikis; the call to prayer by a khuntha is not valid by agreement. Rows and leading the prayer: he stands after the men and boys and before the women; the Hanbalis have the imam place him at his right; leading men is invalid, leading women valid for the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis, standing in front of them; the Malikis forbid his leading. Pilgrimage and ihram: he is like a woman in the conditions of the Hajj for the majority, and does not travel for it without a mahram; the Hanbalis require no expiation if he covers only the head or only the face, expiation if both. Looking and seclusion: no non-mahram may be alone with him or travel with him; he may not be uncovered before women or men in caution; al-Qaffal allowed it by the presumption of childhood. Marriage: the Hanafis allow it if his father marries him to a man who consummates, otherwise they postpone it as for the impotent; the Malikis and Shafiis forbid it on both sides; the Hanbalis rely on his inclination; Abu Bakr forbids marriage until his sex is clear. Suckling: his milk does not establish marriage bars for the Hanafis and most Hanbalis; the Malikis count it by analogy with purity; the Shafiis and Ibn Hamid suspend the matter. Admission and testimony: his admission lowers his share of inheritance or blood-money is accepted; his claim to raise it is not; he is witness as a woman; his judgeship is not valid by the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis, the Hanafis accepting it outside hadd and retaliation. Retaliation: one who kills or is killed in retaliation may be killed for or by him; for injuries the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis retaliate, the Hanafis do not. Blood-money: the Hanafi discussion of the diya of the khuntha begins here and continues beyond p.7874. Blood-money: the Malikis and Hanbalis give half a male and half a female diya, since the sex is one of two possibilities; the Shafiis give the female diya as the certain sum; for wounds the Hanafis and Shafiis give half the male sum, and the Malikis and Hanbalis equal the male up to a third. The khuntha is not in the paternal kin who pay; if he proves male, the Shafiis have him repay the share others paid; in the oath of the group (qasama) the Hanafis and a Hanbali view exclude him, while the Malikis and another Hanbali view include him; the Shafiis have the majority swear and suspend the rest. Slander: the Malikis and Shafiis impose the hadd for slander of his male organ, and none if he committed adultery in either; the Hanafis give no hadd, but discretionary punishment. Circumcision: the Hanafis permit it for a child who is not yet desired by a man or a woman; some Malikis forbid it out of caution; the Shafiis forbid it in childhood, with two views at puberty; the Hanbalis circumcise both organs out of caution. Silk, gold and silver: most jurists forbid them; the Hanafis dislike them out of caution. Washing, shrouding and burial: the Hanafis do not wash him, a man or a woman, and he is dry-ablute; the Shafiis divide: if a child, both men and women may wash him, if grown, two views; the Hanbalis dry-ablute him from seven years; he is shrouded in five white pieces like a girl; he is placed between a man and a woman in the prayer; covering the grave is recommended. Inheritance: the Malikis, Hanbalis, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad give him half a male share and half a female share; Abu Hanifa gives the lesser of the two shares; the Shafiis give the certain share and hold the rest until the matter is clear or they agree.

• Khuruj (going out; departure rulings)

  Khuruj is lexically going out, the opposite of entering; jurists use it also for rebellion against the rulers. Among what leaves the two passages, semen, menses and postnatal blood require a full wash; usual discharges such as urine, faeces and wind break wudu; unusual discharges break it for the Hanafis, Shafiis, Hanbalis and Ibn Abd al-Hakam, but not by most Malikis, who count worms and pebbles as harmless. The heel or most of the foot coming out into the leg of the sock brings the rule of taking off the sock; the Shafiis count this only for a long sock beyond custom. Leaving the mosque after the call to prayer without excuse is disliked by most jurists and forbidden by the Hanbalis, citing a report of Abu Hurayra. Speaking while the Imam preaches is forbidden by most jurists; speech before the sermon begins is permitted by most; Abu Hanifa forbids it from the moment he comes out; voluntary prayer is barred after he comes out for the Hanafis and Malikis, and ends when he sits on the pulpit for the Shafiis and Hanbalis, citing the report "sit, you have troubled and delayed". The one in retreat (mu'takif) leaves only for a human need or the Friday prayer; the Shafiis require him to go out for Friday. Going out to pray for rain (istisqa') is allowed to the young, the old, the weak and the infirm, and women who are not in the public eye, on foot in humility and after repentance and almsgiving; the jurists differ on non-Muslims. The rule is that a woman is ordered to stay at home; al-Kasani, among the rights of confinement, holds that she is kept from going out, citing the verses on dwelling and 'stay in your houses' and the report that a woman is nakedness and the devil looks at her when she goes out. She goes out for need, such as visiting parents and close kin, attending a funeral or wedding, or meeting an unavoidable need, on conditions: that she is not feared as a temptation, the road is safe, it is a time when men are not about, it does not lead to mixing with men, and she is dressed modestly, without display. By majority she goes out only with her husband's leave; he may prevent a visit to her parents when she has another option, though he should not stop her from visiting them when ill; the Hanafi fatwa is that she may visit parents each Friday and close kin yearly, with or without leave. She may go out without leave for what she cannot do without: to the judge to claim her right, to earn maintenance when the husband is poor, to ask a fatwa if he is not learned, and if the house is about to collapse. On women going to the mosque: the Shafiis and the two companions of Abu Hanifa dislike it for a young or desirable woman and allow it to an old woman for the prayers; the Malikis divide women into four classes; the Hanbalis allow attending the congregation with men, citing 'do not forbid God's maidservants the mosques of God'. Scholars agree that a woman may not travel except for Hajj or Umra without a mahram, except to migrate from the abode of war to the abode of Islam. Leaving the mosque, it is recommended to step out with the left foot and to say a prayer; leaving the house, to say 'In the name of God, I rely on God', as in the reports of Umm Salama and Anas; leaving the privy, to step out with the right foot and say the words of thanks. Most jurists require a woman in the waiting period to remain at home; details are under 'iddah. A woman in the waiting period must remain at home and goes out only for need or excuse; if she goes out she sins, and her husband may stop her, as may his heirs at his death. A commander may not take with him a disheartening man, a spreader of alarm, a spy or one who sows enmity; those who go anyway get no share or reward, even if they show help to Muslims. Scholars agree that a just Imam must be obeyed and rising against him is forbidden; they differ on rising against an unjust one. A man held for debt is kept from his business, funerals, visits and sick calls, since the detention is a way to force payment.

• Khushu' (humility in prayer)

  Khushu\' is lexically stillness and humility; one who is humble in prayer or supplication turns his heart wholly to it, from the phrase the earth is still when it settles. Khushu\' is more often in the limbs, and dara\' (submission) more often in the heart; takhshu\' is forced humility, and Qatada called it fear and lowered gaze in prayer. Khudu\' is lowliness, found in the body; ikhbat is steady obedience and stillness. Most jurists hold that khushu\' in prayer is a sunna, not a pillar, since someone thinking of worldly matters still has a valid prayer while he keeps its acts. The worshipper should be humble in heart and limbs: attend to nothing but the prayer, not fidget with his body or clothes, and recall that he stands before the King who knows the secret and the most hidden. The basis for seeking humility in prayer is the verse "the believers prosper, those who are humble in their prayer"; Ali explained it as a softened heart and restrained limbs. The worshipper should ponder the recitation and empty his heart of distraction and not follow the flow of his thoughts, since presence of heart is being free from anything but what one is engaged in. Most jurists hold that prayer is valid without humility, since it is not voided by the heart's act, though it is disliked and earns no reward; some schools made it a pillar that is excused, a pillar whose lack voids the prayer, or a condition for part of it, which some fix at the opening takbir. Blameworthy humility is the feigned kind before people, with bowed head and weeping, a deception of Satan.

• Khusuma (dispute and litigation)

  Khusuma is lexically dispute, argument and victory by proof; the jurists use it for bringing a claim before the judge. It differs from enmity, a purpose lodged in the heart to harm or avenge; disputing is speech, enmity is an act of the heart. The Hanafis define a claim as an accepted statement before the judge seeking a right against another or defending one's own, so for them claim and dispute coincide; the Shafiis define it as news of a right against another before a ruler. A dispute is of two kinds: one in which a party stands alone, as one whose admission would bind him is a disputant when he denies; and one needing another party, as in deposit, loan, hire, pledge and usurpation. Rule: a claimant is a disputant if his admission would bind; a respondent whose admission cannot bind (a claim for debt against a minor's guardian) is not a disputant by denying.

• Khutba (sermon)

  Khutba is lexically a prose speech by an eloquent speaker to a group to persuade them, and in technical usage a composed speech of admonition and announcement in a set form. It differs from admonition (persuasion by the consequences), from charge (commanding conduct with exhortation), and from private counsel (nasiha), which is secret, while the khutba must be heard by a group. Lawful khutbas are those of Friday, the two feasts, the eclipses, rain-prayer and the Hajj; all come after prayer except the Friday khutba and the Hajj khutba on the day of Arafat; a khutba is also given at betrothal. The Friday khutba is a condition of the validity of the Friday prayer by the majority; the Hanafis hold that one khutba is the condition, two are sunna. The majority cite the Prophet\'s instruction to pray as he prayed, and that the two khutbas stand in place of two units. Pillars: the Hanafis require only a praise, a declaration of unity or a glorification; the two companions require a long speech called a khutba; the Malikis require the least that is called a khutba, even two rhymed phrases with admonition; the Shafiis require five pillars: praise of God, prayer on the Prophet, admonition to piety, prayer for the believers in the second khutba, and a recitation of a verse conveying meaning. Pillars for the Hanbalis are four: praise of God in the word hamd, prayer on the Prophet in its form, admonition, which is the purpose, and recitation of a whole verse; some add continuity and audibility, which the others take as conditions. Conditions: the time, which the majority take as the time of noon prayer while the Hanbalis allow from the rise of the sun, citing the practice of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman; the sermon before the prayer, repeated if near and restarted if not; and a congregation of a number that makes the Friday prayer valid: one besides the Imam for the Hanafis, twelve for the Malikis, forty for the Shafiis and Hanbalis; the speech must be loud enough for that number. Silence: the majority make it obligatory and forbid speech except for the preacher, or to warn of danger; the old Shafii view agrees, the new view neither obliges nor forbids, citing the Bedouin who spoke during the sermon. Continuity between the pillars, the two sermons and the prayer, with slight gaps forgiven; the Hanafis require no action that cuts between sermon and prayer. Arabic: the majority require it as an act of worship, even for a non-Arab congregation; Abu Hanifa allows other languages; the Malikis require the preacher understand what he says; the Shafiis require learning Arabic as a collective duty, and if impossible a speaker in their own tongue. Intention: required by the Hanafis and Hanbalis; not by the Malikis and Shafiis. Agreed sunnas: a pulpit or raised place, sitting before beginning, facing the people, the call before the preacher as in the time of the Prophet, raised voice, brevity of both sermons and shorter second. Disputed sunnas: standing when able (a condition for the Shafiis and most Malikis, a duty for al-Dardir), leaning on a staff or bow, sitting between the sermons, purity (a condition for the Shafiis and Abu Yusuf), covering the awrah, greeting the people twice (Shafiis and Hanbalis), and the order of praise, testimony, prayer on the Prophet and admonition. Disliked acts: the Hanafis dislike prolixity and omitting sunnas, and dislike glorifying, reciting or praying on the Prophet aloud while the sermon is heard, and returning greetings; Ibn al-Humam forbids speech; the Malikis dislike stepping over people after the preacher sits and forbid speech, greeting and extra prayer; the Shafiis dislike striking the pulpit steps, turning around, and flattery of rulers; the Hanbalis dislike raising the hands in the sermon\'s prayer and asking for prayer on climbing. The sermon of the Eid feasts: the Eid sermons are a sunna that need not be attended; some Malikis make attendance binding on those who attend the prayer; they match the Friday sermon except that they come after the prayer by agreement, open with takbir not praise, and use takbir within; the majority prefer nine takbirs in the first and seven in the second, the Malikis set no limit; the sermon of fast-breaking teaches the alms, that of sacrifice its rules; the Shafiis do not require standing, purity, covering or sitting for the Eid sermon. Eclipse sermon: the Hanafis and Hanbalis have none, the Malikis advise an exhortation without sermon form, the Shafiis prefer two sermons like the Friday ones, and forbid giving it before the prayer. Rain sermon: the majority prefer a sermon after prayer like the Eid sermon, exhorting repentance and alms; Abu Hanifa holds neither congregational prayer nor sermon; the Malikis, Shafiis and Muhammad al-Shaybani two sermons, the Hanbalis and Abu Yusuf one. Hajj sermons: the Imam or his deputy gives sermons teaching the rites; the majority three and the Shafiis four: the first on the seventh of Dhu al-Hijja at Mecca, the second on Arafat before the midday and afternoon prayers, the third on the day of sacrifice at Mina (on the eleventh by the Hanafis and Malikis), and the fourth on the second day of tashriq for the Shafiis and Hanbalis. Marriage sermon: it is recommended to give one sermon before the contract, while the Shafiis prefer two.

• The no-harm maxim

  The maxim 'no harm and no reciprocating harm' is among the great foundations of jurisprudence, taken from Abu Sa'id al-Khudri's hadith — the thirty-second of the Forty — which al-Darawardi's route in al-Daraqutni, al-Hakim and al-Bayhaqi extends as 'whoever harms, God harms him, and whoever makes things difficult, God makes things difficult for him'; Malik transmitted it mursal in the Muwatta' with no divergence reported by Ibn Abd al-Barr, who found no sound full chain for it, Khalid ibn Sa'd al-Andalusi declaring it never established with one, while al-Hakim graded its reported chain sahih on Muslim's condition and al-Nawawi notes it has routes that strengthen one another; its meaning negates harm both initiatory and retaliatory — one may not harm oneself or another, nor answer harm with harm save through lawful retribution — and the maxim serves to lift hardship from legal impositions and to ward off corruption (Jami' al-Ulum wal-Hikam pp. 667–668).

• Learning and teaching (ta'allum and ta'lim)

  Ta'allum (learning) is the reflexive form of ta'lim (teaching). Teaching is making a thing known by repetition until it leaves a mark on the learner, and al-Raghib says it differs from informing, which is quick and by report. It is distinguished from culture (taqif), from training (tadrib), which is a means of teaching, and from discipline (ta'dib), which may be by upbringing or by punishment. Learning is an individual duty for what a Muslim cannot do without in belief, worship and dealings; a communal duty for what public life needs, such as medicine, arithmetic and grammar; recommended in depth; forbidden in sorcery, soothsaying, augury and geomancy; disliked in love poetry that names real women; and permitted where nothing is objectionable. Teaching is a communal duty, and becomes binding on one who is the only qualified person; it is binding when someone asks about Islam or what is lawful and unlawful; al-Nawawi holds that teaching students is a communal duty. Scripture and reports praise knowledge, including the report that God wants good for whomever He gives understanding of the religion. The etiquette of the teacher: seek God's face, be kind to students, be humble, teach to their level, and practise what he teaches. The etiquette of the student: purify the heart, be humble before the teacher, do not press him with questions, be diligent and steady, and show patience and high aims. Parents must teach a child what his belief and worship require, and also manners, swimming and archery; al-Rafi'i holds this is obligatory and al-Nawawi affirms it. Teaching women the Qur'an, sciences and manners is lawful by agreement, and what they need, such as women's medicine, is required; most jurists see no objection to teaching women to write. A teacher may beat a pupil for discipline under conditions: the beating is customary, the guardian permits it, and the child understands discipline. The Hanafis hold the teacher liable if he beats without permission, while the Shafiis hold him liable whenever the beating leads to death. Being paid for teaching the Qur'an and religious knowledge is disputed: the earlier Hanafis and one Hanbali view forbid it, while the later Hanafis, one Maliki view and one Hanbali narration allow it. The Malikis allow pay for teaching the Qur'an and dislike it for jurisprudence and other sciences; the Shafiis require the surah or the questions to be named. Pay for teaching lawful crafts is allowed; most jurists allow it for non-religious sciences such as language and manners, while the Malikis dislike it. Teaching forbidden sciences such as soothsaying, astrology, geomancy, sorcery and their like is forbidden, and taking pay for them is forbidden. For the game caught by a trained hound to be lawful, the hound must have been trained, as the Qur'an says and the hadith confirms.

• Joint (mafsil)

  A joint (mafsil) is, in lexical sense, the meeting of two bones in the body; in the technical sense it is the place where one organ joins another by ligaments connecting two bones. Its rulings appear in ablution and washing, where it is recommended to wash the hands up to the wrist three times before dipping them into the vessel. In retaliation, a wound short of death is subject to retaliation only if the cut is made at a joint. For blood-money, each finger phalanx carries a thirteenth of the full diya, and the thumb two phalanges of a twentieth each. Most jurists hold that a thief's hand is cut at the wrist joint and his foot at the ankle joint.

• Maintenance of the divorced nursing mother and infant

  From al-Baqara 2:233 Sha'rawi holds that maintenance and clothing fall on the father, the one to whom the child is born, and that they are owed to divorced nursing mothers rather than to wives in general; that it is measured by custom and nobody is charged beyond capacity; and that the heir bears the same duty if the father dies.

• Ma'siya (disobedience, sin)

  In the Kuwaiti encyclopedia's account, disobedience (ma'siya) is lexically leaving obedience and in the jurists' technical sense a forbidden act intended in itself. It differs from a slip (zalla), which is not intended in itself. Jurists divide sins into minor and grave, a view some deny, and by the soul's inclination. Their effects include worldly penalties, spiritual deprivation and punishment in the hereafter. Repentance is obligatory at once; persistence is condemned; concealment is recommended except where a hadd is involved. Contracts for hiring, endowment, bequest and vows for sin are invalid, and zakat is not given to a traveller on a sinful journey.

• Mi'sam (the wrist)

  In the Kuwaiti encyclopedia's account the wrist (mi'sam) is the joint between the forearm and the palm, the place where a bracelet sits; the technical sense is the same as the lexical one. Its rulings concern washing in ablution, the cut in theft and banditry, retaliation for a severed hand, and the blood-money for a hand cut at the wrist. The page citations are given in the Arabic summary.

• What the right hand owns (milk al-yamin)

  For al-Sha'rawi, what the right hand owns belongs to the aim of ending slavery. He holds that Islam widened the ways of manumission, that a concubine must be fed, clothed and not burdened beyond her capacity, and that no source of such ownership remains in his own time.

• Inheritance (mirath)

  Sheikh Omar Abdelkafy warns against denying an heir his inheritance, and says that whoever keeps an heir from his inheritance will be kept by God from his own inheritance in Paradise on the Day of Resurrection (needs_source). He reminds listeners that God is the one who set the limits, laid down the obligatory shares and distributed the estates, so a person has no right to interfere in their distribution.

• Mujtahid

  The mujtahid is one who reaches the rank of deriving rulings from their proofs; the Kuwaiti Fiqh Encyclopedia presents the age of ijtihad and the ranks of mujtahids and jurists.

• Intoxicants (muskirat)

  Intoxicants in the forty-sixth hadith of Ibn Rajab's additions are a genus not confined to wine: 'every intoxicant is forbidden' — asked about Yemen's al-Bit', a honey-wine, and al-Mizr, a barley-wine, the Prophet generalised the ruling to every intoxicant, Muslim's wording adding 'everything that intoxicates away from the prayer is forbidden'; Ibn Rajab calls this hadith the foundation of the prohibition of all substances that veil the intellect, tracing its staging: wine was first forbidden at the approach of prayer through the verse 'do not approach the prayer while intoxicated' — after an Emigrant fumbled his recitation — and only later forbidden absolutely (Jami' al-Ulum wal-Hikam p. 881).

• Nafy (exile and banishment)

  Nafy, in the lexicon, is banishment, driving out and removal. The Qur'anic phrase about exile has three readings: wandering through the lands, favoured by the Hanbalis and in one Shafi'i view; imprisonment, favoured by the Hanafis, Shafi'is and some Hanbalis; and a combination of removal and imprisonment, favoured by Malik. Exile is established by the Qur'an, the Sunna and consensus. It is required for banditry, permitted as discretionary punishment, and according to most jurists required for fornication by an unmarried free person, though the Hanafis treat it as discretionary. For fornication its term is a year according to the majority; for banditry it lasts until repentance is evident; for discretionary exile the judge decides. It ends with the term, death, insanity, a fatal illness, pardon or intercession, with details. Women are not exiled by the Hanafis and Malikis; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis exile a woman only with a mahram or trustworthy women.

• Nahb (plunder)

  Nahb is, in the lexicon, taking by force and dominance in the open. The jurists use it for taking by force in the open, and for taking what the owner has permitted, such as what is scattered at feasts. It differs from embezzlement, usurpation and theft.

• Naqd (annulment and breaking)

  Naqd, in the lexicon, is undoing what was tied; in the usul sense it is a flaw in a cause when the ruling does not follow it. Its forms include breaking ablution, breaking truces, safe-conducts and the dhimma contract, annulling reasoning, and annulling a judgment. A judgment is annulled only if it contradicts a text of the Qur'an or Sunna or a consensus; the Malikis and Shafi'is add a clear analogy and established principles. A judgment that is correct or falls in an area of ijtihad is not annulled, and the schools differ on the cases in between. A ruling by an unfit or tyrannical judge is annulled in whole or in part, by the schools' differing views. A ruling based on false witnesses, or on witnesses later shown to be unfit, is treated differently; testimony withdrawn after execution does not annul a money ruling. A judge annuls his own ruling if he sees an error, and does not search through another judge's rulings except for a plain contradiction. A judgment on a right of God may be annulled without a claim; one on a right of a person needs the claimant's demand.

• Naw' (kind or species, and its effect on zakat and exchange)

  Naw' in the lexical sense is a kind or class; the Jurist al-Jurjani defined it as a term for many different things by their individuals. Kind matters for zakat: if the animals are of one kind, the zakat is taken from that kind; most jurists allow substituting a sheep for a goat and the reverse, taking value into account, while the Hanafis require the same kind. If the kinds differ, the Hanbalis and the sounder Shafi'i view let the owner give what he chooses, proportioned by value, while the Hanafis join the kinds together. For crops and fruit, kinds are joined to complete the threshold; joining gold and silver is disputed. The exchange of ribawi goods of different kinds is referred to the chapter on usury.

• Nawa'ib (extraordinary levies on the people: their rightful and unjust forms)

  Nawa'ib are the plural of nawaiba, a calamity or an extraordinary matter that befalls people. In the Hanafi usage the term can mean a rightful levy, such as one the imam imposes to equip the army or ransom captives when the treasury has no money, or an unjust exaction. Imposing a levy is obligatory when there is public benefit and the treasury cannot meet it, the jurists citing the Qur'anic command to strive with one's wealth and self (surat al-Tawba, ayah 41). A permitted form is a fee for escort or guard that does not burden the people. An unjust levy need not be paid, and Ibn Abidin held that paying unjust levies helps the oppressor. Guaranteeing a rightful levy is permitted by Hanafi agreement, and the Hanafis differ on guaranteeing unjust ones. The Hanafis allow one who pays another's levy with his leave to reclaim it.

• Nawm (sleep: its rulings, its effect on ablution, worship and legal acts)

  Nawm in the lexical sense is calm and stillness; technically it is the relaxing of the brain's nerves through vapours rising from the stomach. It differs from nu'as, the first stage of sleep, from sina, a drowsiness that does not take away reason, and from fainting. Sleep is permitted in itself; it may be obligatory when a duty depends on it, recommended when one dozes in prayer or recitation, forbidden when one sleeps past the prayer time, and disliked in certain cases such as sleeping after the afternoon prayer or among the awake. Before sleep one is recommended to put out lamps, close the water-skin and the door, and on waking to recite the prescribed formulas and wash the hands three times. Sleep breaks the ablution in general, the majority relying on the saying 'the eyes are the binding of the buttocks'. The speech of a sleeper is void in legal acts: his consecration, vow, oath, divorce and admission do not take effect, with the exception of standing at Arafat. In injury, the sleeper's act is treated as an error, with the diya on his kin and expiation on him, and in destruction of property he is liable like the waking.

• Forgetfulness (nisyan) and its legal effects

  Nisyan in the lexicon is the opposite of remembering or retaining, and it also means leaving aside or delaying. As a term it is failing to recall a thing when one needs it, and it is distinguished from error (khata'), which is a thing one did not intend. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold, in the sound view, that the forgetful person is not accountable while he forgets. The Hanafis hold that forgetting does not cancel the duty owed to God but may be an excuse in God's rights, and is no excuse in the rights of people. The Malikis hold that forgetting in acts of worship does not harm the act, while ignorance does. All agree that forgetting removes sin in the next world. In this world, an omitted command must be made up, harm done in forgetting still requires compensation, and forgetting may be a doubt that lifts a penalty. Among the applications are forgetting the basmala in ablution and prayer, forgetting water when making tayammum, forgetting impurity in prayer, forgetting a prayer, and forgetting the intention in fasting. Opinions differ on each, and the entry gives each school's view. In fasting, forgetting the intention or intercourse during a fast of consecutive expiation may break the sequence in some schools. Forgetfully eating or drinking during Ramadan does not break the fast for the Hanafis and the Shafi'is, while the Malikis hold that it does. In prayer, forgetting talk or eating is excused in small amounts by most schools, while the Hanafis void the prayer on any such act. On divorce and oaths, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold that the divorce of a forgetful man takes effect. Forgetting gives no excuse in the liability for destroyed property or injury.

• Niyaba (representation and agency: contractual and legal, and substitution in worship)

  Niyaba in the lexical sense is making another one's deputy in a matter; technically it is one person's standing in for another in an act. It differs from wilaya, qawama, wakala and wasiyya; niyaba is the wider notion. There are two kinds: the contractual, which is agency, and the legal, which is guardianship over those unable to act for themselves through youth or the like. Legal guardianship is over property or over the person. In purely financial worship, such as zakat, expiations and vows, substitution is permitted by agreement; in purely bodily worship, such as prayer and fasting, it is not; in worship of body and wealth, such as the pilgrimage and the lesser pilgrimage, it is permitted under conditions: the principal must be permanently unable and must have funds, and for the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis the deputy must have performed his own pilgrimage first. Pilgrimage on behalf of the dead is treated separately for obligatory and voluntary acts; hiring for the pilgrimage on behalf of the dead is permitted by the Malikis, Shafi'is and in one Hanbali report, and forbidden by the Hanafis. Substitution in sacrifice and in stoning is permitted; the jurists differ on substitution in offices.

• Niyaha (wailing over the dead: its ruling, the dead's punishment, and hire)

  Niyaha in the lexical sense is wailing aloud, as in keening; the jurists' definitions differ: for the Hanafis it is weeping with praise of the dead, its good qualities enumerated; for the Shafi'is and most Malikis it is raising the voice in lament, even without weeping; for the Hanbalis it is raising the voice in lament with a chanted or rhymed cry. It differs from weeping, elegy, condolence and the announcement of death. The majority hold wailing forbidden; the Hanafis hold it disliked in the sense of forbidden. The prophetic prohibitions are many, including the report of Umm Atiyya at the pledge and that of Aisha on throwing dust into the mouths of mourners. Some Malikis allow loud weeping over a dying man when no ugly words are added. Most jurists hold that the dead is punished for wailing over him only if he bequeathed it; some reports from Umar and Ibn Umar take it otherwise, and the jurists interpret the hadith. A bequest to wail is void and forbidden. The imam must discipline a wailing woman according to the majority; others counsel and give respite without beating. Hire for wailing is void, and its earnings are unlawful according to the majority; the Hanafis allow a fee where custom makes it expected.

• Niyya (intention: its place in worship, contracts and oaths, its conditions and time)

  Niyya in the lexical sense is intention. For the Hanafis it is the purpose of obeying and drawing near to God in enjoining the act; for the Malikis the heart's purpose in what one does; for the Shafi'is intending a thing together with doing it; for the Hanbalis the heart's resolve to perform an act of worship seeking God. It differs from azm, which precedes the act. Acts commanded in their form, such as prayer, purification, fasting and the rites, need intention, since their purpose is to honour God by doing them; those whose purpose is met by performance alone, such as repaying debts, do not. Most jurists hold intention a condition of worship; most Shafi'is a pillar of it. Acts that could be confused with another of their kind, such as the obligatory prayers and fasting, need specification; it is not required in the pilgrimage, the purifications and zakat. The schools differ on whether intention in ablution, the major ablution and tayammum must be of obligation or merely of purification; the majority hold intention a condition of ablution, the Hanafis a sunna, and removing filth needs none according to the majority. The schools differ on specifying obligation, performance or making up in prayer, fasting, zakat, the pilgrimage and expiations; the Shafi'is require specification where acts could be confused. Intention is real or constructive: the real one is a condition at the start of worship, the constructive one suffices for its continuance. Intention cannot be delegated; the schools differ on combining intentions and on splitting intention over the parts of ablution and worship. In fasting, zakat and the pilgrimage the schools differ on the time and the sufficiency of intention. In contracts, intention matters for allusive wording: a clear divorce takes effect without intention, an allusive one only with it; likewise return, zihar, waqf, marriage, emancipation and retaliation; in oaths the Hanafis follow the intention of the swearer if wronged and of the one who demands the oath if he is the wrongdoer. In jihad, slaughter, hunting and the finding of lost property, intention affects the ruling; hunting is owned by taking even without intention, but the finder who intends to appropriate becomes liable.

• Nukul (refusal to swear)

  Nukul is refusing to swear an oath that has been required. The jurists differ over its nature (a surrender, an admission with doubt, or like producing evidence) and over whether a case may be decided by it, with the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali accounts differing by kind of claim.

• The orientalist claim that Islamic law derives from Roman law

  Zaqzuq reports that most orientalists think Islamic law was influenced by Roman law to varying degrees, and names Goldziher, von Kremer and Sheldon Amos, some of whom say it is derived from Roman law. The book presents the claim in order to answer it; the museum gives no ruling.

• Lots in distribution (qur'a)

• Rabd (the outskirts of a city, and a sheep pen): its place in travel-shortening and Friday prayer, and the reviving of land

  Rabd in the lexicon is a sheep pen; the jurists use it for the houses and dwellings around a city, and for the pen. For shortening the prayer on a journey, the outskirts count as the city, and villages joined to them do too, but orchards do not. Friday and Eid prayers are valid in outskirts that belong to the city when the conditions are met, and most jurists hold them invalid in outskirts outside it. Outskirts are not dead land and cannot be revived. Prayer in sheep pens is allowed when free of impurity, while prayer in camel resting places is disliked.

• Rabi'a (the sentinel posted on a height to watch the enemy): his share in jihad, retaliation and banditry

  A rabi'a is the lookout of a people, posted on a height to watch the enemy so the people are not surprised. He is distinguished from the spy, the garrisoned fighter, the guard and the ambusher on the road. In jihad he is one of the people and has a share of the booty like the fighters. In retaliation for killing most jurists do not punish him if he did not do the killing, while the Malikis do if he colluded. In banditry he is treated as a direct perpetrator by the Malikis, Hanafis and Hanbalis, while the Shafi'is hold no hadd penalty on one who only helped.

• Rabigh (the place near al-Juhfa, a station for pilgrims from Medina)

  Rabigh is a valley between the two sanctuaries near the sea, a known place close to al-Juhfa. Al-Juhfa was the miqat for the people of Greater Syria, Egypt and the Maghrib; it has long since disappeared, so pilgrims from those lands take ihram from Rabigh out of caution. It lies a little before al-Juhfa for those coming from Medina, about 220 kilometres from Mecca.

• Milk-kinship prohibition (rada')

  The prohibition effected by suckling in the forty-fourth hadith of Ibn Rajab's additions: 'suckling prohibits what birth prohibits', or in another wording 'what lineage prohibits is prohibited by suckling' — the scholars agreed on acting upon it in sum, as Ibn Rajab reports, so that suckling establishes in marriage the very prohibited degree that birth establishes: whatever would be forbidden to the nursling were he a son is forbidden through the nursing woman, her kin and the milk-father, and the commentary's division of the prohibited degrees — the everlasting individual prohibition and the rest — applies to milk as it applies to lineage (Jami' al-Ulum wal-Hikam p. 864).

• Radd (return and restitution): of goods to their owner, of a contract, of a witness, and of an oath

  Radd in the lexicon is turning back, refusal and sending back; in law it means returning a thing to its owner or rightful holder, and in several cases the annulment of a contract. The property of another must be returned at once when taken unlawfully; in non-binding contracts a return is by annulment, and a void contract is undone, while the Hanafis annul a defective one. A return is lost by correcting the contract, by renewing it, or by the loss of an option; the jurists differ on correcting a defective contract. The Hanafis distinguish a return by judgment from a return by agreement, while the majority do not. The property of a ward is returned at maturity and sound judgment. A witness's testimony is set aside on suspicion. When the defendant refuses the oath, the jurists differ on whether the judge decides against him or refers the oath to the claimant. For goods taken unlawfully the return is compulsory; if they are lost, the like or the value is due. The Hanafis hold a thief who has been punished owes no damages. The cost of return falls on the one who must return.

• Monk (rahib): his killing in jihad and the jizya on monks

  A monk, rahib, is one who fears God; in the usual sense it is a Christian who withdraws for worship, and the plural is ruhban. He is distinguished from the qissis, the Christian scholar, and from the ahbar, the Jewish scholars. If monks take part in fighting Muslims, mix with the people, or help the fighters with counsel, they may be killed when taken, by agreement. If they stay apart in their monasteries without taking part, the majority (Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis, and one view of the Shafi'is) say they are not killed; the more apparent Shafi'i view allows killing them. Whether monks owe the jizya is disputed, and the detail is given under jizya.

• Smell (raiha) in the rulings: purity, pilgrim, mosques, harm, the drinker and the wife

  Smell is an accident perceived by the sense of smell, whether pleasant or foul; the word rih is used by some only for a pleasant scent. Its ruling changes with the chapter of law. If an impurity or a mixed substance changes the smell of water, most jurists say the water loses its purifying power, while the Hanafis say it does not unless its nature as water is lost. A pilgrim in the state of ihram may not use scents whose smell is intended, but fruit with a pleasant smell is not forbidden. Mosques are to be perfumed and kept free of foul smells such as garlic and onion, and a person with such a smell is kept from the congregation. The smell of wine on a drinker's breath does not prove the hadd penalty in the view of most jurists, but the Malikis accept it. A husband may forbid his wife what gives him an unpleasant smell, and he may require her to remove foul odours from her body and clothes.

• Capital (ra's al-mal): the principal sum without profit

  Capital (ra's al-mal) in the lexicon is the principal of money without profit or increase, the whole sum put into an enterprise. The jurists mention it in zakat, partnership, mudaraba, salam, usury, loan, trust sales, murabaha, tawliya and hitta, and its rules are found in those places.

• The head (ra's) in the rulings

  In lexicon ra's is the top of anything, and by metaphor the chief of a people. Wiping the head in ablution is required by agreement; a man in the state of ihram for hajj or umra may not cover his head and owes a ransom if he does; for prayer a man is recommended to cover his head with a turban or the like, and a woman must cover hers. The majority hold that the head of a person under the hadd or discretionary punishment is not to be struck, while Abu Yusuf allows it.

• Rasul (the messenger): the duty to convey, the penalty for insulting messengers, the prohibition on sacrifice in a messenger's name, and the Prophet's protected pastures

  Rasul in the lexicon is one sent to carry a message; in technical use it has two senses: one sent from one person to another with money or a message, and one of the messengers of God, a free male to whom God revealed a law and whom He commanded to convey it. The messenger must convey the call, and those who receive it must believe in and obey the messengers. The scholars agree that whoever insults or mocks a messenger disbelieves, and the insulter of the Prophet is killed. An animal may not be slaughtered in the name of the Messenger of God. The Prophet set aside pastures at al-Naqi' for the horses of the Muslims and at al-Rabadha for camels of charity, and the majority forbid later rulers to cancel what he protected. Envoys of the enemy who come with a message are safe until they deliver it.

• Regular (ratib): the regular sunnas, the regular muezzin and the regular imam of a mosque

  Ratib means fixed and settled, and its technical sense keeps that meaning. Among its uses are the regular sunnas that follow the obligatory prayers; the jurists differ on their number: most say ten rak'as, and the Hanafis twelve, with the two before fajr the most emphasised for them. In a mosque the regular muezzin and the regular imam come first; no one may call the adhan before the regular muezzin unless he is absent and the time is at risk. The regular imam leads over the others present even if someone else is more learned, but the ruler, his deputy or the judge takes precedence when present. Most jurists (Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is) dislike repeating the congregation in a mosque with a regular imam unless it is off the path of people or the imam permits it; the Hanbalis allow it.

• Rayba: suspicion, doubt, and their legal effects in Islamic jurisprudence

  Rayba denotes suspicion and doubt, and the juristic meaning aligns with its lexical usage. It is recommended to leave matters that induce suspicion and adopt what is clear of doubt out of scrupulous caution, and rulers are advised to overlook private faults and refrain from seeking suspicions among the public so as not to corrupt them. Entertaining groundless suspicion against someone of apparent righteousness is forbidden, while suspicion is not ruled out regarding those who openly display wrongdoing. Suspicion impacts waiting periods and establishing pregnancy, whereby a woman in doubt regarding pregnancy waits out a full gestation period of nine months according to the Malikis until doubt is dispelled. In judicial proceedings, suspicion among witnesses warrants their separation by the judge for individual examination prior to character witness verification in order to ascertain truth.

• Restricting permissible acts

• Ribat (garrisoning the frontier, and the endowed hostels for travellers)

  Ribat in its root sense is the garrisoning of an enemy frontier; it is also used for keeping the five prayers, for persistent sitting in the mosque, and for endowed hostels that house the poor, travellers and students. Ribat is a confirmed sunna, since it guards the frontiers of Islam; Ahmad called it the root and branch of jihad, and many hadiths praise it. The best ribat is at the most dangerous frontier. A complete ribat is forty days by agreement; the Hanbalis set its least at an hour, and Ibn Hajar at a day or a night. Endowed hostels on roads and frontiers belong to those entitled to them, and whoever arrives first to one of them has the better claim.

• Ridh (the helper of the fighters in jihad): his share of the booty, his liability in crimes, and his place in retaliation and banditry

  Ridh in the lexicon is a helper or supporter; in the usage of jihad he is one who stands in for the fighters or waits at a post and fights when they withdraw. The jurists agree that the helper and the direct fighter are alike in the right to share the booty, and differ on giving one more than the other. A helper may be disciplined in cases of discretionary penalty; he has no hadd penalty for fornication, drinking or false accusation. In banditry the majority treat the helper like the direct perpetrator, while the Shafi'is hold no hadd for one who only helped. In retaliation the majority do not punish the helper, while the Malikis punish those who agreed in advance to the killing.

• Ridda (apostasy from Islam): its conditions, its forms, the repentance of the apostate, and its effects on property, marriage and worship

  Ridda in the lexicon is turning back from a thing; in law it is a Muslim's unbelief by an explicit word, a word implying it, or an act containing it, and it can only be committed by a sane, adult and free person. Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i do not count a child's apostasy in one view, the Malikis and a famous Hanbali view count it; a child is not killed before puberty; a madman's apostasy is not valid; a drunk man's apostasy is not counted by the Hanafis, while the Shafi'is and Ahmad count it. One who is compelled to speak unbelief does not become an unbeliever, by the verse excepting the compelled whose heart is at peace in faith. Apostasy happens by belief, speech, act or omission: associating others with God, throwing the Qur'an in filth, prostrating to an idol, and abandoning prayer in denial. Insulting God is unbelief by agreement; insulting the Prophet is apostasy for the Hanafis and Hanbalis, and for the Shafi'is apostasy with an added hadd, while the acceptance of the repentance of the insulter is disputed. The apostate is asked to repent, and if he does not he is killed by the imam; the female apostate is killed by the majority and not by the Hanafis. A marriage of an apostate is void; a spouse's apostasy annuls the marriage for the Hanafis; the apostate's property is disputed as to whether it passes away. The deeds of the apostate are annulled, and the jurists differ on the condition of this, and on repeating the pilgrimage and the missed prayers.

• Rishwa (bribery): its definition, its ruling for giver and taker, the paying to avert harm, and its effects on judges and rulings

  Rishwa in the lexicon is a fee or reward paid to secure a purpose; in the jurists' usage it is what is given to void a right or to establish a falsehood, and it is distinct from favours, forbidden gain, gift, alms and presents. It is forbidden to the one who takes and to the one who gives, is a major sin, and taking, offering and accepting it are all forbidden, as is acting as broker; the Prophet cursed the giver, the taker and the broker. The majority hold that a person may pay a bribe to avert wrong or harm or to gain a right, and that the guilt falls on the taker. Taking gifts or bribes is forbidden to the ruler, the governors, the judges, the muftis and the witnesses, and the forbidding of it to the judge is agreed. Obtaining the office of judge by bribery is forbidden, and the majority hold the rulings of a judge who took a bribe void, while the Hanafi, Shafi'i and Hanbali schools hold that a judge is removed by such wrongdoing. No fixed punishment applies, and discretionary punishment is the rule.

