Ikrah (duress or compulsion)

Ikrah in the lexical sense is compelling a person to something he dislikes. In the jurists' sense it is an act done by one person to another that removes the other's consent or spoils his choice. ¹

• Duress may be by speech or by deed, and a threat counts, even one understood from the circumstances, such as a ruler's order or a highwayman's order. ⁸
• For the Hanafis a ruler's order is duress even without an explicit threat; others treat anyone with the power to harm alike. ⁸
• A bare threat: some jurists accepted only a threat coupled with the act, such as Ammar ibn Yasir (may God be pleased with him)'s case, and al-Kharaqi followed that. The majority accept a bare threat, citing a report from Umar about a man on a rope gathering honey, whose wife threatened to cut the rope unless he divorced her; Umar treated the divorce as void. ⁸⁹
• A threat to harm someone the victim loves: the Malikis and some Hanbalis confine it to children and parents; the Shafi'is extend it to anyone hard to harm, such as a spouse, a friend or a servant. ⁹²

For the Hanafis, consent is the fullness of choice that shows in outward signs, and choice is the intention toward something possible, with one side preferred. The majority do not distinguish the two. ²

Coercion without right is forbidden and is a major sin, because it is injustice; a report of God's words says He forbade injustice to Himself and made it forbidden among people. ²

1. The coercer is able to carry out the threat, even if he is not a ruler or a commander. ²
2. The victim fears the threat. A deferred threat counts for the Hanafis, Malikis, Hanbalis and some Shafi'is; most Shafi'is reject it even if deferred to the next day. ²
3. The threat is to kill, to maim, or to cause a grief that removes consent. A threat of hunger counts only when it reaches fear of death. ²⁵
4. The victim would have refused the act without the coercion, for his own right, another's, or God's. ⁵
5. The act must be specified. The Shafi'is and some Hanbalis require this strictly; the Hanafis accept a choice among specific acts. ⁵
6. The victim has no alternative. Jurists work this out in four kinds of choice between two acts, by their prohibition or permission. ¹⁰¹¹

Duress is either with right or without right, and without right it is either compelling or non-compelling. ¹¹

• With right: the coercer has a right to threaten and the act is one he may require, as in forcing an apostate to Islam or forcing a debtor who can pay. This does not negate free choice in law. ¹¹³
• The Hanafis alone speak of compelling duress, a threat to life or limb or to all property or to someone one cares for, which removes consent and corrupts choice; non-compelling duress is a short imprisonment, which removes consent but not choice. ³
• Other schools agree that compelling duress counts. The Malikis distinguish: unbelief, false accusation and zina are not counted, while drinking, eating carrion, divorce, oaths and sales are. ³⁴

In the Hanafi view

• A confession made under duress is void, because a confession is trusted only when the truth is more likely; duress makes that less likely. ⁴
• Contracts made under duress are corrupt rather than void; they become valid and binding if the coerced person consents later, and if he accepts the price or hands over the goods voluntarily. ⁴
• Marriage, divorce, taking back a wife, vows and oaths stand under duress, because the Law gives weight to the words. ⁴¹²
• Acts: non-compelling duress makes an act forbidden, and the person who acts bears the responsibility. Compelling duress depends on the act: what the Law allows in itself, such as eating, requires taking the lesser harm; what the Law allows in necessity, such as wine or carrion, is permitted and must be done when refusal would lead to death; unbelief is permitted with the heart at peace in faith, following the case of Ammar ibn Yasir; what is never allowed, such as taking an innocent life, is not allowed, and a person who does it is liable. ¹²⁶
• On killing under duress, Abu Hanifa and Muhammad hold qisas on the coercer; Abu Yusuf holds diya. If the person to be killed is the coerced, there is no qisas and no diya, unless the threat is of a worse death. ⁶
• Zina under duress is forbidden, but no hadd penalty is due, because duress is a doubt. ⁶
• Al-Babarti's rule: compelling duress counts in word and deed; non-compelling duress is disregarded in deed, and is taken into account in words except words that bind equally whether said in earnest or in jest, such as marriage and divorce. ⁶

In the Maliki view

• Contracts, confessions and oaths do not bind the coerced; the coercion is by a threat of killing, a painful blow, or imprisonment. If the coerced later approves, the act binds, except marriage. ⁶⁷
• Unbelief, false accusation of a Muslim or zina with a free woman is not allowed even under duress, except under a threat of death. ⁷
• Killing a Muslim, cutting a limb or zina with a coerced woman is never allowed; qisas is due on the killer and the coercer, and the killing bars inheritance. ⁷
• Abandoning prayer or breaking the fast under duress requires making up the fast without expiation; in prayer, duress is treated like illness. ⁷¹³

In the Shafi'i view

• Words said under duress are not valid, by the hadith on lapse of error, forgetting and what is compelled, except in prayer, where they invalidate it. Saying unbelief under duress is permitted but not obligatory; the better course is to refuse. ¹³
• For acts: a compensable act such as killing or destroying property falls on the coerced for qisas or compensation, with the liability resting on the coercer. Zina is sinful for the coerced but without hadd, and the marriage bar of nursing applies. ¹³¹⁴

In the Hanbali view

• Words under duress are void except marriage, and divorce does not take effect under duress, by the hadith that divorce is not given under compulsion. ¹⁴
• Someone compelled to unbelief is not an apostate; the better course is patience. ¹⁴
• Duress removes hadd penalties from the compelled, because it is a doubt. ¹⁴
• If the coerced kills at the coercer's order, qisas falls on both, and they bar inheritance in the preferred view. ¹⁴¹⁵

For the Hanafis a child is a tool, so there is no qisas or diya on him, and qisas falls on the coercer. The Malikis impose qisas on the coercer and half the diya on the child's kin. The Shafi'is distinguish a discerning child from one who does not discern. The Hanbalis put qisas on the coercer. ¹⁵