Iradah (will and intention: its place in contracts, acts and consent)

In the lexicon iradah is will or desire; the jurists use it for aiming at a thing and turning towards it. ¹ It differs from niyya (intention): for the Shafi'is niyya is intending a thing together with doing it, and for the other three schools it is a firm resolve of the heart to bring about the act; niyya is tied to the act, while iradah is not. ¹ It differs from rida (contentment): rida is liking an act and being at ease with it, and will and contentment do not necessarily go together; this is why the theologians separate God's will from His contentment, and why the jurists separate them in the matter of duress. ¹ It differs from ikhtiyar (choice): ikhtiyar is aiming at a matter poised between existence and non-existence by preferring one side, whereas iradah is directed at one matter. ¹

A will counts only when it comes from a competent person; the jurists treat this in the book on interdiction, where the gifts of a minor, an insane person, a foolish person and an insolvent person are void and their will is counted for nothing. ¹ In principle the will comes from the principal, but another's will may stand in for it, as the agent's for the principal's, or the guardian's and executor's by compulsion, so the principal is bound by what the other has validated in the main. ¹

In principle the will is expressed in words; a sign may stand in for one who cannot speak, as may a message, silence, conduct or strong indications, so the jurists count a dumb person's sign as his speech in many matters. ²

Contracts produce their effects only when acceptance matches the offer, since they need two wills, such as sale, hire, pledge, settlement, partnership, profit-sharing, marriage and khul'. ² Other acts take effect by a single will: some are not reversed by refusal, such as an endowment, and others are, such as an acknowledgement of debt. ² The wills of the two parties create a contract, while its effects are fixed by the Lawgiver, not by the contracting parties. ² Where error, deception, fraud or duress enters an act, it may be annulled in general by giving the one whose will was affected an option. ²