• Rizq (stipends from the treasury): who is paid, the register of the fighters, and the three groups the imam supports

  Rizq in the lexicon is provision, given in this world or the next; in the jurists' usage it is what is fixed from the treasury by need and sufficiency, monthly or daily, and it is distinguished from 'ata' which is set yearly by a person's service and merit in religion. Judges, agents and governors may be paid from the treasury; al-Qarafi holds that such pay may be cut, reduced, increased or changed as the public interest requires. The imam should keep a register of the paid fighters, give each what he needs, put the Quraysh first, and enter no child, madman, woman or weak man unfit for war; he pays once a year and may pay monthly, and gives the dead man's wife and young children enough. Those the imam supports are three groups: the needy; those who uphold the pillars of religion, such as judges, rulers and muftis, who must be relieved so that they can devote themselves to it; and those given a share of the treasury for their standing, such as the Banu Hashim and Banu al-Muttalib.

• Ruju' (return or retraction): in judgment and fatwa, in contracts, in testimony and confession, in apostasy and in the rules of travel

  Ruju' in the lexicon is turning back; in the law it is a return to what was, or the undoing of an act. It may be obligatory, as a return to the Qur'an and the Sunna when people dispute; recommended, as the mutual cancellation of a sale; permitted in revocable contracts; forbidden, as taking back a charity; or disliked, as taking back a gift in the Hanafi view. A judge or mufti may change his ruling when his ijtihad changes; a few Malikis disagreed, but most held that the earlier judgment is not annulled by a later ijtihad. Revocable contracts, such as loan of use, bequest, partnership, agency and deposit, may be revoked; binding contracts may be revoked only by mutual consent. A return is lost by remission, by the death of a party, or by the waiver of a right. In testimony, witnesses who retract after judgment pay the money, and the penalty is not carried out; in confession, a retraction removes the hadd penalty by the majority.

• Rukhsa (the concession: a ruling eased for a reason, set against the strict ruling 'azima)

  Rukhsa in the lexicon is ease and permission after a prohibition; in usage it is what is made lighter for the person in doing something, for a cause that prevents him from the strict ruling while the forbidding cause remains. It is set against 'azima, and is close to permission and to lifting hardship. Its causes are necessity, need, travel, illness, forgetting and compulsion; its kinds are obligatory, recommended, permitted and against the better course for the Shafi'is, and real and figurative for the Hanafis. Some jurists hold that the strict ruling is better in some cases, such as compelled unbelief when refusing would mean death, and fasting on a journey. Analogy from a concession is allowed by the majority and refused by the Hanafis, except Abu Yusuf. Taking up concessions merely to escape duty is condemned; taking them for a lawful cause is permitted.

• Rushd (sound judgment as the end of a ward's incapacity): its meaning, the test of a child, and the release of property

  Rushd in the lexicon is sound judgment and right conduct; in the jurists' usage it is the soundness of property for the majority, and of both property and religion for al-Shafi'i. It is the last stage of capacity: a person who comes of age sound has full capacity, his guardianship ends and his property is handed to him. If he comes of age unsound, the majority hold the restriction continues until his soundness is shown, while Abu Hanifa hands over the property at twenty-five years. A child is tested by letting him conduct the kind of transactions his peers conduct, once or more, and the schools differ on the method and the time, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis mostly before puberty. The rules of soundness appear in many chapters of law, such as sale, partnership, agency, gift, endowment, marriage, khul' and custody.

• The dream (ru'ya): its standing, its interpretation and the rules of telling it

  A dream (ru'ya) is what a person sees in sleep; it is distinct from inspiration (ilham), from a bad dream (hulm), from a passing thought (khatir) and from revelation (wahy). A sound dream is one of the parts of prophethood; a righteous person's dreams are more often true, while others' dreams mix truth with confusion. Seeing the Prophet in a dream is true; whether his words or acts seen there bind the dreamer is disputed. Interpretation (ta'bir) carries the dream from its outward form to its inward meaning, with rules drawn from the Qur'an and the Sunna. A dream should be told only to a sympathetic or learned person; a liked dream is praised to God and told to others, and a disliked one is answered by seeking refuge from its harm and not telling it to anyone.

• Sight (ru'ya) in the rulings: seeing as a legal basis

  In lexicon ru'ya is perceiving a thing with the eye, and it may also be by the heart; jurists mostly use the first sense. The ruling on seeking sight varies with its purpose: sighting the new moon of Ramadan is a collective duty for the Hanafis, seeing a woman one is considering marrying is recommended, seeing a forbidden part of the body is unlawful, and seeing ordinary things is permitted. Deliberately looking at what is awra is forbidden except in necessity, such as treatment or testimony, and spouses may look at each other's bodies. Looking with desire at what is not awra is forbidden. A suitor may look at the woman he intends to marry, and it is sunna; repeated looks are allowed. A person who prayed with tayammum for lack of water and then sees water he can use before entering the prayer has his tayammum voided. A sale requires knowledge of the goods, and sight is the way to it; sight at the contract removes any option of sight, and earlier sight serves if the goods have not visibly changed. For uniform goods sight of a part suffices; for varied goods sight of what shows the purpose suffices. A witness testifies only to what he knows by sight or hearing; the Hanafis and Shafi'is require sight with hearing for statements, while the Malikis and Hanbalis accept hearing alone. Sight has effects: fasting is due on sighting the new moon of Ramadan, a seen wrong must be changed according to its degrees, and a seen defect after a sale gives the buyer a right of return.

• Sighting the crescent (ru'yat al-hilal): how the start and end of the lunar month are proved

  Sight is seeing with the eye or the heart; when it takes material things as its object it is by the eye. The crescent means the moon at the start of each lunar month; its sighting here is the seeing of it after sunset on the twenty-ninth of the previous month by someone whose report is accepted. The hadiths on seeking the crescent and completing the count of thirty days when it is hidden are the basis; the search is urged most on the thirtieth of Sha'ban, Ramadan and Dhu al-Qa'da, because fasting and the pilgrimage and both Eids depend on them. Sighting is proved by a mass report that rules out collusion, by two just witnesses, or, for Ramadan's start, by a single just witness according to the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis; the Malikis do not accept a single witness. For other months most jurists require two just men. A crescent seen in daylight is disputed: whether it belongs to the night before or the coming night. Most jurists did not accept reckoning by astronomy to prove the month, read the phrase "estimate it" as completing thirty days, and the majority set aside differences of horizon, while the Hanafis and Shafi'is take them into account.

• Polygyny in Islam

  Polygyny in the sharia is the permissibility of a man marrying more than one wife under conditions including justice between them; the Kuwaiti Fiqh Encyclopedia devotes sections to its rulings in the marriage chapters.

• Ta'addud (plurality in worship, expiation, marriage, divorce and the rest)

  Ta'addud is plurality. Its applications: several muezzins are lawful and recommended; repeating the congregation in a mosque after the quarter's imam is disliked by the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafiis, and lawful for the Hanbalis. More than one Friday prayer in a town is forbidden by the majority except by necessity, and lawful for the Hanafis. Repeating the fast's expiation by repeated intercourse is disputed. Marriage up to four is established by the Qur'an. Several judges in a town are lawful, but more than one imam is forbidden by the majority.

• Ta'liya (building above another building)

  Ta'liya, from 'uluw (height), is in law raising a building on top of another. An owner may build up on his own wall as he likes, and a neighbour may not stop him unless the harm is gross; the claim that it blocks wind and sun is not gross harm. Most jurists (Malikis, Shafiis, Hanbalis) allow selling the right to build above, with the two storeys described; the Hanafis forbid it because air is not property. When the lower or the upper part falls, the jurists differ on whether the other owner can be compelled to rebuild and when the rebuilder may claim his costs. A dhimmi may not build higher than a Muslim neighbour, and the jurists differ on building level with one. Opening a window over a neighbour is refused without consent by the Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis, while the two disciples of Abu Hanifa allow it if no harm; the Malikis distinguish new and old openings.

• Ta'arud (conflict between proofs, and how one is preferred)

  Ta'arud is the mutual resistance of two proofs; if they can be joined they are joined, otherwise one is preferred. It is mostly used for conflicting testimony, and the schools differ on the grounds of preference: the Hanafis do not weigh numbers or extra probity, the Malikis weigh probity, strength of proof, date and cause of ownership, the Shafiis prefer the holder's proof, and the Hanbalis in the known view prefer the claimant's. In rights of God that doubts avert, the stronger proof prevails in averting.

• Ta'jiz (declaring a party unable: a slave under a writing, or a party who fails to produce proof)

  Ta'jiz is ascribing inability to a person; the jurists use it only for a slave under a writing of manumission and for a party who cannot produce proof. The Hanafis, Shafiis and Hanbalis let the master cancel the writing after default, the Malikis through the judge; the Malikis have the judge declare a claimant unable when the set terms run out, while the Shafiis and Hanbalis give a defendant no more than three days.

• Ta'lil (giving reasons for rulings)

  Ta'lil, in the technical sense, is establishing that a cause is effective in order to prove its effect, or showing that a thing is a cause; it is the motive for legislating a ruling or the interest for which it was set. Worship rulings are presumed not to have a stated rationale, because they rest on pure devotion; transactions, customs and offences are presumed to have one, because they serve the interests of people. Stating the rationale helps people know and keep the rulings, and makes them more accepted. The usuliyyun divided on whether texts have stated reasons into four views: the default is no reason unless shown; the default is any suitable attribute; the default is an attribute with a test to choose the suitable ones; or the texts are devotional. The paths to a cause are the explicit text, consensus, implication and allusion, division and examination, suitability, resemblance and concomitance, the refinement and verification of the ground, and concomitance of presence and absence. A defective hadith is one in which a cause has been found that impairs its soundness although it appears sound; it is a kind of weak hadith.

• Ta'liq (conditional linking of clauses)

  Ta'liq links the occurrence of one clause to the occurrence of another, and is called an oath by metaphor. It differs from idafa in carrying uncertainty, and from shart in placing its particle on the act itself. The jurists list its particles (in, idha, mata, mata ma, man, ayy, mahma, kull and kullama, law, kayfa, haythu and ayna, anna), with the four schools differing on several. Its conditions are that the condition be uncertain, that it be something that can be known, that no gap separate condition from consequence, that it refer to the future, that it not be meant as mere retort, and that a link appear. Ta'liq of divorce on God's will is void. Hanafis and Malikis require only ownership in some form, while Shafiis and Hanbalis require that the one making the ta'liq have the power of immediate effect. Hanafis hold that ta'liq prevents both the cause and the ruling from taking effect; Shafiis hold it prevents only the ruling. Some acts accept ta'liq (the ila', the hajj, khul' from the husband's side, divorce, zihar, manumission, writing for manumission, vows and appointments to office), while others do not (hire, acknowledgement, faith, sale, return to the wife, marriage, endowment and agency), with a principle that pure transfer of ownership rejects it and pure release accepts it.

• Ta'mim (generalisation in purification, supplication and alms)

  Ta'mim means in language making a thing general and comprehensive, and the jurists use it in this sense. In ablution every part that must be washed must be reached by water. Except al-Zuhri, the jurists agree that the ears are not part of the face; the Hanbalis differ on the inside of mouth and nose and make them obligatory, while the other three schools require only the outer nose. Clay or dough stuck under the nails must be removed so that water reaches the skin; some Hanafis and Shafiis excuse the baker and the clay worker, and the Malikis excuse nail dirt unless it is excessive. In the full bath the whole body must be reached, with the inside of mouth and nose a point of dispute: the Hanafis and Hanbalis require it, the Malikis and Shafiis do not. Water must reach the roots of hair, and plaited locks must be unbraided if water cannot reach beneath. In tayammum the schools differ on covering the face: the Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis require covering the whole face, including the beard; the Hanafis hold the covering of the face and hands a condition, not a pillar. Generality in supplication is recommended. A report that the dearest prayer to God is one that asks mercy for the community of Muhammad as a whole was given by al-Khatib, and Ibn Adi rejected it; a bedouin who prayed for himself and Muhammad only was told he had narrowed a wide mercy. Covering all eight categories of zakat recipients is not obligatory for most jurists; the Shafiis require it. A general invitation to a feast (al-juffa) may be accepted by most jurists; the Hanbalis allow it with dislike.

• Ta'rid (allusion in speech: a veiled proposal in the waiting period, a charge of slander, protection of a Muslim from his pursuer, and a judge's allusion to retraction)

  Ta'rid is allusion, the opposite of plain statement: speech that may carry the intended sense or another. A veiled proposal to a widow in her waiting period is lawful by agreement; to one divorced irrevocably the Malikis, the more known Shafii view and one Hanbali view allow it, while the Hanafis forbid it. Allusion to slander is punished by the hadd for the Malikis if the context shows it, by discipline only for the Hanafis, and for the Shafiis is slander only if meant and the words can bear it. One may allude to kill a seeker who would take a Muslim back to unbelief. The judge may allude to a confessor to retract, in the sounder Shafii view, and it is recommended by the Hanafis and Hanbalis.

• Ta'rif (making known: the Arafat gathering in towns, the announcement of a found thing, identifying the parties in a claim)

  Ta'rif is making known and clear; the usulis use it for a definition that includes and excludes. Among its applications for the jurists: the gathering in towns on the day of Arafat, which Ahmad allowed without recommending while Abu Hanifa and Malik disliked it; the announcement of a found thing, which the three imams hold obligatory and the Shafiis hold the sounder view; and identifying the claimed thing and the defendant, a condition of hearing a claim by agreement.

• Ta'yin (specification of an object, intention or term)

  Ta'yin (specification) is in language singling out a thing from its like, and in law making a thing distinct so that nothing shares it; its opposite is ibham (vagueness). In the usulis' usage it contrasts with choice among obligations: a specified obligation such as the noon prayer, and a vague one among a set number of options, such as the expiations for an oath; the Mu'tazila denied an obligation of choice. A compulsory prayer must be named in intention as noon or afternoon; the follower must intend to follow an imam but need not name him, and for the Hanafis a wrongly named imam invalidates the prayer. Naming the optional prayers is disputed. Most jurists require the fast of Ramadan, a make-up fast, an expiation or a vow to be named in intention; the Hanafis and one Hanbali view allow a general intention for Ramadan. In a sale, the currency most common in the town is taken as specified when one prevails; when several prevail, the currency must be named in words; when they are equal, the sale is valid without naming. The term must be named in a salam, and most jurists require the place of delivery when it has burden. A sale needs a known object and known price: a sheep from a flock, or a price by value, by another's ruling, or at what people sell, is not valid, and the Hanafis count this as defective but correctable at the session. On whether a specified coin is bound by specification in the contract, the Shafiis and Hanbalis say yes, the Hanafis and Malikis say no. The Hanafi option of specification: one buys one of two or three garments, the buyer choosing later; four are not allowed, and the contract must say so. The Shafiis and Hanbalis void such a sale for uncertainty. The salam object may not be specified but must be a debt, since a specified object may perish before delivery; a salam in the fruit of a named orchard is void, as Ibn al-Mundhir reports the consensus, following the report about the Jews of Banu Qaynuqa. An agent bound to a named buyer or a named time or place must keep to it, unless the principal had no interest in it. A lease must specify the kind of benefit and its term; some early jurists allowed leasing unknowns. If a man says one of my two wives is divorced and intends one, that wife is divorced, and he must specify. A claim must specify the thing claimed: an animal's sex, age, colour and kind, or a sum's kind, quantity and description.

• Ta'dil (certifying a witness's probity; equalising shares; correcting postures in prayer; the value-based division)

  Ta'dil is equalising or setting straight; in law it is certifying a witness or narrator as upright. A judge must seek the probity of the witnesses if he does not know it, according to the Shafiis, Hanbalis, Malikis, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad; Abu Hanifa accepts the apparently upright, except in penalties and retaliation. Settling the postures in prayer is obligatory: a pillar for the majority and a duty short of obligation for the Hanafis. Division by value divides a common thing by worth rather than by parts; the majority also allow a change of value in the fixed penalty for hunting in pilgrimage.

• Tafarruq al-safqa (partition of a contract)

  Partition of the deal (tafarruq al-safqa): the ruling of the contract does not reach the whole of what is contracted, or reaches it and then leaves part of it; safqa lexically is the clapping of hands at sale and so the contract itself. Distinguished from plurality of deals, which can arise by splitting the price between two items or by several parties, and from selling at two prices in one contract; partition is only in one deal. The Hanafis treat partition in the loss of part of the goods, in the defective goods and in eviction; the Shafiis split plurality into the initial and the continuing; the Hanbalis give cases of mixed goods. Selling what one owns with what one does not: valid in what one owns and suspended in the rest, for Abu Hanifa and Malik; the Hanbalis have two views; the Shafiis split the price by parts; the buyer, if ignorant, has the option, the seller has none. Effect of the option: confirm or annul; if he confirms the rest he pays its share of the price, in the Shafii view. Option of partial eviction: if part of the goods is evicted before receipt, the evicted part is void and the buyer has an option over the rest; after receipt the rule depends on whether the goods are valued or uniform. Option of partial loss before receipt: the buyer may confirm or annul, and the price drops by the lost share if the loss is in quantity; for the Shafiis, if one of two goods perishes before receipt the contract stands and the buyer has the option; a missing share of a deferred delivery gives the option to annul or confirm.

• Takfir

  Takfir is declaring a Muslim to be an unbeliever; the Kuwaiti Fiqh Encyclopedia devotes a section to the rulings on takfir and takfir of a Muslim, treating it as among the gravest and most restricted of judgements.

• Divorce (talaq)

  In his commentary on al-Baqara 2:228-232, Sha'rawi reads divorce in stages, once and then twice, as giving the couple room to mend; he holds that returning to a wife after the waiting period needs a new contract and a new dower and the woman's consent, and that relatives may not block the return when the spouses agree.

• Tarjih (preponderance): choosing the stronger of two conflicting evidences, between two reports and between two analogies

  Tarjih in the lexicon is strengthening one of two alike things over the other. The Hanafis define it as showing an excess in one of two alike items that is not independent, and the Shafi'is as one of two valid proofs being preferred to its opponent. When two conflicting proofs cannot be reconciled, the stronger must be acted upon and the weaker set aside, and the Companions and the early scholars did so by the strength of the opinion. Among the rules for two reports are those about the chain, such as more transmitters, a senior Companion, earlier Islam, and mutawatir over single reports; and those about the text, such as a prohibition over a command, and the literal over the figurative. For two analogies, one prefers the analogy whose root ruling is stronger, whose cause is more clearly stated, or whose branch is of the same kind as its root.

• Implementing the sharia — totality versus stages

  The 'Al-Wasatiyya' episode on implementing the sharia — wholesale or in stages. The audience voted the concept clear in both general and detail to only 28% of its advocates, clear in general but not in detail to 69%, and unclear to 3%. Ahmad Nawfal compressed the rule: 'the foundation is divine, the detailing human' — the generalities are revealed, the details are ijtihad tested in the field.

• Ta'wid (compensation for harm)

  Ta'wid is in language a substitute, and in law the payment of a monetary replacement owed for harm done to another. It differs from taththim (fixing a price in an exchange), from taqwim (valuation), which belongs to compensation, from arsh (the sum owed for an injury short of death), and it is narrower than daman (liability). Compensation is owed only against harm and is binding; harm may fall on property, its use, life, or a part of the body. Unlawful destruction calls for compensation by agreement, whether the right is God's (as hunting in the sacred state) or a person's. Lawful destruction calls for compensation only where another's right is involved. For a destroyed thing: a fungible item is replaced by its like, a valued item by its value at the place of destruction. For the loss of use: most jurists hold use guaranteed by the one who takes it; the Shafiis and Hanbalis guarantee the use of usurped property, the Malikis guarantee the yield of property used or left idle, and the Hanafis hold use is not property, except in three cases: an endowment, an orphan's property, and property prepared for rent. In trusts such as deposit and agency, the holder is liable only for negligence or transgression, and so is a private hired worker; the shared worker is disputed. On instigation: most jurists place liability on the instigator; the Malikis pursue him only when the actual wrongdoer cannot pay; al-Nawawi holds no liability for mere cause, such as opening a store or guiding a thief; the Hanbalis let the owner hold either. On coercion, the jurists differ whether the coercer alone is liable or the coerced too. Liability falls on one who destroys directly or by causing. The thing destroyed must be valuable property, and the destroyer must be liable in law. Animals are guaranteed for damage to crops only where a keeper is present and does not restrain them; the rest is disputed. Killing carries blood money where retaliation does not apply; loss of a limb carries its fixed sum, or else a just assessment. No jurist, the book notes, spoke of monetary compensation for moral injury; the term is a recent one.

• Ta'zir (discretionary punishment)

  Ta'zir is, in language, repelling, preventing, aiding, honouring or disciplining; in law it is a penalty not fixed by the lawgiver, due as a right of God or of a person for every wrong that has no hadd and generally no expiation. It differs from the hadd, retaliation and expiation in that the judge chooses its measure to suit the case; a hadd is averted by doubt while ta'zir is established even by doubt; a child is not liable to a hadd but may be disciplined; and some jurists hold a hadd lapses with time while ta'zir does not. It may combine with a hadd, retaliation or an expiation in known cases, and it is divided into a right of God and a right of a person, according to which interest predominates. Most jurists leave its measure to the ruler's judgement. Harm that may destroy a limb or life is forbidden, so the face, the private parts, the belly and the chest may not be struck, and the beard may not be shaved.

• Wad' al-yad (possession and the hand, fiqh)

  Wad' al-yad (literally, placing the hand) means leaving or dropping, as in the phrase that one dropped someone's debt, and the hand in the sense of favour, power, holding and ownership: 'the matter is in so-and-so's hand' means it is in his control. For the jurists it is a holder's act of control over a thing, or the holder's disposal of it in the way an owner disposes. The jurists also use the phrase for the physical hand itself. Hiyaza is taking hold and gathering, and wad' al-yad is the broader term; ghasb is taking an owner's property by force and open contest, and wad' al-yad is broader than ghasb. First, the rules on holding a thing for ownership. The jurists agree in general that holding is evidence of ownership, with differences of detail. The Hanafis call holding and disposal among the strongest proofs of ownership, so testimony that the holder owns the thing is valid. The Malikis hold that a holding which lasts, is not contested and is used as an owner uses a thing proves ownership, while a short holding does not. Ibn Rushd gives different answers on whether a third-party holder must say where the thing came from, depending on how long the holding has lasted and whether the claimant's root of title is established. The way of holding varies with the thing. For land it is living in a house, building on it, digging a well, canal or channel, planting trees, sowing, making bricks on open ground; for a thick wood or a reed thicket, cutting and selling wood and using it; for pasture, cutting and selling grass or grazing animals on it. A key held by someone else does not make him the holder of a house; the one who lives in it holds it. For movables, holding is any sign that a person has the thing, such as using slaves, riding animals, milking livestock. Second, proof of holding. The Hanafis distinguish land from other things: a disputed holding of land must be proved by witnesses and is not established by the admission of both parties, nor by the judge's knowledge, because the holding of land is not visible and both parties might be feigning it. Exceptions are claims of purchase, usurpation and theft, where proof of holding is not needed, because the claim of an act may be made against anyone who holds. For movables, the one in whose hand the thing is found holds it, and holding may be shown by witnesses, sight or admission; if the defendant denies holding and the claimant shows by witnesses that the thing was in the defendant's hand for a year, the witnesses are heard and the defendant is treated as the holder. Third, holding another's property. Taking another's property without permission in aggression is usurpation, detailed under ghasb. Taking it by mistake, as when a person thought it was his own, makes him liable for compensation but not sinful, because error is lifted from account. The book cites a hadith on the lifting of error from this community and notes that al-Nawawi graded a hadith on the subject as hasan, as Ibn Hajar reports; the grade is attributed and recorded here as attributed only. Fourth, disputes over holding. When two people contest land and each claims to hold it, each is asked for evidence; if both produce it, both are held to hold the land together, each the defendant for the part he holds and the claimant for the part he does not. If one shows he cannot prove his holding and the other proves it, the latter is treated as the holder. Without evidence, the stronger holder is preferred, or they share if equal. Fifth, grades of holding. Without evidence the Hanafis give examples: the one wearing a garment has a better claim than the one holding its sleeve; the rider has a better claim than the one holding the bridle; the one seated in the saddle over the one behind him, in the apparent view; the one carrying the load on an animal over the one who hangs his jug on it; a wall belongs to the one whose beams rest on it, with the three-beam rule; and a wall joined by interlocking bricks or by a wooden piece set into another belongs to the one it is bonded with. The Malikis rank holding: first the clothes and belt a person wears, then the carpet he sits on, then the animal he rides, then the one he drives or leads, then the house he lives in. The Shafi'is: when two contest an animal and one has a load on it, the load-holder is believed with his oath; when one holds the animal and the other holds its load, the holder of the animal has the better claim. The Hanbalis: when one rides an animal or has a load on it and the other holds its halter or drives it, the first has the better claim, on his oath, as his use is stronger. Sixth, holding a lost thing and a foundling. The Hanafis forbid the finder to take a lost thing for himself and not for its owner; the book cites a hadith in Sahih Muslim on the one who shelters a stray. The Shafi'is: when one of two walking companions finds a lost thing and the other tells him to pick it up, the intention of the one who picks it up decides who owns it. The Hanbalis: when two see a foundling and one takes it or puts his hand on it first, he has the better claim; the taking, not the seeing, is what counts; if one asks the other to hand it to him, the intention of the taker decides. Seventh, a pilgrim in the state of ihram laying hold of game. Jurists agree it is forbidden to a pilgrim for hajj or umra to take hold of game by purchase, hire, loan or similar means, inside the sanctuary or outside it, as the Qur'an forbids it in sura al-Ma'ida (cited by sura only); it is also forbidden to take hold of game within the sanctuary even for a non-pilgrim. Eighth, what does not come under holding. The rule is that a free person does not come under another's hold. Taking another's property without legal cause is a wrong that makes the taker liable, whether the taker is a ruler or one ruled. Second part, the physical hand. In prayer the jurists differ on placing the right hand on the left. They agree that placing the hand on the hip in prayer is disliked, for a hadith of Abu Hurayra against praying with the hip hold, and because the posture contradicts the prayer. At the Black Stone the circumambulant kisses it with his mouth if able, and otherwise touches it with his hand and kisses his hand. On graves: the Malikis, a Hanafi view and a Shafi'i view hold touching graves to be an innovation; the book quotes several jurists against touching or kissing graves, as the custom of Christians, and Ibn Taymiyya as reporting consensus that a grave is not touched or kissed. The Shafi'is in the school view and Ahmad in one report consider touching a grave with the hand disliked; al-Jamal excepts the case in which it is intended for blessing. A Hanafi view and the Hanbali school view say touching a grave is not objectionable, and Ahmad in one report recommends it. On yawning, it is recommended to suppress it, and if one cannot, to place the hand on the mouth. On sneezing, the sunna is to place the hand or garment on the mouth and lower the voice. The Malikis recommend placing the hand on a sick person while praying for him, if the touch is not disliked to him. On the hands of the dead: the Hanafis place the right hand on the right side and the left on the left, and forbid placing both on the chest; the Shafi'is allow placing them on the chest, the right over the left, or leaving them along the sides.

• Wadi'a (loss-sale, loss, remission)

  Wadi'a, in lexical use, means loss, the tax the ruler takes from the land and the tithes, a reduction, and it is used in the phrase 'he reduced it for him' (wada'a 'anhu), and of a merchant who has lost in his trade. For the jurists it is a sale at the first price with a known amount deducted from it; it is also called mawadi'a, mukhasara, muhatta and hutayta, and this is its best-known sense. The jurists also use the word for loss and for the remission of a debt. Murabaha is giving a profit, that is a sale at a price fixed as the capital plus a known addition; it is the opposite of wadi'a. Tawliya is the transfer of the whole goods to the buyer at the first price, and ishrak is the transfer of part of the goods at the price of that part; wadi'a, tawliya and ishrak are all trust sales. Wadi'a as a sale: its best-known sense is a trust sale at a known reduction from the first price. It is lawful as a kind of sale, and valid when its conditions are met; its conditions are those of murabaha. Wadi'a as loss in partnerships: the jurists agree that loss in partnerships falls on the partners in proportion to their capital, and that no other arrangement may be stipulated; Ibn 'Abidin says there is no dispute that stipulating a loss other than the capital shares is void. In a mudaraba the owner of the capital bears the whole loss and the managing partner bears none; profit follows the agreed terms. If the managing partner gains and then loses, the loss is taken from the profit while the partnership continues; Ahmad, asked about it, held the loss is set against profit, and when the capital is returned and a new partnership is made, the earlier loss is not covered from the later profit. Wadi'a as remission of a debt: The Kifayat al-talib cited in the book gives the view that remitting part of a debt in return for early payment is not lawful, which is called (put and hasten) and is treated by most jurists as usury. Cross-reference: the heading of remission (ibra').

• Wadi'a (deposit)

  The deposit (wadi'a) is property placed with another to keep; the Hanbalis add: without return. Making someone a depositary is granting another custody of one's property; the Hanbalis add: as a gift. It is close to the loan of use, since the hand in both is a trust for some jurists, and to found property, since the finder's hand during the year is a trust; it differs from usurpation, which is seizing property by force and wrong. Its lawfulness rests on the sunna and on general consensus, and a report orders the return of trusts to their owner. On the ruling for some cases the text gives two opinions, prohibition and disapproval, and the printed preference is disapproval. On its nature there are two views: most jurists (Malikis, Hanbalis and, in the preferred view, Shafi'is) call it a restricted agency, since the depositary keeps but does not dispose; the Hanafis describe it as an express or implied grant to another of custody over one's property; some Shafi'is call it a mere permission, which makes the holder a trustee rather than a depositary. If the depositor withdraws, on the permission view the withdrawal is void and the deposit stands; on the contract view the deposit ends and the property stays in hand as a trust that must be returned once possible. Its three features: it is a contract either party may end at will, it is a trust contract rather than a guarantee, and it is gratuitous in origin. The pillars are the formula, the two parties and the object according to most jurists; the Hanafis count an offer and an acceptance, which may be express, by allusion, or by act. The depositary may not charge for keeping unless agreed, customary, or a professional; the Hanbalis forbid stipulating a fee for the deposit itself. Capacity for the depositor is discernment according to the Hanafis and full adulthood, sanity and good judgement according to most jurists; a deposit made by a child or an insane person is not valid, and the depositary who takes it bears liability. On a discerning child there are four views. Most Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold that a child cannot be a depositary at all, so a loss in his hands brings no liability; the Hanafis allow a child licensed to trade; Ibn Rushd allows a discerning child to act as an agent; Ibn Arafa allows it when the holder expects him to keep it. The object must be property for the Hanafis and Malikis, which excludes carrion and blood; for the Shafi'is and Hanbalis it must be property or specially owned, which excludes forbidden wine and instruments of play. Most jurists allow deeds and documents to be deposited, and most allow immovable property, against Ibn Arafa, who requires movables. The deposit is a trust in the depositary's hand, so there is no liability without transgression or negligence, a view held by most jurists and reported as consensus by Ibn al-Mundhir. For the Hanafis a paid depositary is liable for avoidable loss, while Malikis and Shafi'is make no such distinction. A stipulation that the depositary bears liability is void according to most jurists, and a stipulation that excludes liability for transgression is void for the Hanafis and Shafi'is. The depositary's word on loss is accepted with his oath according to most jurists; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis require proof of an apparent cause such as fire or flood, while for the Malikis, in the preferred view, only an accused depositary swears. His word on return is accepted with his oath according to most jurists; for the Malikis he needs witnesses if he took the deposit as a security. The increase of a deposit belongs to its owner, by consensus. Upkeep falls on the owner. When milk or fruit is at risk of spoiling, the Hanafis allow sale with the judge's permission, and a sale without one is valid where no judge can be reached. When the owner is absent, the Hanafis and Shafi'is refer the matter to the judge, and the Hanbalis let the judge spend from the owner's property or sell, rent or borrow for him. On spending without the judge's leave there are three views: the Hanafis and Shafi'is give no right of recovery, the Malikis allow recovery of proven costs, and the Hanbalis allow it under conditions. The depositary must keep the deposit as he keeps his own property; where the owner has named a place he must keep it there, a lesser place makes him liable, and an equal or better place does not. Where no place is named, he keeps it in a place customarily safe for such goods, and the standard varies with time and place. The depositary may keep the deposit himself or with dependants whom he trusts with his own property; placing it with others is a transgression for most jurists. When the owner has been absent for long, there are four views on how long to keep it: the Hanafis keep it until the owner's death or life is known; the Malikis wait as long as such a person could live and then pass it to heirs or give it in charity; the Shafi'is keep it or hand it to the judge and, once hope is lost, to the public treasury; the Hanbalis allow charity with intent to guarantee repayment. The deposit must be returned at once on demand; delay without excuse makes the depositary liable if it is lost. Recognised excuses include night, prayer, and a fear for one's safety, which the Hanafis extend to moral threats. Return is made by letting the owner take the deposit where it lies, without carrying it to his house. If the depositary dies and the deposit is found in his estate, it is a trust in his heirs' hands, which they must return to the owner. Destroying a deposit without the owner's leave is forbidden and makes the depositary liable by consensus; if the owner ordered its destruction there are two views. Replacing a destroyed deposit does not remove liability for the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis; the Malikis excuse fungible goods that are replaced in kind. Giving a deposit to a third party without leave or excuse is a transgression that makes the depositary liable, although some allow it for a trusted person when there is a real need. Mixing a deposit with other goods so that it can still be separated brings no liability; where separation is impossible or hard, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold the mixer liable, and the Malikis hold him liable when the goods differ in kind. Travel with the deposit is allowed with the owner's leave; without it the jurists differ on liability according to safety, need and ability to return. Trading with the deposit without leave is a transgression that makes the depositary liable, and there are five views on the profit: to the owner, to the public treasury, to be given in charity, to the depositary, or to be shared between them. Use with leave is lawful; use without leave is a transgression that brings liability and, for the Malikis and Shafi'is, payment of the customary hire. Lending, renting, pledging or selling the deposit without leave is a transgression that brings liability; for the Hanafis a sale without leave stands only if the owner approves. Denial of a deposit after the owner's demand makes the depositary a usurper and liable, and the Hanafis set seven conditions for this. Waste, neglect of an animal entrusted to him, forgetting the deposit, and failure to name it in a will when death is near can all bring liability, though the jurists differ on the detail. The contract ends by death or insanity of either party, by withdrawal or removal of the depositary, by transfer of the property, or by denial; the property then stays with the holder as a trust that must be returned. Disputes over the deposit cover whether a depositary may sue a usurper to recover it, and how several depositaries share custody and loss. Where the depositor and the depositary disagree on the terms of the deposit, on what was received, or on who owns a deposit claimed by two people, the jurists give rules on proof, oath and division.

• Waiver of the dower

  On the phrase 'or the one in whose hand is the marriage knot,' Sha'rawi holds that the dower is the woman's right and that the one meant is the husband, not her guardian. He answers those who took it to be the guardian, whom he reports without naming them on this page.

• Wajib (the obligatory: kinds, grades and how it is discharged)

  The obligatory (wajib) in the technical sense is, for the Hanafis, what is required by evidence that admits doubt, and for the majority what the law blames one for omitting in some respect. The Hanafis hold the fard to be what is established by certain evidence and the wajib by probable evidence, such as the alms of the breaking of the fast and the sacrifice; for the majority the two terms are synonymous in the law. The grades of obligation differ, for the Shafi'is by the blame attached to omission, and for the Hanafis by the strength of the evidence. An obligation is individual or collective, specific or optional, timed or untimed; a timed one is narrow or broad, and is immediate or may be delayed. If an obligation is missed through delay it must be made up, or repaired by expiation; the insane, the menstruating and the child are excused the making up for reasons of mercy. On exceeding an obligation, the schools differ: the Hanafis rule on what the law specifies, the Malikis dislike the excess, and the Shafi'is and Hanbalis distinguish an excess that can be separated from one that cannot. For the Shafi'is an obligation may arise and then fall away when the cause and the bar conflict.

• Wakala (agency, fiqh)

  Wakala, with its vowel variants, means in the language protection, as in the Divine name al-Wakil meaning the Guardian, and in tawakkul ('we have entrusted our affairs to God'); tawkil is the delegation of a disposal to another. The agent is called wakil because his principal has entrusted him with the conduct of his affair. The jurists define it in several ways. The Hanafis: setting another in one's place in a lawful, known disposal, out of ease or incapacity. The Malikis: the deputising of a person with a right, who has no command or worship, for another in what is not conditioned on his death. The Shafi'is: the delegation by a person of what he may do and that admits delegation, to another to do it during his life. The Hanbalis: the deputising of a person capable of disposing of property, like himself, in what deputising admits of rights of God and rights of men. The Mawsu'a distinguishes wakala from neighbouring terms: deputising (niyaba), which is for some jurists wider than wakala and for others its synonym; authority (wilaya), the carrying out of a word over another whether he wills it or not, which is a legal or compulsory deputising, while wakala is agreed; bequest (iya'), the setting of another in one's place in disposal after death, while wakala is in life; and guardianship (qiwama), a power given by the judge to an adult to act for a minor's interest, or the husband's authority over his wife. The jurists agree that wakala is lawful. They cite the Qur'an: the account of the People of the Cave sending one of them with their silver to the city, and the verse of the two arbiters in Surat al-Nisa, which is taken to show that each arbiter acts as agent of one of the spouses. They cite the Sunna: the report of 'Urwa ibn Abi al-Ja'd al-Bariqi, to whom the Prophet gave a dinar to buy a sheep; the report of Hakim ibn Hizam about buying a sacrifice; the report of Jabir about the agent at Khaybar; and the report of Abu Rafi' that he was the go-between in the Prophet's marriage to Maymuna. The jurists agree on its lawfulness from the time of the Prophet to the present. By reason, the need for it is clear, since a person may be unable to act himself by illness, age or rank, and without it hardship would follow, which the text removes. The pillars of wakala: the majority hold them to be the formula, the two parties (principal and agent) and the object of the agency. The Hanafis hold that the pillar is the offer and acceptance, since their presence entails the other two. The formula is the offer and acceptance, through which mutual consent is expressed. The offer. The majority hold it is what comes from the principal and shows his permission to appoint an agent; the Hanafis hold it is what comes first from one of the contracting parties to show his desire to make the contract. It may be made by any sign of consent, in words, in writing, by message or by the sign of a mute man. Explicit words include 'I appointed you', 'I entrusted to you', 'I made you my deputy', 'I permitted you', 'I set you in my place' and 'you are my agent'. An order such as 'sell it' is valid for the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, and for the Malikis where custom so treats it. The words 'I will appoint you', 'I appoint you' and 'I have relied on you' do not make a valid agency for the Shafi'is, since they are ambiguous, unless a clear term is added. Agency may be concluded by message, according to the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is: the agent becomes agent once the news reaches him and he accepts, whether the bearer is trustworthy or not. The offer may also be made by clear writing, by the understood sign of a mute man, by an act that shows permission (for the Hanbalis), and by what custom treats as an offer, as when a husband disposes of his wife's property while she knows and keeps silent (the Malikis). Silence is not an offer for the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis: one who sees a stranger sell his property and says nothing is not made an agent by his silence. The acceptance may be given in words, such as 'I accept' or words showing acceptance. The Hanafis and Shafi'is add that the agent must not refuse; if he refuses after the offer, no agency is concluded even if he accepts later, unless the offer and acceptance are renewed. On acceptance by act there are three views. The majority (Hanafis, Malikis, the sounder Shafi'i view, and the Hanbalis) hold that it is complete by any act that shows it, such as the agent doing what he was told; the Shafi'is in one view, the Hanbalis in one view and Zufar among the Hanafis hold that it requires words; a third Shafi'i view distinguishes: if the offer is in the form of a command such as 'sell and buy', acceptance by act suffices, but if it is in the form of a contract such as 'I appointed you', words are needed. Acceptance is also valid in clear addressed writing and by the understood sign of a mute man; the Hanafis hold that an agent's silence is acceptance, which is undone by his refusal. If acceptance is delayed after the offer, the majority (Hanafis, Hanbalis, the Shafi'i school view, and one Maliki view) hold that it is valid, since the permission remains while the principal does not withdraw it, and it is like a permission to act. The Shafi'is limit this to cases where the time of the act is not fixed; if it is fixed and there is fear of its passing, acceptance must be immediate, as also when the judge offers the agency to a man on its being established before him. The second Maliki view and Abu Hamid al-Marwarudhi among the Shafi'is hold acceptance must be immediate, because wakala is a contract made in life, and like sale it requires immediate acceptance. Al-Mazari said the matter returns to intention and custom: whether the words in question call for an immediate reply, or allow a prompt or a deferred one. The forms of the wakala formula, by the time at which its effects arise, are: the immediate form, which is neither conditioned on a condition nor linked to a time; the conditional form; the form attached to the future; and the time-limited form. The immediate formula, which is neither conditioned on a condition nor linked to a time, as in the principal saying 'I appointed you to sell that house', is valid by agreement of the jurists. The formula conditioned on a condition. The jurists differ on two views. The first, held by the Hanafis, the sounder Hanbali view and, against the sounder view, the Shafi'is, is that it is valid, as in 'if the pilgrim arrives, sell this food'. They cite the report of Ibn 'Umar that the Prophet appointed Zayd ibn Haritha to command at Mu'ta, then Ja'far, then Ibn Rawaha if the first two were killed; and they argue that the agency is a contract whose effect on the agent, the permission to act, is recognised, so it is like a bequest. The second, held by the sounder Shafi'i view and one Hanbali view, is that it is invalid; al-Mawardi says conditioning an agency on conditions or terms is void. The Shafi'is allow the principal to conclude the agency now and to make the act itself subject to a condition, as in 'sell it after a month', since that is postponement, not conditioning. Al-Ghazali reports that the Iraqis held that 'I appointed you now, but do not act until a month passes or a certain man arrives' is valid, since it is a delay, and the agent must comply. The periodic formula: the principal says 'I appointed you to sell this property, and whenever I remove you, you are my agent again', so the agency renews itself each time he removes the agent. The Hanafis and the sounder Hanbali view hold it valid, on the ground that agency admits conditioning; for the Hanafis the principal may remove his agent at any time, and for the Hanbalis removal is effected by his words 'I removed you, and whenever I appoint you, I have removed you'. Ibn Taymiyya holds it invalid, since it would turn a permissive contract into a binding one; the purpose of the conditional is to prevent appointment, not to dissolve a contract before it exists. The Shafi'is have two views on its validity at once; the sounder is that it is valid, because permission exists. If he removes the agent, and the agent did not know, or knew, there are two views on whether the agency returns after removal; the sounder is that it does not. If the words are 'whenever I remove you', the agency returns once; if they are 'every time I remove you', it returns each time. The formula attached to a future time, as in 'I appointed you to sell my beasts in Ramadan', or 'I appointed you to sell this house tomorrow'. The Hanafis and Hanbalis hold it valid, since agency admits being attached to the future; the Hanafis add that the agent becomes agent from tomorrow onward and not before. The Shafi'is agree that it is valid, since the agency is concluded now and only the act is linked to a future time. The formula conditioned on a time, as in 'when the new month comes, I appointed you to sell my house': on the sounder Shafi'i view it is void, since conditioning an agency on terms is invalid; the Hanafis, Hanbalis and the opposite Shafi'i view hold it valid. The Hanafis distinguish attachment (idafa) from conditioning (ta'liq). An attached formula is a cause that concludes the contract now while its effect is deferred to the time; a conditioned formula cannot be a cause of the effect now, so the agency is not concluded until the condition is met. The time-limited formula, as in 'you are my agent for a month', is valid by the jurists. They differ whether it survives the period. The Shafi'is hold that it does not survive the period. The Hanafis report two views on one who was told 'sell my house today' and did it tomorrow: the sounder view is that the agency does not survive the day, but some Hanafis hold it survives, since naming the day is for haste, not for limiting the agency to that day. Al-Bazzaziyya, quoted by the author of Minhat al-Khaliq, holds that an agency for ten days does not end when the ten days pass, on the sounder view. Conditions attached to the agency. If the condition is invalid, the Hanafis, Ahmad in the apparent of his two reports, and Ibn Abi Layla hold that the agency is not invalidated by any invalid condition. The Shafi'is hold that an invalid condition invalidates it, as when the principal says 'prevent the buyer from taking the goods', since to prevent a right-holder from taking possession is forbidden; the sale itself is valid by permission. Al-Zarkashi says that the permissive contracts (partnership, agency and mudaraba) are not stopped from taking effect by permission when they are invalid, but lose their own features. The effect of invalidity is that a named fee falls away and the customary fee is due. Some Hanbalis hold that the agency is void, like a deposit, because the trust is gone; and Abu Muhammad among the Shafi'is says the permission is not separate from the agency, so its invalidity means the permission is void. The nature of the agency contract, whether binding or permissive. The first view, held by the Hanafis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis and some Malikis, is that it is permissive on both sides, since it is a gift and gifts are not binding: the principal may see that it is better to leave the matter, or to appoint another, and the agent may not be free. The Hanafis and Malikis except where a third party's right attaches to the agency, which then binds, as with an agent in a suit appointed at the claimant's request, or an agent to sell a pledge in the presence of the pledgee. The Hanafis say that from its non-binding nature three rules follow: an option of stipulation does not enter it; agency is not valid as a principal claim; and the agent may resign whenever he wishes. The second view: if the agency is for a fee in the form of a hire, it binds both sides and must meet the conditions of hire; the Shafi'is and in one view the Malikis say so. The third view, of some later Malikis, is that it binds the agent's side even without a fee, by analogy with a gift that binds once given, though not received. If the agency is by way of a reward (ju'ala), the Malikis hold three views: binding on both sides; permissive on both sides, which is the view relied upon by the Shafi'is; and binding on the side of the one who offers the reward once the other starts work. The second pillar, the two parties, the principal and the agent. First, the principal: one who sets another in his place in a lawful known disposal, who must have the power to make that disposal and be bound by its rules. The jurists agree that agency may not be made by an insane person, an imbecile, a person under anaesthesia, a sleeper, or a minor who cannot discern, in any disposal. A discerning minor may be appointed to acts that are purely beneficial to him, by agreement. For acts that are between benefit and loss, the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis allow it with the guardian's permission, while the Shafi'is void it. A spendthrift placed under restraint may not be appointed in what he cannot do independently, but may be in what he can. The majority of jurists do not allow a woman to be appointed in a marriage, since she does not marry herself and so cannot be an agent for it; the Hanafis allow it, and the Malikis allow it in some cases. On the appointment of an apostate there are three views. The first, held by the majority (the sounder Shafi'i view, the Hanbalis and Abu Hanifa), is that it is suspended on his return to Islam: if he returns the agency takes effect, and if he dies, is killed or joins the enemy as an apostate, it is void. The second, held by the two companions of Abu Hanifa and by one Shafi'i view, is that it is valid and binding; the Hanafis add that an apostate woman may be appointed by their agreement, since her acts take effect. The third, a Shafi'i view that Zakariyya al-Ansari and al-Shibramallisi regarded as the sound one, is that it is void. On a Muslim appointing a dhimmi to sell wine or pork: the Shafi'is, Malikis, Hanbalis and the two companions hold it invalid, because a condition of the agency is that the principal himself owns the act he delegates, and a Muslim cannot sell wine or pork; one cannot give what one lacks. Abu Hanifa holds it valid, since it is enough that the principal has the capacity to act that entitles him to appoint another. On a pilgrim (muhrim) appointing a non-pilgrim to contract a marriage: the majority do not allow it, since the pilgrim does not conduct the contract during his pilgrimage; the Hanafis allow it in every case, since he could conduct the contract himself. The Hanbalis say that agency is invalid if the agent does not know his principal, as when he is told 'Zayd has appointed you' without a name or a description that identifies him. The agent must have the same sanity as the principal, so an insane person, an imbecile or a minor who cannot discern may not be an agent, by agreement. On puberty as a condition: the Hanafis and Hanbalis allow a discerning minor who understands the contract and intends it to be an agent, and the rights of the contract return to the principal, not to him; their evidence includes the report that the Prophet married Umm Salama through 'Amr ibn Umm Salama, who was a boy. The Shafi'is forbid it, because a minor is not accountable and cannot dispose of his own right, so he cannot dispose of another's by appointment. The agent must be named: if someone says 'I appointed one of the people to sell this goods', the agency is void, because the agent is unknown. Ibn Najim says that a creditor's words to his debtor, 'whoever comes to you with a certain sign, and takes your finger, or says such and such to you, pay what I owe him', are an unknown agency that does not discharge the debtor if he pays. Knowledge of the agency. For the Hanafis, knowledge of the agency is a condition, either by the agent or by the party dealing with him. If the agent sells before he knows and the buyer knows, the sale is not valid until the principal or the agent ratifies it after knowledge. If a trustworthy man informs the agent, and the agent accepts, he is an agent; if one who is not trustworthy informs him and he accepts, he is an agent; if he does not accept, Abu Hanifa holds he is not an agent, while Abu Yusuf and Muhammad hold he is. The Hanbalis do not require knowledge, since the matter of contracts is what is actually the case; the sounder Shafi'i view agrees. Justice in the agent is not required in general, except in certain contracts such as marriage; nor is the male sex, except in some contracts such as marriage. The object of the agency is the disposal the principal permits the agent, in ownership or in guardianship. The Shafi'is set three conditions: it must be known in some respects; it must admit deputising; and the principal must own it at the time of the agency. Agency is special, where it concerns a named disposal and the agent may act only in that, by agreement; or general. On general agency the Hanafis and Malikis allow it with detail. The Hanafis say that 'you are my agent in every small and great matter' gives only the power to keep; 'you are my agent in every matter your order permits' makes the agent competent for all money dispositions, such as sale, purchase, gift and alms; they differ on divorce, emancipation and waqf, and the view taken is that the agent does not have those, which the author of al-Bazzaziyya also holds. The Malikis say that a general agency is not concluded by the bare words 'I appointed you'; it must be delegated in words such as 'a delegated agency' or 'in all my affairs'. What increases property is allowed; gifts, emancipation and alms for the reward of the next life are not, unless the principal permits them in words. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold a general agency invalid because of the risk. 'I appointed you in all my small and great matters' or 'I delegated to you everything' is therefore invalid, while 'I appointed you to sell my goods and collect my debts' is valid even if the goods and debts are unknown. The general rule for what may be the object of an agency is that whatever contract a person may make himself, he may appoint another to make, because a person may be unable to act himself in some circumstances and so needs to appoint another. The jurists agree that agency in sale and purchase is valid, because there is a need for it. The Prophet himself appointed 'Urwa al-Bariqi to buy a sheep, and gave a dinar to Hakim ibn Hizam to buy a sacrifice. They also agree that agency is valid in assignment of debt (hawala), pledge, surety, partnership, deposit, mudaraba, reward contracts (ju'ala), irrigation partnership (musaqa), hire, loan, bequest, rescission, release, exchange (musarafa), cancellation (iqala) and pre-emption, since all of these are like sale in their need for an agent; likewise surety, settlement and gift. The jurists agree that a man may appoint an agent in a marriage contract, citing the Prophet's appointment of 'Amr ibn Umayya and Abu Rafi' to accept a marriage for him; the need for it, since a man may wish to marry from a far place and cannot travel there; and the Prophet's marriage to Umm Habiba while she was in the land of Abyssinia. They agree that agency is valid in financial acts of worship, such as zakat, charity, vows and expiations, since the Prophet sent his agents to collect and distribute charity. They also agree that agency is valid in divorce, revocation and khul', since the need is like the need for agency in sale and marriage. Acts that agency may not cover, by agreement. Testimony: agency is not valid in it, because it depends on the witness himself, who reports what he saw or heard, and because it rests on devotion and certainty; if a witness appoints another to testify, the second acts as a witness on the first witness's testimony and not as an agent. Oaths and vows, since they depend on the swearer or vower himself; so do the oaths of mutual cursing, the vow of abstinence from wives and the oath of compurgation. Sins, such as killing, theft, usurpation and slander, which are forbidden and may not be done by the principal or the agent. And purely bodily worship, such as prayer, fasting and the purification from minor impurity, since they depend on the body of the one obliged. Matters on which the jurists differ. The pilgrimage: agency is not allowed for a person able to make it himself; the incapable person's case is set out elsewhere. The lesser pilgrimage (umra) may generally be performed on behalf of another by agency. Marriage by a woman: most jurists forbid a woman to appoint or be appointed in marriage, since she may not contract it herself; the Hanafis allow it for a free adult sane woman. Zihar: the majority forbid agency in it, the sounder Shafi'i view forbids it, and a Shafi'i view allows it; Ibn 'Abd al-Salam of the Malikis held that zihar is like divorce, since both are mere utterances. Securing permitted acts, such as reviving dead land, drawing water, hunting, gathering grass or digging a mine: the Malikis, the sounder Shafi'i view and the Hanbalis allow it, since the ownership comes from a cause that does not bind the person; the Hanafis, some Shafi'is and some Hanbalis forbid it, since the cause of ownership, taking hold, has occurred for the agent and an intention cannot turn it aside. Acknowledgement of rights: the Hanafis, Malikis, Hanbalis and a non-sounder Shafi'i view allow it, since it establishes a right in the obligation by words, as sale does; the sounder Shafi'i view and al-Tahawi forbid it, since it is a report about a right, like testimony. Litigation: the Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis and the two companions of Abu Hanifa allow agency in litigation over debts, specific property and all rights, whether the principal is present or absent, sick or well, and whether the opponent consents or not; the Malikis exclude an agent who is hostile to the opponent. They cite the consensus of the Companions, as 'Ali appointed 'Aqil before Abu Bakr and said 'what is decided for him is mine, and what is decided against him is mine'; and the need for it. Abu Hanifa holds that litigation by agency is valid only with the opponent's consent, unless the principal is sick or absent three days' journey or more, since the principal's presence at the court is a right of his opponent. His reason is that a claim is a report that may be true or false, so its answer is required only by necessity; that necessity arises when the principal is sick or travelling. Al-Jassas reports that the apparent view draws no distinction between a man and a woman, or a virgin and a married woman; later Hanafis approve the agency of a secluded woman who does not appear in public; Ibn Abi Layla held it valid only for a virgin. Proof and execution of retaliation (qisas). The Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis, Abu Hanifa and Muhammad al-Shaybani allow agency in proving qisas, whether the principal is present or absent, since qisas is a human right; Abu Yusuf does not allow it, and the evidence is accepted only from the principal himself, because of the doubt that must be guarded against in retaliation and the hudud. On the execution of qisas: the Malikis, Shafi'is and the school view of the Hanbalis allow it whether the principal is present or absent. The Hanafis, some Shafi'is and some Hanbalis allow it only when the principal is present, since he may pardon in his absence. Proof and execution of the hudud. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis distinguish the two. The school view of the Hanbalis allows agency in proving adultery, from the story of Unays; Abu al-Khattab among them says it is invalid. The Shafi'is do not allow agency in proving the hudud of God except the hadd of slander, since the right is God's, and it is commanded to avert it. On execution, the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis allow agency, citing the Prophet's order to stone Ma'iz and 'Uthman's appointment of 'Ali to carry out the flogging for drinking on al-Walid ibn 'Uqba. The Hanafis say there are two kinds of rights of God: proof, where agency is not allowed for the hudud that need no litigation, such as adultery and drinking, and is allowed for those that need it, such as theft and slander, according to Abu Hanifa and Muhammad, but Abu Yusuf forbids it; and execution of slander and theft is valid when the injured party is present, while if he is absent the Hanafi shaykhs differ. The rules of agency. They bind the agent to carry it out within the limits the principal permitted or that law or custom imposes, to inform the principal of necessary information and render an account, and to return what belongs to the principal that is in his hand. A special agency may be issued unrestricted or restricted. Among its forms is agency in sale. For Abu Hanifa, the agent in an unrestricted sale is not bound by any restriction unless he is suspected; he may sell for little or much, for cash or on credit, and for goods, since the unrestricted word keeps its unrestricted sense, and a sale at a gross undervaluation in order to buy something more profitable is also customary. The unrestricted agency in sale. The jurists differ on whether it is restricted, on two views. The first, Abu Hanifa's, is that an agent in an unrestricted sale is not bound by any restriction unless he is suspected; he may sell for little or much, for cash or on credit, and for goods, since the unrestricted word keeps its unrestricted sense, and a sale at a gross undervaluation in order to buy something more profitable is customary. The second, the majority (Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis), is that the unrestricted agent is restricted by several limits. He may sell only for the currency of the town, since an unrestricted currency means the local currency. He may sell only at the market price in goods that people do not sell at a notable undervaluation; if he sells below it, the Malikis give the principal a choice, even for a small loss, which they set at half a tenth or less; the Hanbalis hold the sale valid and make the agent liable for the shortfall. He may not sell in goods instead of money, according to the Malikis, Hanbalis and the two companions; he may not sell on credit, according to the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, though a Hanbali deduction allows it; and he may not sell for a benefit, according to the Hanbalis. The agent selling to himself. The majority (Hanafis, Shafi'is, the school view of the Hanbalis and the settled Maliki view) forbid it, since custom in sale is that a man sells to another, and there is a suspicion of bias. The Malikis and Hanbalis allow it if the principal permits, and the Malikis exclude cases where the bids have run high or where the sale is in the principal's presence. A narration of Ahmad allows the agent to buy if he outbids in a public auction and someone else conducts the auction; al-Qadi said the second condition may be obligatory and may be recommended. A Maliki view allows it if he does not favour himself. The agent selling to one whose testimony cannot be accepted for him. For the Hanafis, a sale to such a person above the value is valid; below the value by gross undervaluation it is invalid by agreement; at the value there are two narrations of Abu Hanifa. The two companions allow a sale to them at the value, except to his own slave or the slave who has bought his freedom by instalments. The Malikis hold, on the settled view, that the agent may not sell to his ward, whether a minor, a spendthrift or an unauthorised slave. The Shafi'is forbid a sale to his young son even if permitted, and the sounder view allows sale to his ascendants and his non-ward descendants. The Hanbalis in the school view forbid a sale to his son, his father or his mukatab (a slave contracted to buy his freedom by instalments); the other view allows it; the difference arises where the principal did not permit it. Restricted agency in sale. The agent must keep to the restrictions the principal set, by agreement. The Hanafis say that if he goes against a restriction the sale does not bind the principal unless he ratifies it, unless the difference is for the better, which is agreement in meaning. If he is told 'sell my garment for a thousand dirhams' and sells for less, or for something other than dirhams, the sale is not binding, even if the goods are worth more; if he sells for more, it binds. If he is told to sell on credit and sells for cash, the sale binds; if he is told to sell for cash and sells on credit, it is suspended. The Malikis hold that exceeding the price in a sale, or paying less in a purchase, does not give the principal an option, since it is desired; only a difference which affects a valid purpose does. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis say the agent may act only in what the principal's permission requires by word or custom. If one of two acts harms the principal he may not do it, citing the saying that there should be no harm nor reciprocal harm; if one benefits the principal, he must do it, since that is the sincere counsel. A permission limited to a time does not extend before or after it; one limited to a place with an interest in it, such as a market known for its currency or price, is confined to that place, and where the place is equal in interest, the permission extends to it. Where the buyer is named, the agent may not sell to anyone else, unless he knows the principal has no interest in that particular buyer. Breach of the price terms. As to the description of the price: if the principal says 'sell on credit' and the agent sells for cash, the majority hold that the sale binds the principal, since he gets his object and the agent has given him more; a Hanbali view makes the sale void where the principal has a definite interest in the deferral, and the Shafi'is forbid it where the principal has an interest. If he is told to sell on credit for a fixed price and sells for cash at less, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis do not allow the sale, and the Malikis make it suspended on the principal's approval. If he is told to sell for cash and sells on credit, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis do not allow it, since immediate payment may be the principal's interest; the Malikis make it suspended on approval. If the principal said to sell for a thousand now and the agent sold for a thousand on credit, the sale is not binding but suspended on the principal's approval; this is al-Kasani's view. Breach of the currency. If he is told to sell for dinars and sells for dirhams or for goods, the Hanafis, the Shafi'is and al-Qadi among the Hanbalis do not allow the sale, even if it is worth more, since permission in one kind is not permission in another. The sounder Hanbali view is that if he is told to sell for a dirham and sells for a dinar, it is valid, since that is customary: whoever accepts a dirham accepts its equivalent in dinars. Al-Kasani holds the sale suspended, with the principal choosing between approval and cancellation. For the Malikis, where the two currencies are the currency of the town and of equal value, there are two views on whether the principal chooses or approves; otherwise he chooses on one view. If he is told to sell for money and sells for cloth or other goods, the Hanbalis and Malikis hold it invalid, since goods are not a kind of price. Breach of the amount. If he sells for more than the price named, in the same currency, the majority hold the sale valid, since the breach is for the better; the Shafi'is add that it is refused if the principal has expressly forbidden the excess, and one Shafi'i view forbids it entirely, since the principal may have an interest in keeping his oath. If he sells for less than the price named, the Malikis make it suspended on the principal's approval: the principal may take back the goods if they remain, or their value if they are lost. The Shafi'is and one Hanbali narration void it, since the principal did not agree to part with his property on that terms. The settled Hanbali view validates the sale and makes the agent liable for the shortfall, and there are two Hanbali views on how the shortfall is measured. Breach of the place. If he names a place and the agent sells elsewhere, the Shafi'is, Hanbalis and Ibn Shas among the Malikis require keeping to it where the place carries a particular interest, such as a market known for good currency or high prices. Some Hanbalis and a Shafi'i view allow sale elsewhere where the two places are equal in interest. The Hanafis require keeping to the place, and the agent is liable if he breaks the rule; the principal is not bound by the sale. The Malikis make the sale suspended on approval, and the sounder Shafi'i view forbids it. Breach of the time. If a time is fixed and the agent sells at another time, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis forbid the sale and it does not bind the principal, since he may want the sale at the time of his need and not before or after; the Malikis let the principal choose between approving and rejecting it. Breach of the named buyer. If the principal says 'sell only to him' and the agent sells to another, the majority (Hanafis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis) forbid it, whatever the price, since the principal may have an interest in that buyer and not another. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis allow it if the agent knows from a clear sign or from words that the principal has no interest in that buyer in particular. The Malikis let the principal choose. Splitting the sale. If the agent sells part of the goods and leaves the rest, or sells part and then the rest later, the rule depends on whether splitting harms the principal. If it does not harm him, as with two houses or two animals, the sale is valid for the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, and the Hanbalis add that it is valid unless the principal forbade splitting. The Malikis state a general rule that whenever the agent departs from his principal's terms or from custom, the principal chooses between approving the sale and rejecting it, if the goods remain, and between approving and holding the agent liable if they are lost. If splitting harms him, the jurists give three views: the Shafi'is and Hanbalis void the sale; the Malikis, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad make it suspended, and it is completed if the agent sells the rest; Abu Hanifa lets the sale take effect against the principal, since the agent stands in his place and the principal owns part of the goods as he owns the whole. Breach of the kind of object. If the agent sells a different thing in place of the named one, the sounder Shafi'i and Hanbali view voids the sale, because he has broken the terms of the permission; the Malikis, and a Hanbali narration, let the principal choose. Agency in purchase. It may be issued unrestricted, as in 'buy for me whatever you like'. The Hanafis, the Malikis and a narration of Ahmad allow it, since the principal has delegated his judgement; the Hanbalis in the school view and the Shafi'is forbid it, since the agent may buy what he cannot pay for. The agent buying for his principal from his own property or from those whose testimony cannot be accepted for him: the Hanafis forbid buying from himself even with permission, since rights in sale return to the agent and that would make one person both payer and payee; they forbid buying from his minor son even with permission. Abu Hanifa forbids buying from his father, grandfather, grown son or wife; Abu Yusuf and Muhammad allow it at the value or less, or at a small excess. If the agency is general, the Hanafis agree that buying is allowed, since the cause of the bar is suspicion, which general words remove. The Malikis in the settled view and the Hanbalis in the school view forbid buying from his own property, and allow it if the principal permits; the Malikis allow buying from his relatives if there is no suspicion. The Shafi'is forbid buying from his own property or from his minor son in every case, and in the sounder view allow buying from his adult, independent ascendants and descendants. Restricted agency in purchase. It is valid, the Hanafis (on istihsan), the Malikis and the Hanbali school view agreeing, even if the kind of goods is not named: 'buy me a garment' is valid, by analogy with the partnership of profit. The Hanafis cite the Prophet's giving a dinar to Hakim ibn Hizam to buy a sacrifice, which shows that a small uncertainty does not stop agency, since agency rests on leniency and not on the strict bargaining of sale. Restricted purchase and its breaches. If the principal ordered a purchase on deferred terms and the agent bought for cash, the majority (Hanafis, Malikis, one Shafi'i view and the school view of the Hanbalis) allow the purchase and make it bind the principal if the agent has not raised the price, since the breach is in form only and agrees in meaning. The Shafi'is in the settled view do not allow it, since the principal meant that he should have no debt; a Hanbali view forbids it where the principal is harmed. If the agent bought on credit when told to pay cash, the Hanafis bind the agent alone, the Malikis give the principal the choice, the Shafi'is void the purchase if it was with the principal's own money, and the Hanbalis make it suspended on approval. Breach of the kind of price in purchase. The Shafi'is and one Hanbali view void it. The school view of the Hanbalis allows exchanging dirhams for dinars and the reverse, since one who accepts a dirham accepts a dinar in its place, but not goods in place of the two coins. The Hanafis hold that if he was told to buy with dinars and buys with other goods, the purchase binds the agent only; on the view reported from al-Karkhi, the purchase is not binding on the principal for dirhams instead of dinars either. The Malikis make it suspended on approval, and there are two well-known views on whether dirhams in place of dinars bind the principal. Breach of the amount of the price. If the breach is for the principal's advantage, such as buying a beast for less than the named price, the purchase binds the principal, since the breach is in form only. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis except the case where the principal forbade paying less. If the breach is to the principal's disadvantage, the Hanafis bind only the agent; the Malikis bind the principal for a small excess, such as one in twenty, and make a large excess suspended on his approval, binding the agent if he takes it on himself; the Shafi'is and one Hanbali view void it; the school view of the Hanbalis validates it and makes the agent liable for the excess. Breach of the object purchased. If the agent buys something other than what he was told, the Hanafis make the purchase fall on the agent and not bind the principal. The Malikis let the principal choose; if he rejects it, the purchase falls on the agent, who pays the price from his own money. The Shafi'is void it if he buys with the principal's money; if he buys on his own credit without naming the principal, it falls on the agent even if he intended the principal. The Hanbalis validate the purchase on the agent's credit, with two views on whether it binds the principal, and hold a purchase with the principal's money void on the sound view. The Shafi'is (on a name said in acceptance) hold that the name is ignored and the purchase falls on the agent in the sounder view, while the other view voids the contract. Breach of the quantity bought. Where the agent buys more of the same thing than the principal ordered, for the same price, the Hanafis distinguish: for things valued individually (qiyyamiyyat), the excess does not bind the principal at all, since the price of each is unknown. For things measured by weight, Abu Hanifa, and Muhammad in some narrations, bind the principal only for the quantity ordered; Abu Yusuf and Muhammad bind him for all of it. The Hanbalis, and the Malikis in the view opposite the settled one (that of Asbagh), bind the principal if the agent buys two sheep for one dinar and each is worth a dinar; the Hanbalis add that it is valid if one of them is worth a dinar, while if neither is, it is invalid in the school view. The Shafi'is distinguish whether the principal described the sheep or not. Splitting the purchase. If the thing ordered may be split by custom without harm to the principal, all agree that the agent may buy part, and the principal is bound by what he bought; the Hanbalis and one Shafi'i view restrict this to the case where the principal did not say 'buy it all in one deal'. If custom forbids splitting, or it harms the principal, the Hanafis and Malikis make the purchase suspended on the principal's approval. The majority of Hanafis hold that buying the rest before the principal sues the agent in court binds the principal, since the partial purchase was a means of carrying out the order; Zufar holds that the purchase falls on the agent alone. If the principal sues first and the judge binds the agent, a later purchase of the rest binds the agent alone, by Hanafi agreement. If the principal orders the purchase of a described good, the agent may buy only a sound one, since an unqualified sale implies freedom from defects. If he buys a defective one, the Hanafis hold, by agreement, that it does not bind the principal where the description is not met: for example, a blind or a one-handed slave girl bought when he was told to buy a servant, or a stallion bought when he was told to buy a riding mount. If the principal named the goods, and the agent bought them defective without knowing it, the purchase binds the principal, who may return it. If the agent knew, it does not bind the principal. The Hanafis add that if the agent takes the purchase and finds a defect while it is in his hand, he may return it; but if he has handed it to the principal, he may return it only with the principal's permission, since the agency has ended on delivery. If the agent accepts the defect, it binds him, and the principal may accept it or hold the agent liable. The Malikis hold that the agent who buys a defective good knowingly is bound if he bought outright or on the seller's option; if he bought on his own option, it does not bind him and he may return it. The purchase binds the principal only if the defect is slight and customarily tolerated and the purchase is a bargain, as with a cheap beast with a short tail, unlike a noble beast with a cut tail, which does not bind him. The Shafi'is, for a purchase on the agent's credit, hold that if the defective good is worth the price paid, and the agent did not know, the purchase falls on the principal; if he knew, the sounder view says it does not fall on the principal. If the defect makes it worth less than the price, the sounder view makes it bind the principal if he did not know, and not if he knew. If he bought with the principal's own money, it binds the principal if the agent did not know, and not if he did. If the principal expressly required soundness, al-Isnawi says it does not bind the principal, since it was not authorised. Either the principal or the agent may return the good, if the agent did not know of the defect, and the agent may not return it where the principal has accepted the defect. The Hanbalis: if the agent knew the defect, the purchase on his credit does not bind the principal; if he did not know, the purchase is allowed and both the agent and the principal may return it. The Azjiyy raised whether a purchase with the principal's money with knowledge of the defect falls on the principal; if the goods are equal to the price, the apparent view is that he accepts it, but he may not. If the principal named a defective item and the agent knew before buying, the agent may not buy it; if he buys, the purchase binds him and binds the principal only if the principal accepts; if he did not know, he may return it. The agent and an invalid contract. If the principal authorised an invalid contract, the agent may not conclude a sound contract in its place; this is the view of the Shafi'is, Hanbalis, Muhammad and Zufar. Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf, by istihsan, allow the sound contract to bind the principal where it is better for him, as with an agent to sell for a thousand who sells for two thousand. The agent and the stipulation of an option. The Hanafis hold that if the principal ordered a sale with a three-day option for himself and the agent sold without it or with less, the sale is void and he is liable as a usurper. If he was told to stipulate an option of a month and stipulated three days, Abu Hanifa allows it by istihsan, but his two companions do not, since in their view the option of a month is valid with the sale. The Shafi'is hold that a sale on a stated option is void if the agent sells without it. The Hanbalis allow the agent to stipulate an option for himself and for his principal, but not for the other party, since that binds the principal to what he did not agree to. The agent in litigation making an admission. The Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis and Zufar do not allow it, since an admission ends the dispute, which the agent may not do, and the command to contend does not include its opposite. Abu Hanifa and Muhammad allow it before the judge only, excluding the hudud and retaliation; their analogy allows it elsewhere too, and Abu Yusuf allows it in every case. If the principal excluded admission, the admission is void and takes the agent out of the agency. Settlement, release, sale, gift and postponement by the litigation agent are not his, by agreement; the Hanafis add that he may not sell, give or postpone the right. The agent to collect a debt, when the debtor denies it. The Hanbali school view and one Shafi'i view make him an agent in litigation for proof, since he cannot collect without proving the right, so that this is permission by custom; the agent is so whether the right is a specific thing or a debt, and whether the principal knows the debtor's willingness to pay or his denial or delay. Abu Yusuf, Muhammad, the Malikis, one Hanbali view and one Shafi'i view deny him this power. Permission to collect is not permission to litigate, either in words or by custom, since a person one accepts for collecting need not be one accepted for litigation. Abu Hanifa distinguishes the agent who collects a specific thing, who is not a party to the principal's dispute over a purchase or the like, from the agent who collects a debt, who is a party, since collecting a debt is an exchange that the litigation agent may conduct. On whether an agent for litigation may collect what he was appointed to litigate over: the Shafi'is, the school view of the Hanbalis, Zufar, and the view reported from Abu Yusuf hold he may not, since a principal may accept a man for litigation whom he would not accept for collection. The other Hanafis, and one Hanbali view that Ibn al-Banna relied on, allow it, since whoever is appointed to a matter is appointed to complete it. Appointment of another by a litigation agent. If the principal permits it, the agent may appoint another; if he forbids it, he may not. Where the principal says nothing, the Hanafis, Malikis and the school view of the Hanbalis forbid it, because people differ in eloquence and skill in litigation. The Malikis and Hanbalis limit this to matters that befit the agent himself; if the matter is beneath him or beyond his skill, he may appoint another, and the Malikis add that where the litigation is heavy he may appoint a partner to help him, though not another in his stead. Ibn Qudama says that where the agency is unrestricted, the agent may appoint another if the work is beneath the agent or beyond his capacity in volume; for work he can do himself, there are two narrations. If two parties appoint one agent to litigate against each other, the Hanafis hold the appointment invalid; if the two appoint one agent against a third party, it is valid. Payment of a debt by an agent. If the principal says 'pay it and do not take witnesses', the agent is not liable if the creditor denies payment; if the principal orders witnesses and the agent takes none, the agent is liable. If he is told to pay without a stated instruction on witnesses and does not take witnesses, the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and the school view of the Hanbalis hold him liable, since he failed to take care; his word is not accepted against the creditor without proof. He is not liable if he paid in the principal's presence, by the Malikis, the school view of the Hanbalis and the sounder Shafi'i view, since the principal's silence is consent; a Shafi'i view holds him liable, since a neglect is not removed by the presence of the principal. The agent to collect a debt. Once he collects, the debtor is discharged, the money is the principal's and it is held by the agent as a trust, bound by the rules of a deposit. The agent to collect may not give the debt away, defer it or release it. The Hanafis add that he may not take a pledge for it, but may take a surety; the Malikis and Hanbalis add that he may not compromise over it without the principal's permission. Delivery of a right to one who claims to be an absent owner's agent. All agree that if the claimant proves the agency by evidence, the judge compels the debtor to pay him. If no evidence is given, the Malikis, Shafi'is and the school view of the Hanbalis hold that the debtor is not bound to pay the claimant unless he confirms the agency; if the debtor pays voluntarily and the creditor denies the agency, the creditor may recover from the payer only, and the payer may recover from the agent if the money is lost through his fault or neglect. The Hanafis distinguish a debt from a specific thing: if the debtor confirms the claimant's agency he is ordered to pay, and if he denies it, the agent alone is held to what he collected. When the absent owner later confirms the agency, the debtor is discharged; if he denies it, the debtor pays again and may recover from the agent if the money remains in his hand, and if it was lost in his hand the debtor may not recover from the agent unless he has made himself liable. If the debtor proves that the claimant denied the agency and took the money from him, the proof is accepted, because it establishes that the claimant's right to the sum has ended by his own collection, and so the agent's hold is ended by necessity. If the right is a specific thing, such as a deposit, and the depositary confirms the claimant's agency, he is not ordered to deliver it, since that would be an admission that he surrendered another's property; a debt is different, and he is ordered to pay it, since he admits that the sum is the creditor's own property, debts being discharged by equal sums. If the depositary hands the deposit to one who claims agency, it is lost in his hand and the owner denies the agency, the depositary is liable; he may make the owner swear, and he may not recover from the agent unless he made him liable at the time of delivery. Several agents. The principal may appoint more than one agent for a particular disposal other than litigation. If he appoints them in one word at one time, none may act alone, unless the principal allows it. The Hanafis hold that where the disposal calls for judgement and counsel, such as sale, marriage and collecting a debt, none may act alone; where it does not, such as delivering a gift, returning a deposit or paying a debt, each may act alone. Two agents for a sale, a marriage, a khul' or any contract with a sum in it likewise do not act alone, since the principal relied on the judgement of both. The two agents to collect a debt may not collect one without the other, though their collection is complete once what one collected reaches the other or the principal. The Hanafis and Malikis allow either of two agents appointed by separate words to act. For two agents in litigation, each may act alone according to the Hanafis (other than Zufar), one Hanbali view and one Shafi'i view, since litigation aims at informing the judge and the two voices confuse it; Zufar, the sounder Shafi'i view and the school view of the Hanbalis forbid it. An agent appointing another. With permission, it is allowed by agreement. With prohibition, it is not allowed by agreement. Where the principal says 'do as you like' or 'act on your judgement', the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis allow it, while the Shafi'is forbid it, since such words admit many possibilities. Where nothing is said, the majority forbid it, since the principal relied on the agent's judgement and people differ in judgement. Some allow two cases: where the work is beneath the agent or beyond his skill, and where he could do it himself but cannot do all of it because it is great in volume. In the second case, the school view of the Hanbalis and one Shafi'i view allow him to delegate all of it; the Malikis and the school view of the Shafi'is allow only the excess beyond his capacity. Ahmad and Ibn Abi Layla allow it in every case. The trust of the one an agent appoints. Whoever the agent appoints must be trustworthy, unless the principal named an untrustworthy person, in which case the agent follows the principal's choice. If the agent's appointee becomes a wrongdoer, the Hanbalis and one Shafi'i view require the agent to remove him, and the sounder Shafi'i view says the agent may not remove him, since he was allowed to appoint but not to remove. The kind of agency the appointee holds. If the principal says 'appoint on my behalf' or 'delegate to him', the appointee is the principal's agent, is not dismissed by the first agent's removal, and both lose their office on the principal's death. If the principal says 'appoint on your behalf', the appointee is the first agent's agent, and falls with the first's removal or death; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis allow the principal to remove the sub-agent, since he is a branch of a branch. If the principal says only 'appoint', the Hanafis, Malikis, the sounder Shafi'i view and the school view of the Hanbalis make the appointee the principal's agent. Appointment without any permission is not valid according to the majority; Ahmad and Ibn Abi Layla validate it in one case. The agent is a trustee for what is in his hand of his principal's property. It is like a deposit: he is not liable for a loss unless he transgresses or is negligent, whether he works for a wage or as a volunteer, since his hand is the principal's hand, and agency is a contract of kindness and assistance. As a trustee his word is accepted on his own discharge from liability with his oath, since agency rests on leniency and easy dealing. Stipulating liability or its absence. Ibn Qudama says that what is a trust does not become a liability by stipulation, and what is a liability cannot be removed by stipulation; a narration of Ahmad seems to allow removal of liability by stipulation, but the first view is the apparent school view. Transgression and negligence. The agent is liable if he overloads a beast, wears a garment without permission, loses the money without knowing how, mixes the principal's money with his own so that it cannot be separated, refuses to return it without excuse, or delays return after the excuse has ended. If the principal paid the debt himself and the agent then paid it too, the agent is not liable if he did not know; if he knew, he is liable, since the principal's payment was a removal of the agent that the agent knew of. Abu Hanifa holds the agent liable for a double payment of zakat whether he knew or not. If an agent to sell on credit delivers the goods before collecting the price and the buyer denies payment, he is liable for the goods' value. If he delays paying the price he has received without excuse until it is lost, he is liable; with an excuse, he is not. If he slaughters a beast by mistake and it dies unlawfully, he is liable, since error and intent are the same for people's property. If he was told to collect a deposit in full but collected part, he is liable, and the liability falls away if he collects the rest before the first part is lost. Measure of liability. For a fungible thing he pays its like; for a thing valued individually he pays its value; if a fungible thing has no like, he pays its value. The value is taken on the day of transgression or loss, not any other day. Duty to account. The agent must give the principal the information he asks for about what he has done, and Ibn Hajar says that any trusted person who is asked for an account must give it; what counts is the answer and the claim, not the handwriting. Return of what is in the agent's hand. He must return to the principal what he holds. If he refuses when asked, without excuse, until it is lost, he is liable; and so if an excuse ends and he delays return until the loss. If the principal and the agent agree on a wage, the wage is due by agreement. If they do not agree, the Hanafis distinguish: an agent who does not work for a wage acts as a volunteer, since the agency is originally gratuitous; an agent of a trade whose people work for a wage, such as a broker or a dealer, is due the customary wage. Article 1467 of the Majalla al-Ahkam al-'Adliyya states this. When the wage is due. The agent earns it by handing over what was entrusted to him, where handing over is possible, as a cloth he weaves or sews; if he was appointed to sell, buy or perform the pilgrimage, he earns the agreed wage on completing the work, even if the price was not yet collected. But if the principal stipulated that the price be handed over first and the agent did not hand it over, he has no wage, since the condition failed. Conditions for the wage. The work must be known, the wage must be known in amount, the wage must not be part of the object of the agency according to some jurists, and the agent must carry out the agency validly. An unknown reward, such as 'a tenth of its price', gives only the customary wage. If the agent makes a defective sale, he has no reward, since a general permission to sell permits only a valid sale; if he makes a valid sale and the price is lost in his hand, he has the reward because the work was done. Recovery from the principal of what the agent paid. If the principal orders him to pay a debt and he pays from his own money, he recovers it whether or not the principal stipulated recovery. If the agent buys without the principal's money and pays the price from his own money, the Hanafis except Zufar let him hold the goods until he collects the price from the principal, since he is the contracting party to whom the price is due. Zufar says he may not hold them, since the goods are a trust in his hand. The liability for holding them is, for Abu Hanifa and Muhammad, like the liability of a seller; for Abu Yusuf, like a pledge; for Zufar, like usurpation. Whose rights a contract made by the agent concerns. Contracts are of two kinds: those that may be made in the agent's name, such as sale and hire, whose rights return to the agent, who delivers the goods, receives the price, and sues for the price as though he were the owner; and those that must be made in the principal's name, such as marriage, khul' and compromise over wilful killing, whose rights return to the principal, so that the husband's agent is not sued for the dower. The Shafi'is and a narration of Ahmad hold that the rights of every contract return to the agent; the school view of the Hanbalis holds that they return to the principal in every case. If the principal orders the agent to collect the price, the agent has the right to demand it, and the buyer is compelled to pay whichever of them he asks. If the principal forbids the agent to collect, the prohibition is valid; but if the buyer pays the price to the principal, he is discharged by istihsan. If the goods are seized from the buyer, he recovers the price from whichever of them he paid, the agent or the principal; and a defect is pursued against the agent if he is the one who received the goods. Contracts that must be made in the principal's name, such as marriage, khul', manumission for a payment, writing of manumission and compromise over wilful killing, have their rights for and against the principal; the agent is a messenger and a conveyor. So the husband's agent is not sued for the dower, and the wife's agent may not receive it. The Malikis hold that the agent in a sale sues for and collects the price, and the agent in a purchase receives and delivers the goods; he returns a defect if he did not know it, and is bound for the price unless he expressly disclaims it. How the effect of the contract reaches the principal. The majority (the sounder Hanafi and Shafi'i views, the Malikis and the Hanbalis) hold that the effect passes directly to the principal, since the contract was made for him. Al-Karkhi holds that it first falls on the agent and then passes to the principal. Abu Zayd holds that the agent is a deputy for the ruling and a principal for the rights. Disputes between agent and principal. On the existence of the agency, the principal's word is accepted, since the original state is that there is no agency. On its terms (a sale for a price or on credit, a particular object), the principal's word is accepted by the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and in one Hanbali view; the Malikis add two cases where the agent's oath prevails; the school view of the Hanbalis accepts the agent's word, since he is trustworthy. On the loss of what the agent holds without negligence, the agent's word with oath is accepted by agreement, since he is a trustee and cannot easily prove the loss. The Malikis limit this to an agent who is not suspected; the Hanbalis to a hidden cause, such as theft; if the cause is evident, such as fire or plunder, the Hanbali judge (al-Qadi) requires proof of the event first. On a claim of transgression or negligence in keeping, the agent's word with oath is accepted, since he denies what is alleged against him. Disputes over the sale and the collection of the price. The Hanafis work through cases, depending on whether the object was delivered to the agent or not. If the principal confirms the sale and the collection but not the loss or delivery, the agent's word with oath is accepted on the loss. If the principal denies the sale and the collection, the agent is believed about the sale but not about the collection as against the principal; the buyer may pay again to the principal and take the goods, or rescind; if the principal confirms the sale and the agent says the buyer paid the principal, the buyer is discharged on the agent's acknowledgement, but the agent is liable if he then cannot prove it. The summary is compressed here. The Malikis hold that if the agent says 'I acted as you permitted', his word is accepted, since he is trustworthy. The Shafi'is hold that if the dispute arises after the agent's removal, his word is not accepted without proof; if before, there are two views, the more accepted of which gives the principal's word; the other gives the agent's word where he can act alone (as in divorce and manumission) with oath. The Hanbalis in the school view accept the agent's word that he sold and collected and the price was lost. On the claim to have returned what the agent holds, the majority accept the agent's word with oath, whether the agency is paid or not, according to the Hanafis and Malikis; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis require proof when he is paid, and accept his oath when he is not. The end of agency. The first way is removal. Agency is a non-binding contract, so either party may end it by dismissal. The end of agency. The first cause is removal. The principal may dismiss his agent and forbid him the act, and the agent may dismiss himself; the jurists agree on this in general. Conditions for a valid removal by the principal. The first is that the agent knows of the removal. The Hanafis, a view of the Malikis, a Shafi'i view and a Hanbali narration require it, since removal dissolves the contract and cannot bind without knowledge. The majority of the Malikis, the sounder Shafi'i view and the school view of the Hanbalis do not. For the Hanafis, knowledge comes by being present at the removal, by the principal's letter, by a messenger (whether trustworthy or not, adult or minor), or by the report of two trustworthy men or one trustworthy man, and a report from an untrustworthy man counts if the agent believes it. Abu Hanifa holds that if the agent denies the report, he is not removed even if it proves true, since reporting a removal resembles testimony; Abu Yusuf and Muhammad disagree. The second is that no right of a third party is attached to the agency. The Hanafis hold that removal without the right-holder's consent is not valid, as with a pledge given to a creditor with the agent appointed to sell it, or with a defendant's agent in a suit appointed at the claimant's request. The Shafi'is allow removal if the agency was requested by the opposing party; the Malikis forbid removal once the agent has sat with the opponent three times. The third is that the agency is not a hire, since a hired agency binds both parties. The fourth is that removal must not cause harm; the Shafi'i Sharwani says that removal is forbidden if it would let a wrongdoer seize the property of a ward. The agent's removal of himself does not require the principal's knowledge, by the majority, except that the Hanafis require it where the agency is for litigation or the purchase of a named thing. Death. The agency ends on the death of the principal or of the agent, by agreement, since death ends capacity and the property passed to the heirs. The Hanafis, Shafi'is and the school view of the Hanbalis do not require the agent's knowledge of the death. The Malikis hold that if the person dealing with the agent was in the town of death and knew of the agency, the agent is not removed until he knows of the death; otherwise the agent is removed only on knowledge of the death. Insanity. The Hanafis end the agency by permanent insanity, taking a month according to Abu Yusuf and a year according to Muhammad; once it is permanent, the agency does not return on recovery. The Shafi'is and the school view of the Hanbalis end it by insanity; the Malikis do not, unless the principal's insanity is long, in which case the judge considers it; a Hanbali narration says it does not end. Fainting. Most jurists do not end the agency by it; the sounder Shafi'i view does, by analogy with insanity. Interdiction. The Hanafis hold that interdiction of the principal or the agent ends the agency, but specify that interdiction of the principal ends it only where the agency concerns contracts and litigation, not payment of debts or collection of a deposit. The Hanbalis end it by interdiction for prodigality, and by the principal's insolvency in what he is restrained from. The Shafi'is end it by interdiction for prodigality or insolvency in any disposal that does not take effect. The Malikis end it by the principal's narrow insolvency, a judicial order to take the debtor's goods for his creditors, not by general insolvency. Apostasy. The Hanafis hold that if the apostate is ruled to have joined the enemy's land, the agency ends and does not return on his return to Islam in the school view. His acts before joining are suspended in Abu Hanifa's view and binding in the view of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. The Malikis hold that the agent is removed by his principal's apostasy after the period of asking to repent. The Shafi'is base the matter on whether the apostate's property passes out of his ownership, with several views, the most apparent being that it is suspended. The Hanbalis hold that the agency is not ended by the agent's apostasy in the school view, and is ended by the principal's apostasy. Immorality (fisq). The Hanbalis hold that agency is not ended by the agent's immorality, except in matters that immorality contradicts, such as the offer in a marriage, where an agent is removed by his own or his principal's immorality. An agent for matters requiring trust, such as the agent of a guardian of an orphan or the administrator of an endowment, is removed by his own immorality or his principal's. The Shafi'is end it by the principal's immorality in matters that require integrity. Drunkenness. The Shafi'is hold that if either party becomes drunk without fault the agent is removed; if by fault, the Shafi'is say it may or may not end the agency. The Hanbalis hold it does not end the agency except in matters it contradicts, such as the marriage offer. The Hanafis hold that it never ends the agency: an agent appointed to divorce who divorces while drunk has not divorced; an agent who sells while drunk does not bind the principal. The object leaving the principal's ownership. If the principal does the act himself, as by selling the goods before the agent does, or if the goods are claimed by another, or if he marries the woman himself, the agency ends. The Malikis hold that if the principal sold to one buyer and the agent sold to another, the first sale binds, and the second is an unauthorised sale, unless the second buyer has taken possession, in which case the second stands and the first is undone, unless the second buyer and seller knew of the first. The Hanbalis hold that the agent's admission that he received what he was appointed to collect ends the agency. If the object returns to the principal. Muhammad holds that the agency returns, since what comes back by rescission is the first ownership with its rights; the Shafi'is and Abu Yusuf hold that it does not, since the principal's own act implies the agent's removal. Ibn 'Abidin says it returns if the ownership returns by rescission, not otherwise. The agent's transgression in what he was appointed to do. The sounder Shafi'i view and the school view of the Hanbalis hold that agency is not ended by transgression, since the act was done by permission: the trust is lost by transgression, but the act stands, as with a pledge. The opposite Shafi'i view and one Hanbali view end it, since agency is a trust contract, like a deposit. Al-Mardawi says that if the agent destroys the thing he was appointed for, the agency ends, and if it remains, it does not. Denial. The Hanbalis and a view of the Hanafis hold that the agency is not ended by the agent's or principal's denial, since denial does not show a withdrawal of earlier permission; the Hanafi fatwa and one Hanbali view hold that it is ended. The Shafi'is hold that denial for forgetfulness or to hide something is not removal; if either denies deliberately with no reason, it removes. Loss of the object. The agency ends when the object is lost, and when the woman whose divorce was entrusted dies. The Hanafis hold that the agency of two partners ends when they part, even if the agent does not know. Completion of the act. The Hanafis hold that the agent is removed when the matter entrusted is completed, as when he collects a debt or contracts a marriage. Implied withdrawal. The Hanbalis hold that agency ends by implied withdrawal of the principal, as by intercourse with a wife whose divorce he entrusted, or by implied withdrawal of the agent, as by accepting the agency to free a slave when he had been appointed to buy him.

• Wakira (feast on finishing a house, fiqh)

  The wakira is, in the language, from wakr, a bird's nest; a wakira is a meal that a man makes when he finishes building a house, to which people are invited. In the technical sense it is the meal made on finishing the building of houses and called to. The walima, in the language, is the wedding feast or any food made for a gathering; in the technical sense it is the food made for a happy occasion, such as a wedding or a betrothal. In its wider sense it covers invitations to particular occasions, such as the shindakhiyya, the i'adhar, the khurs, the 'aqiqa, the wakira, the naqi'a, the tuhfa, the hadhdhaq, the shindakh and the 'atira. Making a wakira. The Shafi'is hold that it is recommended, not obligatory, on the school view, and less emphatic than the wedding feast; some drew a view that all feasts are obligatory. The Hanbalis say that making invitations other than to a wedding is permitted, neither disliked nor recommended; a report from al-Hasan says that 'Uthman ibn Abi al-'As declined a circumcision invitation, since they did not attend such feasts in the Prophet's time. The 'aqiqa is sunna, and an invitation to a mourning gathering is disliked. Ibn Qudama says that an invitation other than to a wedding has no particular merit, since the law does not mention it, but its maker is rewarded for giving thanks and feeding his brothers. Answering the invitation. The Hanafis, the school view of the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis hold that answering is not obligatory: it is sunna for the Hanafis and recommended for the Shafi'is and Hanbalis, on the report 'we were commanded to answer the caller', and to comfort the host. A Shafi'i view holds that answering is obligatory for the wakira and all feasts, on the report 'whoever is invited to a wedding or the like, let him answer'. The Malikis have one view that it is disliked and another that it is permitted. The purpose of answering is to bring joy to the host and comfort him; the guest should intend to follow the sunna, to visit and honour his brother. Eating from the wakira's food. The majority hold that the invited guest who is not fasting is recommended to eat; Ibn Hajar mentions the possibility of obligation, and reports that al-Nawawi preferred the view of obligation. A guest who is fasting by an obligatory fast completes it and does not eat. If the fast is voluntary, the Shafi'is and Hanbalis recommend breaking it if it would distress the host, on the report of Abu Sa'id about the Prophet and his companions eating at a meal prepared for them. Ibn Taymiyya says that the host should not press the guest to eat if he refuses to break a voluntary fast, or to eat if he is not fasting; both are permitted, and to oblige him to what is not required is one of the forbidden matters. The conditions for answering an invitation to a wakira are set out under walima, and are not repeated here.

• Wala' (clientage, fiqh)

  Wala', in the language, comes from wali, a root meaning nearness; the word is used for nearness of place, of kinship, of religion, of friendship, of support and of belief. Wala' and tawali both mean following one another without a gap between. The majority (Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis) confine wala' to the legal kinship that arises when a slave is freed and ownership of him ends. The Malikis define it as a connection like kinship that arises from manumission. The Shafi'is define it as an 'asaba arising from a freedom that comes after ownership has ended, later than the 'asaba of lineage, which gives the manumitter and his male 'asaba inheritance, the guardianship of a marriage, the funeral prayer and the payment of blood-money on his behalf. The Hanbalis define it as the establishment of a legal rule, an 'asaba fixed by manumission or by the cause of it, such as umm walad status or tadbir. The Hanafis define it as a legal kinship arising from manumission or from alliance, with the effects of inheritance, blood-money and guardianship of marriage. They distinguish two kinds: wala' 'itaqa (the wala' of blessing), caused by manumission; and wala' muwala, caused by contract, in which one person covenants with another that if he commits a crime he will pay its compensation, and if he dies his estate goes to the other. Related words: manumission ('itq), which is the cause of wala'; inheritance (irth), its effect; and blood-money ('aql), which it also causes. Wala' of manumission (wala' al-'itaqa) is an 'asaba later than the kinship of lineage, which gives the manumitter and his male 'asaba after him inheritance, blood-money, guardianship of the marriage and the funeral prayer for the one he freed. The term 'client of manumission' (mawla al-'itaqa) applies to the manumitter and to the freed slave, and some say only to the manumitter. Its lawfulness rests on the Prophet's saying: 'the wala' belongs to the one who frees', which al-Bukhari and Muslim report from 'A'isha. Its cause is manumission. The jurists agree that wala' belongs to the manumitter where the manumission is not forbidden, whether he did it himself or by what takes the place of manumission in law, such as buying a relative, accepting a gift or charity or a bequest, or whether it came without his act, as when he inherits a relative. It holds whether the manumission is for no price, for a price, conditioned, or dated, express or implicit, and so too manumission by tadbir, by umm walad status, or by contract of purchase of freedom. It also holds where he frees a slave for a duty, such as expiation for killing, for zihar, for breaking the fast in Ramadan, for ila', for an oath or for a vow, according to the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and the school view of the Hanbalis; a Hanbali narration holds there is no wala' in these cases. Wala' in forbidden manumission. Manumission may be forbidden: where the manumitter is likely to see the slave join the enemy's territory, leave Islam, or steal and raid, or where the slave is freed for the devil or an idol. The Hanafis hold that the manumission takes effect despite its prohibition and the wala' belongs to the manumitter; they say that one who frees a slave for the devil or an idol is an unbeliever on the sounder view. The Hanbalis say that manumission in such cases is disliked, that where it is likely to lead to the forbidden it is forbidden, and that if it is done it is valid. Wala' in manumission as a sa'iba (a freed slave whom the master releases without any obligation to him). The Hanafis, Shafis, the sounder Hanbali view and Ibn Nafi' among the Malikis hold that the wala' belongs to the manumitter, on the Prophet's saying that the wala' belongs to the one who frees, and because wala' is a kinship like lineage, which a condition does not remove. The Malikis in the settled view call it disliked; Asbagh allows it; Ibn al-Majishun forbids it. A Hanbali narration denies any wala' to the manumitter, so that what comes back from the freed man's estate is spent on freeing slaves; the sounder view, according to al-Mardawi, sends it to the public treasury. Difference of religion and its effect on wala'. The majority (Hanafis, Shafis, Hanbalis) hold that the manumitter has the wala' even when his religion differs from the freed man's. The Malikis require that the two share a religion: if the master is an unbeliever, the wala' belongs to all Muslims, and it does not return to him when he becomes a Muslim. The sale and gift of wala' are not valid according to the four schools, on the Prophet's prohibition of its sale and gift, and because it is an inheritable status that does not pass like kinship. Passing of wala' on death. The wala' belongs to the manumitter and then to his male agnatic kin, and not to the sharers. A woman inherits by wala' only from her freed slave, his children and his freed slaves. Ibrahim al-Nakha'i, Shurayh and Tawus hold that wala' is like property and is inherited as the manumitter's estate is. Inheritance by wala'. The jurists agree that the master inherits the whole estate of his freed man when he dies, if their religions agree and there is no other heir, on the saying that wala' is a kinship like lineage, and on the report of Hasan that the Prophet gave the master the estate where there was no heir. The master takes before the return of shares to the sharers and before the distant kin, according to the majority. If the manumitter has agnatic kin, or sharers who exhaust the estate, the master gets nothing, on the Prophet's words: give the shares to their owners, and what remains goes to the nearest male. Inheritance across religion. The Hanafis, Shafis and a narration of Ahmad hold that the manumitter does not inherit from the freed man when their religions differ, on the saying that a Muslim does not inherit from an unbeliever and an unbeliever does not inherit from a Muslim; if both are Muslim they inherit each other. The Hanbalis in the school view hold that a Muslim inherits from an unbeliever by wala', on the report that a Muslim does not inherit from a Christian except a slave of his own. The majority hold that the freed man does not inherit from his manumitter, since there is no kinship between them; Shurayh and Tawus held that he did. Blood-money and the 'aqila (the kin who pay it). The majority hold that the 'aqila are the agnates, and then those related by manumission. The Hanafis: if the killer is a freed man or a client by contract, his 'aqila is his master and his master's tribe, on the saying the client of a people is of them. The Malikis (settled view): the 'aqila are the agnates, then the manumitters, then the public treasury. The Shafi'is: the agnates, then the manumitter, then his agnates, then the public treasury; a freed slave does not pay for his manumitter in the sounder view. The Hanbalis: the 'aqila are all agnates and wala'-kin except the ascendants and descendants. Wala' of contract (wala' al-muwala). It is a covenant by which one man makes an alliance with another: if he commits a crime, the other pays its compensation, and if he dies, his estate goes to the other. Three views are given. The first, held by the Hanafis and reported from 'Umar, 'Ali and Ibn Mas'ud, is that it is a valid wala' by a valid contract, giving inheritance and blood-money. They cite the verse of the covenanted in Surat al-Nisa (verse 33), the verse of the remoter kin, the report of Tamim al-Dari that the convert's client is the nearest to his life and death, and the fact that the Companions did not give wala' by Islam alone. The second, held by the settled Maliki view, the Shafis and the Hanbalis, is that it has no effect at all, citing 'wala' belongs to the one who frees', the saying 'no alliance in Islam' and the harm to the Muslim community, which would otherwise inherit from the unknown dead. The third, held by Ishaq ibn Rahawayh, a Hanbali narration, a Maliki view and reported from 'Umar, 'Ata' and 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, is that wala' arises by conversion at another's hand, without an alliance. The cause of wala' of contract, for those who hold it valid, is the contract itself, with offer and acceptance, such as 'you are my client; you will inherit from me if I die and pay my compensation if I commit a crime'; the reply 'I accept'. A person converted at one man's hand who made alliance with another is the client of the one he allied with. The Hanafis state nine conditions for this contract. The first is that the contracting party is sane. Adulthood is a condition of making the offer, so a minor's offer is void even if he is sane; the minor's acceptance needs the guardian's consent to take effect. Islam is not a condition: a dhimmi may make alliance with a dhimmi or a Muslim, and the sex of the parties and the abode of Islam or war do not matter. Among the Hanafi conditions of the contract of alliance: the person who makes it must have no wala' of manumission, since that is stronger and a weaker tie cannot overrule it; he must have no alliance already made with another whose blood-money he has paid, since that alliance has become firm and binding; and he must not have had his blood-money paid by the public treasury, since his wala' has then gone to the whole community of Muslims. He must be free and of unknown lineage, meaning that he is not ascribed to another, since one whose lineage is known may not ally himself to another; this is the view relied on in the school. He must not be an Arab, since an Arab has a tribe that supports him and so does not become a client; nor a client of the Arabs, since their client is one of them. The contract must include the blood-money and the inheritance: that the one allied pays the blood-money if the other commits a crime, and inherits from him if he dies. The nature of the contract. The Hanafis hold it is a permissive contract, not binding, so either party may end it by his own will, as with agency, partnership and bequest, until he has paid blood-money on the other's behalf; then the contract is binding, since the right of another is involved. Ending it must be in the presence of the other party; if the client makes an alliance with another, that is an implied ending. The effects of the contract are blood-money during life and inheritance after death. The Hanafis hold that the lower client may inherit from the higher one if they stipulate it in the contract, on the saying that Muslims abide by their conditions. The contract cannot be transferred. The wala' established by this contract cannot be sold, given or bequeathed, since it is not property and the saying that wala' is a kinship like lineage, which is not sold or given, applies to it. If the lower client sells it to another, that ends the first alliance and makes an alliance with the second. What proves the contract. The Hanafis hold that it is proved as wala' of manumission is proved, by an explained testimony or by acknowledgement, including acknowledgement in the last illness, since such a person is not suspected when he has no known heir.

• Walad (child, fiqh)

  Walad (a child) in the language is one born; it is used for one or many, for a small or a grown child, and for a male or a female. Ibn (a son), in al-Jurjani's definition, is a male born from the seed of another of its kind, and the Mawsu'a notes that the son is male while the child (walad) may be either sex. Bint (a daughter) is the feminine of ibn. Hafid (a grandchild) is a child's child. Sibt (a grandson by a daughter, in the lexicographers' usage) is applied by the Shafi'is to a daughter's child, and by the Hanbalis to both kinds of grandchild. Dhurriyya (descendants) means in the majority's usage the children, daughters and their children, while some Hanbalis exclude the children of daughters. Nasl (offspring) is wider than walad. The child follows the better of its parents in religion, by agreement of the jurists. If one spouse is Muslim the child is Muslim; if one parent converts and the child is young, the child becomes Muslim with him, for the child's benefit. The Hanafis hold that if one parent is a People of the Book and the other a Magian, the child is a People of the Book, since Magianism is worse. The Hanafis require for the child to follow the better parent that the two share one abode. The child follows the religion of his parents where the rule of following applies. If the child is in our land and the father in the abode of unbelief, the child is treated as a Muslim by ruling; but the child does not follow a father who is in the abode of Islam while the child is in the abode of unbelief. The apostasy of a discerning boy. Abu Yusuf, Zufar, al-Shafi'i and a view of Ahmad hold that it is not valid, since a boy's words have no effect for harm. Abu Hanifa, Muhammad, the Malikis and the known view of Ahmad rule it valid, since Islam depends on sound reason, not puberty. Once his apostasy is established, the rulings of apostasy apply: he does not inherit or pass on an estate, his wife is separated from him, no funeral prayer is made over him, and he is compelled to return to Islam; but he is not killed, because killing is a punishment and he is not of the kind to bear it. At birth the call to prayer is recited in the right ear of the newborn, and the summons in the left. In the funeral prayer for a dead person, the father comes first, then the son, then the son's son. On leading prayer by the son of an illegitimate union or of li'an, the rulings are set out in their own places. The Hanbalis see no harm in the imamate of a child disowned by li'an if his religion is sound and he is fit to lead; 'A'isha said of the child of illegitimacy that he bears nothing of his parents' sin. By agreement, zakat may not be given to one's own child, since the benefits of property are joined between them. A person pays zakat al-fitr for himself and for those whose maintenance is due, including his children; there is a difference on paying it for a child who died or was born after the obligation arose. By the majority, a child may perform the pilgrimage on behalf of his parents, on the report of the woman of Khath'am who asked whether she might do it for her aged father. A child's lineage is established from the mother by birth, and from the father by the marriage bed, acknowledgement or evidence; it ends only by li'an. On sacrifice for a child: if the child is grown, his father is not obliged; if he is a minor without property, the Hanafis report from al-Hasan from Abu Hanifa that it is obligatory, and another narration that it is not obligatory but recommended from the father's own money. If the minor has property, his father or executor sacrifices from it, according to Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf, against Muhammad and Zufar. The Malikis make it a sunna for the parent to sacrifice for poor parents and for a young child until the boy reaches puberty; the Shafi'is allow it only for the father and grandfather from their own money. The 'aqiqa, the animal slaughtered for a newborn in thanks to God, is a sunna for the Shafi'is and Hanbalis, recommended for the Malikis and permitted for the Hanafis. Among the rulings that bind the child to his parents are: circumcision (cutting the foreskin of a male and the membrane of a female, obligatory for some and sunna for others); naming; custody; suckling; maintenance; education; discipline; the duty of the child to obey and honour his parents in what is not sinful; the child's prayer for his father; the prohibition on a parent's curse on his child; the Hanafi dislike of a son calling his father by his name, and the Shafi'i recommendation that a child not name his father by name. These are set out in their own places. Preference among children in gifts. The Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is recommend equality; the Hanbalis and Abu Yusuf make it obligatory. Preference in affection is not blamed by the Hanafis, since affection is an act of the heart. Gift of an occupied thing. The Hanafis hold that a house still occupied by the donor's goods cannot be given, while a lent house may be given; the father may take back a gift to his child, according to the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the school view of the Hanbalis, which the Hanafis and a Hanbali narration deny. An endowment for one's children includes children of both sexes by agreement, and their children are a matter of difference. In a bequest to relatives, the Hanafis do not include parents or children in the apparent view; the Hanbalis and one Shafi'i view include them; the sounder Shafi'i view excludes them but includes grandparents and grandchildren. It is sunna for a child to be just in his gifts to his parents, and if he prefers one, al-Darimi says he should prefer the mother. Leave of parents for travel. The Hanafis hold that for a journey in which danger is great, the child may not go without his parents' leave; for a journey without great danger he may go if he does not neglect them. Jihad requires the permission of the parents, as the next part of the entry sets out. Jihad is not valid without the leave of Muslim parents, or the leave of one of them when the other is an unbeliever, unless jihad has become an individual duty, as when the enemy attacks a group of Muslims. Parents taking from the child's property. The majority hold that a father may take from his child's property only in need. The Hanafis distinguish: if they are in a town, a poor father may eat without payment; if in the desert and without food, he may eat at its value. The Hanbalis allow a father to take from his child's property what he wishes, and to own it, if the father is in need, on two conditions: it must not injure the child, and he must not give what he takes to another child. They cite the saying 'you and your property belong to your father', and that God calls the child a gift to the father. Ibn Hani' records Ahmad's view that a father who takes from his son's property is not punished as a thief, and that a mother may not give from her son's property except with his leave. Khul' on a child's maintenance or suckling. For a weaned child, khul' on his maintenance is valid only for a fixed term, since his maintenance runs for his whole life. For a suckling, khul' on his suckling and maintenance is valid, and if no term is fixed the mother suckles him for two full years, on the verse 'mothers suckle their children two full years for whoever wishes to complete the suckling', and on the saying 'there is no suckling after weaning'. If the husband returns, or the wife or the child dies before the term ends, the husband recovers the balance of the maintenance according to the Hanafis and Hanbalis; the Shafi'is do not allow khul' without a fixed term. Khul' on custody of the child. The Hanafis allow the khul' and void the condition, since the child's right is to be with his mother while he needs her. The Malikis allow a khul' on the mother's custody, and custody then passes to the father, unless harm is feared or the child's heart is attached to the mother. The Shafi'is hold that the mother's custody does not end by her marrying someone other than the child's father if the khul' fixed a term, since it is a binding hire. The child's inheritance is established between the child and his parents on conditions; the child of illegitimacy is ascribed to his mother and inherits only through her; the child of li'an does not inherit from the one who disowned him, since his lineage is denied. The details are set out in their places. A vow to slaughter one's child. The Hanafis: by analogy nothing is due, but by juristic preference a sheep is due, and for several children a sheep for each; this is the view of Abu Hanifa and Muhammad and one Hanbali narration. The Malikis say nothing is due; the Shafi'is say the vow is invalid, since it is not an act of devotion. On a narration of Ahmad about a woman who vowed to slaughter her children, she sacrifices a ram for each child. The child born dead. If the newborn cries or shows signs of life, he is ruled as living. If he is born dead, he is a child in the sense that the waiting period ends with his birth, and blood afterwards is the blood of childbirth. The rulings on the child in his own right, such as his washing, the funeral prayer over him, and his inheritance and bequests, are set out under their own headings. A father selling his minor child's property. This is allowed by agreement in general, since the suspicion is removed and a father is more solicitous than another. The Hanafis and Shafi'is allow the grandfather to do it too, since he holds authority over property as the father does; the Malikis and Hanbalis deny it, since the grandfather has no authority over the child's property. An agent selling his principal's property to the principal's child, or buying for him. The Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and a Hanbali narration forbid selling it to a minor child, since it is like selling to oneself and one person cannot join both sides of a contract. For an adult child, the Hanafis, the Shafi'is in the opposite of the sounder view and a Hanbali narration forbid it; the Malikis and Abu Yusuf and Muhammad allow it at the value; the sounder Shafi'i view allows it; the second Hanbali narration allows it on two conditions, that the agent outbids in the auction and that another conducts the auction. The Hanafis allow it when the agency was given in general terms. A father buying for himself from his child's property, or selling to him, is allowed by the jurists. The father's receipt of what he bought from his child. The Hanafis hold that a father does not become the receiver by the sale alone, and is not discharged from the price until the judge appoints a trustee for the child to receive it from him and return it to him as a deposit. The Malikis hold that where the giver and receiver are one hand, receipt occurs by intention. The Hanbalis allow the father to make the offer, accept and receive. The child's right to retaliation for a killing belongs to all the heirs of the slain, young and old, male and female, as set out under retaliation. Killing a child. A parent may not kill his child, on the verse 'do not kill your children for fear of poverty' and on the saying that the gravest sin is to kill one's child for fear that he will eat with you. If a father kills his child, the majority hold that he is not retaliated against, and a grandfather is not retaliated against for his grandson; the Malikis distinguish: he is retaliated against if he lays the child down and slaughters him or splits his belly, and not if he strikes him with a sword or a stick. A child who kills his parents is retaliated against for each parent, according to the majority, by the general texts and the reasons: the need for deterrence lies with the child, a parent loves his child for the child's own sake rather than for his own, and the father has greater sanctity than a stranger. A father's killing of his child carries no retaliation by the majority, since his offence against the child's life is void; Ahmad in one narration says the son is not killed for his father, because the father's testimony for his son is not accepted. A killing of a parent or child by a just or rebel party in the course of fighting, where the fighting requires it, is not liable; outside the necessity of fighting, it is liable. The testimony of a child for a parent, or a parent for a child, is not admitted; the testimony of one for the other is admitted. The inclusion of parents and children in the 'aqila (the kin who share blood-money): the Malikis, a Hanafi view and one Hanbali view include them; the Shafis, another Hanafi view and the second Hanbali view do not. Theft by a parent from his child's property, and the reverse. The majority hold that a parent is not amputated for stealing from his child's property, on the sayings 'you and your property belong to your father' and 'your children are from your earnings', since hudud are averted by doubts. Abu Thawr and Ibn al-Mundhir amputate a father, by the apparent text of the verse of theft. For a child stealing from his parent, the majority do not amputate him, while the Malikis, a Hanbali narration and al-Kharaqi amputate him. A parent's slander of his child. The Hanafis, the school of the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis do not punish a parent for slandering his child, by analogy with his non-retaliation for killing him; the Shafi'is and Hanafis discipline him for abuse. A parent who inherits a slander against a woman from his child is not punished unless others share the right. One Maliki view allows the son to claim the slander penalty against his parents. A child's brigandage (hirabah) against his parent. The Hanafis remove the hudud of brigandage if the victim's child or an unlawful relative is the brigand, since there is an apparent permission to take property at home, and hudud are averted by doubts; the Shafis and Hanbalis agree for a child who takes his father's property as a brigand. A child who kills his father by brigandage is still liable to retaliation. The young of a sacrifice: some jurists require it to be slaughtered with its mother, others do not; details are under sacrifice. The kid of a goat that looks like a dog: the Hanafis decide its lawfulness by tests (drinking, eating, whether it has intestines or a paunch). The Shafis leave it as a matter of caution unless its shape points to lawfulness.

• Waqf (endowment, fiqh)

  Waqf, lexically, is detention: to hold back a thing in God's way; it also means prevention and stillness, and the word names the thing held. Technically the jurists define it in several ways: for the Hanafi companions, the detention of a thing in God's ownership with its use given to whom the founder wishes; for Abu Hanifa, its detention in the founder's ownership with the use given as charity; for the Malikis, the grant of the use of a thing for as long as it exists, the ownership remaining with the grantor even notionally; for the Shafi'is, the detention of property whose use can be had with its substance kept, the disposal of its ownership cut off, for a lawful and existing purpose; for the Hanbalis, the detention by an owner of his property whose use is kept in its substance, with its income given to a charitable purpose seeking God's favour. Related words: tabarru' (giving without return, wider than waqf), sadaqa (gift in life without return, which may also name waqf, as in 'Umar's land), hiba (gift without return), 'ariya (the permission to use a thing while its owner keeps it), and wasiyya. The difference from a gift is that waqf transfers the use while the substance stays in God's ownership and cannot be disposed of, whereas a gift transfers the thing itself. Wasiyya: the Hanafis define it as a transfer of ownership attached to what comes after death, and the Shafi'is similarly. It differs from waqf: a bequest takes effect after death and may be of the thing or of its use, while waqf is a gift made in life and only of the use. The legality of waqf: the majority of jurists hold it lawful, binding and a recommended act of devotion, citing the report of Ibn 'Umar that 'Umar got land at Khaybar and the Prophet told him, if he wished, to hold back its substance and give its produce in charity; the saying that when a man dies his deeds end except for three, among them continuing charity; and the report of Jabir that every wealthy man among the emigrants and the helpers held back property in endless charity. Ibn Qudama calls this consensus of the Companions. Ibn 'Abidin, quoting al-Is'af, says waqf is lawful according to Abu Hanifa and his companions; the disagreement is about its binding character: for Abu Hanifa it is like a loan of use, with the ownership remaining with the founder, binding only by a judge's ruling or when made as a bequest. Ibn Qudama reports Shurayh as not accepting it. On its legal ruling: it is basically a recommended act of devotion; it becomes obligatory when vowed; it is permitted when not made for the sake of devotion, as a dhimmi's waqf, which has no reward; and forbidden when it serves sin, as an endowment for a church. The Malikis mention that an endowment only for sons and not daughters is forbidden as resembling the custom of the pre-Islamic age, but Ibn al-Qasim preferred disliking it and enforcing it. The pillars of waqf: the majority (Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis) count four: the formula, the founder, the beneficiary and the thing endowed; the Hanafis count only the formula. Waqf is not valid without an offer, and the jurists differ on whether acceptance is required. The formula of offer: whatever shows the founder's intent by word, a clear sign, writing or act. The express words are 'I endowed' (waqaftu), which the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold express, and 'I detained' (habastu), express for the Hanbalis, the Maliki view and the sounder Shafi'i view, and 'I made a way' (sabbaltu), express for the Shafi'is and Hanbalis in the sounder view, since custom has fixed their use and the Prophet's words to 'Umar use the same. The allusive words are 'I gave in charity' (tasaddaqtu), which the Hanbalis and Malikis count allusive, and which the Shafi'is count express when it is joined to a general beneficiary such as the poor, and otherwise allusive; also 'I forbade' and 'I made eternal', allusive for the Hanbalis and the sounder Shafi'i view; they make a waqf only when joined to a clear sign, such as 'a charity endowed', 'a charity never to be sold, given or inherited', or when intention is added. When the administrator holds, from the endowment's income, a sum that may properly go to a work of charity, such as ransoming Muslim captives or aiding a stranded fighter, and the endowment needs repair, then: if delaying repair until next year's income causes no clear harm that threatens the endowment's ruin, the income goes to the charity and repair is postponed; if the delay causes clear harm, the income goes first to repair and only the surplus to the charity. Ibn Najim states that an administrator who pays the beneficiaries while repair that cannot be delayed is due becomes liable, because the upkeep the endowment needs is excluded from the poor's right. For the Hanafis, where repair is necessary, such as raising a roof or building a wall, it takes precedence over all other uses, since it is not proper care to let a mosque fall into ruin for the sake of what is given to the imam and the muezzin; any surplus over the repair goes to the beneficiary nearest to the founder's purpose whose loss would cause clear harm. Where repair is not necessary, so that leaving it until the next year's income would not ruin the thing, the more important need comes first. The Hanafis separate the case where the founder stipulated that repair be given priority each year, when the administrator keeps the amount aside each year even if it is not yet needed, from the case of silence, when repair is paid when needed and nothing is saved for it. When part of an endowed building or its materials has fallen, the judge spends it on repair; if the means of repair are not ready at once, he keeps it until they are. For the Shafi'is, the surplus of a mosque's income above what its repair needs, reckoned by the cost of its rebuilding, is saved, and with the balance a property is bought and endowed; this is safer for the mosque, and it is not bought from the endowed thing whose upkeep it is, since the founder endowed that thing for upkeep. The jurists differ on the source from which the endowed thing and its upkeep are paid. The Hanafis and Malikis hold that it comes from the endowment's income whether or not the founder stipulated this, since the endowment is a continuing charity in God's way and can continue only in this manner; the Malikis add that a stipulation to the contrary is void. For the Hanafis, if the founder gave a house for his son's residence, its repair falls on the one who lives in it, from his own money and not from the income, since the burden follows the benefit; if he refuses or cannot pay because he is poor, the judge lets the house, from him or from another, and repairs it from the rent, and the one who refuses is not compelled to repair. The Malikis agree. The Malikis say that a horse endowed for raiding is fed from the public treasury; if there is no treasury, it is sold and its price buys weapons and similar things that need no feeding. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis follow the founder's terms. For the Shafi'is, the feeding, the equipping and the repair are paid from the source named; failing that, from the endowed thing's own benefits, such as a slave's earnings or a property's rent; if its benefits cease, the feeding and the equipping come from the public treasury, while repair is then owed by no one, because a property is like absolute ownership, unlike a living animal, whose life and sanctity must be preserved. For the Hanbalis, the founder's terms govern. If he named a source of feeding, whether the income or another, that is followed. If he did not name one and the endowed thing is a living being, such as a slave or horses, it is fed from its own income; if there is no income, the feeding falls on the named beneficiary. If the feeding is impossible, the thing is sold and its price is spent on another thing that becomes an endowment; if it can be let out, it is let out for enough to feed it. If the beneficiary is unnamed, as the poor are, the feeding comes from the public treasury. For property, such as buildings, weapons and goods, repair is owed by no one unless the founder made it a condition. The jurists agree that whoever wrongfully damages an endowment, by demolition or otherwise, must pay. For the Hanafis, a man who lets an endowed house, and whose tenant uses its courtyard to tether animals and wrecks it, is liable, because he acted without permission. For the Malikis, whoever wrongfully demolishes an endowment must rebuild it as it was, even if what was demolished was decayed; but the preponderant view among them is that he owes its value, like any other destroyed property. Ibn 'Arafa accepted this view and 'Iyad made it well known. For the Shafi'is, no one is liable for a book endowed for the pursuit of learning that is lost in his hands without his fault; but whoever is at fault is liable, and using the book for a purpose other than the one endowed is a fault. When an endowed thing needs repair or upkeep and its income does not suffice, may the administrator borrow on the endowment, and does he need permission? The Malikis, Hanbalis and, in one view, the Hanafis hold that the administrator may borrow for the endowment without the judge's permission, as with his other acts, since he is a trusted agent with full power to act. The Malikis say that if an administrator undertook, on taking up the office, to spend from his own money on the endowment when needed, he is not bound by that, but he may recover what he spent. For the Shafi'is, the administrator may not borrow without the founder's condition or the ruler's permission. The ruler may lend him money from the public treasury, permit him to borrow, or permit him to spend his own money on repair on condition that he may recover it. If he borrows without permission or condition, it is not allowed, and he cannot recover what he spent, since he transgressed. The preferred Hanafi view is that borrowing on an endowment is not allowed unless it is needed for the endowment's good, such as repair or buying seed, and then only on two conditions: the judge's permission, and that letting the thing and spending its rent is not possible; if the judge is far away, the administrator may borrow on his own authority. Ibn 'Abidin says borrowing is not allowed without the founder's order, because a debt attaches only to a person's liability; an endowment has no liability, the poor have liability but they cannot in practice be pursued, so the debt falls on the administrator alone. Necessity overrides this analogy; Abu al-Layth's preferred view is that borrowing is allowed with the judge's permission when there is no alternative and the judge is not far from the administrator, because the judge's authority covers the public interests of Muslims more widely. Where there is an alternative, such as paying the beneficiaries, borrowing for that is not allowed, except for what is given to the imam, the preacher and the muezzin, and the mats and oil of a mosque, on the preferred view. If the judge's permission is required and the administrator claims to have had it, the claim is apparently not accepted without evidence, because he wants to take from the income, and his word is accepted only about what is in his hand. If he did not obtain permission, it is forbidden for him to take from the income, since he is then a volunteer, until permission is established. Ibn 'Abidin says that if the administrator spent his own money to repair the endowment, he may recover it from the endowment's income; the fatwa of al-Hanuti holds that he may recover it in conscience, but his claim is not accepted unless he had it witnessed that he spent in order to recover. This applies only where the endowment has income; without income, the judge's permission is necessary. Second, the sale of an endowment and its exchange. When an endowed thing is disabled and can no longer be used, the Hanafis, Malikis, Hanbalis and, in one view, the Shafi'is allow its sale and the spending of the price on a like thing. The Hanafis allow sale and exchange even when the endowment is not disabled, under special conditions; the Malikis, in general, distinguish between real estate and movable goods. The Hanafis recognise three cases of exchange. In the first, the founder stipulates, at the endowment, that the endowed land may be exchanged for another land, either for himself or for another. This has two formulas; the first is to say: 'my land is an endowed charity to God forever, on condition that I sell it and buy with its price another land', and then the second land is endowed on the first's terms. Abu Yusuf, Hilal and al-Khassaf hold that the endowment and the condition are valid by juristic preference, which is the sound view according to the Fatawa Qadikhan; the condition does not undo the endowment, since an endowment can pass from one land to another, and the second stands in place of the first. For example, if an usurper floods an endowed land until it becomes a sea unfit for farming, he pays its value and buys another land which becomes an endowment on the first's terms; likewise, if its yield has fallen through blight and does not exceed its costs, the good of the endowment lies in exchange, so the founder may validly stipulate the power of exchange even when the need is not present now. Muhammad and Yusuf ibn Khalid al-Samti hold that the endowment is valid and the condition void, which is the analogical view. Sarakhsi justifies Muhammad's view: the condition does not prevent the endowment from ending, so the endowment is completed, while the exchange stands as a void condition in itself, like a mosque on which an exchange is stipulated or where it is stipulated that only some people may pray. Some Hanafi jurists say the endowment and the condition are both void. Kamal ibn al-Humam reports from al-Ansari that the condition is valid but the sale may be made only with the judge's permission, and the judge should permit a sale when there is no benefit in the endowment and he sees it is better for its beneficiaries. If the founder stipulated that the land be sold and another bought with its price, without adding a further endowment formula, the second land becomes an endowment on the first's terms without renewed formula, because the land was already fixed for the endowment and its price takes its place. By analogy the endowment would be void, since no other land was named to stand in the first's place. The second formula: if the founder stipulated the right of exchange for the administrator and not for himself, the administrator may exchange for himself, since giving power to another follows from owning the power oneself. If the right of exchange is stipulated for another man together with the founder, the founder alone holds the right, and the other man does not hold it alone. Exchange under a stipulation is allowed even if the thing yields income and benefit, since the endowment does not thereby leave use, and neither the judge's direct action nor the absence of income for repair is required. The Hanafis limit exchange to what the founder stated in kind and type: if he stipulated exchange for land, it may not be made for a house; if he stipulated the land of a village, it may not be made for other land, since village lands differ in cost and yield; if he did not specify the replacement, he may exchange for any real estate, whether land, house or town, as he wishes, since the stipulation is general. If the stipulation covers one exchange, the founder may not exchange the second land for a third, since the condition was fulfilled only in the first, unless the words express that. The second case: the founder did not stipulate exchange at the endowment, whether he stipulated its absence or was silent, but the endowment came to a state in which it gives no benefit at all, such as giving no yield or not covering its upkeep. Exchange in this case is allowed on the sounder view when the judge permits it and sees the good in it. Ibn 'Abidin reports from al-Bahr that Qadikhan's words differ: in one place he allowed the judge to exchange without the founder's stipulation where he saw the good; in another he forbade it even when the land had come to a state where no benefit could be had. The sound view is that the judge may exchange on the following conditions, the first of which is that the endowed thing is wholly taken out of use. Among the conditions for exchange, as the Hanafis state them: the sale must not be at a gross undervaluation; the endowment must have some yield with which it can be repaired; the exchanger must be a man of knowledge and action, so that the endowments of Muslims are not undermined; the replacement must be real estate and not cash; and the thing may not be sold to someone whose testimony cannot be accepted in his favour or to a creditor of the founder's heirs. The exchanged and the replacement should be of one kind. Ibn 'Abidin, quoting Qanali-zada, says that the sameness of kind is probably not required for an endowment held for its yield, since what counts is a large return and little upkeep: exchanging a shop for land that yields rent equal to the shop's rent is better, because land lasts longer and needs less repair; whereas an endowment held for residence is judged by the residence. In al-Qunya, a house endowment may be exchanged for another house only if the new one is in the same quarter or in a better quarter; the reverse is not allowed, even if the house held is larger in area, value and rent, because it may fall into ruin in the lesser quarter. The Bahr al-Ra'iq, citing the commentary on Ibn Wahban's poem, asks whether exchange is allowed when the founder forbade it, or when the administrator is removed before exchanging, or when he is removed as soon as he decides to exchange. Tarsusi replies that there is no transmitted ruling, and that the rules of the school mean the judge may exchange when he sees the good in it. The same work reports from Muhammad that if an endowed land has weakened in yield, and the administrator can buy with its price another land with higher yield, he may sell and buy that. Some shaykhs forbade sale and exchange whether or not the endowment had ceased to yield. Qadikhan says that an endowment without a stipulation of exchange may not be sold or exchanged even if its land is salty and unusable, because an endowment is meant to be perpetual and is not sold; the power of exchange arises only from a stipulation. The third case: the founder did not stipulate exchange; the endowment has yield and is not disabled; but exchange would bring some general benefit, and the replacement is better in benefit and yield. Ibn 'Abidin says that this is not allowed on the preferred view, as Qanali-zada settled it. Ibn 'Abidin also reports from al-Ashbah that a productive endowment may be exchanged only in four cases: first, when the founder stipulated exchange; second, when a usurper flooded the land into a sea, so that he pays its value and the administrator buys land with it; third, when the usurper denies the seizure and there is no evidence, so that the administrator takes the value to buy a replacement; and fourth, when someone desires the land and offers a replacement with more yield and a better location, which is allowed on Abu Yusuf's view and is the fatwa, as in the fatwas of Qari al-Hidaya. The author of al-Nahr says that Sadr al-Shari'a's rebuttal stands against this: we do not give fatwa on the view of Abu Yusuf. Exchange of endowed property among the Malikis. The Malikis distinguish between real estate and movable goods in sale and in exchange. They allow exchange of movable goods when no party can maintain them and they are in danger of perishing, or when their benefit has ceased so that they cannot be used for the purpose for which they were detained. Thus a horse endowed in God's way, for raiding or frontier guard, is fed from the public treasury; if there is no treasury, it is sold and the price buys weapons and similar things that need no feeding. Any movable endowment that is not real estate and cannot be used is sold, such as a horse that has caught rabies, a cloth that wears out, a slave who grows old, or books that decay. Its price is spent on a like thing if possible, or on a share of such a thing if the whole cannot be bought, and if that is impossible the price is given in charity. Likewise male animals endowed for raiding or breeding, when there are more of them than needed, or females that have grown too old to be of use, are sold and young females bought with the price, so that milk and offspring continue and the endowment remains, as al-Dardir says of ostriches. For real estate, the Maliki school holds that it may not be sold even if it is ruined and cannot be used, whether a house, shops or other buildings, and it may not be exchanged for a like unruined thing. Abu al-Faraj reports from Malik that the imam may sell it, if he sees the good in it, and spend the price on a like thing. Some Malikis allowed the exchange of a ruined dwelling. Al-Taj wal-Iklil reports the absolute prohibition of selling a ruined dwelling of an endowment; Ibn al-Jahm gives the reason that someone will be found to repair it by renting it for years, so that it returns to its former state. The exchange of a ruined dwelling for an unruined one is disputed. Ibn Rushd says that if such a piece of land has lost all use and cannot be repaired or let, there is no harm in exchanging it for a place that will be endowed in its stead, by the judge's ruling after the cause is proved and the advantage to the endowment is clear; this is to be recorded and witnessed. The Malikis allow the sale of real estate for the necessary widening of a congregational mosque, whether the endowment is held for named or unnamed persons. Ibn Rushd says that the apparent report of Ibn al-Qasim's collection allows it for every mosque, as does Sahnun's view; al-Nawadir reports from Malik and others that it applies to congregational mosques when there is need, and not to neighbourhood mosques, since the necessity there is not the same. Endowed property may also be sold to widen a graveyard or a road used by people, even against the will of the beneficiaries or the administrator; the beneficiaries are bound to have the price put into another endowment, but the judge may not compel them to accept a different endowment in its place. Al-Sharh al-Saghir says that for property taken to widen a mosque, the price is paid if the endowment was held for named persons; if it was held for unnamed persons, such as the poor, no compensation is due, since no named person has a right attached to it, and the reward the founder gains when the property enters the mosque is greater than what he first intended. The Malikis say that if the founder stipulated change and exchange, his condition is followed. If he stipulated that, should a desirable price be offered, the property be sold and another bought, al-Nawadir and al-Mutiyya report that this is not allowed; if it is done nevertheless, it stands and the founder's condition is applied. Fath al-'Ali al-Malik reports a case: an endowed land on a road used by Muslims, whose founder stipulated that it not be sold or exchanged, was exchanged by the administrator of the road for a state land, the administrator handing the endowed land to a farmer and taking state land in return. Dardir holds that where the founder stipulated no exchange and gave no exception, the exchange is void; the administrator must return the state land to its owner and take back the endowed land itself, and the ruler restrains anyone who refuses. Exchange of endowed property among the Shafi'is. The Muhadhdhab says that if a mosque is endowed and then ruined so that prayer in it ceases, it does not return to ownership, and the owner may not dispose of it, because what left ownership for God's right does not return to ownership by ruin, as a man who frees a slave and then becomes disabled does not reclaim him. Al-Sharbini says that the sounder view allows selling the mats of an endowed mosque when they have worn out, and its beams when they have broken or nearly so and are fit for nothing but burning, lest they be lost and the space be crowded with them to no purpose; a small sum from their price returning to the endowment is better than losing them. Such things are not counted as a sale of the endowment, since they are treated as nonexistent; this is the view on which the two shaykhs, al-Rafi'i and al-Nawawi, relied. Al-Rafi'i says that the analogy is to buy a replacement mat with the price of the old one, and al-Adhra'i takes the mentioned case to be straw used in clay. Mats given or bought for a mosque are sold when needed. Beams that can be used for other things, such as planks and doors, are never sold. If a mosque is at risk of falling, the judge may strip it and use the material to build another mosque, if he sees fit, and building it nearby is better; but he may not build a well with the material of a mosque. If an endowment on a bridge is destroyed by a flood and the bridge is not needed where it stands, it may be moved to where it is needed; the income of an endowment on a frontier that has become secure is kept by the administrator, in case the frontier returns. If an endowed date palm dries, an endowed animal is disabled, or the beams of a mosque break, there are two views, and the sounder is that they may not be sold, as with a mosque. The other view allows sale, since the thing is no longer hoped to yield benefit; the price then takes the rule of the value that comes from the destruction of endowed property. If the ownership of the endowed thing's substance is held to belong to the beneficiary, which is the lesser view, the price goes to him; if it belongs to God, which is the more apparent view, a like thing is bought with the price to become an endowment in its place. Abu Hamid al-Isfara'ini says that the price buys a like thing to become an endowment in its place, without dispute. Exchange of endowed property among the Hanbalis. Among them exchange is allowed when the endowed thing is no longer fit for the purpose for which it was endowed and no longer serves to be used, whether it is movable or real estate, and whether it is a mosque or not. They hold that selling an endowment is forbidden and invalid, and that exchanging it, even for something better, is invalid by explicit text, except where its intended benefit is lost through ruin and its yield cannot repair it, in which case it is sold; or where its intended benefit is lost by a cause other than ruin, such as wood that has cracked and is feared to fall. If the endowment is a mosque whose intended use is lost because it is too narrow for its people and cannot be widened, or because its neighbourhood is ruined, or because the place is filthy and prevents prayer in it, then, according to al-Qadi, sale is valid and the price is spent on a like thing, because keeping it so is a waste of property. Since an endowment is perpetual, when that cannot be kept in the same thing its purpose is preserved in another, and a succession of replacements is treated like the things themselves. A dried endowed tree may be sold; so may a beam that has broken, worn out or is feared to break or fall. Al-Talkhis says that when an endowed beam is near breaking, or an endowed house near collapse, and it is known that delay would take it out of use, it is sold to protect its value. Schools, hospices and caravanserais that are endowed may, when ruined, be sold by one view without dispute. An endowed horse for raiding that is no longer fit is sold and another horse fit for it is bought; once the replacement is bought it becomes an endowment. A founder's stipulation that an unusable endowment not be sold is void, and it must be sold. The seller is the judge where the endowment is for a public good, such as the poor, mosques or bridges; where it is held for a named person or named group, or for the worshippers or muezzins of a mosque, the endowment's special administrator sells it. Even so, it is best done with the judge's permission, because such a sale binds those who come after the present holders, like a sale made against an absent party. Once the replacement is bought for the endowment's use it becomes an endowment; the prudent course is to re-endow it by a new formula, lest a later person, not seeing that the purchase made it an endowment, undo it. The return of an endowment to the founder's ownership. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan of the Hanafis holds that if what surrounds a mosque is ruined and no longer needed, even while the mosque remains maintained, or if the mosque itself is ruined with no means to repair it and people no longer need it because another mosque has been built, then it returns to the ownership of its builder if he is alive, or to his heirs if he is dead; Abu Yusuf disagrees. Muhammad's reason: the founder gave the endowment to a kind of devotion, and since that devotion has ended the endowment ends with it. It is like a mosque's mat and grass when no longer needed, or its lamp when the mosque is ruined, which return to the one who made them; like a shroud that a beast has torn, which returns to its owner; and like an offering made by one who is prevented from completing the pilgrimage, which he may dispose of once the hindrance is removed. Abu Yusuf says that it is moved to another mosque with the judge's permission, and its debris is sold with the judge's permission and the price spent on some mosques. The Hanafi consequence is that if an endowment falls into ruin and has no income to repair it, it returns to the builder or his heirs in Muhammad's view, though not in Abu Yusuf's. But in Muhammad's view, only what has left the founder's intended use altogether returns to ownership, such as a shop that burned and cannot be let for anything, or a hostel or a neighbourhood cistern that is ruined with no means of repair; what was made for income returns to ownership only as its debris, while its open ground remains an endowment that is let, even for a small rent. Khulasa reports that Muhammad said of a horse that was made a detained endowment in God's way and became unfit to ride that it is sold and its price goes to its owner or his heirs, as with a mosque. The Shafi'is, in the view opposite to the sounder, say that if an endowed thing loses its benefit through a cause that is not chargeable, such as a tree drying or being uprooted by wind or flood before it can be replanted, the endowment ends and the thing returns to the founder or his heir. The sounder Shafi'i view is that it does not return to ownership but remains an endowment; the Hanbalis agree. The administration of an endowment. The jurists agree that the administration of an endowment follows the founder's condition. If he assigns it to a named person, his condition is followed, as 'Umar ibn al-Khattab did when he left his endowment to his daughter Hafsa to manage for her life, and then to the people of sound judgement of her kin, as al-Bayhaqi reports. Ibn Qudama says that the disposal of an endowment follows the founder's condition, and so does its administrator. The jurists differ on whether the founder may assign administration to himself. The Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis allow it. The Malikis say that if the beneficiary has not taken possession of the endowment, the endowment is void by the founder's death, illness, or bankruptcy; if the beneficiary has taken possession and the founder stipulated administration for himself, the endowment stands, but the founder is compelled to assign administration to another, since he may not assign it to himself. If the founder names no administrator, the Malikis and Hanbalis hold that where the endowment is for unnamed persons, such as the poor, the mosques, the ruler appoints whom he chooses, since he cannot himself administer it. Where the endowment is for a named beneficiary of sound mind, that beneficiary administers it, since it is his ownership and his benefit, so that his supervision is like absolute ownership. If he is not of sound judgement, his guardian administers it. There is a possibility in the Hanbali school, which Ibn Abi Musa chose, that the ruler administers it. On the administration of an endowment where the founder did not stipulate it, the Hanafi views differ. Abu Yusuf holds that the endowment belongs to God and the administration goes first to the founder, then to his executor, then to the judge. Hilal, the apparent view of the school, holds that the administration belongs to the founder, then to his executor or the judge, because an administrator derives his authority from the founder's stipulation, so it is impossible that he should have authority while another derives it from him; and the founder is the person nearest to the endowment. Muhammad holds that the founder has no administration unless he stipulated it, because for him handing the endowment over to a custodian is a condition of its validity, so that once it is handed over the founder has no authority over it. If the founder dies without naming an administrator, the judge appoints a custodian from among the founder's family while a suitable person can be found there, either because such a person is the most solicitous or because the founder meant the endowment to be attributed to them; only if none is found does he appoint an outsider. The Shafi'is hold, on the school's view, that if the founder names no administrator, administration belongs to the judge, who has general authority over such matters. A second view gives it to the founder, who had it, and a third gives it to the beneficiary, since the income is his. The qualifications of an administrator. The jurists set several conditions for an administrator's fitness; some are agreed and some are disputed. The first condition is legal capacity. The jurists agree that an administrator must be adult and sane, since a minor or a mentally ill person lacks the capacity; this holds in general. The Malikis and Hanbalis add that if the founder names no administrator and the beneficiary is a named person, such as Zayd or 'Amr, the beneficiary administers it himself; if he is a minor or insane, his guardian stands in for him. The Hanbalis say that the ownership of an endowed thing passes to the beneficiary if he is a named human or a limited group, and he administers it if he is adult and sound of judgement, or his guardian does if he is a minor, insane or a spendthrift; Ibn Abi Musa says the judge administers it. The Hanafis: Ibn 'Abidin quotes al-Is'af that appointing a minor as administrator is void by analogy in every case, and by juristic preference void while he is a minor, so that the administration passes to him when he grows up; al-Shilbi holds that the assignment to a minor is never valid, since administration is a form of guardianship and a minor under guardianship cannot be given guardianship over others. Ibn 'Abidin cites the fatwas of Rashid al-Din that a judge who assigns administration to a minor who is able to keep the property does so validly, since it grants him authority to act; the two views can be reconciled by reading al-Is'af as concerning a minor unable to act. Insanity prevents appointment and also ends it once it occurs; Ibn 'Abidin quotes al-Fath that an administrator is removed by permanent insanity lasting at least a year, and that if he recovers, administration returns to him, though al-Nahr says this holds for one named by the founder and not for one appointed by the judge. The Shafi'is state that administration is stripped by insanity, and al-Shabramallisi says that when a sane person returns to a founder-named administrator, the office returns by recovery alone without a new appointment. The second condition is justice (adala). The Hanafis differ whether it is a condition of validity or of preference. Al-Is'af says that no one is appointed except a trustworthy and capable person, whether acting himself or through a deputy, because removing a dishonest person from office is not part of administration. Ibn 'Abidin holds that justice is a condition of preference, not of validity, and that an administrator who turns to wrongdoing deserves removal but is not removed automatically, as a judge who turns to wrongdoing is not removed on the sound and fatwa view. The Malikis treat justice as a condition when the administrator was appointed by the judge or by the founder. Al-Hattab says that administration of a detained endowment belongs to the one the founder chose, who must be one trusted in religion and honesty; if the founder is negligent, administration falls to the judge, who sets up someone he approves. If the administrator is badly managing and not to be trusted, the judge removes him, unless the beneficiary owns his own affairs and accepts him. Al-Qarafi says that a judge removes an administrator only for a fault, but the founder may remove him even without one. The Shafi'is require apparent and inner justice in an administrator the judge appoints. Al-Subki says that for one appointed by the founder, apparent justice should suffice; al-Adhra'i requires both apparent and inner justice in that case too, and al-Sharbini prefers the first view. If the administrator becomes a wrongdoer he is removed, and then the administration passes to the judge. Al-Shafi'iyya say that if an administrator becomes a wrongdoer and then just again, his authority returns if it was made a condition in the endowment's terms and named exactly; otherwise it does not. Al-Nawawi gave this fatwa, and Ibn al-Rif'a and others agreed; al-Zarkashi says it is apparent. The Hanbalis hold that if administration belongs to someone other than the beneficiary, and the appointment was by the judge or by an original administrator, justice is required, because it is authority over property, like guardianship over an orphan's property. If he is not just, his hand is removed from the endowment to preserve it, and if he returns to fitness his right returns. If the administrator was set by the founder, justice is not required, and a trustworthy person is added to the wrongdoer; his authority is removed only where its removal is needed to keep the endowment, since preserving the endowment matters more than leaving a wrongdoer in authority over it. Where administration belongs to the beneficiary himself, whether just or not, he has the better claim to it, since he owns the endowment and so administers for himself; some say a trustworthy person is added to him. The third condition is capability (kifaya), meaning the strength and ability of the person to act in what he administers. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis require it, since preserving an endowment is a religious duty and someone without capability cannot preserve it. If capability is lost, the Shafi'is say the judge removes administration from him even if it was assigned to him by the founder. Al-Nawawi says that when the defect ends, his administration returns if it was stipulated in the endowment and named exactly. The Hanbalis say that if capability is lost he is not removed, but a strong and trustworthy administrator is added to him, to achieve the purpose. The Hanafis say that the administrator must be removed where he is not trustworthy or is incapable (the OCR text reads 'the founder' here, probably a slip for the administrator, flagged as a doubt). The Malikis' words also imply that capability is required. The fourth condition is Islam. The Hanbalis hold that an administrator must be Muslim if the beneficiary is Muslim or the object is a mosque or the like, relying on Surat al-Nisa, verse 141, which they cite for this condition. If the endowment is for a named unbeliever, an unbeliever may be made administrator. The Hanafis allow a dhimmi to be administrator and do not require Islam; if the judge removes a dhimmi for some reason and he then converts, administration does not return to him. Al-Ramli holds that analogy with the will and marriage makes valid a dhimmi's administration of an endowment for a dhimmi beneficiary, provided he is upright in his religion, but this is rejected because the endowment requires real justice; al-Shabramallisi says the rejection is the sound view. He distinguishes a dhimmi's marriage of his ward, where the guardian has a natural restraint from wishing to protect his ward from shame, which does not apply to an endowment. The administrator's wage. The subject covers his right to a wage, whether it is set by the founder or the judge, its amount, and whether he is due one where neither has named it. On the right to a wage: the jurists hold that an administrator is due a wage for his work in running the endowment and caring for its affairs. The evidence they cite includes 'Umar's words when he endowed his land at Khaybar, that whoever administers it may eat in reasonable measure or feed a friend without making profit from it; 'Ali's making the upkeep of the slaves he endowed to work the land a charge on the income; the analogy with the collector of zakat; and the saying attributed to the Prophet that what remains after his wives' maintenance and his worker's wage is charity. Ibn Hajar says that the worker there means the custodian of the land, so the saying shows that his wage is lawful. On the setting of the wage. If the founder set it, the administrator takes what the founder fixed even if it exceeds the usual wage; this is the view of the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis. The Hanafis say that if the founder fixed less than the usual wage, the judge completes it on request. The Shafi'is say that if the founder made himself administrator and fixed a wage for himself, it may not exceed the usual wage; if he fixed more, the endowment is void, since it would be an endowment upon himself. The Hanbalis say that if the founder fixed a stated wage, and it equals the usual wage, the administrator takes it; if it is more, the costs of what the endowment needs, such as the trustees and others, are paid from the excess until only the usual wage remains, unless the founder gave it to him outright. The Malikis fixed no amount and left it to the founder or the judge. If the founder set no wage, the judge fixes it. The Hanafis and Hanbalis hold that the judge's wage must not exceed the usual wage, and if he sets more, the excess is withheld. The Malikis leave the matter to the judge's discretion; Ibn Fattuh says the judge may give the appointed administrator a fixed monthly stipend according to his work, as the imams did. The Shafi'is say that if the founder names no wage, the administrator has no wage on the sound view and may not take anything from the endowment; if he does take it, he is liable and is discharged only by handing it to the judge. If the administrator asks the judge to fix a wage for him, he is like a guardian of an orphan's property who asks the judge to set his fee. Al-Iraqi, who reports al-Balqini's view, says that the administrator then takes the wage where there is need, either the amount of his maintenance, as al-Rafi'i preferred, or the lesser of his maintenance and the usual wage, as al-Nawawi preferred; another view is that he is due the usual wage even if it exceeds his maintenance. If the founder set no wage. Al-Ramli of the Hanafis says that the administrator is due nothing unless the judge fixes a wage for his work. Ibn 'Abidin concludes that where the founder names a sum for the administrator, he has it, whether large or small, whether or not he works, provided it is not set in return for work; where the founder names none and the judge fixes the usual wage, that is valid; if he fixes more, the excess is withheld; and if the administrator does no work he is due no wage. If the judge appoints an administrator and names no wage, then, where the custom is that the work is not done without the usual wage, he is due the usual wage, since custom is like a stipulation; otherwise nothing. Ibn Najim, citing al-Qunya, reports two Hanafi views on a judge's appointee who is given no wage: the first is that he has nothing even if he works a year; the second is that the custodian is due a wage like the effort he gives, whether or not the judge or the residents of the quarter set a wage for him, since no one accepts custody publicly without a wage, and custom is like a stipulation. Where the endowment has administrators, the Malikis and Hanbalis and the Shafi'is treat the wage in a particular way. The Shafi'is hold that if the founder assigned no wage to the administrator, he is not entitled to one on the sound view; if the matter is referred to the judge, he is given one where there is need, as explained above. The Hanbalis have three views. The first is that the administrator may eat from the endowment's income in reasonable measure, whether he is needy or not, by analogy with the collector of zakat; this is the view of Abu al-Khattab. The second is that he takes the lesser of the usual wage or his maintenance, by analogy with the guardian of an orphan, and is entitled to it only if he is poor. The third is that an administrator known to take a wage for his work has a right to the usual wage, which is the analogy of the school. The Malikis, as Ibn Fattuh says, let the judge give a set monthly stipend in endowments, fixed by his judgement of the work. The source of the wage. The majority of jurists, namely the Hanafis, the Malikis except Ibn 'Attab, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, hold that the administrator's wage, whether set by the founder or by the judge, comes from the endowment's income, citing 'Umar's words on his endowment that whoever administers it may eat from it in reasonable measure without accumulating property. Ibn 'Attab, of the Malikis, held that the wage comes only from the public treasury; if it is taken from endowments it is returned and recovered from the treasury, and if not given, his reward is with God. Al-Hattab explains that nothing should be taken from endowments because they are for bequests. Ibn Warad gave a fatwa in his view, but al-Dasuqi weakened Ibn 'Attab's view. The work that earns the wage is to preserve the endowment, repair it, let it, collect its yield (rent, crop or fruit), strive to develop it, and spend it on its purposes, such as repair, upkeep and the beneficiaries, since that is what is customary for such work. The wage runs from the time the administrator takes up the office, and is due in proportion to the work. The Hanbalis say that if an administrator neglects his duty, his fixed wage is reduced by the amount his neglect cost the endowment; what is set for him is divided between what he did and what he did not, and the share for what he did not do falls away. The Hanafis say that if the beneficiaries dispute with an administrator who says the founder fixed a wage for work while he does nothing, the judge does not impose tasks that the rulers themselves do not perform. If an impediment comes upon him that stops him ordering, forbidding, taking and giving, he has no wage; if not, he keeps it. If the founder fixed more than the usual wage, that is permitted. In one case, the owner of an endowed land died and the judge appointed a custodian and gave him a tenth of the income, while a mill in the endowment was held by a man on a lump-sum lease and needed no custodian, and the beneficiaries collected its yield from him; the custodian has no right to a tenth of that yield, since his wage is payment for work and there is no wage without work. The accounting of an administrator. It is the administrator's duty to collect the endowment's yield, spend from it on what the endowment needs, and pay the beneficiaries. The jurists agree that he must account for what he spends, whether he is called to account by the judge or by the beneficiaries. They differ on whether his word about his spending is accepted without evidence, and, if there is no evidence, whether his oath is required. The Hanafis say that the judge need not require a detailed account of every sum the administrator has spent from the endowment's income; a general account suffices if he is known to be trustworthy. If he is suspected, the judge makes him explain item by item, and does not imprison him, but summons him for two or three days and warns him; if he explains, well and good, otherwise the judge takes his oath. Al-Durr quotes al-Qunya that if the judge suspects him he makes him swear, even if he is trustworthy, as a depositary who claims that a deposit was lost must swear. The Hanafi views differ on the claim that the administrator paid the beneficiaries. Al-Durr says his word is accepted without oath. The Is'af says that if he says he received the wage and paid it to the beneficiaries, and they deny it, his word is accepted with his oath and he is not liable, as a depositary who claims to have returned a deposit when the depositor denies it. The lessee of the endowed property is discharged by the administrator's acknowledgement of receiving the rent. If he says the rent was lost or stolen after he received it, his word with oath is accepted, since he is trustworthy. Ibn 'Abidin reports from al-Khayr al-Ramli that the fatwa is that he swears in this age. The Hamidiyya quotes Abu al-Su'ud as ruling that if the administrator is a squanderer, his oath is not accepted on his spending of endowment property. Al-Shilbi holds that a wrongdoer whose conduct breaks the Law is not believed on what he spent unless he has proof. Whether a trusted administrator's word after his removal is accepted: al-Hamawi says the apparent view is that it is, since removal does not take away his trustworthiness. Mulla Abu al-Su'ud draws a further distinction: if the administrator claims to have paid from an endowment's income to beneficiaries whom the founder named as his children or grandchildren, his word is accepted; if he claims to have paid holders of offices, such as the imam and the muezzin, it is not, just as a man who hired a builder for a known wage in a mosque and then claims to have paid him is not believed. Al-Tamartashi praised this distinction. The Malikis hold that if the founder dies and the endowment deed is lost, the administrator's word is accepted about the purposes on which he spends, if he is trustworthy. If he claims to have spent the yield, it is accepted if he is trustworthy, unless the deed had witnesses at its making, in which case he spends only with their knowledge. If he claims to have spent his own money on the endowment, it is accepted without oath unless he is suspected, and then he swears. Al-Hattab reports a case put to al-Suri: an imam, a muezzin and the general administrator of a mosque were charged years later by a market inspector with a surplus from the rent of shops; the administrator denied any surplus and refused to state his spending, saying he was not bound to, and that without him the endowment would be lost. Al-Suri ruled that his word is accepted about what he says he spent, if it resembles what he said. Al-Barzali adds that this holds where no condition was set requiring a record of income and spending, except with witnesses. The Shafi'is distinguish between beneficiaries who are named, such as Zayd and 'Amr, whose word on what is paid to them is accepted and who may demand accounts, and unnamed beneficiaries, such as the poor. Where the beneficiaries are unnamed, it is disputed whether the ruler may demand accounts; of two views, the more apparent is that he may. The administrator is believed about the amount he spent, where that is probable; if the judge suspects him, he makes him swear. Al-Azra'i explains that what is meant is spending in accordance with custom; the payments to the poor and other general purposes are included, but spending on a named beneficiary is not believed, since that beneficiary did not entrust him with it. The Hanbalis distinguish the administrator who serves without pay from one who takes a wage. The word of a volunteer administrator is accepted about a payment to a beneficiary; a paid administrator's word is not accepted without evidence. Al-Buhuti and al-Mirdawi say that the beneficiaries may not object to a trusted administrator whom the founder appointed; they may question him about what their endowment needs, so that their knowledge equals his; and the ruler may set up an office to audit endowment accounts when it is in the public interest. The removal of an endowment's administrator, and who has the right to remove him. The conditions for an administrator and the rule when one fails were set out above; here is who may remove him. First, the founder's right to remove his appointee. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis distinguish between a founder who at the start kept administration for himself and later assigned it to another, and a founder who gave it to another from the outset. In the first case he may remove and appoint someone else, since the assignee stands in for him, as a principal removes his agent; this is the sound view of the Shafi'is and the sound and correct view of the Hanbalis in the corrected text of al-Furu'. Al-Shirbini notes that this implies the founder may remove without cause, and al-Subki says so in his fatwas; but many later scholars, among them Ibn Razin, ruled that removal without cause is not permitted. A Shafi'i and Hanbali view denies him any removal, since his ownership has gone. In the second case, where the founder names an administrator at the endowment's creation, the Shafi'is say that he may not remove him, even for a reason of advantage, since he has no authority after assigning it to another. Hence if the administrator so named removes himself or becomes a wrongdoer, the appointment of a replacement belongs to the judge, not the founder. The Hanbalis say that if the founder named an administrator and stipulated for himself the right to remove him, he may remove him; if not, he may not. The Hanafis: Muhammad ibn al-Hasan holds that if the founder stipulated for himself and his children the right to appoint and remove custodians, and to exchange the endowment, and all such authority, and then handed the endowment over to the administrator, the founder may remove him. If he did not stipulate the right to remove, he may not do so after handing over, because the administrator stands in place of the beneficiaries. Al-Sadr al-Shahid says that the fatwa follows Muhammad's view. Ibn 'Abidin says this rests on whether handing over is a condition, which it is for Muhammad and is not for Abu Yusuf. For Abu Yusuf the founder has authority whether or not he stipulated it, since handing over is not a condition; if he appoints another he is a deputy and may remove him, whether he stipulated the right or not. Hilal, al-Fath and al-Bahr hold this to be the apparent view, and the shaykhs of Balkh gave fatwa on Abu Yusuf's view. Al-Ramli says that this is plain: removal is valid for cause or without cause, since he is a deputy, and a principal may remove his agent in every case. The Malikis hold that the founder may not stipulate administration for himself; he follows his own condition in naming the administrator, and if he named a particular person he may not change to another. Al-Qarafi says that the founder may remove an administrator even without cause; al-Hattab says that one who has appointed someone to administer his endowment may remove him only for a cause that appears. Second, the judge's right to remove. The judge has general authority, so he may remove an administrator whom the founder named if the administrator's dishonesty is proved or if he lacks one of the required conditions; he may not remove him without cause. Where the judge himself appointed the administrator, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and some Hanafis hold that he may not be removed except for a cause, such as embezzlement or some other fault; the Hanbalis and some Hanafis hold that he may be removed without embezzlement. The plurality of administrators. An endowment may have one administrator or more, as the jurists state. If the founder assigns administration to two persons, the Shafi'is, the Hanbalis and Abu Hanifa hold that neither may act alone, since the founder did not accept either's judgement alone; but if the founder names each of them, each may act alone. Abu Yusuf allows each of two administrators to act alone. The Hanbali text adds that if the founder assigns the repair of the endowment to one man and the collection of its yield to another, each has his assignment. The Shafi'is say that if the founder stipulates that the administrator be the most upright of his children, and they all share that uprightness, they share the office; if one is manifestly more upright, he alone holds it. The Hanafis hold that if the founder names a man and then names a guardian for a minor, they are both administrators, the guardian sharing the office; unless the founder specifies, saying, for example, that he endowed his land on a named beneficiary and gave its administration to one man, and named another as executor of his estate and all his affairs, in which case each acts alone within his own assignment. Ibn 'Abidin cites al-Is'af for this. If the founder gives administration to the most virtuous of his children and they are equal in virtue, they do not share it and it goes to the eldest. If the founder gave the administration to two men and one accepts and the other refuses, or dies, or is disqualified, the judge appoints another in his place; the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis agree. The delegation of administration by an administrator. Except where the founder allowed it, the jurists hold that an administrator may not delegate administration to whomever he wishes or bequeath it to another. The Hanafis say that if the founder's delegation to the administrator was general, meaning that he stood in the founder's place and could assign and bequeath administration to whomever he chose, he may delegate it in health and in his last illness; if it was not general, he may not delegate it in health, but only in his last illness, since he is like an executor, and an executor may appoint another. The Shafi'is say that if the founder says he has assigned administration to a named person, who may delegate it to whomever he wishes, the delegation is valid. Whether the first person's administration then ceases is disputed: the school's view is that it does, since delegation is like a transfer of ownership, so that neither the founder nor the delegate can remove the new administrator, and it does not return to the delegator after his death. Al-Subki's view is that the delegate is the delegator's agent, so if the delegator dies administration returns to the delegate, and if the delegate dies it returns to the delegator. The Hanbalis say that an administrator named by the founder, if he is himself a beneficiary, may appoint an agent and remove him, since his authority is original, as a person disposes of his own property. If he is not a beneficiary, he may not appoint an administrator or bequeath the office, unless the founder stipulated that he may appoint whomever he chooses. The end of an endowment. One way an endowment ends is the return of the endowed thing to the founder's ownership: when the thing is ruined and no longer fit for use, when the endowment is for a class of beneficiaries that comes to an end, or in the case of a temporary endowment, which the Malikis allow. These cases have been discussed in the course of the article.

• Wasat (the middle, moderation, the choice)

  Wasat in the jurists' usage has three senses: the moderate, the choice, and what lies between two ends. The general rule is that what is due in each kind is its middling part; as an example, the zakat on livestock is the middling animal, on the report "but from the middle of your property". Flogging for penalties and discretionary punishment uses a middling whip, neither new and cutting nor worn and painless; stones for stoning are the size of a palm; and the feeding in expiation is of the middle quality of food eaten by one's household, a point on which the jurists differ in detail. In the sense of choice, wasat is used of the middle prayer, on whose identity the jurists differ at length. In the sense of what lies between two ends, it is recommended that the imam stand in the middle of the row; standing at its right or left wing is reported as contrary to the sunna. Women's imam stands in the middle of the women's row. Eating from the middle of a dish or bread is disliked, and sitting in the middle of a circle is disliked by most jurists and forbidden by some Shafi'is.

• Wasf (description and attribute)

  Wasf in the lexicon is description, and to describe a thing is to name it; a doctor describes a medicine when he names it and gives its dose. Technically it is a term for what points to an essence by a meaningful attribute; for the usulis it restricts a word of shared meaning by another, specific word that is neither a condition nor an end. Most jurists hold that a sale by description is valid as a sale by sight, since description gives knowledge of the object; in the preferred Shafi'i view the sale of an absent object not seen by the buyer is not valid, even if described at length, because of the prohibition on uncertain sales. In a salam contract the goods must be described as a debt in the buyer's favour by attributes that fix them, and the Shafi'is require the attributes to be named in the contract itself, not after it. In usul, attaching a ruling to a fitting attribute shows that attribute to be its cause, which is called an allusion. The concept of the attribute (mafhum al-sifa) means that a ruling tied to one attribute of a thing is read by Shafi'i, Malik and most as excluding the ruling from what lacks it; Abu Hanifa and a group of Malikis and Shafi'is, including al-Ghazali, deny that.

• Washm (tattooing)

  In the lexicon washm is a mark, and the word is also used for the first green growth of a plant and for a change of skin colour from a blow or fall. Technically it is piercing the skin with a needle until blood comes, then rubbing on indigo or kohl so that the mark turns blue or green. A woman who is tattooed at her own request is the mustawshima, and the tattooer is the washima, who marks the face, arm, lips, chest or any part of the body. The wasm (branding) is a mark made by fire or by a stipulated sign; it differs from tattooing in its tool and its ruling. Most jurists hold tattooing forbidden, on sound reports cursing the tattooer and the one tattooed; some later Malikis and Shafi'is count it among the grave sins, and some later Malikis call it disliked. Some jurists exempt two cases: when tattooing is the only treatment for an illness, and when a wife tattoos herself to adorn herself for her husband with his permission; a report from A'isha on the second point is cited, its hadith source not found by the book. The jurists agree that tattooing is impure, because blood is held in the place where the dye was rubbed. They differ on removal: the Hanafis hold that washing suffices and skinning is not required, since the mark is hard to remove, and prayer and leading prayer are valid with it; the Malikis do not require removal by fire when it was done in the forbidden manner, treating it as a pardoned impurity; the Shafi'is require removal unless it risks harm that permits tayammum, and do not require it of a minor or a person forced; the Hanbalis compare it to a wound stitched with impure thread, so removal is not required where removal risks harm, and is required where it does not; a dead person who was bound to remove it is cleaned unless the cleaning would mutilate the body. For the Hanafis, the fee a tattooer takes for forbidden tattooing is unlawful gain and forbidden.

• Wasi (executor)

  In the lexicon wasi is a noun of the passive form, one to whom a matter is entrusted; the word is also used for the testator, so it is one of the words with two opposite senses. Technically it is one whom a man charges with his affairs to act for him after death in what concerns his interests, such as paying his debts. The qayyim is wider than the wasi, and the wakil acts during life where the wasi acts after death; both stand in another's place. On accepting the commission, the Hanafis say a man should not accept it, as it is perilous; Abu Yusuf is reported to call a first acceptance an error, a second a betrayal and a third theft; the Shafi'is say it is recommended for one who knows himself trustworthy and forbidden for one who knows himself weak; the Hanbalis call it a recommended act for one able to bear it. The conditions are agreed as sanity, Islam where the ward is Muslim and ability to act, and disputed as to puberty and justice. On the moment of acceptance, the majority allow it both in the testator's life and after his death; the preferred Shafi'i view does not count acceptance in his life. The executor's power is bounded by what he is charged with, and several executors may be named for different tasks; if one dies, the judge appoints another in his place. An executor who loses a condition is dismissed, and he may release himself in the testator's life by agreement. A fee may be fixed for him in general, and a further executor may be added when he is unable to act. The executor must act for the ward's benefit, as the Qur'an requires in the verses on orphans' property.

• Wasiyya (bequest, fiqh)

  In the lexicon wasiyya comes from joining one thing to another and can also name the thing bequeathed. Technically a bequest of property is a gift made by way of kindness and attached to the time after death, whether of things or of benefits. Related terms are the commission (ايصاء), the executorship (wisaya), the gift, which is in life and without return, and alms, which is in life to one in need seeking reward. The bequest is lawful by the Qur'an, the Sunna and consensus. The Qur'an places the bequest and the debt before inheritance, and the sunna places the debt before the bequest; a report from Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas holds a third to be much, and that leaving heirs rich is better than leaving them in need. A report from Mu'adh says God gives charity of a third at death as an increase in good deeds, and a report from Ibn Umar says a Muslim who has a bequest should not spend two nights without it written by him. Its purpose is to gain remembrance and reward, to give to relatives who do not inherit and to help the needy, on condition that no one is harmed, that it stays within a third, and that it is not valid for an heir without the consent of the other heirs, to prevent hatred. Most jurists hold that a bequest of part of the property is not obligatory but recommended for one who leaves good; the obligation was abrogated for heirs by the report that there is no bequest to an heir, and recommendation remains for non-heirs. A bequest of less than a third is preferred; the Hanbalis say a fifth is better for the rich; Ibn Abbas and others preferred a quarter. Where heirs are poor the bequest is reduced, and a poor man with needy heirs is not advised to bequeath, in the Hanafi and Hanbali views. Some early authorities, such as al-Zuhri, Masruq and Tawus, held the bequest obligatory for relatives who do not inherit, relying on the verse on bequests and the report of Ibn Umar. The pillars of the bequest are, for the majority, four: the formula, the testator, the legatee and the thing bequeathed. For the Hanafis the pillar is offer and acceptance according to Abu Hanifa and his two companions, and offer alone according to Zufar. The formula is any word showing transfer after death. The majority accept a bequest in writing; the Shafi'is treat writing as an allusion requiring intention, and the Hanbalis require the testator's hand to be proven. A sign from one able to speak is not valid in the majority view, and the Malikis allow it. Acceptance may be by conduct, where the legatee deals with the thing as its owner, by sale, gift or lease. If the legatee dies after the testator without accepting, the Hanafis hold the thing passes to his heirs; the Malikis, Hanbalis and a Shafi'i view require acceptance for a named person, not mere silence, and if he dies before the testator the bequest lapses. All agree that refusal after the testator's death voids the bequest; acceptance or refusal before his death counts for nothing according to the majority. Acceptance and refusal need not come at once after death; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis let the heirs require the legatee to decide. On retracting an acceptance there are three views: the majority forbid it; some Shafi'is and Hanbalis allow it before possession; a third allows it for measured goods before possession. A partial acceptance is disputed in the Shafi'i school; Zakariyya al-Ansari prefers invalidity. A named legatee of full capacity accepts or refuses for himself; an unnamed group such as the poor or the mosques needs neither; a ward accepts through his guardian for his interest. If a named legatee dies after the testator without accepting, the Hanafis except Zufar hold the bequest valid by preference; Zufar and a Hanbali view make it the heirs' property and void it; the majority let his heirs stand in his place. A bequest may be made conditional or dated to the future: the Hanafis and Shafi'is allow it; the Malikis void it when the testator says if I die of this illness and does not die of it; the Hanbalis allow a condition expected to occur after death. A bequest is not binding; the testator may revoke all or part of it, in health or in sickness, as Umar is reported to have said that a man may change what he wills. Revocation may be by word, or by conduct such as sale, gift, pledge, consumption, mixing, grinding grain, spinning cotton or building on the thing. The majority hold that denying the bequest is not a revocation. The testator must be sane; the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis require puberty, while the Malikis and a Hanbali view allow a discerning minor in the matters where he is able. An insane person, the dazed and the unconscious are excluded. Freedom is required, so a slave's bequest is void; the bequest must be made freely, so one forced, joking or mistaken makes it void. The majority do not require the testator to be Muslim; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis accept a non-Muslim's bequest, including an apostate's on the Shafi'i view unless he dies as an apostate, while the Malikis void an apostate's bequest during the apostasy. For the Hanafis, a bequest by a non-Muslim enemy in enemy territory is valid if the thing is still there when they come under protection. The legatee must exist at the time of the bequest for the Hanafis, Shafi'is (preferred view) and Hanbalis; the Malikis and a Shafi'i and Hanbali view allow a bequest to one not yet born. The legatee must be capable of owning; a bequest to a dead person unknown to the testator is void, and the Malikis then direct it to the debts of the dead or his heirs. A bequest to a foetus is valid if it is born alive within the usual period: six months from the bequest where the mother has a husband or master; four years for the Shafi'is and Hanbalis otherwise; two years for the Hanafis. A bequest to one of two unnamed men is void according to Abu Hanifa, Zufar, the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis; Abu Yusuf holds it valid if they agree, and Muhammad leaves the choice to the heirs. A bequest to a group that cannot be counted, such as the poor, is valid; the Malikis do not require equal shares, the Shafi'is in the preferred view accept delivery to three, and the Hanbalis to one. Where the legatee is a group that cannot be counted, such as the tribes of Tamim and Aqil, the bequest is void according to the Hanafis and the less favoured Shafi'i view, because the legatee must be known; it is valid where they can be counted, and the meaning of counting is disputed. A bequest to an animal itself is void; a bequest for the fodder of a named person's animal is valid and spent on its feed, and the Shafi'is and Hanbalis differ on a bequest to a particular horse or a horse held for God. A bequest by a Muslim to a public work, such as building or repairing a mosque, is valid because it is an act of devotion; the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis allow it to a lawful public purpose. A Muslim's bequest to build a church is forbidden by the majority as an act of disobedience. On bequests by non-Muslims, the Hanafis divide: what is devotion for both sides is valid; what is devotion only for Muslims is void; what is devotion only for them Abu Hanifa allows and his two companions forbid. A bequest to God alone is spent on works of piety in the Shafi'i view and that of Muhammad, and his view is the one followed by the Hanafis. A bequest for the cause of God is spent on military expedition by the Shafi'is, Hanbalis and Abu Yusuf, and Muhammad and a Hanbali view add the pilgrimage. A bequest to works of piety goes, for the Hanbalis, to all acts of devotion beginning with the raid; for the Hanafis, to anything without transfer of ownership. If the testator says place my third where God shows you, the Hanbalis allow it to any act of devotion; the Shafi'is prefer his relatives who do not inherit, then his close kin by milk, then his neighbours. A bequest is void where the legatee killed the testator: the Hanafis, Hanbalis, a view of the Shafi'is and al-Thawri require that the legatee not be the killer, relying on the saying that a killer has no bequest, which al-Daraqutni weakened. The bar is a killing that carries retaliation, blood-money or expiation, even by mistake; the Hanafis require direct killing and an heir of the testator. The Malikis, the preferred Shafi'i view and a Hanbali report do not require this. For the Malikis, if the testator knew the cause of the killing the bequest is valid; if he did not know, there are two views, and al-Dusuqi prefers invalidity. The jurists require that the legatee not be an heir at the testator's death where another heir exists, on the saying that God has given each holder of a right his right, so there is no bequest to an heir unless the heirs consent. If some heirs consent and others do not, the bequest is valid for the share of those who consent, according to the majority; the Malikis and a Shafi'i and Hanbali view hold it void and require a fresh acceptance. Consent must come from a competent person and, for the majority, after the testator's death. For the Malikis, consent given in the testator's illness binds, if the illness is dangerous and he does not recover; the test of who is an heir is the moment of death, not the moment of the bequest. Terms about the legatee vary in meaning: a bequest to neighbours is, for Abu Hanifa, to adjoining houses; for the two companions, to adjoining houses and others in the quarter who share the mosque; for the Malikis, to adjoining houses on six sides and those across a lane; for the Shafi'is and Hanbalis, to forty houses on each side; the Hanbalis also count those who hear the call to prayer. A bequest to relatives: for Abu Hanifa, the nearest kin in order of closeness among blood relatives within marriage's bar, excluding parents and children; for the two companions, all who trace descent to the furthest ancestor who was Muslim; for the Malikis, the paternal kin not heirs; for the Shafi'is, all kin however distant, except ascendants and descendants in the preferred view; for the Hanbalis, descendants of four forefathers. A bequest to the nearest kin: the Shafi'is include ascendants and descendants; their preferred view puts a son, however distant, before a father, and a brother before a grandfather. The Hanbalis distinguish by full and half siblings. Bequests to in-laws, to relatives by marriage, to a household and to scholars have their own senses: for the Hanafis, in-laws are the blood relatives of one's wife and kin by marriage are the husbands of the forbidden kin; scholars, for the majority, are jurists and hadith specialists, to which the Shafi'is and Hanbalis add exegetes. A bequest to a non-Muslim is valid for a protected person; the Hanbalis require him to be named. It is valid for a protected foreigner according to the Hanafis, Shafi'is, Malikis and Hanbalis. For an enemy: the Shafi'is in the preferred view and the Hanbalis in the sound view allow it to a named enemy, while the Hanafis and Malikis in the school forbid it in enemy territory. For an apostate, the Hanafis, Malikis and a Hanbali face forbid it, and the Shafi'is and sound Hanbali view allow it to a named apostate. The fourth pillar, the thing bequeathed, must be property; it includes cash, goods, debts owed by others, rights measured in money, and benefits that may be sold, given or hired. Ibn Abi Layla and Ibn Shubruma forbid bequests of benefits. It must be of value in law: a bequest by or to a Muslim of wine, pork, a savage dog or a beast unfit for hunting is void; a Christian may bequeath what is of value in his belief; a trained dog or a beast fit for hunting may be bequeathed. Only property of value may be bequeathed; a bequest of a skin before tanning is valid for the Shafi'is, and a bequest of a gold or silver vessel is valid, since it may be used when not in use as an ornament or sold. Some jurists require that what is bequeathed be capable of transfer by contract after death: the Hanafis and a Shafi'i view require it; a bequest of a year's dates from palm trees is valid, and the Hanafis reject a bequest of what a flock will bear. The majority allow bequests of what does not yet exist, as in sale by salam and in tending orchards and leasing. A bequest of an unknown thing, such as one sheep from his flock, and of a thing one cannot deliver, such as a stray camel, is valid by agreement; a bequest of an undivided share or of a divided one is valid according to the majority. For the Hanafis the thing must exist at a time that depends on its kind: a named property at the bequest; a share of the whole estate, such as a third or a quarter, at the testator's death; a share of part of the estate at the bequest. The thing must belong to the testator: the Malikis, a Shafi'i view and the Hanbali school hold that a bequest of another's property is void even if he later owns it; the Hanafis, another Shafi'i view and a Hanbali view allow it as subject to the owner's consent. A bequest of a forbidden thing is void, since its purpose is to make up for good done in life. A bequest is not carried out for a sum that absorbs all the estate unless the creditors release it, according to the Hanafis and Shafi'is; the Malikis hold that a testator whose estate is wholly owed cannot bequeath. Where the testator has heirs, a bequest above the third is valid only with their consent, according to the majority; if they consent it stands, and if they refuse it falls. Where there are no heirs, the Hanafis let the bequest take the whole estate. On a bequest of a share of property: for Abu Hanifa and the Hanbali school the legatee takes a sixth where the division has fewer than six shares; other views fix it at the smallest heir's share, or a third, or a sixth. The Malikis distinguish according to whether the estate is subject to the 'awl. A bequest of a part or portion of property is, if not explained by the testator in his life, given by the heirs as they wish after death, according to the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis. A bequest of a sheep covers the young or old, male or female, according to the context; the Hanbalis give what the name normally covers. A bequest of an animal is interpreted by custom as a horse, mule or donkey; a bequest of a dog that the testator does not own is void. A bequest of a drum of war is valid for one of them; a bequest of an instrument for amusement is valid if it can be used for a lawful purpose. A bequest of benefits is valid according to the majority, and its value is taken from the third; if it exceeds the third it is allowed only up to the third. For the Hanafis, the benefit returns to the owner of the thing when the legatee dies. A bequest of benefits for a set year is counted against the third by the loss of value of the thing during the period; where the benefit is shared between the legatee and the heirs it is divided by rent, by division of the thing if divisible, or by alternation of time or place. The bequest ends when the period ends before death, when the legatee gives up his right, and, in the Hanafi view, when he dies before taking it. Where the legatee of benefits is prevented from using the thing, the Hanafis make the one who prevents him pay the value of the benefit, whether one heir or all the heirs did it, and he cannot claim another period after the set time has passed. The Malikis make whoever destroys a benefit liable for it; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold that any right tied to a thing passes to its replacement, so if an animal whose benefit is bequeathed is killed, its value is used to buy what stands in its place. The Shafi'is say that if a house's benefit for a year is bequeathed and the testator lets it for that year and dies just after the lease, the bequest is void; if he dies after six months, it is void for the first half and the legatee takes the rest. The upkeep of a thing whose benefit is bequeathed falls on the benefit-holder for the Hanafis, Malikis and the Hanbali school, and on the owner of the thing for the Shafi'is in the preferred view. A bequest of the rights of easement that pass by inheritance, such as the right to water, to a drainage channel and to build upwards, is valid; a bequest that amounts to dividing the estate among the heirs has its own rules. A bequest to each heir of an undivided share is void for the Shafi'is, as the heir takes that by inheritance; a bequest to each heir of a particular thing needs the heirs' consent in the preferred Shafi'i view, because the aims differ. On when the thing passes: for the Hanbali school, a Maliki view and a Shafi'i view, a named legatee owns only by accepting after death, so the increase before acceptance belongs to the heirs; for the Hanafis and the preferred Maliki view, the increase after death belongs to the legatee; the preferred Shafi'i view holds ownership suspended until he accepts or refuses. Gifts bequeathed are carried out from the third left after the costs of shrouding and burial and the debts owed to people; for the Hanafis, debts owed to God such as pilgrimage, zakat, vows and expiation come from the third alone, and for the majority from the whole estate. For the Hanafis a bequest is void if the testator becomes permanently insane, whether it lasts until death or he recovers before death; permanent insanity is a month or more for Abu Yusuf and a year for Muhammad; a faint and a temporary insanity do not void it. A bequest is void where the testator is an insane person whose insanity is permanent; a person who becomes insane but recovers and bequeaths in his lucid time is valid, according to Ibn al-Najjar; the Shafi'is hold that an insanity that comes later does not void it. The apostasy of the testator voids his bequest for the Hanafis and Malikis; the Malikis add that if he returns to Islam, a written bequest stands and an unwritten one does not. The apostasy of the legatee does not void it for the Shafi'is and some Malikis; the Malikis in the school hold it void. A bequest is not binding, so the testator may revoke it whenever he likes, following Umar's words that a man may change what he wills; al-Sha'bi, Ibn Sirin, Ibn Shubruma and al-Nakha'i allow him to change anything but manumission. Revocation is either express, as in saying I revoke my bequest, which is agreed, or by act: a sale, gift, alms or endowment of the thing, or an act on it such as slaughtering the sheep, spinning cotton or weaving thread, or any act that changes its name, such as grinding grain or making a board into a door, which the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis count as revocation; denying the bequest is not revocation for most jurists. A bequest is void when the legatee refuses it after the testator's death, when the legatee dies before the testator, by agreement, and, for the majority, when he dies after the testator without accepting; for the Hanafis the bequest stands. The killing of the testator by the legatee is disputed; a bequest is void when the thing bequeathed is specific and perishes before acceptance, or when it is shown to belong to another. A bequest to an heir is void unless the heirs consent, as explained earlier. The rule is that a bequest may not exceed a third of the estate where there is an heir; if the bequests exceed the third and the heirs do not consent, the legatees share the third in proportion to their bequests. For the Hanafis, when bequests are combined, God's rights are placed first: the obligatory acts of worship such as zakat and pilgrimage, then expiations, vows and zakat al-fitr, and voluntary acts; a bequest to people is not ranked unless by text, or unless it is manumission or a bequest of advantage. Where the legatees have equal claims, the third is shared equally in the Hanafi school; where one is bequeathed the whole estate and another a third, Abu Hanifa divides the third in two, while Abu Yusuf and Muhammad share it in four parts; Ibn Abidin accepts the imam's view. The Malikis rank some bequests above others when the third is too small: ransoming a captive, then the temporary manumission of a slave, then zakat, zakat al-fitr, expiation for zihar, homicide and oaths, then a vow; bequests in the same rank share. Where the bequests overflow the third and the heirs do not consent, the legatees share the third as creditors share a bankrupt's estate, and the Malikis give worked examples with a half, a third and a quarter. The Malikis include in such sharing the bequest to an unknown person together with a named one, giving the unknown a third in the calculation; Sahnun treats a bequest without a time limit as a third of the estate. For the Shafi'is, death-related gifts are apportioned from the third by value or amount, with no priority by sequence; manumission among them is apportioned by value, and a view gives it priority. For the Hanbalis the third is shared among the legatees in proportion to their bequests, and a report from Ahmad gives manumission first. Writing a bequest is recommended: begin with the basmala, praise, the testimony of faith, then call witnesses; the Companions are reported to write the basmala at the head of their wills. Proof of a bequest is by testimony and writing: the Hanafis and Shafi'is accept writing read to witnesses or acknowledged by the testator, and not bare handwriting; the Malikis accept the testator's hand with witnesses; the Hanbalis accept known handwriting proved by the heirs or evidence. When the estate is partly present and partly absent or in debts, the Hanafis and Hanbalis carry out the bequest from the present money up to the third; the Shafi'is hold the rest of a named thing in suspense until what is absent comes. Bequests may be by shares, by portions or both; one who bequeaths the equal of an heir's share gets, for most jurists, that share added to the case; the Malikis divide differently when the heirs consent, the Shafi'is and Hanbalis give the least heir's share where heirs differ. A bequest of the equal of one of the testator's sons is valid according to the Hanafis; if the son is not an heir, the majority give the legatee nothing, and the Malikis give the son's share if the testator said as if he were an heir. A bequest of a known fraction up to a third is computed by taking the fraction from the common base of the shares; if the remainder does not divide among the heirs, the heirs' base is multiplied by the base of the bequest or by a common factor, as the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis compute it, with three sons and a third as the example. For two or more fractions within the third, the bases are multiplied together to produce the base of both shares; the Malikis give an example with three sons and a sixth and a seventh, and the Shafi'is an example with two parents, an eighth and a fifth; the Hanbalis reduce the fractions to one common base. A bequest above the third that does not exhaust the estate needs the heirs' consent; if they consent the estate is divided by the shares, as in a half, a third and a quarter, where the base is twelve and the sum rises by one, which is agreed. When the heirs reject the excess over the third, the jurists differ on how the third is divided among the legatees. The Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad hold that the third is divided by the legatees' shares as though the heirs had consented, with two-thirds going to the heirs, and that it makes no difference whether a legacy exceeded the third. Abu Hanifa, Abu Thawr and Ibn al-Mundhir hold that the excess is void without consent, so a legatee of the excess counts only for the third, because a bequest of the excess was not valid and the preference carried inside it falls with it. Examples: a quarter and a half, rejected by the heirs, give three parts to the majority (two to the half-legatee, one to the quarter-legatee) and seven to Abu Hanifa (four and three). A third, a half and a quarter, rejected, give thirteen parts to the majority and eleven to Abu Hanifa. When the bequests exhaust the estate and the heirs consent, they behave like the fixed shares of 'awl, and each legatee takes a fixed part as if prescribed by God for an heir. If the heirs reject the excess, the majority divide the third among the legatees in proportion to their shares, while Abu Hanifa, Abu Thawr and Ibn al-Mundhir do not count a legatee above the third without consent. One example: all to Zayd and a third to Amr. With consent the division rises to four parts (three to Zayd, one to Amr); without consent the third is divided on four, and the base of the bequest is twelve by the majority view. The Hanafi figures for the case where the two sons do not consent (p.17343) are garbled in the scan, so they are not given here; the reading is doubtful and flagged. The third case is the combination of bequests of parts with bequests of shares. It has several forms: a bequest equal to an heir's share together with a fraction of the whole estate, a fraction of what remains after a share, and a share bequest with a part of the estate excepted. In the Hanafi example with two sons, one legatee gets a third and another an amount equal to one son's share; with both sons consenting the account runs from nine, so the third-legatee takes three and the rest is divided among the two sons and the share-legatee in thirds, giving each son two and the share-legatee two. If only one son consents, the account grows to a base of eighteen. The Shafi'is treat the share-legatee as one of the heirs when the bequest does not exceed the third; the Hanbalis have two views, the preferred one giving the share-legatee a third of the estate on consent, and the other giving him what a son receives. For a bequest of a part of what remains after a share, the Hanafi example of five sons gives a base of fifty-one: eight to the share-legatee, three to the legatee of a third of what remains, and eight to each son. The Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali examples on the next pages use unknown quantities and the method of correction; the figures are in the book's worked lines and are summarised here, not reproduced. A share bequest with an exception of part of the estate: the Hanbali example of one son and a bequest equal to his share except half the estate gives the legatee a quarter. For three sons and a bequest equal to one share except a seventh of the estate, the arithmetic is run on a base of sixty-three. The exception that accompanies shares and fractions comes in four kinds. First, a part of what remains after the share (five sons, base fifty-seven). Second, a part of what remains after the bequest (three sons, with the base of thirteen). Third, a part of what remains of a part after the bequest. Fourth, a part of what remains of a part of the estate after the share, with a base of thirty-nine for three sons. When the testator states an exception without saying whether it is after the share or after the bequest, there are two views. The first, which Ibn Qudama attributes to most jurists, reads it as after the share, because the share is what was named. The second reads it as after the bequest, which yields the larger exception and so the smaller legacy; the legacies are read on the surest minimum. This second view is that of most Shafi'is and is attributed by Ibn Qudama to Muhammad al-Shaybani and to the Basran jurists.

• Wasm (branding)

  Wasm (branding) in the lexicon is the mark left by a burn. Branding animals is lawful, and the Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold it sunna for the camels, cattle and sheep of zakat, of fay' and of the poll-tax; zakat animals are marked with a word such as "zakat" or "sadaqa" and poll-tax animals with "jizya". The mark goes on a firm, visible place, the ear for sheep and the thigh for camels and cattle. Branding the face is forbidden according to the preferred Shafi'i view, on the report that the Prophet cursed whoever branded a donkey's face; the Malikis, the weaker Shafi'i view and some Hanbalis regard it as disliked. Branding a human being is forbidden by consensus unless it is for treatment.

• Waswasa (whispering doubts and scrupulosity)

  Waswasa and wiswas in the lexicon mean a faint sound. In jurists' usage it has four senses: the passing thought and the hesitation within it; what Satan casts into a person's mind; the scruple that comes from excessive caution and scrupulousness, so that a person repeats an act many times; and the waswas, a man whose mind is disordered. A passing thought is forgiven to this community as long as no word or deed follows, so that a thought of theft or of divorce brings no sin and no divorce or vow takes effect, on the report that God overlooks for my community what its souls whisper. Repelling passing thoughts in prayer is lawful, and attentiveness is a virtue; Hanbali jurists differ on whether a prayer is void when whispering dominates it: Ibn Taymiyya says no, while Ibn Hamid and Ibn al-Jawzi say yes. Satanic whispering is repelled by remembrance of God, and al-Ghazali divides it into three kinds according to its source. Believers too suffer whispers of unbelief; Ibn Taymiyya holds that such a whisper that the believer hates and repels is a sign of pure faith, while one who answers it may fall into unbelief or hypocrisy. The scruple that comes from excess in caution is an exit from scrupulousness into rigidity; the jurists note that a matter not contested by two sound indicators is either clearly lawful or clearly forbidden, and that a bare imagined possibility carries no weight. Examples given include refusing marriage in a large city for fear of an unmentioned close relative, and the cases in the sunna of the woman who claimed to have suckled the groom and of the instruction to Sawda to veil from her half-brother. Al-Juwayni and Ibn al-Jawzi describe the practices of such people, including wasting water and washing clean clothes again and again, and note that the law is easy. The cause is a mistaken reading of the principle of caution and of avoiding doubtful things; the remedy is to follow the path of the early generations and avoid rigidity, as the Prophet warned against excess in religion and in ablution. Rules for the scrupulous person: a visible impurity is removed by peeling it off and the washes are counted as three for him; urinating where one bathes is disliked; sprinkling the private parts after cleansing is recommended by the Shafi'is and Hanbalis to cut off doubt, and the Hanafis allow that the one who is often troubled should sprinkle and then disregard any doubt. If doubt about the intention in ablution is mere imagination, the person continues without repeating; the Malikis hold that a scrupulous person's doubt counts as nothing; and a follower keeps pace with the imam and lags only for a real physical reason. A waswas who is out of his mind cannot divorce and his words cannot be apostasy; Ibn al-Qayyim reports this as agreed.

• Watan (homeland, fiqh)

  Watan, lexically, is a dwelling or the place where a person stays and settles; the folds of sheep, cattle and camels are also called watan. Technically it is the place where a person lives and settles, whether or not he was born there. The mahalla, the quarter where a people lives, is narrower than watan. The kinds of watan, by the rules that attach to them: the original homeland (watan asli), the residence homeland (watan iqama), and the dwelling (watan sukna). The original homeland: for the Hanafis, the place of a person's birth, marriage or settling; it is also called the family homeland or the homeland of nature. For the Shafi'is and Hanbalis it is the place where a person lives without leaving it in summer or winter except for a need; the Hanbalis in the sounder view add a town where he has a wife or married, on the saying of 'Uthman that whoever marries in a town should pray the prayer of the resident; one report of Ahmad includes a town where he has people or livestock. The Malikis define it as the place of a person's residence with the intention of staying for ever, and the place of a wife he has consummated with, however rarely he lives there. The residence homeland (iqama): for the Hanafis, the place a person goes to with the intention of staying for a period that cancels the rules of travel; the other jurists agree on the meaning and differ on the period. The dwelling (sukna): for the Hanafis, a place where a person means to stay for less than the period that cancels travel. Conditions: the original homeland needs permanent building in the customary way (Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis); the Hanafis treat the place of birth, marriage or settling as the original homeland. The residence homeland needs the intention to stay, the relevant period, the taking of the place, its fitness, and that it is not the person's original homeland; the dwelling needs no intention of staying and no actual stay for the period, and must not be an original homeland. What ends a homeland: for the Hanafis an original homeland ends only by moving to another with the family and leaving the old one; the Hanbalis hold it does not end by taking up another original homeland; a man with wives in two towns has two original homelands, which the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis agree. A residence homeland ends by an original homeland and by travel, and a dwelling ends by an original homeland, a residence and another dwelling. Rules attached to the homeland: shortening the prayer, combining prayers, breaking the Ramadan fast, the sacrifice, and the Friday and festival prayers. The resident in his original or residence homeland does not shorten the prayer, and one returning to his original homeland must complete the prayer from the moment he enters. For travellers the majority allow combining the noon and afternoon prayers and the sunset and night prayers, while the Hanafis deny this. A traveller may break the Ramadan fast while travelling; if the travel ends in the day he must abstain for the rest of the day and make up the days later. On the sacrifice: the Hanafis hold it obligatory and require residence for the obligation, while the majority hold it a sunna and do not require residence. Friday prayer: a traveller who ends his journey before the Friday prayer is held becomes obliged to attend it; the journey ends on entry into the original homeland in every case, and after that by residence in the residence homeland on its conditions. The festival prayers: obligatory for the Hanafis, a strong sunna for the Malikis and Shafi'is, and a communal obligation (fard kifaya) for the Hanbalis; the majority hold that residence or settlement is a condition of the obligation, against the Shafi'is, so the traveller is not obliged in the majority view. Transfer of zakat: all agree that the people of the town where the wealth and the payer are have the first claim; where the payer and the wealth are in different towns, the jurists differ on whether the town of the wealth or the town of the payer governs. A woman of the abode of war entering the abode of Islam: if she enters on safe conduct and marries a Muslim or a dhimmi, she becomes a dhimmi, since by residence she follows her husband, who is settled in the abode of Islam for ever. Banishing a stranger who commits adultery: the Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold that a stranger who commits adultery is exiled to a place other than his homeland; the Malikis say that if he commits it on arriving in the town he is imprisoned there, and if after settling with his people he is exiled to another town. Emigration from the homeland by those in the abode of war: its cases differ, some obliged, some recommended, others not obliged; detailed under emigration. Settling in the abode of war: a Muslim may not travel from the abode of Islam to the abode of war to settle there for ever. Travel to the abode of war for trade is disputed between forbidden, disliked and permitted, if he is not compelled to a forbidden act or an omitted duty; travel for a lawful purpose, such as ransoming a Muslim or carrying a message, is permitted.

• Wathiqa (documentary security for a right: witness, writing, pledge and surety)

  Wathiqa in the lexical sense is the making firm of a matter; technically it is what is taken to secure a right against loss through denial, forgetting, insolvency or other hazards. Its basis is the Qur'anic verses on debt and the Prophet's saying 'the guarantor is liable'. There are three kinds: witness against denial, pledge and surety against insolvency, and writing against forgetting. Most jurists hold the command to write a recommendation, not an obligation, since Muslims sell on deferred prices without writing or witness, while some, including al-Tabari, hold it obligatory. The purpose of writing and witness is that a debt whose payment is deferred suffers forgetting and denial. A pledge is property held as security for a debt, to be paid from its price if the debtor cannot pay; a surety joins the guarantor's liability to that of the debtor, so the right holds against both.

• Wazifa (office, stipend, fixed duty)

  Wazifa, lexically, is what is fixed of food, sustenance or work for a given time; it is also used for the daily litany of the recitation and for an office and a particular service, a later usage, and figuratively for the tithe and the land tax. Mihna is service and work, and wazifa is the wider term. First, wazifa as the work required of a person; it is either general (public) or particular. Public offices: the power to appoint to public offices belongs to whoever's commands are obeyed and whose supervision is valid: the sovereign who holds all affairs, the minister of delegation, or a governor of a general charge, such as a provincial governor. An appointee must be trusted in honesty, able to discharge the duty alone, and the best suited; the book cites a saying about appointing a man when others are better, noting that one of its transmitters is weak. At the appointment the work that falls to the officer must be defined, its rules and rights known, and the place where he works specified. The period of an officer's charge depends on the terms of appointment: a fixed term in months or years, a task that ends with its completion, or an unlimited charge. Al-Mawardi distinguishes whether the officer is bound when the pay is known and valid for a contract, from the case where pay is not so fixed. If the appointment is valid, a continuing charge (collecting revenue, judging) continues until dismissal, while a charge that ends (such as the division of spoils) lapses; a charge that recurs every year (such as the land tax) has two views: confined to the year of appointment, or read as continuing each year until dismissal, by custom. Particular offices: those tied to the contracts that the parties make, including endowments. In an endowment the ruler or any officer may not create an office that the founder's terms did not provide, nor spend from the endowment on it; whoever does so is a sinner, and the administrator who does so is dismissed; no one but the founder may dismiss the appointee except for a clear cause such as incapacity or betrayal. The wording of the appointment is express or allusive; appointment by word or by writing, when accompanied by evidence, is permitted, and the details are under the appointment heading. Wording of the appointment, continued: an appointment may be made in express or allusive words, by writing when the circumstances supply evidence, and in an immediate form. On conditional appointment: the Hanafis and one Shafi'i view opposite the sounder view allow it, citing the Prophet's appointment of Zayd, then Ja'far, then Ibn Rawaha at the battle of Mu'ta; the Malikis and Hanbalis are read to accept it in their statements. The sounder Shafi'i view forbids the conditioning of offices on a condition except in necessity, as in a bequest or a command. Buying an office for money: the Shafi'is, and one view of the Hanafis and Malikis, forbid it; the Hanbalis, the Hanafi view on which fatwas are given, one Maliki view (weak according to al-Hattab) and some Shafi'is such as al-Subki, permit it. Absence that leads to dismissal: the Hanafis distinguish. If the holder goes a journey's distance and returns, he forfeits what he would have received during the absence; if he stays in the countryside fifteen days or more without excuse he forfeits it, while an excuse such as seeking a living is pardoned unless the absence exceeds three months, when another may take the office; if he is in the town and does not occupy himself with religious learning, he may be dismissed. Where he appoints a deputy, no one else may take his office. The book cites al-Khassaf: if a custodian suffers an incapacity that prevents him from acting, he takes no pay, but if he can still speak, command, forbid, take and give, he takes it. Resigning an office: the Hanafis hold that a holder who dismisses himself is not dismissed until the judge is informed and appoints another. The Hanbalis hold that if a person resigns an office such as the imamate, preaching or teaching to one who is qualified, the resignee is not superseded; if the official with authority appoints him, the matter is complete; if not, the office stays with the resignor. Al-Ruhaybani gives the conditions for the resignation to be complete: acceptance by the appointee and approval by the authority. The children of officials after their death: the Hanafis hold that where a holder of an office in the public treasury, for the sake of religion and the strengthening of Islam, such as the imam's or muezzin's pay, dies leaving sons who perform the duty and maintain the same, they have the better claim to it; the details continue on the next page. The children of holders after their death: the Hanafis hold that where a holder of an office in the public treasury, for the sake of God's law and the strengthening of Islam, dies leaving sons who perform the duty, the imam may give the office to the sons and to no one else, to secure the purpose and to console them; al-Bayri says this is an accepted custom in the two holy cities, Egypt and Rum, where the sons are qualified. The holder's death before receiving his pay: if the work could not lawfully be hired for, as with sins, his claim lapses; if it could be hired for, he receives the pay for what he did and it passes as an inheritance. If the work is an act of worship, such as the call to prayer, the imamate, teaching the Qur'an or the pilgrimage, the jurists differ according to whether it may be hired for. Entitlement to pay for an office: an office is either a particular task or a public charge of the state, such as the emirate, judgeship, imamate, call to prayer or teaching the Qur'an. The jurists differ on taking pay for these; hiring for sins is forbidden by agreement. Detail is under hire. Al-Mawardi and Abu Ya'la say the pay of an agent has three cases: a named pay, which he earns if he does the work and loses part of if he neglects it or embezzles; an unnamed pay, which he earns at the wage of the like; and no pay named at all. In the last case the Shafi'i school view has him a volunteer with no pay; al-Muzani holds he has the wage of the like; Ibn Suraij distinguishes whether he is known for taking pay; Abu Ishaq al-Marwazi distinguishes whether he was called to the work. Abu Ya'la holds with Ibn Suraij, and where there is no fund to draw on the pay comes from the public treasury, from the share for public interests. The office as a daily litany: what a person sets himself each day or night of work; the details are under its own heading. The office as a levy on land: the jurists divide what is due on land into tithe and tax, and the land tax into the fixed tax and the sharing tax; the rules are under land reclamation and tax. The office as a daily allowance of food or sustenance: if it comes from the public treasury it is a sustenance, the measure being sufficiency; if it comes from another source, what the giver fixed governs, however little or much.

• Wazni (weighed goods)

  The lexical sense of wazni is what is measured by the balance, and kayli is what is measured by volume; both are fungible goods. Whether a good counts as weighed is disputed: most jurists (Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis and Hanafis other than Abu Yusuf) hold that what was weighed in the Prophet's time stays so, on the report that the weight is the weight of the people of Mecca and the measure that of Medina; Abu Yusuf holds that custom is decisive in every case. A good not fixed in the Prophet's time, or whose status is unknown, is judged by local custom at the place of sale, since neither the law nor the lexicon sets a standard for it; the Shafi'is have further views (measure by volume because most texts concern volumes, by weight because it is more exact, or by the standard of its origin). The weighed good named in the texts is gold and silver, and like them are earthly metals such as iron, copper, lead, glass and mercury, and silk, cotton, flax and wool with their yarn. Usury on weighed goods follows the disagreement about its ground in the named goods.

• Year-long residence of a widow as a bequest

  In his commentary on verse 240, Sha'rawi distinguishes two rulings: four months and ten days, which is obligatory for a widow, and a bequest the husband may make that she stay in his house for a full year, which no one may force her out of. If she leaves by her own choice there is no blame on her.

• Wilaya over property (fiqh)

  Authority over property (al-wilaya 'ala al-mal) is, in the jurists' usage, the capacity under the law to dispose of one's own property or of another's. It is linked to authority over the person, since both carry the power to execute an order over another. The cause of this authority, in al-Kasani's analysis, is in truth two things: fatherhood and judgeship. The paternal grandfather is a father through an intermediary; the executor of the father or grandfather derives his authority from them, so it is in substance the authority of fatherhood; the judge's executor derives his from the judge, so it is the authority of judgeship.

• Wilaya over the person (fiqh)

  Authority over the person is the power to supervise matters that concern the ward's own person. Its kinds are three: custody (hadana), guardianship proper (kafala), and marriage guardianship. Custody is keeping the child in his sleeping and in his going and coming, and caring for his food, clothing, bodily cleanliness and place. It is obligatory, since the child may perish or be harmed without it. When the child no longer needs the custodian, custody passes to a stage the jurists call kafala. Some say custody ends at discernment, and others that it continues to puberty under the name of custody. On when custody changes hands: the Shafi'is and Hanbalis let a sane boy of seven choose between his two eligible parents. The Hanafis have the father take him after seven, with a distinction between boy and girl. The Malikis keep custody with women until a boy's puberty and a girl's marriage. The Hanafis require for men's custody: agnation, so the nearest agnate precedes (the father, then the paternal grandfather, then the full and consanguine brothers and their sons, then the paternal uncles and their sons, in order); for a girl the cousin may not have her, since he is not her mahram; trustworthiness, so that if the agnates are not trustworthy the judge places her with a trustworthy woman; and unity of religion, so that an agnate of another religion has no right, though when the brothers differ in religion the Jewish brother prevails over the Muslim one, as they reported. Guardianship over a khuntha (a person of doubtful sex). The Shafi'is and Hanbalis treat the doubtful hermaphrodite after puberty like a virgin girl. The Hanafis hold that such a person is like a female in all rulings except specified matters, and custody is not among them. The Malikis hold that the mother's custody does not end while the child remains of doubtful sex. Guardianship of custody ends when the boy or girl reaches puberty, because they are then self-sufficient; the time differs when the ward is insane or non-discerning. Cases in which an adult boy remains under guardianship: for the Hanafis, if he is not trustworthy for himself, his father may take him to prevent sedition or disgrace; for the Malikis, a father may take in his adult son if he fears his squandering; for the Shafi'is and Hanbalis, an adult boy who is beardless or feared to live alone may be kept from leaving his parents. Marriage guardianship is in principle a guardianship of supervision (nazar). The capable supervising the incapable is reasonable and lawful, as a help in righteousness, a kindness and a relief to the weak. Its kinds are set out elsewhere.

• Wilaya (authority and guardianship, fiqh)

  Wilaya, with a kasra, in the language comes from the root wali, nearness; he is near to him, and one who takes up a matter is said to have governed it. With a fatha it means help and love. The guardian (wali) of an orphan, of a slain person, or of a woman is one who takes charge of their affairs. In the technical sense most jurists use wilaya as carrying out a word over another whether he wills it or not. It covers the supreme imamate, judgeship, the office of hisba (public order), the grievances court and the police, and the adult's management of the affairs of one who is still a minor. The word is also used for a husband's authority to discipline a rebellious wife, a father's to discipline a young son, and a teacher's over his pupils. The Malikis use wilaya for a bond that causes inheritance, in five kinds: wilayat al-Islam, which gives inheritance only when no other kind exists; wilayat al-hilf (alliance); wilayat al-hijra (migration), by which inheritance was given at the start of Islam and then abrogated, as were the alliance; wilayat al-qaraba (kinship); and wilayat al-'itq (manumission), by which inheritance stands. Ibn Rushd explains that the wilaya of Islam is general, by the verse of believers as protectors of one another; the wilaya of alliance was abrogated by the verse of the kin; the wilaya of migration was likewise abrogated; kinship by the verse of shares; and manumission gives inheritance where lineage fails. God's wilaya over believers means that He takes charge of them with love, guidance and help. Ibn al-Qayyim says it is general for every pious believer and special for one who keeps all God's rights. Related words: deputising (niyaba), which is one person standing in place of another in an act; wilaya is wider than it, so every deputising is a wilaya, but not every wilaya is a deputising. 'Amala, the fee of the collector of charity; the wali is wider than the collector. Qiwama, the custody and care of a matter; the custodian (qayyim) is the manager and administrator of a minor, an insane or a spendthrift, or of an endowment's property. Related words. Qiwama is narrower than wilaya and means keeping and preserving. Wasiya (guardianship after death) is the setting of another in one's place after death to look after the estate and the young children, and is narrower too. Wakala is the delegation of a disposal that admits delegation during one's life, and is narrower than wilaya. General authority (wilaya 'amma) is power to compel and carry out an act over another without his delegation, in matters of religion and the world, of persons and property, governing the public affairs of life, to secure benefits and avert harms. It is a religious and worldly office, instituted for three things: enjoining good and forbidding wrong, delivering trusts to their owners, and judging among people with justice. Its ranks run from the supreme imam down to his deputies and governors. By it armies are equipped, frontiers defended, taxes collected and spent where they belong, judges and governors appointed, the hudud and the discretionary penalties enforced, rebels suppressed, disputes settled, and guardians and custodians appointed and held to account. Ibn Taymiyya says the aim of all authority in Islam is that religion be wholly God's. The law makes the authority over people one of the greatest duties of religion, since people's interests are not secured without gathering, and gathering needs a head; hence the saying that when three go on a journey they should appoint one of them as leader. The common conditions of general authority. Islam is required by agreement, on the verses of Surat al-Nisa (verses 144 and 59, cited by number). Puberty is required by agreement, on the saying that the pen is lifted from three. Sanity is required without dispute. Freedom is required, so a slave does not hold it. Male sex is required by the majority, on the verse that men are guardians over women (Surat al-Nisa, verse 34) and the saying that a people who give their affairs to a woman will not prosper. Justice is required by the majority, and knowledge of the rulings by the majority; al-Samarqandi requires knowledge of the principles of religion and independent judgement in its branches, and reports that a scholar of his time held that this would mean that no imam could hold office, so that a man can rely on others for what he lacks. Bodily soundness: the holder must hear, see and speak, since a defect in these senses prevents full action; al-Juwayni says that loss of sight, hearing or speech prevents rising to urgent matters. Opinion and capacity. These differ with each office: what is needed in the supreme imamate (political, military and intellectual ability, firmness, compassion and shrewdness) is not required of lesser offices. The Prophet told Abu Dharr: 'you are weak, and it is a trust', and said: 'when trust is lost, await the hour'. Choosing the best when the ideal is absent. When all the conditions cannot be met, the appointment of holders is not suspended; the most suitable is chosen, since necessity permits what is forbidden, and keeping some interests is better than losing all. Al-'Izz ibn 'Abd al-Salam says that if justice were absent from all people, the interests of judges, caliphs and governors could not be suspended, and the best of the corrupt would be chosen. Necessity also requires striving to reform matters until the conditions are completed. The duties of the holder of general authority vary with the office. He must keep to the law of Islam in word, deed and conduct, since he is an example; and he must discharge trusts, as the verse of Surat al-Nisa (verse 58) commands. The Prophet said: 'No servant whom God appoints over a flock dies on the day he dies while deceiving them without God forbidding him Paradise.' He also said: 'Whoever appoints a man from a group while in it is one more pleasing to God has betrayed God and His Messenger.' So whoever holds any part of the affairs of Muslims must appoint in each place the most suitable and most capable he can find. Ibn Taymiyya says that turning from the most entitled to another for kinship, clientage, friendship, shared town or school, race, bribery or grudge is betrayal of God, His Messenger and the believers. He holds that the discharge of trust rests on three things: fear of God, not selling His signs for a small price, and not fearing people. Justice is God's balance on earth and the support of religion and the world. The jurists say that when authority is accompanied by justice it is among the best acts of obedience; a just imam, ruler or judge has a greater reward than all others, and unjust rulers bear the greatest burden. The sum of just governance is the delivery of trusts to their owners and judging with justice. Enjoining good and forbidding wrong is the purpose of all authority. It is an obligation on each capable person, and becomes an individual obligation on the capable one when no one else undertakes it; those in power bear more of it. Offices differ: some are like a trusted witness, required to be truthful, and others like a trusted commander, required to be just. Consulting people of knowledge, judgement and experience is obligatory for the holder of general authority, on the verse that he should consult them in the matter (Surat al-Shura, verse 38, cited by number). Ibn Khuwaz Mindad said that rulers must consult the scholars where they do not know or where religious matters are unclear, the commanders in war, the notables on public interests, and the scribes and governors on the good of the lands. Caring for the needs of the community is an obligation in every office, on the saying that whoever God gives authority over Muslims and shuts himself off from their needs, poverty and wants, God shuts Himself off from his needs. Al-Qarafi says that authority is for securing pure or preponderant benefit and averting pure or preponderant harm. The rights of the holder of authority include obedience in what is good, agreed upon, on the verse 'obey those in authority among you' and the saying 'hearing and obedience are due to the Muslim in what he likes and dislikes, unless he is ordered to sin'. Rebellion against a just ruler is agreed to be forbidden; rebellion against an unjust one is disputed. Advising him is obligatory, on the saying 'religion is sincere counsel... to the leaders of the Muslims and their common folk'; it should be gentle and private, not public censure. The holder has a right to a stipend from the public treasury sufficient for him and his dependants, by analogy with the zakat collector, since he devotes himself to the interests of Muslims, and so that he is not driven to bribery or unlawful gain. The kinds of general authority differ with regions, eras and customs, and the jurists count more than twenty. They include the supreme imamate, the great leadership in guarding religion and governing the world as deputy of the Prophet, called 'great' to distinguish it from leading the prayer; the vizierate, a legal authority the imam gives to a trusted man, in two kinds, delegated and executive; and the judgeship, whose reality is declaring the legal ruling with binding force and settling disputes, with partial kinds such as a supervisor of marriage contracts only or of orphans' affairs only. The mazalim (grievances) authority. Al-Mawardi says it is the leading of wrongdoers to fairness through awe, and the restraint of disputants from denying one another's rights through dignity. Its holder must be of high rank, obeyed, of great presence, clearly chaste, little greedy and very pious. Those who already hold general powers, such as ministers and amirs, need no separate appointment; others need one. The amirate (imara) has two kinds. The chosen amirate (istikfa') is made by the imam, general over a town or region or specific to the army's command, the protection of the realm and the defence of its honour, without judgement, taxes or alms. The seized amirate (istila') is made by the imam out of necessity, when a commander has taken a land by force and the caliph gives him its command. The police (shurta) are the sultan's aides. Ibn al-Amin al-Qurtubi gives them two tasks: helping the judges in imprisonment and release, and investigating crimes and carrying out the hudud. Ibn Khaldun notes the title varies by land (hakim, sahib al-madina, wali). Taj al-Din al-Subki says the police may investigate public wrongs such as wine and hashish and stop their pretext, and cover those whom God has covered, but may not spy on people or raid their houses on rumour; they should send a trusted man in secret to forbid the wrong only as far as God has forbidden it. Ibn Taymiyya calls this the 'lesser war' (wilayat al-harb al-sughra), to distinguish it from the 'greater war', which he describes as the deputising of the sultanate. Its purpose is to prevent corruption on earth and suppress the wicked and aggressive. He says that in his time in the Levant and Egypt it covered the hudud involving bodily harm and judgement in disputes, while in the Maghrib the governor only carries out what the judge orders. The hisba is enjoining good when it is abandoned and forbidding evil when it is committed. It is a religious office like prayer, giving fatwas, judgeship and jihad. It is of two kinds: an original office from the lawgiver, binding on everyone asked, and a delegated one, given by the caliph or amir, held by the muhtasib. The amirate of jihad is only against polytheists, and is of two kinds: one limited to army policy and the conduct of war, and one that includes the division of booty and the making of treaties. If it is made for a single campaign, the amir may not undertake another; if it is general, he must renew campaigns year by year. Authority over wars for the public good is against non-polytheists: apostates, rebels and highwaymen. The office of collecting charity is limited to zakat funds; its holder must know the rules, the amounts, the kinds of property and the payers, and be gentle and vigilant. Special authority (wilaya khassa) has three forms: the compulsory deputising over a minor's person and property (guardianship over the person and over property), the authority of the administrator of an endowment over its property, and the authority the law gives the kin of a slain person to exact retaliation or to pardon it for blood-money, on the verses and sayings 'whoever is slain wrongly, We have given his heir authority' and 'the kin of the slain have the choice of two things'. The first is the common meaning in the jurists' usage. Special authority passes to the general authority when its holders are absent, on the saying 'the sultan is the guardian of him who has no guardian'; the sultan exercises it himself or through his deputies, such as governors and judges, since the deputies stand in his place. Special authority prevails over general authority, since it is stronger. Thus the endowment administrator prevails over the judge, and the guardian of an orphan prevails over the judge; the judge may not dispose of an orphan's property while the father's executor exists, nor marry an orphan except when there is no guardian or the guardian refuses. The holder of special authority may pardon retaliation free of charge, and the imam may not. If the judge leases an endowed shop to one man and the administrator leases it to another, the administrator's lease stands. The general authority nonetheless supervises all, and may audit the executors, supervisors and administrators, and remove the dishonest among them, even if the donor or founder stipulated against his interference. Hanafi exceptions: the administrator may not appoint officers for the endowed purposes unless the founder stipulated it, but the judge may; the judge may lend an orphan's property without the father or executor. Ibn al-Qasim of the Malikis says that if the sultan marries an adult woman while her guardian is present, the marriage stands and is not annulled. Special authority over property is of two kinds: the authority over one's own property (qasira, proper to any fully capable person) and authority over another's property (muta'addiya), which is either original, given by the lawgiver (the father's or grandfather's authority over a minor's property), or deputising, such as the executor or agent. It is established over those under restraint: the minor, the insane, the imbecile, the spendthrift and the inattentive, and lasts while the cause remains. The minor is one who has not reached puberty, male or female; he is discerning or not discerning. The insane is one whose reason is gone so that his words and acts do not go right, and it is permanent or intermittent; his acts while insane are void, and while sane are valid. The imbecile has little understanding and disordered speech but does not strike or curse; he may be like a non-discerning or a discerning minor. The spendthrift squanders his property against reason or the law, from a levity of joy or anger. The Shafi'is, Malikis, Hanbalis and the two companions of Abu Hanifa allow him to be placed under restraint, while Abu Hanifa does not. The prodigal and the inattentive (dhu al-ghafla), who is cheated for his simplicity, are treated like the spendthrift in restraint. Who holds authority over the property of those under restraint? The Hanafis give the order: the father, his executor, the executor's executor, the grandfather, his executor, the executor's executor, the judge, and then the judge's appointee; the order follows compassion, which is greatest in the father. The mother, the brother and the uncle have no authority over a minor's property, since a brother's or uncle's compassion is deficient and women's judgement is weak. The Malikis: the father, his executor, the executor's executor, then the judge or his executor. The Shafi'is: the father, then the grandfather, then the executor of the later of them, then the judge or his trustee; the mother does not act in the sounder view, though the opposite view lets her act. The Hanbalis: the father, his executor, then the judge, then his trustee in his absence; neither the grandfather nor the mother has authority. What the guardian may do. He may act only with care, precaution, and in what benefits the ward, on the saying 'no harm and no reciprocal harm'. He may not make a gift without return, a bequest, a charity, a manumission, or give an undue favour in an exchange, and he must compensate what he gave away. A gift for a return is, by Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf, not valid; by Muhammad and the Hanbalis, valid. He may trade with the ward's property, give it in partnership for a fixed share of profit, sell it on credit where useful, deposit it with a trusted person, buy real estate for it at the value or less, sell and lease his property at its value or better, and appoint another for all of this. Lending the ward's money. The Hanafis and Malikis forbid it, since a loan removes ownership without an immediate return, unlike the judge who lends to preserve the debt. The Shafis allow it where he fears plunder, fire or drowning, to a trusted solvent person. The Hanbalis allow it for a reason such as travel, and prefer a surety or pledge. He may claim the ward's rights, prove them, make the opponent swear, and compromise on a part of a debt where there is evidence, and collect part of what is due to the ward where there is none. Buying or selling the ward's property to oneself. The Malikis allow the father to buy his minor son's property for himself and sell his own to the son if it benefits the son; the Shafis allow it only to the father and grandfather; the Hanbalis and Zufar forbid it except for the father; the Hanafis allow the father to buy at the value or the usual range, and allow the executor of the father to buy for himself where it is clearly better; Muhammad forbids it. The guardian eating from the ward's property. The Hanafis allow the executor a customary wage for his work if he is in need, by istihsan; some forbid it. The Malikis forbid the rich guardian and allow the poor one his sufficiency in what is customary, on the verse 'whoever is poor, let him eat in what is customary'. The Shafis give the poor guardian the lesser of wage and maintenance. The Hanbalis allow the lesser of the customary wage and his sufficiency, except for the judge and his trustee. Al-Jassas forbids it altogether. Must the poor guardian repay what he ate when he becomes rich? The majority say no, since it is a return for his work. Abu al-'Aliya, 'Ubayda al-Salmani and the Shafi'i view opposite the sounder one say he must pay it. The guardian must maintain the ward and his dependants from the ward's property, in what is customary, without extravagance or meanness. Developing an orphan's property. Three views. The first, the majority's: the guardian may trade with it and develop it, since that is better for the orphan, but he may not trade with it for himself; Malik says 'no harm in trade with orphans' property where the guardian is trusted', and 'Umar said 'trade with the property of orphans, so that charity does not consume it'. The second, the sounder Shafi'i view: it is obligatory to develop it to the extent of the maintenance and zakat, where possible. The third, of al-Jassas and some Shafis and Ibn Taymiyya: it is recommended, not obligatory, on the verse 'say: to set them right is good'; Ibn Taymiyya says it is recommended. Guardianship over the person is authority over the ward's personal affairs: marriage, teaching, medical care and employment. Its causes are three: minority, insanity (and imbecility, which follows it), and femaleness. Guardianship over the person, as the jurists use it, is authority over a minor's or another incapable person's personal affairs, such as marriage, teaching, medical care and employment. Its causes are three: minority, insanity (with imbecility, which follows it), and femaleness. Guardianship of upbringing and discipline. It rests on the responsibility of parents for their children's worldly and eternal affairs, on the verse 'save yourselves and your families from a fire' and the saying 'each of you is a shepherd and each is responsible for his flock'. Al-Nawawi says the father must teach his son what he needs of religious duties, a duty on the father and every guardian before puberty. Al-Ghazali says a child is a trust with his parents and his heart accepts any impression. The saying is: 'Command your children to pray at seven years old, strike them for it at ten, and separate them in their beds.' The majority give the authority of discipline to the father, the mother, the grandfather, the executor and the custodian appointed by the judge: they command the child to do the acts of obedience and forbid him the forbidden, and discipline him first by speech, then warning, then rebuke, then beating; the lighter is not passed over for the heavier while the lighter achieves the purpose. Beating must be likely to bring the benefit, must not be severe or painful, and must avoid the face and the lethal parts. The Hanafis confine it to the hand and not beyond three strokes. Among the duties of guardianship over minors are their health and their care, and their training in whatever knowledge or crafts they are fit for, paid from their property, and the letting of a discerning minor's labour within what is customary, according to the majority. Guardianship in marriage. The father has the authority to marry his minor son and daughter, by agreement of the four schools; the others differ. The Hanafis allow the grandfather and the brother to marry them, with the right to choose on reaching puberty; the Hanbalis deny it to anyone but the father. An insane person has a guardian who manages his affairs, feeds him, treats him and restrains him where his harm is feared. He may be married if it serves his interest; if he has lucid intervals he may not be married without his consent. Femaleness is a cause of guardianship over the person and is confined to two things: a woman's marriage, and the discipline of a wife in rebellion. Guardianship in marriage is either compulsion (ijbar) or choice (ikhtiyar). The cause of compulsion: the Malikis, Shafi'is and, in the sounder Hanbali view, hold it is virginity, so the guardian may compel a virgin adult sane woman. The Hanafis hold that the cause is minority, so he may not compel an adult sane woman; Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim agree. A woman marrying herself. The Shafis, Malikis and Hanbalis hold that a marriage is not valid without a guardian, and a woman may not marry herself or delegate a non-guardian to marry her. Abu Hanifa does not require a guardian for a free adult sane woman, who may conclude her own marriage or appoint whom she wishes. A view reported from Ibn Sirin, al-Qasim ibn Muhammad, al-Hasan ibn Salih and Abu Yusuf is that it is not valid without the guardian's permission, and if she does it, it stands on his consent. Obstructing (adl): the guardian's refusal to marry a woman to a suitable man when she asks and he wants her; the effect is the transfer of the guardianship to another. The husband's disciplinary authority. The jurists hold that the marriage contract carries the husband's authority to discipline his wife if she disobeys and is rebellious, on the verse 'those from whom you fear rebellion, admonish them, leave them in the beds, and strike them'. He first admonishes her gently, then leaves her in the bed, then strikes her lightly as far as it corrects her. The authority of the endowment's administrator is a special authority that requires the execution of words over another. It is a right established by law over every endowed thing, which needs a hand to keep it, maintain it, let it, collect its yield and spend it on its purpose by the founder's terms. It is original, for the founder, the beneficiary or the judge, or derivative, by stipulation, delegation or appointment. Only a trustworthy and capable person is appointed. The authority of God. Ibn al-Qayyim says it is general, the authority of every pious believer, according to his faith and piety (cited: 'God is the protector of the believers'; 'God is the protector of those who believe; He brings them from darkness to light'); and special, the performance of all God's rights, preferring Him over everything else. Ibn Taymiyya says that a believer who wrongs himself has of God's authority in proportion to his faith and piety. Al-Shawkani says that the friends of God are sincere believers, who have drawn near to God by obedience. Al-Ghanimi says the wali in the passive sense is one whom God keeps and does not leave to himself, and in the active sense one who performs worship and obedience. Their being free of slips is not infallibility, which is for prophets alone, but God preserves them from persisting in error. The difference between the friend of God (wali) and the prophet. Prophets are infallible by necessity; friends of God are not, and may commit sins, but a friend of God is kept from persisting in them. One must believe all that prophets report and obey what they command; the words of a friend of God are weighed against the Book and the Sunna. Prophets receive revelation; the friend follows the prophet, and one who claims prophecy is an enemy of God. Prophecy ended with our Prophet; friendship lasts until the Hour. Whoever reviles a prophet is an unbeliever; whoever reviles a friend is not, unless he contradicts a root of faith. Muslims agree that prophets are better than friends who are not prophets, and Ibn Taymiyya says the best friends of God are His prophets, the best of them the messengers of firm resolve, and the best of these our Prophet. The criterion distinguishing the friends of the Merciful from the friends of the devil is not marvels, since these may happen at the hands of enemies. It is the qualities, acts and states that the Book and the Sunna describe: whoever follows them has marvels that are of the Merciful; whoever does not has states that are of the devil. Ibn al-Qayyim's test is what the servant does in word, deed and state, examined in his prayer, love of the Sunna and its people, and his call to God and His Messenger. Karama (a grace) is, in the definition of Ibn 'Abidin, the appearance of a marvel contrary to custom at the hands of a servant of evident righteousness who follows a prophet, with sound belief and good works, not accompanied by a claim of prophecy. Sunni scholars hold it lawful and actual; the Mu'tazilis deny it. The difference between karama and miracle (mu'jiza). A miracle is accompanied by a challenge, and the prophet must show it, since people must know his truth; a karama is not accompanied by a challenge and the friend should hide it. The proof of a miracle is certain, and of a karama probable; no one knows for certain that the one who has it is a friend of God. A miracle proves the prophet's infallibility and the duty to follow him; a karama proves neither. Some jurists hold that a karama cannot reach a miracle in kind or greatness; others hold that whatever may be a prophet's miracle may be a friend's karama, but that a miracle is accompanied by a claim of prophecy. Marvels before the mission are called irhas (foundations), not miracles; a friend's karama is also a miracle of the prophet, since the friend is of his community and is a friend only if he believes and obeys the messenger. A marvel that happens at the hands of an evident sinner and agrees with his claim is called istidraj (leading on); at the hands of a false claimant to prophecy it is called humiliation (ihana). Ibn Taymiyya says that the Antichrist's marvels prove no friendship or Islam; one must stop at God's command and prohibition.

• Wilayat al-'ahd (designation of a successor, fiqh)

  The designation of a successor (wilayat al-'ahd) in the technical sense is the imam's appointment, during his life, of one person to be imam of the Muslims after him. It is one of the ways in which the imamate is established. It is done by the imam naming a person and saying 'I have entrusted him to you' ('ahidtu ilayhi'), as Abu Bakr named 'Umar in a letter. Its conditions: the imam must have the qualities of the imamate; the designated person must accept during the imam's life; acceptance must be later than the designation; and the imam must seek the most suitable person. The succession may pass to more than one, in order. If the first dies during the imam's life, the second succeeds; if the imam dies while three are living and the first has taken the office, he may designate someone other than the last two. If the imam designates no one, the electors may not choose anyone but the second. Consent of the people who bind and loose is not required. If the imam makes the matter a consultation among a group, as 'Umar did among six Companions, the effect is like designation; the consultative group may not name a successor before the imam dies unless he permits it. The imam may bequeath the succession to one he sees as suitable, and if the designee asks to be excused after accepting, he is not removed until he is excused and another is found. The designation of an absent person is valid if his life is known. The imam may change the designated successor, since the office has come to him, but the successor may not transfer it to another, nor remove himself except by agreement with the imam.

• Guardianship over an orphan's property

  Al-Sha'rawi holds that the property of an orphan or of a person unable to manage it is run with wisdom and guardianship. A foolish person is not handed his wealth. The orphan is tested for maturity before his property is delivered, the delivery is witnessed, a poor guardian may take a customary share, and wasteful spending of an orphan's money is condemned.

• Wirk (the hip; tawarruk and retaliation)

  Wirk (hip) in the lexicon is the joint between the thigh and the leg; a person has two, above the thighs, and the technical sense does not depart from this. Sitting with the hip down (tawarruk) in the tashahhud is recommended in general. The Malikis apply it to every sitting in prayer; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis to the final tashahhud; the Hanbalis do not apply it to prayers with only one tashahhud, such as dawn and Friday prayers; the Hanafis prescribe spreading the leg (iftirash) for men and tawarruk for women. The Hanbalis differ on tawarruk in the tashahhud after forgetfulness prostrations; al-Qadi applies it in every such tashahhud. On retaliation, the jurists agree in general that a leg cut at its root in the hip is subject to retaliation, since equal cutting is possible, once the general conditions for retaliation on limbs are met. On the blood-money for a leg cut at the hip there is disagreement: the majority of Malikis and Hanbalis and Abu Yusuf hold that the full sum of fifty camels applies, as in the report of Amr ibn Hazm; Abu Hanifa, Muhammad, the Shafi'is and al-Qadi among the Hanbalis add an assessed compensation for the part above the ankles to the sum for the foot. When a leg is cut at the ankle and then at the knee or hip, an assessed compensation is owed for the second cut by agreement.

• Wisaya (executorship)

  In the lexicon wisaya means to commission someone to act after one's death; one can say he bequeathed something to him, or made him his executor. Technically it is the commission to act after death. It differs from the bequest, which is a gift attached to the time after death made by way of a voluntary act; and from agency, which operates in life, while wisaya is after death; authority is the broader term. Its ruling for the testator: it is obligatory when it is for returning wrongful takings and unknown debts, or for young children when their loss is feared; it is recommended for paying a known debt, carrying out bequests and caring for children not at risk of loss. The appointee may accept if he is able and trusts himself. There are two kinds of executor: the judge's executor, appointed by the judge to look after a minor's money, and the testator's executor, chosen by the father, grandfather or one holding their right. The Hanafis list differences between them; for example, the testator's executor may, on Abu Hanifa's view, sell to himself where there is clear benefit, which the judge's executor may not do. The judge appoints an executor in several cases named by the Hanafis, including a debt owed to or by the deceased, carrying out a will, a minor child, and a minor or absent heir. If an executor cannot carry out his duties, the Hanafis, Hanbalis and Shafi'is let the judge add another to help him where the executor was appointed by the father or grandfather; if he proves dishonest or dissolute, he is removed in the view of the four schools, and the judge appoints another. An executor is either a volunteer, which is a pure trust, or paid: by contract, a binding hire that can be paid from the estate, or without contract, a reward whose amount is set by the work done. Wisaya has four pillars: the executor, the testator, the thing entrusted and the formula. The executor must be sane, a Muslim where the ward is Muslim, and able to act; the disputed cases are a minor, a woman, a blind man, a dishonest person, a slave and an unbeliever. Under the executor's rank for a minor's guardianship, the Hanafis put the father, then his executor, then the grandfather, and so on; the Malikis and Hanbalis put the father, his executor, then the judge; the Shafi'is do not allow a father to appoint an executor while the grandfather is present. The testator must be sane and of age, free according to the majority, and in the view of the Malikis and Hanbalis of sound judgement; the Shafi'is require him to be just, and he must hold authority over the ward. The thing entrusted must be a known act the testator may do, such as paying debts or looking after a child. The formula requires offer and acceptance; a dumb person's clear sign suffices. Acceptance or refusal may be made in the testator's lifetime according to the detailed views, and the Shafi'is in the preferred view only after death. Making the appointment conditional or time-limited is permitted by agreement. A full account of the executor's duties follows in the next part of this headword. On the duties of the executor: where the appointment is unrestricted, he must keep and grow the minor's money, spend on him in a reasonable way and pay the dues owed on it, and his authority is measured by the testator's. The Hanafis list his duties as preparing the dead and buying the shroud, meeting the children's needs, returning deposits and paying debts, returning usurped goods, selling what may perish, carrying out a named bequest and pursuing claims for the deceased. The Malikis allow him to collect a debt or defer it in the interest of the ward, to spend on the child reasonably, to pay the zakat al-fitr, and to hand money out on mudaraba or as capital. The Shafi'is name four duties: keeping the principal, growing the yield, spending reasonably, and paying the dues on the money; trading the ward's money is recommended under four conditions. Dues owed to God include zakat al-fitr and the tithes; Abu Hanifa dropped the zakat on property except from an adult of sound mind. Dues to people include debts, which the executor must pay when proven and demanded, and damages, which are paid from the money or, for homicide by mistake, by the kin. Hanbalis list his duties as paying debts, carrying out the bequest, looking after non-responsible persons, returning deposits and usurped goods, and the hadd for slander. On zakat al-fitr for a minor the Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis, Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf hold it due from the minor's money, while Muhammad and Zufar do not allow the executor to pay it. On sacrifice for a minor, Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf require it of a well-off executor, the Malikis recommend it, the Hanbalis allow it from large means, and the Shafi'is and Muhammad and Zufar forbid it from the minor's money. Dispositions: real estate is sold only for need or a clear benefit, movables may be sold to an outsider at market price; self-dealing is forbidden by the majority. Trade with the ward's money takes three forms: trade for himself, trade for the ward, and handing it out on mudaraba. The Hanafis and Malikis forbid self-trade, and Abu Hanifa and Muhammad make the executor guarantee the capital and give the profit in alms. Trade for the ward is allowed by the Hanafis, Shafi'is and the Hanbali school, and forbidden by a Maliki view and a Hanbali face. Mudaraba with the ward's money is lawful, recommended by most, obligatory in the Shafi'i view. Hiring out the ward is lawful for others, and the executor hiring the ward himself is treated in detail after puberty; leasing the ward's land for a long term is not valid in the Hanafi view. Contracts made before puberty are discussed: the Hanafis let the ward dissolve nothing made over his property; the other schools distinguish by what the executor knew of the age. The four schools forbid any gift, alms or bequest from the ward's money, as pure harm. Selling it for a return has three views. On claims of pre-emption: where it helps the ward, the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis allow it and the Shafi'is and Hanbalis, with Muhammad and Zufar, make it obligatory; where leaving it helps him, it may be left. Where taking and leaving are equally good, the Shafi'is have three views: forbidden, obligatory, or optional. Borrowing from the ward for oneself is forbidden by the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis; lending his money to others is allowed only in need or necessity. Pledging the ward's money for a debt of his own is forbidden by the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is, and by the Hanbali school. On a dispute over expenses the executor's oath is accepted in ordinary expenses by the four schools; the Hanafis list twelve matters where his word stands without proof. On a dispute over the period of expenses or the date of the testator's death, the ward's word is accepted by the Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis and Muhammad, and Abu Yusuf accepts the executor's. On handing the money back after puberty there are three views: the ward's word (Malikis in the preferred view, Shafi'is), the executor's oath (Hanafis), and the Hanbalis who distinguish a volunteer from a paid executor. The executor's fee: if the father or the judge fixed one, both rich and poor may take it; a rich executor without a fixed fee takes nothing; a poor one may take it under limits in the Hanafi preference, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali views. Appointing a further executor when none was named is allowed by the Hanafis, Malikis and a Hanbali report, and refused by the Shafi'is and the Hanbali school. An executor's acknowledgement of a debt against the dead is void for the Hanafis and Hanbalis, unless the acknowledger is an heir. The testimony of two executors for a minor heir is void for the Hanafis; for an adult heir it is not accepted in the estate, and is accepted outside it. The headword continues beyond p.17257; the remaining part is to be read in a later batch. Testimony of an executor for someone in his charge is refused by the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis in the preferred view, as an interested party; a Shafi'i may testify for another in matters where he holds a named trust. His testimony against the ward is accepted by the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis in the preferred view, and refused by the Hanafis and a Hanbali report. On appointing an agent, the Hanafis, some Shafi'is and a Hanbali method allow him to appoint an agent for anything he may do; the Malikis, the Shafi'i standard view and the Hanbali school forbid it where custom has him do the act himself. An executor's acknowledgement on behalf of the ward is not valid in the four schools, since it binds another. Depositing the ward's money: the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis allow it where it benefits the child; the Shafi'is deposit or lend only for fear of theft, fire, drowning or travel, to a trustworthy person, and prefer a loan to a trustworthy solvent debtor. Lending out the ward's money as a loan of use is forbidden by most jurists as a gift; some Hanafis allow it by discretion, since it follows from trade. Mixing the executor's money with the ward's: the Hanafis allow it when it is more useful, the Malikis for ease, the Hanbalis if it is easier, and the Shafi'is only for food needed for cooking. Division by the executor on behalf of heirs or the legatee: the Hanafis allow him to divide on behalf of the heirs with a legatee of a third, but not the reverse; the Malikis forbid dividing for an absent party without a judge; the Shafi'is forbid him to divide a common share on his own; the Hanbalis allow it. The executor's liability: a measure that clearly serves the ward is valid; one that does not serve him makes him liable; his hand is that of a trustee, liable only for transgression or neglect. Dismissal: the executor may dismiss himself during the testator's life, and he is removed by losing a condition of executorship.

• Wizara (vizierate and the minister's office)

  Wizara (vizierate) in the lexicon derives from burden, support or refuge, and is a kind of authority: the minister is a helper, an adviser and a refuge in trouble. The Qur'an reports Moses asking God for a minister from his family, Aaron, and the sunna reports the saying that the Prophet's ministers in heaven are Gabriel and Michael and on earth Abu Bakr and Umar; a report from Aisha says that God gives a ruler a true minister when He wishes him well. Al-Mawardi argues that if a minister is lawful for a prophet it is more so for an imam, who cannot manage the community's affairs alone. There are two kinds: the minister of delegation, the first office after the caliphate, who holds whatever authority the caliph holds; and the minister of execution, weaker in authority, who carries out and transmits the ruler's orders. A minister of delegation must be a Muslim, a man, sound in mind and judgement (some say mature at forty), just, trustworthy in money, able to exercise independent judgement in religion though not at the level of the fully qualified jurist, capable in administration, sound in senses, brave, and not engaged in trade. Appointment requires an express words conferring general authority and asking for deputyship; a bare permission or an ambiguous phrase does not suffice. A minister of delegation has general authority, such as appointing judges and governors, raising troops, disbursing funds and sending armies, except the designation of an heir, resignation from the imamate, and dismissal of the one who appointed him. Two ministers of delegation cannot be appointed with equal general power: if they are joined, they act only on what both agree; if each has a separate field, they are governors of a limited task rather than ministers of delegation. The minister must consult the imam in grave matters and report his decisions; he chooses assistants by the legal qualities and watches over their work. The executive minister needs trustworthiness, honesty, moderate greed, freedom from enmity, memory, intelligence, freedom from desire and experience; he need not be a jurist, since he does not judge. Al-Mawardi and Abu Ya'la allow a non-Muslim as executive minister, al-Juwayni refuses, and Umar rebuked Abu Musa for employing a Christian secretary. The appointment is a revocable contract: the ruler may dismiss either minister, a minister of delegation may dismiss his own executive minister, and either may resign; a minister is dismissed for proven betrayal, negligence or incapacity, or moved to a lighter post.

• Wudu' (ablution, fiqh)

  Wudu' (from wada'a, to be fair and clean) is the act, and the water used for it, in the lexical sense. The jurists define it: the Hanafis as washing and wiping specified members; the Malikis as a water purification of four members in a specific way; the Shafi'is as specific acts opened by intention; and the Hanbalis as using pure water on the four members in the prescribed way, in order and in succession. Ghusl is washing the whole body in a specific way. Both wudu' and ghusl remove a ritual impurity, the minor and the major. Tahara is the wider term for removing impurity and removing its effect. Tayammum is wiping the face and hands with clean earth or sand in a specific way, and it serves for either impurity. Most jurists hold that wudu' belongs to earlier revelations, and that what is peculiar to this community is its specific manner or the mark of wudu', the white marks on the limbs on the Day of Resurrection, citing accounts of the prophets and of Sarah and Jurayj. A Maliki view, the opposite of the sounder Shafi'i view, and some Hanafis hold that wudu' itself is peculiar to this community. Wudu' was made obligatory in Mecca along with prayer; the preposition 'with' refers to place, not time. Its legal basis is the Qur'an, the sunna and consensus. The verse of sura al-Ma'ida (cited by sura and aya) is taken by some as the proof of obligation, while most read it as addressed to those who are in a state of impurity when they rise to pray. The sunna includes the saying that no prayer is accepted without purity. The people of biography agree that it was made obligatory in Mecca through Gabriel's teaching, and the community agrees on its legality and obligation. Denial of its obligation for prayer is disbelief; for other purposes, such as touching the mushaf, the Hanafis do not count it as disbelief, because the verse is disputed. Whoever deliberately leaves wudu' and prays in a state of impurity: the Hanafis say one who makes light of religion is a disbeliever, as in deliberately praying without wudu'; the Malikis say he is killed for abandoning purity like prayer; the Shafi'is say he is asked to repent and killed as a hadd punishment, not as disbelief; the Hanbalis say one who abandons an agreed condition or pillar is treated as one who abandons the act, and one who leaves prayer is called to it for three days and killed if he does not pray. The legal ruling varies with the purpose of wudu'. First, where wudu' is obligatory: for prayer, the jurists agree it is obligatory for one in a minor impurity who wishes to stand for an obligatory or a voluntary prayer. The Hanafis require it for the funeral prayer, which they count as a prayer; the majority also require it for the prostration of recitation. For tawaf, the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold that it is obligatory for obligatory and voluntary tawaf; the Hanafis count it as necessary (wajib) and penalise: an obligatory tawaf in a minor impurity requires a sacrifice, and in a major impurity a camel. For touching the mushaf, the majority hold it obligatory, citing the verse of sura al-Waqi'a. Second, where it is sunna: the Hanafis, Hanbalis and Shafi'is, other than al-Baghawi, hold that wudu' before sleep is sunna, on the hadith about lying down on the right side after wudu', reported in the two Sahihs as cited in the book's footnote. The Malikis call it recommended; one Maliki view is that for a junub before sleep it is sunna; another that it is obligatory. Third, where it is recommended: a wudu' that is not a condition for the validity of the act but part of its perfection. It is recommended for reciting the Qur'an and reading hadith, for remembrance of God, for the call to prayer, and for the iqama (on which the jurists differ), for the sermon, for studying religious knowledge, for standing at 'Arafat and for the sa'y between Safa and Marwa, and for visiting the Prophet's mosque and his tomb. The renewal of wudu' is disputed. For a junub, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis (the majority) recommend wudu' before eating, drinking, resuming intercourse and sleeping; the Malikis hold that the junub has no wudu' for eating, drinking or resuming intercourse, but washes his hands and his private parts. The Hanafis also recommend keeping wudu' constant by renewing it whenever it is broken, and recommend it to leave a legal difference. Fourth, where it is permitted: the Malikis hold that the permitted wudu' is for cleanliness and cooling; Qadi Iyad mentions wudu' before entering rulers' presence or boarding a ship in danger, and says that it may be recommended; al-Hattab leans towards recommendation for all except cleanliness and cooling. Such a wudu' does not remove the impurity unless it is intended to. Fifth, forbidden wudu': for the Malikis, renewing wudu' before an act of worship has been performed with it, or wudu' for a purpose for which it was not prescribed or permitted. Merit of wudu': many hadiths on the removal of sins by it: purity is half of faith; the report from 'Uthman that whoever performs wudu' as the Prophet did has his earlier sins forgiven; the hadith of 'Umar on the eight gates of Paradise; and the hadith of Abu Hurayra on the radiant marks of the community. The conditions of wudu' are of three kinds: conditions of obligation, of validity, and of both; the first of the conditions of obligation is intellect, since no address is made to one who lacks it. The required washing: the majority (Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis) hold that it is enough for water to flow over a limb, without rubbing; the Malikis and al-Muzani require rubbing. For the Hanafis washing means pouring water so that it drips, even a single drop; Abu Yusuf accepts merely wetting the place. For the Shafi'is washing means the limb being washed, whether by the worshipper, another person or no act at all, such as rain falling on it. The face is what is faced; its whole outer surface is washed. Its width runs between the ears, and its length from the hairline at the top of the head to the lower chin. The Malikis and Hanbalis measure the length for a beardless man to the hairline and for a bearded man to the end of the beard. Hanging hair beyond the outline of the face: the Hanafis do not require it to be washed; the Shafi'is require the outer and inner surfaces to be washed if it is thin, and only the outer surface if it is thick, with one view requiring nothing. Hair on the face: the Hanafis do not require washing the roots of thick eyebrow, moustache and beard hair because of hardship, but thin hair must be washed outside and inside to the skin. The Malikis require combing thin hair so that water reaches the skin, and say thick hair needs only outer washing. The Shafi'is wash the eyelashes, eyebrows, moustache, sideburns and the hair of the lower lip outside and inside, and the same for a woman's or intersex person's facial hair; for a man's beard, thin hair is washed both sides and thick hair only outside, and where thin and thick hair are mixed the whole is washed. The Hanbalis require washing the beard and any hair hanging beyond the outline of the face, and the thick hair of the moustache, eyebrows, lower lip and of a woman or intersex person; combing the beard is recommended, the hadith on the handful of water under the chin being cited in the book's footnote. The eye: the lid margin is washed with the face; crust on the lid must be removed. The majority do not wash the inside of the eye with the face, because the Prophet did not do so and because hot or cold water may harm it; a report from Ahmad requires it when there is no harm. If the inside of the eye is soiled with impurity, the Malikis, Shafi'is and one Ahmad view require washing it, while the Hanafis and the Hanbali school excuse it in prayer. The hairline growth (ghumum), the hair that falls below its usual place, is washed with the face up to the usual limit. The temples (tahdhif), the thin hair between the sideburn and the receding hairline, are disputed: the majority of Shafi'is, a Maliki view and the Hanbali sounder view treat them as part of the head and not washed with the face; the Hanafis, another Maliki view, a Hanbali view and a Shafi'i view, which Ghazali and Rafi'i call the sounder, treat them as part of the face. The white skin between the sideburn and the ear: the Shafi'is, the Hanbalis and the Hanafi view on which fatwas are given hold it is part of the face; a report from Abu Yusuf excludes it; the Malikis wash the skin level with the earlobe. The lips: the red part visible when the lips close naturally is washed; one Hanafi view says the lip follows the mouth. Washing part of the head with the face is obligatory in the majority view, and the Shafi'is add part of the throat, the area under the chin and the ears, since what the obligation cannot be completed without is itself obligatory. The sideburn is washed with the face. The Shafi'is wash the part of the nose exposed by an amputation; the Malikis wash the septum between the nostrils. The majority hold that the inside of the mouth and nose are not part of the face and need not be washed in wudu'; the Hanbalis hold that the mouth and nose are part of the face, so rinsing and snuffing water are required in both minor and major purification, citing a hadith in which the book notes al-Daraqutni judged the connection to be a mursal narration. The temple (sudgh), the bald part and the receding hairlines: the majority hold these are part of the head, not the face; one Hanbali view holds the temple is part of the face. Al-Shirbini says it is recommended to wash them with the face because of the disagreement. The Malikis wash the folds of the forehead and any hollow of the eyelid if water can reach it by rubbing, and the rest falls away. The ears: al-Zuhri included the ears in the face, citing a hadith about the face's creation. The majority reply that the ears are part of the head, citing the saying that the two ears belong to the head and the report that the Prophet wiped his ears with his head, and that the ears were attached to the face only because they neighbour it, as a thing takes the name of what adjoins it. If the hair is washed and the skin below it becomes visible afterwards, the Hanafis, the Maliki preferred view and the Hanbalis hold that nothing more is required and wudu' is not repeated, because the duty passed to the hair; the Shafi'is in the sounder view, one Maliki view and Ibn Jarir require washing the newly visible skin, by analogy with a foot showing above a wiped sock. The second obligation: washing the hands to the elbows. It is a pillar and an obligation agreed by the Qur'an, by the report of Abu Hurayra describing the Prophet's wudu', and by consensus. The majority (the Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis in the school view and the Hanafis except Zufar) hold that the elbows must be washed with the hands, whether 'to' in the verse means 'with' or marks a limit that is of the same kind as what it limits; they cite the hadith of 'Abbad al-Abdi describing the water running over the elbows. Zufar, a Maliki view and a view of Ahmad hold that the elbow is not included, by analogy with night in the verse on the fast; a further Maliki view includes it as a precaution. If part of the limb to be washed is cut off, the rest must be washed by agreement, on the hadith 'do what you can of what I order you' and because the easier is not dropped for the harder. The rule for an arm cut at the elbow continues beyond p.17391 and is not yet read; this part of the headword is not complete. Amputation at the elbow: the jurists who require the elbow to be washed wash the place of the cut. The Hanafis, the Hanbali school, the Shafi'i sounder view and one Maliki view require washing the bone that is the upper end of the arm, because the two adjoining bones must be washed, and if one is absent the other is washed. The Malikis and a Shafi'i view against the sounder require nothing at the cut, since the elbow belongs to the forearm and the cut has taken it; unless a part of the elbow is known to remain in the upper arm, in which case the place of the cut is washed. Amputation above the elbow: the duty falls away because its place is gone, but the Shafis recommend washing what remains of the upper arm so the limb does not lack purity; if cut at the shoulder, washing the place of the cut with water is recommended. An extra finger, hand or arm: the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and the Hanbali judge al-Qadi wash an extra finger or hand that grows in the place of obligation alongside the original. If it grows outside the place of obligation, such as at the shoulder or upper arm, most jurists wash the part that lies opposite the place of obligation, while the sounder Hanbali view requires nothing for a distinct extra growth outside that place. Nails and what is under them: the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis require washing the nail even when long, because it is joined to the hand by creation and so falls within the name of the hand. The Malikis and one Hanbali view hold that a small dirt under the nail does not harm the wudu' even if it blocks the water, and al-Mardawi calls this the sounder view, because it is common, so the Prophet would have had to explain it if it were a condition. The Hanafi fatwas state that a remaining dot of dough or dry or wet clay at the root of the nail prevents validity, while dye from henna or dough does not; a long nail requires water to reach under it and a short one does not; nails that go beyond the fingertips must be washed by agreement. The book reports that some Hanafis distinguish town dwellers from villagers, and that al-Dabusi gave a fatwa of validity. The Shafi'is require washing the hair on the hand, outside and inside, even if it is thick, and if it is so thick that the skin is not reached, the visible part only. The Malikis, in their preferred view, require the washing of the spaces between the fingers, the joints and the fold of the fingertips; a ring that is permitted to a man or a woman need not be moved, though a forbidden ring must be removed, and a loose ring is moved. An extra hand: the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis require washing an extra hand that grows in the place of obligation. If it grows outside the place, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and a Hanbali view require washing what lies opposite the place of obligation; the Malikis require the whole if it has an elbow of its own. For the Hanafis, if a person has two hands, the one he uses to grasp is the original and is washed, while the other is extra; the Shafi'is require washing an extra hand that is not distinct from the original. A hanging fold of skin on the upper arm: the Hanafis and Shafi'is require washing only the part opposite the place of obligation, while the Hanbalis require washing a fold torn from the upper arm that hangs down the forearm, like an extra finger. A fold of the forearm is washed in full by the jurists; if its head is joined to the upper arm, the part opposite the place of obligation is washed, and the part that moves away from the limb is washed on its underside. The third obligation: wiping the head. It is agreed to be a pillar or obligation, by the Qur'an, by the descriptions of the Prophet's wudu' including the report of 'Uthman, and by consensus. Wiping is passing a wet hand over the head without running water. The questions about wiping the head begin here, starting with the amount that suffices, on which the jurists differ. Wiping the head: the Malikis in their preferred view and the Hanbalis in the sounder view require wiping the whole head, skin and hair, from the usual hairline at the front to the nape's hollow, together with the hair of the temples; the bone that projects and belongs to the face is not wiped but washed with the face. Other Maliki views: Ashhab requires only half, one report has the forelock enough, Muhammad ibn Maslama requires two-thirds, and Abu al-Faraj a third, with the hand passed back under the hair for full coverage, the return being recommended. The Hanbalis require wiping the whole outer head in the sounder view; a report from Ahmad allows most of it, the jurists disagreeing on how much is most; another allows the forelock, another any part without limit. Wiping the skin alone does not suffice. The Hanafis hold that wiping the head once above the ears is a pillar; the amount in the most famous view is a quarter of the head, which is the school's preferred view, with a report of the forelock and a third of three fingers' breadth, the last, which the Badai' calls the report of the principal books, and on which the Zahiriyya says fatwas are given. The Shafi'is require any wiping of part of the skin or part of the hair within the outline of the head, and allow either skin or hair as the part; the head is what is raised and rises. Method: the Hanafi sounder view requires three fingers to wipe; one or two fingers do not suffice in the apparent view, while the index and thumb spread with the palm between them count as three. The Hanbalis allow any manner, with the hand or with an intervening cloth, in the sounder view. Hair that falls below the head: the Hanafis, Shafis and Hanbalis do not require wiping it; the Malikis require wiping the hair that hangs down, however long, as it is hair of the head. Washing the head instead of wiping: the majority allow it, as it is wiping and more; the Hanbalis in the sounder view require the hand to be passed over the head, while a report from Ahmad allows washing without passing the hand. The Hanafis, the sounder Maliki view and the Hanbalis hold that washing the head at the outset in place of wiping is disliked, since it contradicts what is commanded; some Malikis, a Shafi'i view and a Hanbali view deny that it suffices, since it is not called wiping. Shaving the hair after wudu': the majority hold that this does not affect it. The Hanafis hold that wudu' is not repeated, since wiping hair is not a substitute for wiping the skin. A Maliki view requires repeating the wiping after shaving, which al-Dasuqi calls weak; al-Tabari requires repetition too. Ibn Rajab reports that Ahmad recommended wetting the head with water after shaving without requiring it. Repeating the wiping: the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis hold it is done once, since repetition becomes washing, and the Hanbalis cite that most who described the Prophet's wudu' mention one wiping, a view Abu Dawud supports; the Shafi'is recommend three wipings. Braided hair: for the Malikis, hair that is braided by itself need not be unbraided, however firm; hair braided with three threads must be unbraided, whatever its firmness; hair braided with fewer threads must be unbraided if firm. Al-Sawi notes that women may follow the Shafi'i or Hanafi view. Wiping over a turban is treated under its own heading. The fourth obligation: washing the feet to the ankles. There are four views. The first, held by the majority, is that washing the two feet is a pillar of wudu'. The jurists report consensus: Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Layla reports that the Companions agreed on washing the feet, al-Mawardi says the majority of jurists hold washing and not wiping, and al-Nawawi reports that Muslims agreed on the obligation to wash the feet. The second view is that the obligation is wiping and not washing, attributed to 'Ali, Ibn 'Abbas, Anas and al-Sha'bi, who relied on the genitive reading of the word for feet in the verse of sura al-Ma'ida. It is recorded that 'Ali retracted this, ordering the feet washed; Ibn Qudama says no jurist, other than those named, held the view of wiping. The third view, of al-Hasan al-Basri, al-Jubba'i and one report from al-Tabari, is that the worshipper may choose between washing and wiping. The fourth, held by some Zahiris, is that washing and wiping must both be done, since the two readings in one verse count as two verses. The majority require the ankles to be included in the washing; only Zufar disagreed. The ankles are the two bones that project at the foot of the leg. Second, the disputed obligations of wudu'. First, intention: the majority hold it is a condition without which wudu' is not valid; some hold it a recommendation and others a pillar. Abandoning the intention: if the worshipper abandons the intention after finishing wudu', the Malikis, the sounder Shafi'i view and the sounder Hanbali view hold that it does not affect the wudu'; the other Hanbali view holds that it is void. If he abandons it during wudu', the Shafi'is in the sounder view say it is not void and he renews the intention for the rest, the Hanbalis in the sounder view say what has passed is void and he must begin again, and the Malikis in the preferred view do not excuse the abandonment, so it is void. Second, continuity (muwala): washing the limbs in succession, so that the first does not dry before the next is begun. The Hanafis, the new Shafi'i view, one Maliki view and a Hanbali report hold it recommended, a view of Ibn 'Umar, al-Hasan, Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab and al-Thawri. The Malikis in the preferred view, the old Shafi'i view and the Hanbali school hold it obligatory, a view of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab and al-Awza'i. Third, order (tartib) in washing and wiping: the Shafi'is, the Hanbali school and one Maliki view hold it a pillar, a view of 'Uthman, Ibn 'Abbas, Qatada, Abu Thawr, Abu 'Ubayd and Ishaq. They argue from the verse, in which the wiping lies between the two washings, and that every account of the Prophet's wudu' gives the order. The Hanafis, the preferred Maliki view, some Shafi'is and one Ahmad report hold the order is a sunna, a view of Ibn Mas'ud and others, arguing that the verse uses 'and' which does not imply order and that a single immersion lifts the impurity. Fourth, rubbing (dalk): for the Malikis it is passing the hand over the limb moderately, whether or not dirt is removed, even after water is poured and before it dries. The majority of Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, and one Maliki view, hold it a sunna, and the Shafi'is add that one should be thorough with the heels, especially in winter, citing the saying woe to the heels from the Fire. The preferred Maliki view makes it an obligation, citing a saying to Aisha to rub her body with her hand, a report which the book notes is not traced to a source. Rubbing (dalk): the Malikis hold three views. The preferred view makes it obligatory, because it is a condition of the name of washing, and its advocates cite the instruction to 'A'isha to rub her body; the second, from Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, holds it is not obligatory, since the name of washing is met without it; the third holds it obligatory not in itself but to make sure the water reaches the skin, so that one who is sure the water has reached it after a long stay is excused. The sunnas of wudu'. First, the basmala at the beginning. The majority of Hanafis and Shafi'is, and one Ahmad report, make it a sunna; the preferred Maliki view makes it recommended, another Maliki view disapproves; the Hanbalis make it obligatory. For the Hanafis any remembrance of God suffices, but the words reported from the Prophet and the Salaf are 'In the name of God the Mighty, and praise belongs to God for Islam', while some prefer the full basmala; the Shafi'is say the least is 'In the name of God' and the most complete is the full formula with praise for Islam and for the water being pure. The Hanbalis require the words 'In the name of God' and no other phrase suffices, in the most common view. The Hanafis count the basmala at each limb as a courtesy, and cite a report from al-Bara' ibn 'Azib about the two testimonies at each limb; al-Ayni calls its chain weak. The Hanbali school view does not recommend it at each limb. Second, washing the hands to the wrists at the beginning, which is a sunna following the Prophet's practice; if the hands are impure, washing them is obligatory by agreement. Third, rinsing the mouth: the majority hold it a sunna, and the Hanbalis obligatory. Fourth, snuffing water into the nose: the majority hold it a sunna, and the Hanbalis a pillar or an obligation. Fifth, blowing the nose out, a sunna for the four schools, on the hadith 'when you snuff, blow'. For the Malikis it is expelling water from the nose by breath with the index and thumb of the left hand placed on it; for the Shafi'is it is removing what is in the nose with the little finger of the left hand; the Hanbalis recommend doing it with the left hand. Sixth, wiping the whole head. The Malikis in the preferred view and the Hanbalis make it obligatory, as already stated, while the Hanafis and Shafi'is make it a sunna. The Hanafis cite a report of wiping the whole head and the report of the Prophet wiping the forelock, so wiping a quarter is the obligation and wiping the whole is the sunna; they say that one who persistently leaves out wiping the whole head without excuse sins. The Shafi'is recommend wiping the whole head to follow the practice and to leave the disagreement of those who require it. Questions on wiping the head: first, repetition. The Hanafis hold that the whole head is wiped once with one water, and the reports of three wipings are taken to mean wiping with one water; al-Hasan reports from Abu Hanifa that three wipings with one water are sunna. Three wipings with fresh water are, in the Hanafi views, disliked, a bid'a, or permitted; the book quotes Ibn 'Abidin's preference for disliking it. The Shafi'is recommend wiping the whole head three times, one wiping after another, and a wiping of part of the head three times counts as three. Second, the recommended manner. The Hanafi preferred view is to place both palms and the fingers at the front of the head and draw them back to the nape, wiping the whole head, and then to wipe the ears with two fingers, the ears being part of the head. The Shafi'is say the sunna is to place the hands on the front of the head with the index finger joined to the other, the thumbs on the temples, to draw them back to the nape and bring them back to the place they started, where there is hair that turns; a person with no such hair only draws them back. The Hanbalis say repeating the wiping of the head is not recommended. The sunnas of wiping the head: the wiper returns the hands to where he began. al-Tirmidhi reports the account of Abu Hayya of 'Ali's wudu', in which the head is wiped once, and Abu Dawud reports that Ibn 'Abbas saw the Prophet wipe his head and ears with one wiping. Ahmad recommends repeating the wiping with fresh water, a view supported by Abu al-Khattab and Ibn al-Jawzi, and the same for the ears. The Malikis count as a sunna the return of the hand over the head to its starting point, since long hair cannot be covered without it. The return is a sunna only if wetness from the obligatory wiping remains on the hand, and renewing the water for it is disliked. The manner of wiping the head: the Malikis and Shafi'is take water in the right hand and pour it on the left palm, begin at the front, join the fingertips and place the thumbs at the temples, draw the hands back to the nape and return them to the start. For the Hanbalis the recommended manner is to draw the hands from front to back and return them to the start, following the report of 'Abd Allah ibn Zayd; then the index fingers enter the ear openings and the thumbs wipe the outer ears. A man with hair that would be ruffled by the return does not return, following the report of al-Rubay' bint Mu'awwidh. Ahmad, asked how a woman wipes, described the same motion. Seventh, wiping the ears. The Hanafis, the preferred Maliki view and the Shafi'is hold that wiping both the outer and inner ear is a sunna, on the hadith of al-Miqdam ibn Ma'di Karib describing the wiping of the ears and the insertion of the fingers into the ear openings. The majority take the outer ear as the part next to the head and the inner ear as the part facing outwards; a Maliki view reverses this, and the Malikis say the ear is made like a rose. The Malikis count three sunnas for the ears: wiping the outer and inner parts, wiping the openings, and renewing the water for them. The Shafi'is recommend fresh water for the ears. The Hanbalis and some Malikis make the wiping of the ears obligatory, because they belong to the head; they recommend fresh water for them after wiping the head, and the white skin above the ears is part of the head and is wiped with it. The Hanbali recommended method is to put the index fingers in the openings and wipe the outer ears with the thumbs, and the cartilaginous parts within are not required. The Hanafis hold that wiping the whole head and both ears with one water suffices, since they are part of the head; their preferred manner is the one described above, and wiping the ears with the damp remains is enough, while fresh water is better to satisfy the disagreement; they recommend putting the wet little finger into the ear opening. Eighth, combing the beard and the hair of the face is recommended in the main, with the disagreement treated under washing the face. Ninth, passing the fingers between the fingers of the hands and feet is treated under its own heading. Tenth, repeating each washing three times is a sunna among the jurists; the hadiths vary: once, with the statement that this is the wudu' without which prayer is not accepted; twice, with the statement that it doubles the reward; and three times, with the statement that it is his wudu' and that of the prophets. Eleventh, the miswak. The majority hold that using the miswak is a sunna in wudu', citing the saying that had it not been a hardship on his community he would have ordered the miswak with every wudu'. The Hanafis call it a strongly confirmed sunna; the Malikis, in their preferred view, a recommendation; al-Dasuqi notes that the hadith suggests a sunna even against the preferred view. Its detailed rules are under their own heading. Twelfth, the wiping over the turban is disputed and is treated under its own heading. Thirteenth, not wasting water, which is treated under its own heading. Fourteenth, starting with the right side of the hands and feet. The Hanafis, Malikis and the sounder Hanbali view hold it recommended, citing the report of 'A'isha that the Prophet liked to start on the right in all his affairs, and the accounts of 'Uthman and 'Ali describing that he began with the right before the left. The Shafi'is and some Hanafis hold it a sunna, on the saying that when you perform wudu' you begin with your right sides; Ibn al-Hammam says it is a sunna because of his constant practice. One Hanbali report, cited by al-Razi and rejected by al-Zarkashi, makes it obligatory; another says leaving it is disliked. Ibn Qudama reports consensus that one who begins with the left need not repeat. Fifteenth, prolonging the bright marks (ghurra and tahjil): the Shafi'is and the sounder Hanbali view hold it a sunna, meaning washing beyond the obligatory place of the face, hands and feet. The Hanafis count it as a courtesy: for the face it reaches the side of the neck with the front of the head, and for the arms and legs it reaches the upper arm and the shin. The basis is the saying about the community being called radiant with white marks from the wudu'; the Shafis and Hanbalis hold this to be a feature peculiar to this community. The Malikis and one Hanbali report do not recommend it, and Malik regards it as disliked, as an excess in religion; they read the 'prolonging' in the saying as continuing the state of purity, not as extra washing. Al-Dasuqi distinguishes the two senses. Sixteenth, facing the qibla while performing wudu': the Hanafis and Malikis hold it a courtesy, limited by what is possible without hardship; the Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold it a sunna, as it is suitable for every act of worship unless there is a reason. Seventeenth, sitting in a raised place, a courtesy for the Hanafis and Malikis, to keep clear of the water used in wudu' and to protect clothes from dripping; the Shafi'is recommend avoiding the spray. Eighteenth, performing wudu' in a clean place, a recommendation for the Hanafis and Malikis. The Malikis dislike wudu' in a lavatory, because such a place is not for purity. Nineteenth, not seeking help. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis hold it a sunna; the Hanafis count it a courtesy. The Prophet was helped by al-Mughira ibn Shu'ba in pouring water, and Safwan ibn 'Assal poured water on him, but not seeking help is better. The Shafi'is distinguish helping with the pouring, which is disliked but not sinful, from helping by bringing water, which is allowed, and it is obligatory when the person cannot purify himself otherwise, for a reason such as illness. Ibn Mawdud says help is disliked except when one is unable; Ibn 'Abidin says help in pouring, drawing or fetching water is not disliked at all, while help in washing or wiping is disliked without a reason. Twentieth, wiping the neck: the Hanafis and one Ahmad report count it a recommendation, and some say it is a sunna. The Malikis, Shafi'is and the sounder Hanbali view do not recommend it, since nothing is reported for it; al-Nawawi calls it an innovation, and the Malikis say it is disliked as an excess in religion. Twenty-first, moving the ring in wudu': the Hanafis and Shafis recommend moving a loose ring, and likewise an earring; for a tight ring it is recommended if water is known to reach, and obligatory if not. Ahmad ibn Hanbal says a tight ring must be moved, and the details continue on the next page. The ring: if water reaches beneath it the wudu' is valid; the Prophet is reported to have turned his ring in wudu', and if one doubts whether water reaches under it, moving it is required, since the default is that it does not. For the Malikis a permitted ring need not be removed or moved even if tight; a forbidden ring must be removed if it is forbidden to wear, and moving it is enough if it is loose. Twenty-second, starting with the front of each limb. The Shafi'is recommend beginning with the top of the face, the fingertips and the front of the head. The Hanafis and Malikis recommend beginning each limb at its front: the face at the hairline, the hands at the fingertips up to the elbows, the head at the hairline to the hollow of the nape, and the foot at the toes to the ankles. Twenty-third, not speaking. The Hanafis and Shafi'is recommend silence without need; the Malikis and the sounder Hanbali view call speech disliked, and the Malikis and Ibn Muflih say the dislike applies to speech other than the remembrance of God. Twenty-fourth, greeting the one performing wudu' and returning the greeting. The Malikis, some Shafi'is and some Hanbalis hold that greeting him is prescribed and that the reply is prescribed too; the Shafi'i Shaykh al-Islam says the reply is obligatory. The Furu' says most Hanbali texts do not dislike either greeting or reply, while Abu al-Faraj and others say greeting is disliked. The book cites the report of Umm Hani, who greeted the Prophet while he was washing. Twenty-fifth, supplication at each limb. The Hanafis, Malikis, most Shafi'is and some Hanbalis recommend it. The book lists the traditional formulae for each limb; al-Ayni's view, cited with Ibn 'Abidin, is that the report reached the grade of good through its several chains, and that a weak report may be acted on in matters of virtue on conditions. The Shafi'i view in one form and the sounder Hanbali view deny that it is recommended; the Hanbalis call it disliked in the sense of leaving the better; al-Nawawi says supplication at each limb has no basis, and Ibn al-Qayyim says the formulae popular with the common people for each limb have no origin in the Prophet's practice. Twenty-sixth, supplication after wudu'. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis recommend that the performer, facing the qibla with his hands and eyes raised to the sky, says the testimony of faith, then the words from the report of 'Umar about the eight gates of Paradise, then the words that Tirmidhi adds to Muslim's report, then 'Glory be to You, O God, and praise, I testify there is no god but You, I ask Your forgiveness and turn to You', from the report of Abu Sa'id in al-Nasa'i which al-Nasa'i judged to be an account of Abu Sa'id's own words. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis also recite the surah of Power three times. The Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is recommend blessing the Prophet after wudu', and the Hanafis and Malikis add a formula about being among the penitent and the purified. Al-Buhuti explains that ending wudu' and prayer with seeking forgiveness recognises that people fall short of God's due. Twenty-seventh, drying the limbs. The Malikis, Hanbalis and the older Shafi'i view allow drying or leaving it. The Hanbalis say leaving it is better; the Hanafis count drying as a courtesy; the sounder Shafi'i view makes leaving it the sunna unless there is an excuse, since drying removes the trace of worship. The Hanafis and a Shafi'i view hold that drying is disliked. Twenty-seventh, not shaking off the hand or the water. The Hanafis and the sounder Shafi'i view recommend not shaking the hand, on the hadith 'when you perform wudu' do not shake your hands, for they are the fans of Satan', which Ibn Hibban judged a rejected report. The sounder Hanbali view and one Shafi'i view dislike shaking off water. Ibn Qudama says that shaking water off the body is not disliked, though shaking the hand is; the author of Ghayat al-Matlab holds the sounder view is that it is not disliked. Twenty-eighth, drinking the water left over from wudu'. The Hanafis and Shafi'is recommend it straight after the wudu', on the report from 'Ali that the Prophet drank from his leftover wudu' water; the perfect form is to drink standing, facing the qibla, and some say sitting is allowed. A supplication for health is said after drinking, which the book notes is not traced as transmitted. Twenty-ninth, two rak'as after wudu'. The Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis recommend them, on the saying of 'Uqba ibn 'Amir about the Garden for one who performs wudu' well and then prays two rak'as with heart and face attending. The Hanafis and Hanbalis pray them outside the times of disliked prayer; the Shafi'is hold they may be prayed at any time, since they have a cause. Thirtieth, renewing wudu', that is, performing wudu' over a wudu' that has not been broken. Some jurists call it a sunna, some a recommendation, some forbid it before an act of worship is done with it, and one report from Ahmad says it has no merit; the details are under its own heading. Thirty-first, not using less than a mudd of water. The majority recommend not going below a mudd, on the report of Anas that the Prophet performed wudu' with a mudd. The Malikis in their most common view and a Hanafi view hold that no fixed measure applies, the aim being the virtue of moderation; Ibn 'Abidin reports from al-Hilya that several scholars report consensus that the amount needed is not fixed. Ibn Shaban of the Malikis says less than a mudd does not suffice. Thirty-second, not blowing into the water while washing the face, which the Hanafis count among the courtesies of wudu', and performing wudu' from the water of the common people. Thirty-third, the order among the sunnas. The Hanafi and Shafi'i school views make the order among the sunnas a sunna, while the Malikis and a Hanafi view make the order within each sunna recommended. If the order is reversed among sunnas, or between sunnas and obligations, no repetition is required, since a missed recommended act is not commanded again. One Shafi'i view makes the order of the recommended parts obligatory, by analogy with the pillars of prayer. Thirty-fourth, taking water in both hands for washing the face. The sounder Shafi'i view, stated in al-Muzani's Mukhtasar and held by most Shafi'is, is that the recommended manner is to take water in both hands, on the report of 'Abd Allah ibn Zayd that the Prophet put his hands in and washed his face three times, and because it is more complete. A Shafi'i view says one hand; a third view of Zahir al-Sarakhsi says to scoop with the right hand, placing its back on the palm of the left, on the report of Ibn 'Abbas. The Hanbalis say that scooping with both hands, or with the right hand joined to the left, is the established sunna. The disliked acts (makruhat). The jurists list several things as disliked in wudu'. First, striking the face or the other limbs with water, the face being singled out for its honour; disliked for the Hanafis and Shafi'is. Second, stinginess, that is, using only enough water to moisten the limbs without visible dripping; the water should drip so that each of the three washings is certain; disliked for the Hanafis. Third, extravagance, using more water than the legal need, on the report of Sa'd, whom the Prophet passed while he was performing wudu' and asked whether there was extravagance in wudu'; the reply was yes, even by a flowing river; and because it is the excess that leads to scrupulosity, and the saying that no one overdoes religion without being overcome by it. The Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis all dislike it. Among the disliked acts, the Hanafis and Shafi'is add that water endowed for those who purify with it, such as the water of a madrasa, is forbidden to waste, since the excess is not permitted, the endowment being for the proper wudu'. Ibn 'Abidin limits this to still water; running water is permitted. Fourth, performing wudu' with the water left by a woman, meaning the water left after her purification, without her having drunk from it or put her hand in it without intention. Some Hanafis, some Shafi'is and one report of Ahmad dislike it out of regard for the disagreement. Some Hanafis, one report of Ahmad, the Maliki school view and some Shafi'is, including al-Baghawi, hold that it is pure and purifying, and that using it is not disliked; they cite the report of Ibn 'Abbas about a wife of the Prophet washing from a basin, and the saying that water does not become impure by a state of major impurity. The apparent Hanbali school view forbids a man to purify with the leftover water of a woman, on the hadith of al-Hakam ibn 'Amr al-Ghifari; al-Mardawi says this prohibition is an act of worship whose meaning is not understood, so it is permitted to the woman herself. Fifth, wiping the head three times with fresh water: the Hanafis and Malikis dislike it, and the Hanbali school does not recommend repeating the wiping of the head. Sixth, performing wudu' in an impure place, which is disliked because water used in wudu' is to be respected, and so that nothing dripping from the limbs falls on what is impure. The Hanafis add that throwing phlegm into the water or blowing the nose into it is disliked for purity's sake. Seventh, wudu' in the mosque. It is disliked except in a vessel or a place prepared for it, according to the Hanafis, a report of Ahmad and Malik; the Shafi'is and the sounder Hanbali view allow it provided no one is harmed and the mosque is not harmed. Sahnun says wudu' in the courtyard of a mosque is not allowed. The book cites the hadith to place purification places at the mosque doors, and al-Haythami notes a break in its chain. Eighth, pouring out the water of wudu' in the mosque. The Hanbalis dislike it, and dislike it in a place trodden on, such as the road. The Shafi'is allow letting it fall on the mosque floor if no one is harmed. Ninth, wudu' with water heated by the sun. The preferred Maliki view, the Shafi'i school view and some Hanafis dislike it; the majority of Hanafis, the Hanbalis, one Maliki view and some Shafi'is allow it without dislike. Tenth, leaving one of the sunnas of wudu'. The Malikis say it is disliked to leave one deliberately, though prayer is not invalidated by leaving it; if it is left deliberately or forgetfully, it is recommended to perform it for the prayers that follow with that wudu'. The Hanafis regard leaving a recommended act as contrary to the better course, and some call it disliked for purity's sake. The things that break wudu'. For the Hanafis, breaking wudu' means taking it out of its purpose, such as permission to pray; for the Malikis, it is the ending of its ruling or the lifting of its continuance for what it permitted, such as prayer. The jurists differ on some of these and agree on others. First, what comes out of the two passages, agreed in general, citing the verses of sura al-Ma'ida and sura al-Nisa'. The word 'gha'it' is a figure for the need to relieve oneself in a sunken place. If someone comes from the place without need, wudu' is not obligatory, by consensus. The jurists distinguish customary from rare emissions, and emissions from the rear passage, the front passage, the wife's passage, or other places. Second, impurities leaving other parts of the body. The Malikis and Shafi'is hold that these do not break wudu'; only the place they touch is cleansed. The Hanafis and Hanbalis hold that such impurities, like vomit and blood, break wudu' in general, with differences among them. Third, loss of the mind, through sleep, madness, intoxication or fainting. Sleep is held by the majority of Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis to break wudu' in general, on the hadith that the eyes are the binding of the buttocks, so whoever sleeps must perform wudu'. The Hanafi distinction: a sleeper who lies down or leans on his side breaks it, because the joints go loose, while one who leans on something that would fall if it were removed is to be examined. Sleep, in the Hanafi analysis. If the sleeper is standing, bowing or prostrating and his seat is not off the ground, wudu' is not broken; if his seat has left the ground, it is broken by consensus. If the seat is off the ground but the sleeper has not left it entirely, al-Qaduri says it breaks, the Hanafi view attributed to al-Tahawi, while al-Zayla'i says the sounder view is that it does not, a report of Abu Yusuf from Abu Hanifa. A sleeper in prayer does not lose his wudu' in these cases; one who sleeps outside prayer in the posture of prostration breaks it unless he is in that posture as described. A sick person who prays lying down and falls asleep breaks his wudu', on al-Zayla'i's view, by the hadith on lying down. If one sleeps sitting and falls over onto his face or side: if he wakes before falling, or wakes at the moment of the fall, or fell asleep and awoke at once, wudu' is not broken; if he settled after the fall and then woke, it is broken, for he slept reclining; Abu Yusuf says the fall itself breaks it. The Hanafis say sleep is not itself a cause of impurity; the cause is what the sleeper does not avoid, and the apparent sign, sleep, stands in its place, as travel does in another rule. The Malikis have two methods. The first, that of al-Lakhmi, is that the quality of the sleep counts and not the posture: heavy sleep breaks wudu' in any posture, and its sign is that the sleeper is not roused by a loud sound or by a fan falling from his hand; sleep that is not heavy does not break it. The second method makes heavy sleep break in all cases and light sleep break only when lying or prostrate, not standing or sitting; it is attributed to 'Abd al-Haqq. The first is the better-known Maliki view. The Shafi'is hold that sleep breaks wudu' in any form except the sleep of one who is firmly seated on the ground or another firm seat, even if he leans on something that would fall if it were removed, because no emission from the rear passage is then likely. The emission from the front passage is not considered, as it is rare, and the report of Anas that the Companions slept and then prayed without renewing wudu' is read as the sleep of the firmly seated. Al-Nawawi gives rules: it is recommended for a firmly seated sleeper to renew his wudu' as a precaution; if one is sure he slept but unsure whether he was seated firmly, no wudu' is due; if one slept sitting and his buttocks left the ground before waking, wudu' is broken, but if they left after he woke or at the same time, or it is not known which came first, it is not broken, since the default is purity. There is no difference between little and much sleep. A sleeper crouched with knees raised has three views, and the preferred is that it does not break. One who sleeps on his back with his buttocks flat is held to break wudu', and if he is strapped in place the well-known view is that it still breaks. The Hanbalis divide sleep into three kinds. The sleep of one who lies down breaks wudu', little or much, on the view of all who hold sleep breaks it. The sleep of one who sits breaks it if much, not if little. The sleep of one standing, bowing or prostrating: Ahmad has three reports, the school view being that it breaks, the second that it breaks only if much, and the third that the bowing does not break while the prostration does. They cite the general wording of the hadith on the eyes as the binding of the buttocks and the hadith 'whoever sleeps should perform wudu''; and for the sitter they cite Safwan ibn 'Assal on not removing socks during travel except after impurity, excrement, urine or sleep. The seated sitter who leans, or sits crouched, is treated as one who lies down in one view, while Ahmad says light sleep does not break it, and he regards leaning and reclining as more severe than crouching. Ibn Qudama holds that a sitter whose seat is firmly on the ground breaks wudu' only through much sleep, since the evidence for the sitter makes no distinction. The Hanbalis differ on how much sleep counts. Abu Ya'la says there is no fixed measure and it is what custom reckons. Another view makes it what changes the sleeper from his posture, as when he falls or dreams. Ibn Qudama says there is no fixed measure, since measures are known only from revelation; so whatever shows much sleep, such as the fall of a firmly seated sleeper, breaks wudu', and if one is in doubt whether it was much, it does not break, since purity is certain. He adds that sleep is an overcoming of the mind, so one whose mind is not overcome needs no wudu', and one who doubts whether he slept, or has a thought of uncertain origin, a dream or a passing thought, needs none. Second view: Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, Abu Mijlaz, Humayd al-A'raj and 'Amr ibn Dinar are reported to hold that sleep does not break wudu' at all, citing the report of Anas about the Companions waiting for the late evening prayer until their heads nodded. Al-Mardawi cites al-Maymuni that it does not break. Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab used to sleep lying down several times while waiting for prayer and then pray without renewing his wudu'. Ibn Qudama suggests they held that sleep is not itself an impurity and that the impurity is doubtful, so certainty is not removed by doubt. The Hanbalis on sleep: one who sleeps while he believes his purity remains does not lose it; Ibn Taymiyya chose this view, while al-Khallal called that report an error. Second, fainting and swooning break wudu' by agreement. Third, madness, little or much, breaks it by agreement. Fourth, intoxication breaks it by agreement. Fifth, touching the private part of an adult, male, female or intersex, is disputed as a breaker; its detail is under its own headings. Sixth, the touching of the skin of a man and a woman is disputed; its detail is under its own headings. Seventh, apostasy. The Hanafis, the sounder Shafi'i view, a group of Malikis and a Hanbali report hold that apostasy in itself does not break wudu', but nullifies deeds if it is joined to death; so one who apostatised while in wudu' and then returned to Islam keeps his wudu' if nothing else broke it. The preferred Maliki view, the sounder Hanbali view and a Shafi'i view hold that apostasy breaks wudu', citing the verse of sura al-Zumar on the nullification of works, and holding that the address is to the community and not to the Prophet, while a report from Musa ibn Mu'awiya from Ibn al-Qasim recommends wudu' after apostasy. Al-Sawi explains that the nullification is of the reward, and that wudu' becomes due on the preferred view because the returning apostate is in the position of one who has just reached maturity. Eighth, laughing aloud in prayer. The majority (Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis) hold that it does not break wudu' but invalidates the prayer; the Shafi'is recommend wudu' after it. The Hanafis, and what is reported from al-Hasan, al-Nakha'i and al-Thawri, hold that laughing aloud in a full prayer, meaning one with bowing and prostration, breaks wudu' and invalidates the prayer. Ninth, eating what fire has touched. There are two views. The first, held by the majority and reported from Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, 'Ali, Ibn Mas'ud and others, is that it does not require wudu'. They cite the report of Ibn 'Abbas that the Prophet ate a shoulder of mutton and prayed without wudu', the report of Jabir that the last of the two matters was leaving wudu' after what fire had changed, and the saying that wudu' is for what comes out and not for what goes in, which Ibn Hajar judges weak in its chains. The second, held by 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Aziz, al-Hasan, al-Zuhri, Abu Qilaba and Abu Mijlaz, is that wudu' is required; they cite the hadith 'perform wudu' from what fire has touched' in Muslim from Abu Hurayra, 'A'isha and Zayd ibn Thabit. Tenth, eating camel meat. There are two views. The first, held by the Hanafis, Malikis, the newer Shafi'i view and a Hanbali view, is that it does not break wudu', like other food; the reason given by al-Kasani is that the breaker is the emission of an impurity or what causes it, and that did not occur. The second, held by the old Shafi'i view, Ishaq, Yahya ibn Yahya, Ibn Khuzayma and Ibn al-Mundhir, is that wudu' is required for camel meat alone, little or much, raw or cooked; they cite the report of Jabir ibn Samura about the man who asked whether to perform wudu' after mutton and camel, and the Prophet's answer to perform it after camel, and the report of al-Bara'. The Hanbali detail: the school view is that camel meat breaks wudu' whether eaten knowingly or not, raw or cooked; Ahmad has a report that raw meat breaks it but cooked does not; another that it breaks in no case, chosen by Yusuf al-Jawzi and Ibn Taymiyya; and a third that it breaks only if the prohibition was known, chosen by al-Khallal. The other parts of the camel, such as the hump, fat, liver and paunch, do not break it on the school view; drinking camel's milk or the broth of its meat does not, and one report from Ahmad says drinking its milk does. Eleventh, eating forbidden food. The Hanbali reports differ: forbidden food breaks wudu', or forbidden meat in every case, or only pork. The school view is that eating meat other than camel meat does not break it, whether lawful or forbidden, since the rule for camel meat is one that is not understood by its meaning and so is not extended. Twelfth, washing the dead. The majority do not count it among the breakers; the Hanafis say wudu' is recommended after washing the dead. The sounder Hanbali school view is that washing the dead breaks wudu'; some Hanbalis allow that it does not, when the dead person was washed in a shirt. Twelfth, doubt about whether one has wudu' or not. The Malikis hold that doubt is a breaker, since the duty is not discharged without certainty; their three cases are: one who doubts, after knowing his earlier purity, whether a breaker occurred; one who doubts, after knowing his impurity, whether wudu' occurred; and one who knows both purity and impurity and doubts which came first. The majority hold that doubt about whether wudu' remains or has ended is not a breaker: one who is certain he was pure and doubts whether a breaker occurred, or the reverse, acts on the earlier certainty. They cite the hadith in Muslim about a man who feels something in his belly and does not know whether anything came out, who is not to leave the mosque until he hears a sound or smells something. Thirteenth, backbiting and foul speech. A report from Ahmad holds that backbiting, obscenity and the like, including tale-bearing, lying, slander and false witness, break wudu'; 'A'isha is reported to have said that one performs wudu' after good food but not after a foul word that he utters. The Hanafis and Shafi'is recommend the proper wudu' after foul speech such as backbiting.

• Wujub (obligation as a state of the duty-bearer, and the difference from performance)

  Wujub in the lexical sense is affirmation and binding, a falling to the ground, and death; for the jurists it is the occupation of the duty-bearer's obligation by the duty, and for the usuli scholars it is the link of the command to the acts of the responsible person. Command (iljab) is the demand of an act with a prohibition of leaving it, and the obligatory is the act of the person himself; when a ruling is attributed to the lawgiver it is called iljab, and when attributed to the person it is called wujub. The Shafi'i Zarkashi holds no difference between wujub and wujub al-ada (obligation to perform), while most Hanafis distinguish them: wujub is the debt laid on the person, and wujub al-ada is the demand to discharge it.

• Wulugh (a dog lapping from a vessel, fiqh)

  Wulugh is the lapping of a beast of prey with its tongue; the word is used of a dog lapping from a vessel. The jurists differ on whether the vessel becomes impure, how many washings it needs, whether repeated lapping repeats the washing, and whether a trustworthy report of lapping in one of two vessels is accepted.

• Yad (hand, fiqh)

  Yad is the hand from the shoulder to the fingertips; its lexical senses include blessing, power and authority. Its rulings in fiqh cover cleaning with the left hand, washing the hands for wudu' and at the vessel, whether a dipped hand makes water used, wiping with earth in tayammum, hand positions and counting in prayer, covering the mouth at a yawn, and raising the hands in supplication.

• Yalamlam (miqat of Yemen, fiqh)

  Yalamlam is a mountain of Tihama south of Mecca and the miqat of the people of Yemen, fixed by a text; the miqats belong to their own people and to whoever passes through them.

• Yamin (the right side and the right hand, fiqh)

  In lexicon yamin is the right side or limb, the opposite of yasar, and it also names the oath because men pressed their right hands when swearing alliance; in fiqh the senses under discussion are the right hand and the right side. The jurists recommend putting the right first in everything that honours, such as ablution, washing, eating and entering the mosque, and putting the left first in whatever involves harm or lowliness, such as blowing the nose and cleaning after the privy; most schools also hold it sunna to place the right hand over the left in prayer.

• Yaqin (certainty, fiqh)

  Yaqin is certainty: in lexicon knowledge and the removal of doubt, in fiqh the heart's firm conviction that a thing has or has not happened. Its rulings: the roots of faith require certainty; the legal rules are that certainty is not removed by doubt, that the original state persists, that the original state of a person is freedom from debt, that the original state of women is prohibition, and that the original state of things is non-existence.

• Yas (despair, fiqh)

  Yas is despair, the cutting of hope; technically it is the end of hope. Its rulings: despair of God's mercy is forbidden, despair of water is a cause for tayammum, the repentance of one who sees the signs of death is disputed, and the age of despair from menstruation fixes the waiting period of a woman past it.

• Yasir (slight or easy, fiqh)

  Yasir is easy or slight in lexicon; in fiqh it names the small amount that does not change a ruling. A slight movement does not break prayer, a slight deliberate speech does, a slight gap between offer and acceptance, or between an exception and what it excepts, does no harm, and a slight break between sucklings does not split them.

• Yawm al-Sabt (Saturday, fiqh)

  Sabt lexically is rest, ceasing, an age, and a day of the week; the sabbath of the Jews is their ceasing from work and gain, and the jurists use the word in its lexical sense. Among its rules: fasting it alone is disliked on the majority view, on the hadith forbidding its fast except what is obligatory; and it bears on the treatment of Jews — the Hanbalis do not object to a Muslim pressing his Jewish wife to break her sabbath where his right is due, a Jew who fails to claim pre-emption because of his sabbath loses it, and a Jew is summoned to court on his sabbath on the Hanafi and Shafi'i view.

• Yawm (the day, fiqh)

  Yawm is lexically a stretch of time from sunrise to sunset, and in the jurists' usage the span from the rising of the second dawn to sunset, so it is longer than the day-light nahr. Legal rules attach to it in vows, retreat and conditional divorce: one who vows a retreat of an unspecified day must, on the majority view, enter the mosque before dawn and leave after sunset, and a divorce suspended on a named day falls at that day's dawn according to most jurists.

• Injustice (zulm)

  Injustice (zulm) for many scholars is placing things outside their place; others defined it as disposing of another's property without permission — a sense transmitted from Iyas ibn Mu'awiya — which makes it impossible for God since all He does is disposal within His own dominion, in the manner of Abu al-Aswad al-Du'ali's answer to Imran ibn al-Husayn on the divine decree; commenting on 'I have forbidden injustice to Myself' in the sacred hadith, Ibn Rajab explains it as His restraining injustice from His servants, noting that on the first definition the hadith shows God is able to commit injustice but does not, out of grace, bounty, generosity and beneficence, and that His creating His servants' deeds — injustice among them — does not attribute injustice to Him, since He is described only by His own acts; he transmits a report halted at Ubayy ibn Ka'b and similarly from Ibn Masud and Zayd ibn Thabit — 'were God to punish the people of His heavens and His earth He would do so without injustice to them' — while flagging its chain; the injustice forbidden between servants is of two kinds: injustice to one's own soul, whose greatest form is association — 'association is indeed a tremendous injustice' (Luqman 13) — then sins great and small, and injustice to others, the subject of 'I have made it forbidden among you', witnessed by the Farewell Pilgrimage sermon declaring blood, property and honour sacred, by Ibn Umar's 'injustice will be darknesses on the Day of Resurrection' and by Abu Musa's 'God grants respite to the wrongdoer until, when He seizes him, He does not let him escape'.

Screening Room

• 678

  2010 CE · 1431 AH†678.

• Midnight Express

  1978 CE · 1398 AH†Midnight Express.

• The Circle

  2000 CE · 1421 AH†The Circle.

• Bol

  2011 CE · 1432 AH†Bol.

• Inshallah a Boy

  2023 CE · 1444 AH†Amjad Al-Rasheed's Jordanian film about a widow fighting inheritance law to keep her home and daughter; first Jordanian film in Cannes competition.

• Capernaum

  2018 CE · 1439 AH†Capernaum.

• Nikaah

  1982 CE · 1402 AH†B.R. Chopra's Hindi film about a wife divorced by triple talaq in a moment of anger — it sparked a national debate in India on Islamic divorce.

• Rashash

  2021 CE · 1442 AH†Rashash.

• Shahid

  2012 CE · 1433 AH†Shahid.

What is missing? Tell us · A theme is open when it has a reviewed guide, 10 questions, 25 entries across 5 classes, and voices from several traditions and regions.

Controversial topics

• Sexuality and gender diversity
• Converts and those who leave
• Images and figural art
• Takfir and its critics
• Dissent, heresy and freethought
• Conquest and its debates
• Violent extremism and the Muslim response
• Islam and atheism or secular thought